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Abstract 
!
 This thesis explores the nature and function of language as it is used in twentieth-century 
fantastic fiction, as represented by the work of C. S. Lewis and Ursula K. Le Guin. In it I argue that 
the anti-mimetic impulse behind the language of fantasy makes it a polemical, contentious mode, 
which situates itself against discourses (religious and scientific) that assume the existence of a 
reality to which language may be said to correspond in certain clearly understood, conventional 
ways. Both Lewis and Le Guin suggest, by contrast, that experiential reality is an arbitrary and 
shifting construct, although each writer has a very different attitude towards the category of the 
‘real’ and the question of how it may best be articulated. Despite the fact that Lewis uses the 
language of authority and Le Guin the language of liberation, they both interrogate fundamental 
ethical, social, political and theological evaluative assumptions embedded in language, disrupting 
the rigidity that conventional usage confers upon words and the concomitant human tendency to 
submit unquestioningly to cultural conventions. Lewis challenges the modern, secular, materialist 
understanding of reality, contending that metaphor has the power to undermine post-secular fixed 
notions and reveal new semantic fields pertaining to what he understands as the ‘spiritual’. Le Guin 
celebrates human and non-human embodied existence, with its possibilities and limitations, refuting 
any transcendent reality. 
          The thesis is divided into two parts. Part One deals with the ‘reactionary’ school of fantasy 
represented by Lewis. My contention is that Lewis’s Narnian Chronicles dramatise Owen Barfield’s 
theory of the concomitant evolution of human consciousness and language in relation to the 
phenomenal world. The three chapters in this part demonstrate that in the Narnia books Lewis 
represents initial forms of mythical, ‘participatory’ consciousness (as Barfield calls it) – that is, a 
world in which no linguistic or imaginative distinction is made between the human, animal, 
material and spiritual dimensions; followed by the loss of participation and the consequent 
alienation of human beings both from immaterial things and the environment; and concluding with 
the renewal of participation through a new use of language. Part Two is concerned with Le Guin’s 
sequence of fantasy novels about the imaginary world of Earthsea. Following Darko Suvin, I divide 
the sequence into two trilogies, which embody two contrasting responses to the conservative 
fantasy represented by the Narnia books.  For me, the difference between these responses can best 
be understood through a close examination of Le Guin’s changing attitude to language in the First 
and Second Trilogies, which I undertake in four chapters.  The first chapter explores Le Guin’s 
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initial collusion with Lewis’s patriarchal politics, a collusion signalled by the rigid linguistic 
conventions and unchanging cultural practices of her imaginary world. The three final chapters deal 
with the Second Earthsea Trilogy, with particular emphasis on the last two books, since these have 
so far received little critical attention.  In these books she deconstructs the earlier premises of her 
created world by finding new ways in which to represent the voices that had been excluded or 
marginalised in her previous trilogy, as well as in the work of her predecessors in fantasy.  The 
thesis as a whole represents an effort to reassess the political implications of linguistic choices, and 
of attitudes to language, in twentieth-century fantastic fiction. 
!
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INTRODUCTION !!!
‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, ‘it means just what I 
choose it to mean - neither more nor less.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean different things.’ 
‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be master - that’s all.’  
                                                                          (Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass) !!!
The thesis is concerned with the relationship between language as it is used in twentieth-century 
fantastic fiction and the very different kinds of language used in the quasi-literary modes of myth 
and the Bible.  The chief difference between these three modes is that fantastic fiction is concerned 
to construct through its use of language alternate worlds or sets of events which are manifestly 
fictional and indeed impossible: they never did and never will take place. Mythic and biblical 
language, on the other hand, claims to describe things that may have really taken place: the death 
and resurrection of Christ, for instance, or the marriage of Cupid and Psyche, which commentators 
for many centuries have assumed to be based on actual historical events. The mode of the fantastic, 
which includes supernatural events, tales of wonder, and miracles, is deployed by all three narrative 
traditions; but the assumptions and expectations of readers regarding the nature of the worlds they 
construct through language, and the relationship of these worlds to the ‘real’ world of the reader, are 
very different. I will particularly concern myself with the question of control in language, which is 
closely related to the role of the author and of authority.  Briefly put, myth and scripture can be said 
to wield a certain cultural and even social authority to which the writers of fantasy never lay claim; 
and I shall be considering the effects on fantasy of its frequent interaction with these authoritative 
modes of narrative, and to what extent fantasy writers are able to maintain authorial control over 
these effects.   
          Biblical and mythical discourses situate themselves as sacred and true, but with very different 
attitudes towards authorship. Myths are widely defined as anonymous, quasi-sacred stories with 
universal significance. The Bible was for many centuries believed to have been authored by God, 
giving its readers direct access to an objective transcendent reality through the use of language 
unambiguous in its referents and meanings. However, post-Enlightenment thinking effectively 
repudiated both mythical and transcendent authority, replacing these with Reason as the sole arbiter 
of meaning. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, a growing sense of history, from the late 
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eighteenth to the late nineteenth century led to critical methods of reading the Bible as a collection 
of historically situated texts, of composite authorship. This thesis takes as its premise the 
widespread assumption among writers and thinkers that the purportedly truth-bearing language of 
the Bible and myth has become disabled, or at least enfeebled, in post-Cartesian epistemological 
structures. I will argue that fantastic fiction is an intervention in the Biblical hermeneutic, 
responding to the loss or diminution of scriptural authority by constructing what is in effect a set of 
alternative, non-authoritative scriptures better adapted to the cultural needs of modern readers. In 
the process, the active engagement of literary fantasy with the language and imagery of scripture 
and myth - both collusive and polemical – confirms the continuing relevance of these narratives for 
the contemporary world.     
          My interest is in two particular schools of fantasy that evolved in the twentieth century, each 
of which has a different attitude to the language in which it is written and the relationship between 
that language and the world its readers inhabit.  The first seeks to retain the connection between the 
language of fantasy and the truth-claiming language of myth and the scripture, and this school is 
represented in my thesis by the Christian fantasist C. S. Lewis.  The second school of fantasy seeks 
to divorce itself from the linguistic traditions of classical myth and the Bible, seeing these as 
perpetuating certain forms of tyranny in the world – the sorts of social injustice that condemn 
portions of the population to powerlessness and subjugate one gender to another.  This school is 
represented by the American novelist Ursula K. Le Guin. These two schools of fantasy would seem 
at first glance to be utterly inimical to one another; but I shall argue that they are in fact much more 
closely interconnected than their writers would perhaps be willing to acknowledge. My contention 
is that the ‘reactionary’ Christian fantasy of writers such as Lewis contains the seeds of a radical 
questioning of its own conservative stance on language; and that the ‘radical’ fantasy of confessedly 
non-religious writers such as Le Guin is engaged in an intensive close dialogue with the linguistic 
theories of the conservative fantasists who influenced her work.   Each school feeds upon and is 
enriched by the gaps and contradictions in its author’s own linguistic theories; and the processes by 
which this cross-fertilization takes place is my subject in this thesis. 
!
The Linguistic Background 
The seventeenth century witnessed a radical disjunction between subject and object, which is 
imputed to Cartesian philosophy. René Descartes’s well-known formulation in the Discourse on the 
Method (1637), ‘I think, therefore I am’, signalled not only an epistemological but also a linguistic 
!  9
split with the past, the details of which I shall consider later. In England, Francis Bacon emphasised 
the inadequacy of language, which he felt was a hurdle to knowledge. His idola fori - Idols of the 
Marketplace - draw attention to the capacity of discourse to mislead its users through the embedded 
preconceptions and prejudices that could not be eliminated from verbal structures.  In his Novum 1
Organum (1620), Bacon insists that language as it is currently used is incapable of articulating 
scientific knowledge systems.  The response of the Royal Society was a call for a ‘universal’ 2
language, whose precision and transparency would make it a viable tool for scientists.  3
Technological and scientific progress was being hindered by linguistic ambiguity, and the way out 
was to establish an inflexible, unvarying and perspicuous form of discourse, liberating humankind 
from the joint curses of Babel and of the vicissitudes of history.   
          Bacon’s deep distrust of the verbal double meanings beloved of poets, as expressed in the 
Novum Organum, was shared by many of his contemporaries and persisted well into the twentieth 
century.  As literary scholars interested in linguistics, C. S. Lewis and his friends at Oxford were 4
well aware of contemporary trends that were geared towards producing ‘scientific’ systems of 
language and epistemology, somewhat along the lines proposed by the Royal Society in the 
seventeenth century. Lewis refers in his letters to what he calls the ‘Logical Positivist menace’,  a 5
philosophical movement which dismissed as meaningless any statements that were not empirically 
verifiable, so that its adherents considered all metaphysical statements, including religious ones, to 
be effectively null and void. The main proponent of this theory was A. J. Ayer, whose Language, 
Truth and Logic (1936) was influenced by the linguistic theories of C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, 
as set out in their books The Meaning of Meaning (1923) and Principles of Literary Criticism 
 Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge 1
University Press, 2000), pp. 47-48.
 The OED defines the ‘scientific’ method as consisting of ‘systematic observation, measurement, and 2
experiment, and the formulation, testing and modification of hypotheses’. 
 See, for example, John Wilkins and 17th-century British Linguistics, ed. by Joseph L. Subbiondo 3
(Amsterdam: J. Benjamins, 1992); Hans Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of 
Language and Intellectual History (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982); Roy Harris and Talbot 
J. Taylor, Landmarks in Linguistic Thought 1, 2nd. edn. (London and New York: Routledge, 1997 (1989), pp. 
110-125.
 See Jonas A. Barish, The Anti-Theatrical Prejudice (Berkeley: London University of California Press, 1981).4
 C. S. Lewis, Collected Letters, vol. 3, ed. by Walter Hooper (London: HarperCollins, 2006), p. 462. For a 5
comprehensive overview of logical positivism see Oswald Hanfling, Logical Positivism (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1981); Essential Readings in Logical Positivism, ed. by Oswald Hanfling (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1981); A. J. Ayer ed., Logical Positivism (Glencose III: Free Press; London: Allen and Unwin, 
1959).
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(1924). Ogden and Richards differentiated between ‘emotive’ and ‘referential’ language: the 
language of poetry was emotive and figurative, with no ‘real’ referents, while scientific language 
had actual referents, and was the only veridical language.  In response to these theories, systems of 6
language control were proposed in a bid to regulate and constrain the perceived waywardness of 
twentieth-century language use, from Ogden’s Basic English, which proposed an 850-word 
vocabulary to be used for all practical social and scientific purposes, to the Shavian efforts at 
spelling reform.   7
          Owen Barfield, a member of the Oxford literary group known as the Inklings and a close 
friend of the group’s co-founder, C. S. Lewis, categorically equates such systems of language 
control with efforts at thought control, whose implementation would lead to totalitarian stasis. He 
insists that those thinkers who are ‘driven to reduce the specifically human to a mechanical or 
animal regularity will continue to be increasingly irritated by the nature of the mother tongue and 
make it their point of attack’.  What better way to stifle dissent than to impose a strict control on 8
the range of referents available to language users, placing that control in the hands of the 
hegemony? The reductionist tendencies in these efforts to make language ultimately into an almost 
algebraic form, ideally suited to the purposes of indoctrination, would lead eventually, he felt 
certain, to a ‘liquidation of the human spirit’.  Barfield, in the Preface to the second edition of 9
Poetic Diction (1952), and Lewis, in The Abolition of Man (1944), set out the dangers inherent in 
the strict regulation of language along the principles proposed by Ogden and his colleagues. For 
both writers, the abolition of meaning from poetic discourse would ultimately lead to the ‘abolition 
of man’ himself – the erasure, that is, of everything that makes us human.  Barfield asserts that 10
‘Language is the storehouse of imagination’,  a cache of knowledge capable of being accessed 11
through the imagination and readily available to anyone perceptive enough to recognise its value. 
 C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1923), p. 10. 6
See also I. A. Richards, ‘The Two Uses of Language’ in Principles of Literary Criticism (New York: Routledge, 
1924), pp. 244-54. 
 See <http://ogden.basic-english.org>. For Bernard Shaw’s spelling reform proposal, see Edward Carney, A 7
Survey of English Spelling (Oxon: Routledge, 1994), pp. 483-488. For Barfield’s views on these see Poetic 
Diction, pp. 13-14. 
 Owen Barfield, Poetic Diction, 4th. edn. (Oxford: Barfield Press, 2010 [1928]), pp. 13-14.8
 Barfield, Poetic Diction, pp. 13-14.9
 Barfield, Poetic Diction, pp. 5-6, 130; C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: HarperCollins, 1944 ), 10
p. 64.
 Barfield, Poetic Diction, p. 13.11
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As we shall see, Lewis was strongly influenced by Barfield’s thinking on language, and much of the 
first section of this thesis will be taken up with tracing the impact of this influence on Lewis’s 
fantasies for children, the Chronicles of Narnia. 
                  Barfield contended that all language was metaphorical, and that so-called abstract words, 
such as ‘verify’, ‘referential’, and so on, could be traced back to their metaphorical origins. In their 
theoretical and literary works, then, he and Lewis position themselves in direct opposition to the 
positivists. In contradistinction to this school, Barfield offers an account of human linguistic 
development which is commensurate with the Christian narrative of history. He proposes that only 
the submicroscopic world has an objective existence independent of human thought. The 
phenomenological world, or the ‘world as experienced’, as he calls it, is constructed by human 
thought and named by human language. What we perceive, in other words, is structurally 
inseparable from thought and language. According to Barfield, mind and matter interpenetrate: the 
two aspects of the world are indivisible, even if not indistinguishable. Early human language was 
semantically unified because the meaning of individual words encompassed both these aspects of 
the world, the material and the non-material. The modern distinction between self and world, the 
mind and its material environment, was only introduced as a concept in the seventeenth century, 
after which language lost its semantic unity, with human experience and the world it encounters 
being artificially divided into separate regions: soul and body, intellect and matter, ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’. Consequently, following the empiricists’ privileging of observation over other means of 
acquiring knowledge, only the outer, or material aspect of human experience was considered to be 
demonstrably real and permanent and therefore worthy of the scientist’s attention. Barfield further 
proposes that changes in human consciousness constitute changes in the world itself; the physical 
world changes as language changes.  Post-rational language, he insists, is creating a de-spiritualised 
world which effects a radical sense of alienation between humanity and the environment.  
               As I have suggested, these ideas of Barfield had a profound effect on Lewis’s thinking, 
and hence on his fantasy; and Lewis’s response to these ideas had a profound influence, albeit in 
large part a negative one, on the fantasy of Ursula Le Guin. But before proceeding to trace these 
influences, the differences and similarities between myths, scripture and literary fantasy must be 
considered more extensively. 
!
!
!
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The Bible, Myth and the Literary Fantastic 
Myths are complex cultural constructs. Myths were - and in some communities still are - held to be 
exemplary stories, providing models for human behaviour, and giving accounts of the creation of 
the world that articulate some of the dominant values of the cultures in which they circulated.  The 12
models they offered could be useful for suppressing deviant behaviour, or for providing a common 
basis for rituals aimed at asserting communal order. In certain senses, then, they were held to be 
‘true’ stories. As Mircea Eliade points out in Myth and Reality (1963), any cosmogonic myth is in a 
sense self-evidently ‘true’ because the world exists; the myth of how death originated is ‘true’ 
because men are mortal; and so on (6). However, as Eliade makes clear, Greek rationalists such as 
Xenophanes criticised the anthropomorphism of the Greek pantheon. Eventually, the authority 
based on mythos was surrendered to the authority of the logos in around the fifth century B.C.E., 
and the reasons for this surrender were political and linguistic.  13
          A parallel trajectory, though with radically different causes, can be traced for the claims of 
biblical truth. As I stated earlier, the post-Enlightenment privileging of Reason went a long way to 
undermine religious authority. Another trend that gained momentum in the late eighteenth century 
and continued into the nineteenth century was that of Higher Criticism, or historicism. As early as 
the seventeenth century, Spinoza dismissed the inspirational aspect of the Bible, insisting upon its 
composite human authorship. But it was in the latter part of the eighteenth century that the fact 
claims of the Biblical stories were scrutinised, leading eventually to what Hans W. Frei has 
famously called ‘the eclipse of biblical narrative’.  According to E. S. Shaffer, ‘The Biblical critics 14
in […] the 1790s were engaged in showing that the sacred text belonged to mythology.’  This 15
claim is exemplified in the work of German scholars like J. G. Eichhorn - who published a series of 
articles exploring Genesis and certain parts of the New Testament as Oriental myth; and J. G. 
Herder - whose claims that the Hebrew poetry of the Bible was the highest expression of man’s 
intellect led to questions of the historical situatedness of the sacred text. In England, scriptural 
authority had been undermined by Robert Lowth’s lectures (1749-50), which considered the Old 
 Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).12
 See Bruce Lincoln, Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship (Chicago: The University of 13
Chicago Press, 1999), pp. 3-43.
 Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974).14
 E. S. Shaffer, ‘Kubla Khan’ and The Fall of Jerusalem (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 15
7. 
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Testament as literature.  The iconoclastic claims pertaining to the Bible as an appropriation of 16
ancient myths continued into the nineteenth century, when Darwin’s evolutionary theories 
exacerbated the matter by thrusting Man out of his central position in the cosmos, and questioning 
the very ontological assumptions on which such centrality had been based. By this means, the 
authority of the logos was superseded by the authority of reason or logic, and another narrative 
which had helped to constitute the collective identity of a community found itself displaced, very 
much as had happened with mythical narratives in the sixth century before Christ.   
 It is against this background of religious and cultural change that narrative fantasy evolved 
into the form it took in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Its counterpart, realistic 
literature, was claiming at the time to mirror an extra-textual, external reality: realism purported to 
have a correspondence or fidelity to the non-verbal reality of experiential existence. Fantasy, 
however, made no such claims; indeed it openly, even flamboyantly, declared its own impossibility. 
John Clute has given a lucid exposition of its emergence as a major literary form in his seminal 
Encyclopaedia of Fantasy, co-edited with John Grant. Clute points out what he calls an ‘irreversible 
impulse towards fantasy’ in the last decades of the eighteenth century, and distinguishes this new, 
modern literary mode from the ‘taproot texts’ from which it took its growth.  These ‘taproot texts’, 17
such as the Odyssey, Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Beowulf, the Divine Comedy, Milton’s Paradise Lost, 
Spenser’s Faerie Queen, and Shakespeare’s The Tempest – narratives containing elements which are 
recognisably different in kind from anything encountered in ordinary human experience, though not 
necessarily impossible in the cultural context in which these works were generated - are a 
ubiquitous feature in world literature; but the Enlightenment brought about a sea-change in readers’ 
responses to the supernatural. The tidal wave of fantasy generated by the eighteenth-century 
imagination, which includes Coleridge’s Rime of the Ancient Mariner (1798) and Horace Walpole’s 
gothic novel The Castle of Otranto (1764), differed from the taproot texts because the authors of 
these texts consciously situated themselves against the Enlightenment privileging of reason over 
every other form of human discourse. Texts like these helped to generate the mode of fantasy, 
whose relationship to the reader’s world is defined by the manifestly impossible elements it 
contains. From the first, then, fantasy can be seen as a conscious counter-narrative to the dominant 
 For detailed studies of the rise of Historical Criticism and its effects, see Frei, Eclipse of the Biblical 16
Narrative; Stephen Prickett, Origins of Narrative (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 9-47; 
Shaffer, ‘Kubla Khan’ and The Fall of Jerusalem.
 The Encyclopaedia of Fantasy, ed. by John Clute and John Grant (London: Orbit, 1977), p. 921. 17
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world view; and the bulk of this thesis will be given over to a consideration of what sort of counter-
narrative it offers.  
          Given the different relationships of each of these ‘fantastic’ modes to their readers and the 
world they inhabit, the obvious question to ask concerns the nature of the language used by all these 
different narrative traditions. How do the discourses of myth, the Bible, and literary fantasy differ, 
enabling these modes to develop such radically divergent relationships to truth?  And how did 
human understanding of language change, enabling the truth-claims of myth and scripture 
respectively to be dismissed so summarily by the intelligentsia of fifth-century Greece and 
nineteenth-century Europe? These are the questions that this thesis will explore, through an 
examination of the thought and work of the two writers mentioned in my opening paragraphs. But 
before examining further the relationship between fantasy, scripture, and myth, I should give a brief 
overview of some recent definitions of literary fantasy, which include the view that the Bible itself 
is in some sense fantastic. 
!
A Brief Overview of Fantasy and the Fantastic 
Mircea Eliade, in his Two Tales of the Occult (1970), states that littérature fantastique is an 
‘authentic instrument of knowledge’ (viii, xii). Theorists who have engaged with this mode point 
out various ways in which fantasy can be described as a valid means of knowledge acquisition - 
something which had been firmly repudiated in post-Cartesian epistemology. The Victorian fantasist 
George MacDonald offers what is still one of the most comprehensive definitions of the mode: ‘The 
natural world has its laws, and no man must interfere with them in the way of presentment any more 
than in the way of use; but they may themselves suggest laws of other kinds, and a man may, if he 
pleases, invent a little world of his own, with its own laws’.   J. R. R. Tolkien agrees with the 18
notion of fantasy’s symbiotic relationship with reality, and its paradoxical condition of being 
derivative of natural laws that it refuses to acknowledge as infrangible — even if a whole new 
world has to be constructed to violate those laws. But for Tolkien fantasy and reality are not subject 
to a one-way alliance; even while a sub-creator makes an internally consistent world with its own 
laws, many of its qualities ‘are derived from Reality or are flowing into it’.  This points to the 19
transformative potential of fantasy. However, Rosemary Jackson questions the notion of ‘reality’ as 
 George MacDonald, ‘The Fantastic Imagination’ in A Dish of Orts (London: Sampson Law, 1893), p. 314.18
 J. R. R. Tolkien, ‘On Fairy-Stories’ in Tree and Leaf (London: HarperCollins, 2001), p. 71. Added 19
emphasis. Hereafter cited as ‘OFS’.
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a culturally constructed category that suppresses disorder and illegality to establish a comfortable 
social order. Jackson calls fantasy a ‘literature of subversion’ in her seminal book on the subject.  20
According to Jackson, fantasy scrutinises the category of the ‘real’ by positing an ‘unreal’ against it, 
threatening to subvert normative socio-cultural rules and conventions which determine our notions 
of reality.  
 Jackson extends the structural theory of one of the foremost theorists of the fantastic, 
Tzvetan Todorov, who calls fantasy the ‘literature of hesitation’. He affirms that readers of and/or 
characters in certain narratives find themselves hesitating ‘between a natural and a supernatural 
explanation of the events described’, and that the fantastic occupies ‘the duration of the 
uncertainty’.  Tolkien, however, would emphatically disagree with Todorov. For Tolkien, fantasy 21
does not depend on hesitation, nor yet on the ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ espoused by 
Coleridge, but on Secondary Belief. Tolkien’s conception of the ‘fantastic’ is a ‘freedom from the 
domination of observed “fact”’.  Arrogating to himself the power of Humpty Dumpty, he uses the 22
word Fantasy to denote the transference, through what he calls the ‘sub-creative art’, of images 
derived from the real world into new shapes imbued with the ‘quality of strangeness and 
wonder’ (‘OFS’, 47).  In other words, the governing, rational suppositions of the primary world of 
the reader are inverted or destabilised in fantasy. As Tolkien makes clear, a consensus concerning 
reality is necessary if the fantastic is to come into existence. Tolkien’s term ‘strangeness’ can be 
readily identified with the terms ‘estrangement’ or ‘defamiliarisation’, which are central to modern 
critical thinking. The concept of estrangement originates with Viktor Shklovsky’s ostranenie and 
Bertolt Brecht’s Verfremdung; Darko Suvin’s useful formulation ‘cognitive estrangement’, generally 
applied to science fiction but just as relevant to the fantastic, derives from these sources.  Tolkien 23
further suggests that the experience of ‘imagined wonder’ is central to fantasy. Tolkien describes the 
‘fantastic’ as dealing with ‘images of things’ that are not only ‘not actually present’, but not to be 
found in our primary world at all, or ‘generally believed not to be found [...] in such small glimpses 
of it [i.e. the primary world] as are familiar’ to most people.  And crucially for Tolkien, these 24
 Rosemary Jackson, Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion (London and New York: Routledge, 1981).20
 Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, trans. by Richard Howard 21
(Ithaca: Cornell, 1970).
 Tolkien, ‘OFS’, p. 47.22
 Gary K. Wolfe, Critical Terms for Science Fiction and Fantasy: A Glossary and Guide to Scholarship 23
(Westport: Greenwood, 1986).
 Tolkien, ‘OFS’, p. 48.24
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things are created by the ‘fantastic device of human language’.  Here he uses the term ‘fantastic’ 25
for human language in general in order to make a strategic point. The fantastic is a means of 
expressing unreal things; that is, it is free from  the dominion of observed, empirical reality, and can 
therefore be described as the early modern poetic theorists described allegory, as extended 
metaphor. According to Paul Ricoeur, ‘a metaphorical statement proceeds from the violation of 
semantic rules which determine appropriateness in the application of predicates’,  so that 26
‘impertinent predicates’ displace what is accepted generally as ‘pertinent’, opening up novel 
semantic fields. As Barfield observes, the reader absorbs the metaphor, and this enables her to 
observe what she could not observe before. Creative fantasy, says Tolkien can ‘let all the locked 
things’ – that is, everything considered stable and unambiguous – ‘fly away like cage-birds. The 
gems all turn into flowers or flames, and you will be warned that all you had (or knew) was 
dangerous and potent, not really effectively chained, [but] free and wild’ (‘OFS’, 59). In other 
words, the fantastic device of language allows its own mutations, enabling the new to enter existing 
semantic fields. 
 Colin Manlove’s definition of fantasy also lays stress on the ingredient of wonder, calling 
fantasy ‘a fiction evoking wonder and containing a substantial and irreducible element of [the] 
supernatural or impossible’.  Implicit in Manlove’s argument is the idea that the supernatural is 27
evoked by language, for fantasy calls a thing into being by naming it. Many of these features are 
shared by the Bible.  According to Manlove, ‘The Bible is not simply the truth: it is a fantastical 
truth’.  By this he means, among other things, that the setting of the biblical Genesis (for instance) 28
is an ‘other’ world, and that this first book of the scriptures tells the story of humankind’s transition 
from that world to our mundane one. The biblical books of apocalypse, too, such as Daniel and 
Revelation, deploy dream imagery, prophecy, and fantastical images, including dragons, to convey 
their message. Even the Gospels, which relate the story of the incarnation and the resurrection, have 
not been exceeded in the marvels they relate. The human drive to make sense of its experiences 
propels the seminal narratives of creation, redemption and apocalypse. As in religious or mythical 
ritual, stories are re-enacted from one generation to the next to keep them alive and meaningful; and 
as a result, Lewis considered literary re-tellings as in some sense materially participating in what he 
 Tolkien, ‘OFS’, p. 59.25
 Paul Ricouer,‘Creativity in Language‘ in Philosophy Today, 17:2 (Summer, 1973), p. 106.26
 Colin Manlove, Modern Fantasy: Five Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 7.27
 Colin Manlove, ‘The Bible in Fantasy’ in Semeia 60: Fantasy and the Bible (1992), p. 91.28
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believed to be the one fantastic story that came true, in the sense of acquiring non-verbal substance 
in the world we inhabit: that of the Bible. 
          It is hardly surprising, then, if the Bible is a key taproot text for the work of the authors 
discussed in this thesis – which is just one more proof of its continued power to provoke 
imaginative response and energise other texts. The centrality of the Christian scriptures to the 
Western cultural tradition means that for any authors writing in the wake of that tradition the Bible 
remains the primary text to which they must have recourse when engaging with the doubts raised by 
post-Darwinian and post-Cartesian epistemologies. The biblical narrative and images can be 
grotesque, even absurd at times, but they are always challenging and unsettling. These patterns are 
wrenched from their settings and placed by authors of fantasy in different settings — medieval, 
romantic, pagan, or contemporary — in their efforts to bring them to bear on the cultural conditions 
under which they are writing. Whether these authors are trying to extend the biblical narrative or to 
write a counter-version, it is difficult for them not to engage on one level with biblical language and 
imagery; and while this may be true of all writers of fiction, it is perhaps particularly so of those 
who trade in the sorts of impossible events of which certain books of the Bible are so richly 
composed. 
          Farah Mendlesohn’s Rhetorics of Fantasy (2008) provides a useful taxonomy for fantastic 
fiction. Her thesis is that the manner in which the fantastic enters any given text has important 
implications for the way we read the narrative, and offers a crucial insight into the reasons behind 
the rhetorical choices of the author. A good example is provided by Lewis’s Chronicles of Narnia. 
For Mendlesohn, the bulk of these books for children are examples of what she calls ‘portal quest’ 
fantasy, whereby a fantastic world is entered through a door or opening in our own; individuals may 
cross and re-cross the boundary, but magic does not infiltrate the frame world, except temporarily 
(think of the brief intrusions of Aslan and Jadis in The Silver Chair and The Magician’s Nephew). 
The fantastic world is interpreted and explained from the point of view of a character from our own 
world, and the language is descriptive and explanatory, so that the readers are gradually inducted 
into an understanding of the logic that governs the fantastic universe they have entered. According 
to Mendlesohn, the reader in portal fantasy is dependent upon the protagonist for describing and 
decoding the new world they enter; the two movements undergone by reader and protagonist alike 
are of ‘transition’ from a mundane world and ‘exploration’ of a fantastic one. The history of the 
world in portal quest fantasy – our own world and the other – is presented as fixed and 
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unarguable.  According to Mendlesohn,  then, the quest is driven towards a restoration, and not an 29
instauration (make-over) of the world; portal quest fantasy can therefore be seen as a fundamentally 
reactionary form of fiction.  
          While Mendlesohn’s account of portal-quest fantasy gives a good example of the ideological 
implications of a certain rhetorical choice made by the fantasy writer in ordering the world he or she 
creates, and in situating the reader in relation to it, I would suggest that a crucial aspect of this 
particular form of fantasy is the stress it lays on the moment of liminality.  The Latin word limen 
means a threshold, and the crossing of a threshold - especially through a portal between two worlds 
– can be a disorienting experience, described by the anthropologist Victor Turner as the moment of 
‘pure potentiality when everything [...] trembles in the balance’.  The author and/or narrator relies 30
on the moment of bewilderment – the plunge into a different context - as the central estranging 
device of the narrative, so that the epistemological indeterminacy of the threshold moment allows 
the newness of the portal world to be fully experienced.  The relationship between this idea and 
Todorov’s moment of hesitation is obvious, and suggests that portal quest fantasy has a potential for 
radically destabilising its readers’ assumptions in a manner not so far removed from Todorov’s very 
particular form of ‘fantastic’ literature.  I shall be arguing that Lewis effectively extends the liminal 
moment – the crossing of the threshold – throughout his Narnian Chronicles by combining different 
mythical traditions, whose encounters with one another in his text replicates in miniature the first 
crossing from our world into his secondary creation experienced by the protagonist and reader in 
tandem.  And I shall be suggesting that this repeated experience of liminality has a rather different 
effect on the reader than the straightforward induction into Christian doctrine intended by Lewis, 
according to his own accounts of the series. 
 In Mendlesohn’s schema, Le Guin’s fantasy sequence set in the imaginary world of Earthsea 
best fits the criteria for ‘immersive’ fantasy, which invites the reader into a world whose acceptance 
of events and situations we understand as ‘fantastic’ she is asked to share. There is no explanatory 
narrative; the ironic assumption of realism allows the omniscient narrator an authoritative voice.  As 
Mendlesohn remarks, ‘immersive fantasy is both a mirror of mimetic literature and its inner soul’.  31
In other words, it lays bare the strategies used by realism to produce an effect of representing a 
 Farah Mendlesohn, Rhetorics of Fantasy (Middletown, CT.: Wesleyan University Press, 2008), pp. 3-18. 29
 Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play (New York: Performing Arts Journal 30
Press, 1982), p. 44.
 Farah Mendlesohn, Rhetorics of Fantasy, p. 59.31
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reality that is ‘out there’, transparent to language. However, unlike Lewis, Le Guin persistently 
undermines the authority of the narrator, and her own narrative is presented as one of many possible 
versions of the events it recounts even as early as her first Earthsea novel. 
          I will argue that fantasy uses language to build worlds that express, to varying degrees, the 
belief-systems of the author; but that the rhetorical strategies of the fantasy writer sometimes serve 
to undermine the logic that is central to these belief-systems. For instance, in his theoretical writings 
on fantasy Lewis states that the main function of this mode is not to provide excitement, but to 
create an atmosphere or mood, to induce in the reader a kind of trance akin to a waking dream.   32
When Lewis asks for the ‘meddling intellect’ to be left aside as these moods are imaginatively 
absorbed, he seems to be invoking Keats’s notion of ‘negative capability’ - ‘when man is capable of 
being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact & reason’.   This 33
view of fantasy could be seen as fundamentally inimical to his project of indoctrinating his young 
readers in Christian theology.  Although Lewis’s narrator in the Chronicles of Narnia gently but 
firmly coaxes these readers in the right direction, towards the ‘correct’ or Christian attitude 
appropriate for each situation he imagines, the moods evoked in his stories can sometimes be 
resistant to such authoritative mandates, as I shall argue in the first part of this thesis. Le Guin, by 
contrast, invites a dialogic relationship with her readers. She wants the reader to actively participate 
in the construction – or deconstruction – of the text. Reading for her is an act of collaboration; her 
sexual/textual/political ideal is ‘Not a rape: a dance’.  The second part of my thesis will address the 34
verbal means by which she seeks to establish this collaborative partnership between author and 
reader.   
 A comparison of Le Guin’s stipulations, or invitations, with the demands of the Bible is 
illuminating. The biblical text seems to ask much more: in Revelation for example, St. John states: 
‘And I went unto the angel, and said unto him, Give me the little book. And he said unto me, Take 
it, and eat it up; and it shall make thy belly bitter, but it shall be in thy mouth sweet as honey’.  In 35
this case, the reader of the ‘little book’ is asked to ingest it, and warned of the different effects it 
will have on his body. What is the contemporary reader to make of these demands, as compared 
 C. S. Lewis, Spenser’s Images of Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 116-17.32
 John Keats, Letters of John Keats to his Family and Friends, ed. by Sidney Colvin (London: Macmillan, 33
1925 [1891]), p. 47.   
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with the invitations to dialogue tendered by Le Guin? It is an interesting coincidence that many 
authors of fantasy, including both Le Guin and Lewis, compare the use of language to tell stories 
with the process of weaving a magical spell,  with the obvious connotations of control that the 36
metaphor entails.  The medium in both cases is words, and it is how they are used, and what they 
are used for, that gives them their efficacy and power. As Le Guin says, words are events; they 
make things happen. No story escapes ideology; no spell can be innocent of ideological 
underpinnings.  If this is so, then her fantasy cannot be altogether a dialogue, since it effects certain 
changes in its reader while remaining largely impervious to any reciprocal transformations that 
might be effected by the process of reading.  We put ourselves under its spell, casting none of our 
own. Our temporary and unconditional acceptance of its rules, its authority, is a prerequisite for its 
success. 
 Le Guin’s collaborative fantasy, then, may also function as a potent means of indoctrination, 
an authoritative textbook; while Lewis’s instructive handbooks in the art of being a Christian 
engage in a dialogue between different mythic and religious traditions that renders them startlingly 
unpredictable, wayward in a way he might well have been surprised by.  Despite the different 
rhetorical forms they work in, as practitioners of portal quest and immersive fantasy respectively, 
Lewis and Le Guin share a common commitment to the ambiguous poetic language which Bacon 
and the Royal Society sought to systematise – that is, to control.  And in the end their own lack of 
systematic control over the language or rhetoric of their fantasies is one of the things that render 
their work in this medium so endlessly fascinating. 
 Lewis and Le Guin can also be said to represent two different cultural traditions of fantasy, 
the British/Irish (Lewis was an Irishman from Belfast) and the American (Le Guin is from 
California).  This may again seem to place them in opposition to one another, but an examination of 
the two traditions can help to highlight the resemblances as well as the differences between them. I 
have chosen Lewis as representative of twentieth-century British/Irish fantasy because in his work 
the fantastic, theological, and mythical discourses interact in particularly subtle and complex ways.  
Le Guin’s work provides many nodes of opposition and resistance to, as well as appropriation or 
reproduction of, the concerns of the British/Irish tradition. As an American, a fierce ecofeminist (in 
the later stages of her career), and a woman, she seems an appropriate choice to explore the political 
implications of language choices and representations in fantasy. Her engagement with the 
 Tolkien, ‘OFS’, p. 31; Lewis, ‘The Weight of Glory’ in Essay Collection: Faith Christianity and the Church, 36
ed. by Lesley Walmsley (London: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 99; Le Guin, ‘The Question I Get Asked Most 
Often’ in The Wave in the Mind, p. 275. 
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foundational British/Irish fantasy texts that she perceives as emerging out of patriarchal cultures of 
dominance is an act of resistance to textual and gendered authority. These intertextual engagements 
provide provocative inflections aimed at making her readers re-examine their relationship with 
sacred and secular myths in the contemporary world.   
          The central concern of these two fantasists is language and its relation to human freedom.  
Their narratives attempt to show how social control can be effected by controlling and delimiting 
language. The rhetoric of the master-slave relationship between language and its users, as expressed 
in the epigraph to this introduction by Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty, was an ongoing concern of 
linguists in the twentieth century. As Barfield pointed out, an immutable language could only lead 
to establishing systems of uniform thought-patterns, and totalitarian stasis. The powerful discourse 
and images of the Bible and myth, on the other hand, inspire writers both conservative and radical 
to engage with them in ways that destabilise the traditions they draw upon, opening up the 
transformational and revolutionary possibilities within the scriptures and mythologies they reprise. 
While Lewis tries to align his revisions of these traditions with Christian theology to posit a 
typological relationship between myth, scripture and story, Le Guin postulates myth as an 
inherently powerful form that operates at sub-conscious levels to subvert and destabilise normative 
categories, specially those reinforced by the discourse of institutional religion. In the process both 
authors make clear that humanity is not embarked upon a one-way cultural journey of linear 
progress from a crudely ‘primitive’ state to one of increasing social, intellectual and technological 
sophistication. For Lewis and Le Guin equally, return and memory are essential for spiritual 
development, both individual and collective. To resist the rhetoric of linearity is, perhaps 
paradoxically, to resist the discourse of immutability – the assumption that things change only in 
certain predetermined ways; and it is as fellow members of this resistance that Lewis and Le Guin 
find themselves most closely allied as practitioners of literary fantasy. 
!
 Part One 
The first part of this thesis deals with the creative interaction between the two members of the 
Inklings discussed above, C.S. Lewis and Owen Barfield.  Barfield’s proposal that early language 
was ‘concrete’, in that pre-logical humanity had an experiential connection with the universe which 
meant that their language was predicated on the unity of material and spiritual existence, led the 
Inklings to conclude that the language of this early period of human culture reflected certain forms 
of truth that had since been lost, and was consonant in certain crucial ways with the nature of reality 
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as they perceived it. In modern times, they held, metaphor could retrieve these lost connections 
between matter and spirit, the world and the mind, and recover the capacity of language to represent 
the immaterial. 
          In Barfield’s formulation, metaphor is not merely a literary tool, but has a religious 
significance – a capacity to reveal aspects of reality that have remained underemphasised, or even 
unapprehended, until the moment of their utterance, liberating them from their condition of lying 
dormant under the tyranny of empiricism and positivism generated by the scientific revolution. As 
such, metaphor is the linguistic tool that can lead to ‘revelation’, as it mediates the interconnections 
between God’s Word and the human imagination. Lewis (with certain reservations) agrees with 
Barfield’s quasi-religious appreciation of metaphor. For Lewis, the particular potency of fantasy lies 
in its ability to give concrete, sensory form to what has been revealed by metaphor, generating the 
radically impossible such as walking, sentient trees, the metamorphosis of humans into dragons, the 
petrification of living beings, and so on. To achieve this, Lewis draws on disparate narrative 
traditions in the Chronicles of Narnia – scripture, mythologies, fairy and folk tales, the Arabian 
Nights and the immrama (Old Irish tales about journeys to the Otherworld) – as a means of making 
metaphor more intensely present to his readers’ senses.  He incorporates these traditions in his 
stories in accordance with a practice he admired in medieval literature, which freely appropriated 
widely different rhetorical and imaginative traditions in a single text, creating a rich and diverse 
picture of an integrated universe that was itself only a metaphor for the ‘actual’ world of the spirit.  
By this means, Medieval writers implicitly acknowledged that their understanding was limited and 
that the universe was much more vast and mysterious than could be circumscribed in human 
understanding at any one point in history. Lewis tries to create something of this effect in his 
novels. His delight in the reconciliation of disparate philosophies and narrative traditions, all of 
which have something to contribute to our picture of the way things are, explains the dazzling 
heterogeneity of his universe. Lewis’s aim is explicitly to present a fictional version of Christian 
apologetics. However, the exhilarating segue of his narrative into carnivalesque disorder repeatedly 
problematises any systematic reading of the sequence.   
          I will further examine Lewis’s shifting ideological positions vis-à-vis the origins of language 
and its relationship with physical nature and morality, as revealed in the Narnia series. The series 
changes as it progresses; but all along his central concern remains to show the development of 
human consciousness, individual and collective, as mediated by language. In the process he writes a 
secular Bible, with its own imaginative reworkings of the Christian concepts of creation, 
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resurrection, Pentecost, redemption and apocalypse. Parallel with this, he stages a return of the 
pagan gods - choosing the elusive Pan and the raucous Bacchus as the representatives of this return. 
The encounter between these disparate traditions is what renders the sequence so satisfyingly 
complex. 
!
Part Two  
The second part of my thesis will examine Le Guin’s Earthsea series. For her, at least since the 
1980s, the project of patriarchal domination – with the white western male at the top of the 
hierarchy and the rest of the homogenised world arranged in declining order of importance on a grid 
below – is a constructed image that can be demolished by certain linguistic strategies, which 
provide counter-moves to the ideological manipulation of language in the service of reason 
gendered (in the western tradition) white and male. What is fascinating about Le Guin is her acute 
consciousness from the 1980s that she has herself been complicit with this patriarchal hegemony. In 
response to this dawning recognition, she re-visioned her own fantasy world of Earthsea after 
seventeen years, initiating in the process a three-way conversation: between her work and the 
British/Irish tradition of fantasy, as represented by Lewis and Tolkien; and between her own First 
and Second Earthsea Trilogies, separated from one another by almost two decades. The language of 
the First Trilogy tended to reinscribe the binaries it purported to destroy, due to Le Guin’s confessed 
inability to realise that all language choice was politically and ideologically loaded. Even such 
seemingly innocuous texts as the Oxford English Dictionary, she now insists, can become the locus 
of ferocious power struggles, as embodied in the change of the generic singular pronoun from ‘they’ 
to ‘he’, which unobtrusively encodes a gender hierarchy in language.  At the beginning of her 37
career she was inattentive to the ideological implications of such linguistic changes, and barely 
noticed how these reverberate in thought and action.  Her realisation of her unconscious but (for 
her) culpable complicity with the ideology that promotes patriarchal dominance is first addressed in 
the inaugural novel of the second Earthsea trilogy, the startling Tehanu.  
           At the same time, there are consistent themes running through both Earthsea trilogies.  In her 
response to the 1975 issue of the journal Science Fiction Studies – dedicated to her work, and 
published after she had finished writing the first trilogy – Le Guin declares that ‘The central image/
idea of Taoism is an important thing to be clear about, certainly not because it's a central theme in 
 Ursula K. Le Guin, ‘Preface’ in The Language of the Night (London and New York: The Women’s Press, 37
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my work. It's a central theme, period’.  I hope to show that even though Le Guin self-confessedly 38
was flying on the ‘wings of tradition’, by which she means traditional tropes of western literature 
such as the hero’s journey, the cunning of wizards or the wiliness of dragons, and traditional 
language, with its embedded patriarchal hierarchies, the inherent notion of polarity in Taoism could 
not be reconciled with this tradition without opening certain very obvious gaps and aporias, even at 
the very outset of her fantasy sequence. She starts the sequence by exploring her abiding interest in 
the power of words in the form of names. As later, she is also interested in the concepts of 
wholeness and balance, which are based in the philosophy of the Tao. As such, her first trilogy is 
about finding wholeness in the dialectical polarity of darkness and light, male and female, death and 
life – a quest that continues in the second trilogy, for all its modified political outlook.  
          Since not much has been written about the Second Trilogy, especially Tales from Earthsea 
and The Other Wind, I have chosen to treat it more fully than the first. The three last books of 
Earthsea present conversations between opposing views and voices, not least of which is the 
conversation between the two historically situated selves of the author. The central philosophical 
concept of the first trilogy, that every living being and object in Earthsea has its own unalterable 
True Name, becomes problematic in the second as Le Guin realises how it conflicts with the 
teachings of the Tao, which affirms that the world is not made up of finished objects, but exists in a 
perpetual process of becoming. How are fluid and borderline entities named, if each True name is 
separate and distinct? Can a world in flux be named with a unique word, a totalising title, an 
essential identity? As in the second trilogy she unpicks the crudities, so to speak, inherent in the 
conception of True Speech, she addresses her fall into the phallogocentric discourse of the 
unambiguous formulation of one referent for one word, and its drive towards absolutist 
formulations. She moves from de-contextualised power, contained in words, to explore how this 
power can change when contextualised, in sentences. In the process words become agents rather 
than fixed entities, as they modify one another in different arrangements and new syntactic 
structures.   
          This second part will appraise the way this shift in perspective makes her narrative more 
consciously preoccupied with the dogmas of doctrinal language. The proselytising narrative of her 
Christian predecessors drives her to engage more consciously with Biblical themes in the last two 
books of her second trilogy. As a result, even though her response to theology is overtly hostile and 
 Ursula K. Le Guin, ‘A Response to the Le Guin Issue (SFS #7)’ in Science Fiction Studies 3:1 (March, 38
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she rejects the doctrinal rigidity of organised religion, her views are shaped by theology at a 
fundamental level.  
          My conclusion is that authors of fantasy are never quite in control of the language they use to 
construct their works of art, and that fantasy itself as a genre can be said to encourage this lack of 
control, surprising its authors as well as its readers by its capacity to articulate positions 
diametrically opposed to, or profoundly different from, the political and religious positions openly 
espoused by its authors.  The best writers of fantastic fiction may often be aware of and delight in 
this perversity in the genre they practise – its recalcitrant and uncontrollable nature – and reflect this 
delight in the constantly shifting language of their successive narratives. !!
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CHAPTER ONE. SYNCRETISM AND PARTICIPATION IN THE CHRONICLES OF 
NARNIA 
!
In the Chronicles of Narnia C. S. Lewis appropriates and rewrites many texts, most notably the 
Bible, Spenser’s Faerie Queene, Milton’s Paradise Lost, Dante’s Divine Comedy, and a number of 
the medieval texts he mentions in his posthumously published monograph, The Discarded Image 
(1964). His celebrated sequence mingles philosophies (Platonic and Aristotelian), world-views 
(pagan and Christian), cultures (Northern and middle-eastern), historical periods (medieval and 
modern), and mythologies (Greek, Pagan, Arabian, Norse and Biblical), with an obvious delight in 
creating a hybrid intertext. Myth and reality are not presented as discrete, but fused and diffused in 
a myriad of ways, and the effect of this exuberant fusion is to challenge and unsettle the reader’s 
presuppositions about the relationships between time and place, illusion and reality, fiction and non-
fiction, in a number of ways.  
Syncretism - which can be described as the interlacing of differing religious or philosophical 
systems while retaining their heterogeneity, allowing the discrete elements to interact in ways that 
do not obliterate difference - generates much of the energy of the Narnia stories, although this 
aspect has been largely ignored by critics, who concern themselves by and large with the Christian 
message of the sequence. The formal aspect of syncretism allows the fusion of different narrative 
traditions, enabling the juxtaposition of belief systems through the juxtaposition of stylistic 
techniques and clusters of metaphors. Much has been made of Lewis’s desire, as expressed in his 
1956 essay, ‘Sometimes Fairy Stories May Say Best What’s to be Said’, to ‘steal past those 
watchful dragons’ of a reverential atmosphere and the obligatory wish to feel ‘religious’ in a certain 
way, so as to convey a religious message without the usual trappings of hushed voices and stained 
glass associations.  But he was also insistent that his stories not be read as crude allegories, having a 1
one-to-one correspondence with some transcendent ‘truth’. Moreover, as he himself suggests, a 
writer ‘always has imaginative knowledge of his matter which transcends his conceptual knowledge 
- something more than he consciously meant will keep creeping in’.  This ‘something more’ 2
emerges repeatedly in the course of the sequence, as the fusion of disparate elements drawn from 
different mythological semantic fields generates new meaning.  
 C. S. Lewis, ‘Sometimes Fairy Stories May Say Best What’s to be Said’ in Of This and Other Worlds, ed. by 1
Walter Hooper (Glasgow: Collins, 1982), p. 73. Hereafter cited as ‘SFS’.
 C. S. Lewis, Collected Letters, vol. 2, ed. by Walter Hooper (London: HarperCollins, 2004), p. 439.2
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In his Marion E. Wade lecture of 1977, Owen Barfield stated that Lewis was in love with the 
imagination, and that for him the most potent product of the imagination was myth.  Myth is 3
considered by Lewis to be ‘one of the greatest arts’,  whose meaning lives only in the story, and 4
cannot be stated in conceptual terms without suffering some diminution of its potency. It is ‘a real 
though unfocused gleam of divine truth falling on human imagination’, as Lewis puts it in Miracles 
(1947),  with an intrinsically typological relationship with history. The supreme example of myth 5
that became fact, for Lewis, was the Incarnation. Yet he also avers that the imaginative potency of 
certain earlier, pagan myths became in effect somewhat depleted by the factual death and 
resurrection of Christ: 
!
Just as God, in becoming Man, is ‘emptied of His glory’, so the truth, when it comes down 
from the ‘heaven’ of myth to the ‘earth’ of history, undergoes a certain humiliation. Hence 
the New Testament is, and ought to be, more prosaic, in some ways less splendid, than the 
Old; just as the Old Testament is and ought to be less in many kinds of imaginative beauty 
than the Pagan mythologies [...] the story of Christ demands from us, and repays, not only a 
religious and historical but also an imaginative response. (161) 
!
Although Lewis insists that the story of Christ demands and repays imaginative response, he 
is not sure that the actuality of the story, its condition as fact rather than myth, would be able to 
sustain and energise the imagination, in its turn. He questions, in an essay called ‘Is Theology 
Poetry?’ (1944), the validity of an imaginative response to matters of belief. ‘May it not even be 
that there is something in belief that is hostile to perfect imaginative enjoyment?’, he inquires.   The 6
human intellect, Lewis avers, is ‘incurably abstract’, so that experiential reality quickly sinks into 
mere instances and examples the moment it is subjected to intellectual scrutiny. As Keats says, ‘Do 
not all charms fly/ At the mere touch of cold philosophy?’   But Lewis insist that ‘In the enjoyment 7
 Owen Barfield, ‘Lewis, Truth and Imagination’ in Owen Barfield on C. S. Lewis, ed. by G. B. Tennyson (San 3
Rafael, CA.: The Barfield Press, 1989), p. 98.
 C. S. Lewis, ‘Preface’ to George MacDonald: An Anthology, ed. by C. S. Lewis (London: Geoffrey Bles, 4
1946), p. 16.
 C. S. Lewis, Miracles (London: Collins, 1947).5
 C. S. Lewis, ‘Is Theology Poetry’ in They Asked For A Paper (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1962), p. 152.6
 John Keats, ‘Lamia’, Part 2, ll. 229-230 in Lamia, Isabella, The Eve of St. Agnes and Other Poems 1820 7
(Yorkshire: Scolar, 1970), p. 41.
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of a great myth we come nearest to experiencing as a concrete what can otherwise be understood 
only as an abstraction’.  Barfield suggests that this doubt of a mutual sustainability between 8
imaginative enjoyment and belief is what made Lewis hesitant to make any clear systematic 
statements about his views on the relationship between imagination and truth. This apparent 
paradox in Lewis, which makes Barfield aver that there are ‘two Lewises’, problematise his avowed 
intentions of getting past watchful dragons to present a Christian message in the Narnia series. This 
is especially pertinent because his own eventual acceptance of Christianity was brought about by an 
understanding of a typological relationship between myth and history, and he attempts to represent 
that in the Chronicles of Narnia. In the process it becomes clear that typological appropriation does 
not always work unproblematically, as we shall see.  
!
1.1. Typology: Myth, History and Story    
As I have already hinted, Lewis understood the relationship between myth and history to be a 
typological one. A. C. Charity defines typology as the study of the ‘quasi-symbolic relations which 
one event may appear to bear to another - especially, but not exclusively, when these relations are 
the analogical ones existing between events which are taken to be one another’s “prefiguration” and 
“fulfilment”’.  More precisely, for Lewis, the relationship between myth and history was one of the 9
historical ‘fulfilment’ of ancient mythical ‘prefigurations’ in the incarnation and resurrection of 
Christ. In his book The Inklings, Humphrey Carpenter relates the now famous episode of Lewis’s 
conversion to Christianity as a recognition of this relationship between myth and history.  During a 10
conversation in 1931, his friend Tolkien showed Lewis that the beauty that had moved him in pagan 
myths of dying and resurrected gods, such as Balder or Osiris, and the truth and meaning he 
discerned in such myths, were equally available in the story of Christ.                 
          Because of this understanding of a dialectical typology between myth and history, and the 
affective power of myths as conveyors of truth, Lewis conferred a special status on stories - 
especially on the genre of fairy-tale or fantasy (he often used the terms interchangeably). One of the 
common threads in the non-fiction of Tolkien and Lewis is their view of mythopoeic stories as 
‘good-spells’, or secular Gospels, a form of narrative that provides analogies – anticipatory or 
retrospective – for the life of Christ. In his 1938 Andrew Lang lecture, ‘On Fairy-Stories’, later 
 Lewis, ‘Myth Became Fact’ in Essay Collection: Faith, Christianity and the Church, p. 140.8
 A. C. Charity, Events and their Afterlife: The Dialectics of Christian Typology in the Bible and Dante 9
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 1.
 Humphrey Carpenter, The Inklings ( London: HarperCollins, 1978, 1981), pp. 42-45.10
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published as an essay in the mini-anthology Tree and Leaf (1964),  Tolkien states that ‘The 11
Gospels contain a fairy-story, or a story of a larger kind which embraces all the essence of fairy-
stories. They contain many marvels - particularly artistic, beautiful, and moving’.  This points to 12
the eucatastrophic function of fantasy, which brings a message of hope, and a subversion of the 
status quo as embodied both in external hegemonic systems and in internalised convictions about 
the nature of reality.  
          Myths, for Lewis, were (in theological terms) types (that is foreshadowings or 
prefigurements) of the antitype, or fulfilment of God’s self-revelation in the Bible, a fulfilment 
which supersedes all the types that foreshadowed it.  The supreme antitype, of course, is Christ, 
whose birth in the New Testament constitutes the substance of which all Old Testament types are 
shadows, giving retrospective meaning to such incidents as Jonah’s liberation from the belly of the 
whale, which is a type or foreshadowing of Christ’s resurrection from death. In a post-
Enlightenment intellectual context where rationalism is the only acceptable mode of knowledge, 
Lewis felt acutely the need to proselytise about the value of the types provided by myth, which 
embodied what he felt was mythopoeic truth: that is, a form of truth that could only inhere in 
stories. His project in his fiction was in effect a secular rewriting of the Bible, which aimed to fill 
the gap created by the post-Enlightenment repudiation of the Bible as a sacred, revealed text. 
          Language played a central role in the fulfilment of this project, for both Barfield and Lewis 
perceived language as the creative force. Following the Fourth Gospel, which situates the Word at 
the beginning of Creation, Lewis felt that the creative ability of the poet as maker (in prose or verse) 
was an extension of the creative power of God, who created man in his image. His acceptance of 
the basic tenets of Barfield’s arguments about the inherently metaphorical nature of language, the 
creative and epistemological role of the imagination, and the intrinsic interconnectedness of 
language, myth and human consciousness, energises Lewis’s texts in striking ways, as I hope to 
show. 
  
1.2.  Language Control  
Barfield and Lewis were intensely interested in the origin and historical development of 
language(s), and the semantic evolution of words. Barfield’s first published work was History in 
 Tolkien wrote ‘On Fairy-Stories’ in 1938 for the Andrew Lang Lecture in St Andrews University. This was 11
expanded and published in Essays Presented to Charles Williams (1947). The revised and further expanded 
edition in its final form was published in Tree and Leaf in 1964. 
 Tolkien, ‘OFS’, p. 72.12
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English Words (1926), in which he traces the etymologies of several words in an effort to 
demonstrate, as he puts it, that ‘In our language alone, not to speak of its many companions, the 
past history of humanity is spread out in an imperishable map, just as the history of the mineral 
earth lies embedded in the layers of its outer crust [...] Language has preserved for us the inner, 
living history of our soul. It reveals the evolution of consciousness’.  In a similar vein, Lewis wrote 13
Studies in Words (1960), which he claimed was a compilation from years of notes he used while 
teaching at Oxford. In it he traces the etymologies of Old English words, in an effort to make 
people aware of how ‘ancient, fragile, and (well used) immensely potent instruments [...] words 
are’.   14
          Lewis’s scholarly work as well as his fictional projects enabled him to acquire a vast fund of 
knowledge relating to the semantic history of languages, and the changes in world-views this 
historical trajectory demonstrated.  For Barfield and Lewis the universe was a theophany — a self-
revelation of God; and language was a creative force, its creativity emanating from the primal Word 
alluded to in John’s Gospel, the logos that brought the world into being. In this context, history was 
a gradual unfolding of God’s Word, and the world a book that would continue to be written till it 
was ‘folded up like a scroll’ (Isa: 34:4, Rev 6:14). The overarching metanarrative of the Bible can 
be divided into four elements: creation, fall, redemption and apocalypse.   In Barfield’s view, 15
expressed in his seminal book Saving the Appearances: A Study in Idolatry (1957) the history of 
language itself replicates this narrative, and can be similarly broken down into four elements: the 
transition of words from a former unity with what they signify (creation) to a sundering from their 
referents (fall), followed by the expectation of a reunification of word with meaning (redemption) at 
some point in the future, which will be brought about by a linguistic renewal (apocalypse). As an 
admirer of Barfield’s work, Lewis understood fairy stories as being inextricably intertwined with 
the quadripartite structure of the Bible and linguistic history. And in the modern world, newly 
composed fairy stories could participate in this quadripartite narrative, becoming the site both for its 
reiteration and explication – that is, introducing the movement from creation and fall to redemption 
and apocalypse for current generations. 
 Owen Barfield, History in English Words (Gt. Barrington, MA..: Lindisfarne, 1967), p. 18.13
 C. S. Lewis, Study in Words, 2nd. edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, 1967), p. 6.14
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            Lewis’s effort to reclaim language was not a nostalgic but an iconoclastic endeavour, an 
effort to break the prevalent images (idols) of reality and offer a space for new possibilities from 
within the new and unfamiliar semantic fields that metaphor could reveal - meanings which could 
often surprise the writer as much as the reader. Therefore, a tension exists in Lewis’s work between 
creating new meanings and reinstating traditional ones; between recuperating mythic symbolism 
and rejuvenating Christian ones. His stories are at times subversive of their own enterprise, eluding 
authorial intention through the proliferation of multivocal meanings generated by the metaphors and 
tropes from heterogeneous traditions they deploy, marking fantasy as a hybrid and deviant genre 
that escapes generic categorisations. As a consequence, his fantasy is a palimpsest of multiple and 
even contradictory hermeneutical explorations, rooted in his own understanding of his stories as 
interventions in the ongoing typological relationship between myths, legends, folklore, and fairy-
tales on the one hand, and the Bible on the other. 
!
1.3. Barfield’s Influence on Lewis  
Lewis and Barfield have both testified to the fact that their ideas and views developed together, 
each thinker owing a profound debt to the other for the arguments, written and verbal, which helped 
to form and mature their thoughts on important issues. Poetic Diction: A Study in Meaning (1928) is 
dedicated to ‘C. S. Lewis: Opposition is true friendship’. Lewis’s own first major scholarly work, 
The Allegory of Love (1936), is dedicated to ‘Owen Barfield: Wisest and Best of My Unofficial 
Teachers’. The argument in The Allegory of Love takes Barfield’s premise for granted, and the 
reader is referred to Barfield’s books for further details. Lewis and Barfield’s arguments about the 
epistemic significance of imagination are recorded in the letters they exchanged mostly between 
1925-1927, published as C. S. Lewis’ Great War with Owen Barfield (1978). Lewis was in 
agreement with most of the ideas in Barfield’s book Saving the Appearances, about the nature and 
development of human consciousness and its relationship with the external world, as is evident 
from his detailed discussion of it in a letter dated 27 March, 1956, written after reading the text in 
manuscript.  Even by the time Lewis wrote The Abolition of Man (1944), he remained convinced 16
of the effects of abstract thought on language  and human consciousness. That Lewis was largely 17
in agreement with Barfield, eventually if not initially, is revealed in his letters, essays, books and 
 C. S. Lewis, Collected Letters, vol. 3, ed. by Walter Hooper (London: HarperCollins, 2006), p. 724.16
 Lewis mentions both Goethe and Rudolf Steiner - strong influences on Barfield’s work - as examples of a 17
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inorganic matter on the planet, in The Abolition of Man (New York: HarperCollins, 1944), p. 79.
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lectures, and needs to be gleaned carefully from scattered sources to form a coherent argument. The 
Chronicles of Narnia embody these ideas more potently and consistently than his other writings, in 
large part no doubt because of their greater reliance on the imaginative faculty.  
          Lewis alludes to Barfield’s concept of an ‘ancient semantic unity’  in his letters, the phrase 18
indicating that language was initially concrete and figurative, and gradually evolved into literal and 
abstract meanings. This proposal needs to be considered in some detail in order to understand why 
and how it had such a great effect on Lewis’s writing. 
!
1.4. Figuration and Metaphor 
 According to Barfield, primitive humanity discerned what he called ‘unified meanings’ in the world 
around them, in that a number of concepts which are now perceived as separate – in particular the 
modern distinction between the physical and the spiritual – were understood as indistinguishable, 
with language reflecting this lack of distinction between them.  For Barfield the historical trajectory 
of language is from this initial unity to the diversity we experience today, from ‘homogeneity 
towards dissociation and multiplicity’.  This process of diversification can be exemplified by the 19
changing fortunes of the Latin word spiritus (Greek pneuma), which is now rendered as either 
breath or wind or spirit. According to Victorian philologists such as Friedrich Max Müller, the 
earliest meaning of this word was literal and physical, that is wind; later, when people wanted to 
name the human breath, and the principle of life, they abstracted the analogy with wind, and used 
the same term to describe all three. But Barfield refutes this as an instance of imposing post-logic 
al thought on pre-logical humanity. Actually, Barfield insists, pre-logical thinking was a different 
form of thinking altogether from our own, and the phenomena perceived by its practitioners were 
also different. The word spiritus, then, did not mean wind or breath or spirit separately; neither did 
it mean all three together. It had an ‘old, concrete, undivided meaning’ , which was its ‘own, old 20
peculiar meaning’.  This ancient semantic unity stemmed from a different way of understanding 21
and describing the speaker’s relationship to the world she inhabited.  
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           Barfield’s  Poetic Diction anticipates his theory of the evolution of consciousness, expressed 
in more detail in his book Saving the Appearances: A Study in Idolatry. In Saving the Appearances, 
Barfield does no less than insist on what Thomas Kuhn calls a paradigm shift  - an overthrow of 22
the ‘common-sense’ world view to embrace the view of reality revealed by twentieth-century 
physicists. Imagination, for Barfield as for Lewis, is a creative faculty, and he emphasises its role in 
the creation of the familiar world as we perceive it, basing his account on the discoveries of what he 
terms modern physics.   
As early as 1911, Ernest Rutherford, the famous physicist, had postulated that the atom 
consisted of a very small positively charged nucleus orbited by electrons, a discovery that must 
have helped strengthen Barfield’s theory that ‘reality’, as we experience it in the phenomenal world 
around us, is created by the human imagination. What is ‘really there’, the atomic (or sub-atomic) 
structure of the universe, exclusive of human consciousness, is termed by Barfield ‘particles’ or the 
‘unrepresented’. He explicates in detail the difference between this structure of the universe and the 
phenomena (Greek for ‘appearances’) that are presented by that structure to human consciousness.  23
The perceptions of our sense-organs are related to these particles, but our ‘percepts’ or sense-data 
must remain a fragmented jumble of meaningless sensations without some form of active human 
participation; another activity is necessary before they can be transformed into the familiar 
phenomena we experience. This activity Barfield calls ‘Figuration’, the combination and 
construction of the particles into recognisable objects. Figuration and naming occur simultaneously 
- they are in fact the same thing, as Barfield insists: ‘speech and nature [phenomena] came into 
being along with one another’.  Therefore, there is a semantic unity between the name and the 24
thing - which, it must be remembered, is not the supersensible ‘unrepresented’ particles, but the 
appearance, or representation, constructed by Figuration. Barfield calls these appearances 
‘collective representations’, that is, consensual figurations of things, or the shared experience of 
reality. Only the ‘unrepresented‘ (that is, the particles) exist independently of collective 
consciousness and therefore of human language. Barfield insists that ‘the mind first creates what it 
 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 4th edn. (Chicago and London: The University of 22
Chicago Press, 2012 [1962]), pp. 10-17. 
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perceives as objects’.  The ‘data’ that science claims to deal with are no more than bare percepts, 25
Barfield tells us, and ‘The rest is imagination’.    26
          Barfield distinguishes between two modes of metaphor, based on the evolution of human 
consciousness and language. Early humanity had what he calls a ‘participatory’ consciousness, 
incapable of abstract thinking. The ‘seemingly fundamental distinction between self and the 
world’  did not exist for primitive humanity, and their thinking was a simultaneous thinking-27
perceiving, in effect an unselfconscious participation in the creation of meaning with what we now 
call nature. This basic meaning-creation he terms ‘Figuration’, to distinguish it from the more 
conscious activity involved in making poetic metaphors, and to stress the ‘pictorial form’ of these 
earlier, unitary meanings participated in by human beings. This process of Figuration discerned the 
intrinsic interrelatedness of human consciousness and the structures of the universe. Barfield states 
that ‘Men do not invent those mysterious relations between separate external objects, and between 
objects and feelings or ideas, which it is the function of poetry to reveal. These relations exist 
independently, not indeed of Thought but of any individual thinker’  — that is, while primitive 28
humanity perceived these unities as ‘direct perceptual experience’, modern humanity cannot see 
‘this one as one’.   Barfield describes ‘participation’ as ‘the extra-sensory relation between man 29
and the phenomena’,  that is, as a kind of immaterial connection between the percipient and what 30
he or she perceives. Primitive men were aware of this extra-sensory link, so their participation is 
termed ‘original participation’ by Barfield. He explains: ‘The essence of original participation is 
that there stands behind the phenomena and on the other side of them from me, a represented which 
is of the same nature as me’.  This ‘represented’ has been given various names, like mana (life-31
force), gods, demons, God, or Spirit: whatever the name, the ‘represented’ was considered to be 
equally immanent in nature and man; or, to put it another way, the self and the phenomena were felt 
to be derived from a common source, and linked to that source in a supersensible way. Pre-logical 
thought was emphatically not based on cause and effect relationships: primitive man’s mind was not 
 Barfield, Poetic Diction, p. 19.25
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a tabula rasa, looking at the same phenomena as us and then peopling them with gods, as Max 
Müller, for example, suggested. Instead it existed in an entirely different environment, made up of 
humans, animals and gods, all of which are in conversation, and the inanimate objects with which 
all three of these interacted.  
          As consciousness evolved, says Barfield, so did ‘collective representations’. Humanity 
became capable of theoretical thinking - which Barfield calls ‘alpha-thinking’ - and man and nature 
were polarised. However, this polarity, which was the means to man’s self-consciousness, still 
retained traces of ‘original participation’, which survived until the end of the Middle Ages and even 
beyond. It was the scientific revolution  that created a complete disjunction between subject and 32
object, so that man and nature became completely disconnected. Barfield calls this the ‘Cartesian 
sword-thrust between matter and spirit’,  made possible by ‘beta-thinking’ or reflective thinking, 33
characterised by the ability to think about the nature of thought.  
Lewis demonstrates that this dichotomy between subject and object was absent in the 
Middle Ages, and that ‘original participation’ prevailed, in his book The Discarded Image (1964). 
He calls man ‘a cross-section of being’, because every mode of being in the whole universe 
contributes to him.  Man was a microcosm, and the macrocosm – that is, the whole universe – was 34
connected by ‘certain sympathies, antipathies, and strivings inherent in matter itself’,  so that there 35
was a reciprocal participation between man and the universe, an integration which is represented in 
The Chronicles of Narnia – as in early modern poems such as John Davies’s Orchestra (1596) – 
through the image of a dance. The language of the Middle Ages too, Lewis agrees, ‘continually 
suggests a sort of continuity between merely physical events and our most spiritual aspirations’.  36
 Poets, Barfield believes, can recuperate these forgotten relationships; and as far as they do, 
they create ‘true metaphors’. An example of true metaphor is the word ‘shine’, meaning both pure 
human thinking and the physical light, which exemplifies one of those early unitary meanings that 
 The scientific revolution was so named by Alexandre Koire in 1939, to denote the period of fundamental 32
changes in scientific outlook which started at the end of the sixteenth century and continued to the end of the 
eighteenth. Barfield refers to Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, 1300–1800 for a 
comprehensive overview.  
 Owen Barfield, ‘Matter, Imagination and Spirit’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 42: 4 (Dec., 33
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‘appear in the world without individualised human effort’, as ‘immediate realities’.  But in the 37
post-Cartesian world an individualised, conscious effort is required to perceive unities or 
connections between things or concepts that are understood by the rest of the world to be different. 
True metaphor, then, gives access to the reality now lost, inviting and enabling us to participate in 
the unity that resides in the structure of existence.   
When a ‘representation’ is not experienced as such, that is, as a ‘representation’, but is 
thought to be independent of the human mind (alpha-thinking), it becomes, in Barfield’s terms, an 
‘idol’. The human mind ceases to be aware of its own participation in the creation of the 
phenomena, and of the ‘universal Mind’ that is common between man and nature, and becomes 
incapable of apprehending the spiritual plane that intersects with the material world at many points. 
With progressive alpha-thinking, the disjunction between subject and object became more and more 
pronounced. As self-consciousness developed, what was thought to be ‘on the other side of the 
phenomena’ gradually came to be considered as existing inside man. As nature is depleted of spirit, 
the spirit is internalised. Lewis calls this ‘that great movement of internalisation, and that 
consequent aggrandisement of man and desiccation of the outer universe in which the psychological 
history of the West has so largely consisted’ (TDI, p. 42). It must be made clear that Barfield 
considers this a necessary step in the evolution of consciousness, which has to achieve a self-
conscious imaginative impulse - that is, the human mind needs to become aware of its creative 
activity.  Beta-thinking - thinking about these ‘representations’ in relation to our own mind - can, 38
in time, allow a liberation of images (idols) - an endeavour initiated, but not fulfilled by the 
Romantics. 
          The second kind of metaphor, termed ‘accidental metaphor’ by Barfield, is useful for 
exposition or creating a visual image, which can be ‘delightful’ and even ‘influential in the 
evolution of language’. It is based on a ‘synthesis of ideas rather than on immediate cognition of 
reality’,  that is, on an artificial conjoining of already fixed notions or ideas. In other words, true 39
metaphor is an imaginative understanding of the relationships and unities pervading nature and 
human consciousness; while false metaphor is a hypostatisation of ideas formed by tautological 
thinking processes.  
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Barfield’s conception of Figuration and metaphor-making derives ultimately from 
Coleridge’s Primary and Secondary Imagination as expressed in Biographia Literaria (1815-17). 
Barfield’s notion of Figuration is analogous to the workings of Coleridge’s Primary Imagination, 
which is ‘the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, [...] a repetition in the finite 
mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM’.   According to Barfield’s interpretation of 40
this famous formulation, the primal act of creation is ‘God’s projection of his own “alterity”’,  41
which is a unity as well as a progression, for God remains one even as the Word is uttered and 
manifest as creation. Initially, humanity perceives everything as participating in the Logos, not as 
self and other but as a continuum of being. That is, the substance of reality, which in scientific terms 
is waves or sub-atomic particles, achieves actuality by a double process - the sense-datum is 
received by the senses; imagination acts on these data to create objects or things. The phenomenon 
‘only achieves full reality (actus) in the moment of being “named” by man’.  But in the course of 42
history, says Barfield, the ‘Divine Word has been gradually clothing itself with the humanity it first 
gradually created’  - that is, a process of internalisation has been going on through which Logos is 43
now perceived by an individual as within herself. This process, according to Barfield, is mediated 
by language.  
          The Secondary Imagination, states Coleridge, is ‘an echo of the former, co-existing with the 
conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in 
degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create’ (BL, 
313). The poet as ‘maker’ or creator sets this act in motion. Barfield notes that ‘When individual 
man, having achieved self-consciousness, returns to the making of poetry, the secondary 
imagination is at work on the making [...] of meaning. And as the secondary imagination makes 
meaning, so the primary imagination makes “things”. There is no other thinghood’.   The sub-44
sensible (or supersensible) atomic world is all that exists if human participation is excluded. 
!
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1.5. Poetic Diction: The Poetic and the Prosaic 
For the purposes of my argument it would also be useful to explore the difference between logical 
or discursive and poetic or metaphorical language, as understood by Barfield. This is important 
because the Inklings members believed that the structure of the ‘real’ was expressed in poetic 
language, and their fiction explores the relationship between the real and the unreal at two levels. At 
one level, they posit their fantasy as manifestly unreal, creating worlds and inhabitants only within 
language; on the other, they suggest implicitly that the poetic language they deploy apprehends the 
underlying structure of an objective reality, and in so doing, changes the ‘real’ world as well as 
language itself. In other words, ‘fallen’ or fragmented language can be redeemed by poetic use, to 
counter the fall in some sense. In his essay ‘Poetic Diction and Legal Fiction’ (1945), Barfield tells 
us that the ‘logical use of language presupposes the meanings of the words it employs and 
presupposes them [to be] constant’.  Logical propositions, therefore, cannot create new meaning. 45
On the other hand, simile, metaphor and symbol, which Barfield says are different forms of 
figurative language, make one thing stand for another. A simile says that A is like B; a metaphor 
says that A is B, suppressing the words ‘like’ or ‘as’ to foreground the comparison. In symbolic 
language, the element of comparison is dropped still further, so that B is spoken of without any 
overt reference to A. Since metaphor stands in the middle of this gamut, Barfield uses ‘metaphor’ 
for all figurative speech. Metaphor, then, by removing the conventions of predication, reveals 
unapprehended comparisons and contrasts between apparently heterogeneous things and concepts, 
thus effectively creating new meaning, as logic cannot.  
          Barfield notes that modern abstract ideas are derived from old concrete meanings, which 
contained within them the potential for later significations. The rational human faculty splits up the 
older, concrete meanings, producing separate meanings which then get crystallised as dictionary 
definitions. The rational principle in thought is based upon the repetition of the same meanings, 
rather than the interplay of alternatives. The poetic faculty, or imagination, ruptures these ossified 
meanings by wrenching a word out of its habitual context and into a new relationship with the 
words around it, dismantling established notions of fixities in reality and removing the film of 
familiarity to reveal new ways of seeing. As Barfield puts it, ‘The world, like Dionysus, is torn to 
pieces by pure intellect; but the poet is Zeus; he has swallowed the heart of the world; and he can 
 Owen Barfield, ‘Poetic Diction and Legal Fiction’ in The Rediscovery of Meaning (San Rafael, CA: The 45
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reproduce it as a living body’.  In other words, metaphor allows an escape from predisposed views 46
of reality, for example Lewis’s re-presentation of trees as Dryads.  
          Barfield calls these opposing impulses in language the poetic and the prosaic. The poetic is 
‘the principle of living unity’ and it observes the resemblances between things; the prosaic ‘marks 
the differences’.   The pivotal role of language in the creation of meaning is dependent upon the 47
polarity of linguistic development: on the one hand language seeks out unities and analogies 
(poetic) while on the other hand it seeks to particularise more and more, dividing and splitting 
meaning into exceedingly precise terms (prosaic). Polarity is neither identity nor contradiction, for 
‘polar contraries [...] exist by virtue of each other as well as at each other’s expense’.  Within this 48
dynamic interaction, ‘the contraries can and do transform into each other, back and forth’, and the 
‘predominate pole never ceases to require its opposite pole to be predominating’.   49
While not using the Barfieldian term ‘evolution of consciousness’, Lewis was concerned 
about the change that had occurred in consciousness from primeval to modern times, and about the 
concomitant process of ‘internalisation’, where the process of evolution of consciousness seemed to 
be at a standstill in the post-war world – or to be degenerating into the sort of consciousness that 
sees only ‘disjointed impression[s] made by the surface of life upon the senses and the surface of 
the mind’, manifesting itself in the withdrawal, detachment and disillusionment of the human spirit, 
as demonstrated in Modernist poetry (PD, 28). In The Abolition of Man, Lewis states that analytical 
thinking (Barfield’s ‘alpha-thinking’), which led to the perception of a dichotomy between self and 
object, had the further repercussion of inducing man to dominate ‘Nature’: in this context the word 
Nature signifying the world of objects about which man does not make any value judgements, and 
treats in terms of quantity rather than quality. Thus the ‘total reaction’ of man towards Nature has 
become fragmented.  But, claims Lewis, our analytical power comes at a price, for as soon as 50
‘original participation’ stops, 
!
 Barfield,Poetic Diction, p.81.46
 Barfield, Poetic Diction, p. 80.47
 Barfield, Speaker’s Meaning (San Rafael, CA.: The Barfield Press, 2011), p. 22.48
 Richard A. Hocks, ‘Tradition and Talent in Coleridge and Eliot’ in Shirley Sugerman ed. Evolution of 49
Consciousness: Studies in Polarity (San Rafael, CA.: The Barfield Press, 2008), p. 86.
 C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man (New York: HarperCollins, 1944), p. 70. Hereafter cited as AoM.50
!  40
We do not look at trees as Dryads [...] while we cut them into beams: the first man who did 
so may have felt the price keenly, and the bleeding trees in Virgil and Spencer may be far-off 
echoes of that primeval sense of impiety. The stars lost their divinity as astronomy 
developed, and the Dying God has no place in chemical agriculture [...] It is not the greatest 
of modern scientists who feel most sure that the object, stripped of its qualitative properties 
and reduced to mere quantity, is wholly real [...] The great minds know very well that the 
object, so treated, is an artificial abstraction, that something of its reality has been lost. 
(AoM, p. 70-71) 
!
 The reductionism latent in the thinking of trees, stars and so on as mere objects, as opposed 
to earlier, participatory thinking, has not had wholly beneficial results, Lewis maintains. 
Consciousness has evolved to make new ‘discoveries’ about nature, space and man, but not all these 
discoveries can be said to add to the knowledge of reality as Lewis perceives it. As is obvious in the 
above quotation, Lewis believes that earlier consciousness, what Barfield terms ‘participatory’ 
consciousness, might have apprehended reality in more meaningful ways than post-scientific man is 
capable of. Ironically, says Lewis, this process of reduction culminates in man being reduced to an 
object of analysis - as thought processes are imputed to chemical activity in the physical brain - and 
the abstraction Man can lead only to nihilism: deprived of values and qualities, as earlier Nature 
was deprived, Man too becomes an object for manipulation. As long as humans were reducing 
Nature to ‘idols’, and imputing to these an existence independent of human perception, they felt 
able to manipulate Nature, to control it for their own use. But what would be the final step in this 
process? Lewis deems it quite possible that the final conquest will be of our own species, and that 
‘as soon as we take the final step of reducing our own species to the level of mere Nature, the whole 
process is stultified, for this time the being who stood to gain and the being who has been sacrificed 
are one and the same’. Our language, argues Lewis, is saturated with the effects of this idol-making, 
marking the modern age as steeped in prosaic language. The way out of this dilemma, he proposes, 
is a reassessment of our scientific discoveries, a consciousness that ‘the “natural object” produced 
by analysis and abstraction is not reality’.  Rather, a conscious effort to catalyse the poetic impulse 51
in language is required in order to redress the meaninglessness that threatens to pervade individual 
and communal lives. Barfield maintains that natural objects can still be participated with, although 
with the evolution of consciousness this participation will be different: it will be conscious, so that 
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the ‘representations’ figured forth by the imagination can be channelled through a universal moral 
system, which is the phrase used by Lewis to describe his own idiosyncratic version of the Tao.  52
This new participation has been termed ‘Final Participation’ by Barfield. 
          The brutal sway of entrenched notions of what is real and what is unreal is established by 
language; and ironically, language itself provides the most potent resistance to these conventionally 
established meanings. Robert W. Funk, who explores the nature of metaphor in his work on 
parables, cites approvingly Barfield’s perception that metaphor creates meaning. The raw material 
for metaphor is language; the ‘something new’ that is to be created must draw upon this raw 
material. As the new enters language, it modifies and mutates language, allowing words to escape 
from the cages of referential totality into which tradition binds them, so that as Tolkien says, a gem 
can stand for a flower, or a flame. However, poetic language itself, in evoking in the poets’ minds 
unorthodox or unofficial ways of expression, allows the new meaning to be discerned. Language, as 
Funk says, invites its own deformation by ‘refusing its total complicity’  in established forms and 53
meanings. Metaphor resists the tyranny of tradition that has petrified meanings, producing ‘idols’; 
the poet is the ‘true creator, the maker of meaning itself’.  Lewis demonstrates both the prosaic and 54
the poetical impulse of language in his fiction, with the prosaic actualised as frozen Narnia, the 
poetic as midnight dances between heterogeneous Narnian creatures. Often, the trope of dance and 
song is used to show how the poetic can disrupt the prosaic, or even to hold the two up in contrast. 
For example, in The Silver Chair (1953) we are shown the Green Witch’s dominion of controlled 
Earthmen, who expressionlessly repeat a single sentence; and when the kingdom dissolves, the 
same creatures are shown dancing and singing, floating down to fiery Bism, where gems can be 
squeezed for juice, and one can enjoy the wit and eloquence of fiery salamanders. 
          To better understand Lewis’s view of poetic language and its relation to reality, I will now 
briefly discuss Lewis’s concept of Transposition. 
!
!
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1.6. Lewis: Transposition and Imagination 
Lewis’s sermon ‘Transposition’, read out at Mansfield College Oxford in 1949, and later published 
in They Asked For A Paper (1962), is extremely important for an understanding of his views on the 
role of the imagination in the apprehension of meaning. ‘“Transposition” amounts in my view,’ 
asserts Barfield, ‘to a theory of imagination, in which imagination is not mentioned’.  According to 55
Lewis, there is a supersensible, transcendent reality – one that cannot be directly apprehended by 
the senses – which can nevertheless be apprehended through sensible verbal, visual or physical 
symbols. Using the analogy of emotions and their effects on the sensations, Lewis tries to explain 
the correlation between spirit (supersensible) and matter (perceived by senses): as emotions are 
more complex than sensations, the same sensation accompanies a variety of emotions, for example 
a flutter in the stomach in moments of pleasure as well as anguish. That is because, asserts Lewis, 
‘If the richer system is to be represented in the poorer at all, this can only be by giving each element 
in the poorer system more than one meaning’.  The example Lewis gives is an instance when both 56
the simple systems (the five senses) and the complex system (emotions) are known, and we can see 
why physical limitations make it necessary that we should have the same sensation for a variety of 
emotions. But, claims Lewis, that is not all.  The flutter is pleasurable in one instance and 
unpleasant in another: the sensation becomes the emotion it signifies.  In other words, the ‘higher’ 
or more complex reality can be ‘participated’ in (Barfield’s term) by the ‘lower’ or simpler one. The 
signified interpenetrates the sign so that they both become one, making it a sacramental 
relationship. Lewis calls this process Transposition. 
In a sacramental relationship, the signified ‘descends bodily [...] and digests, transforms, 
transubstantiates [the sign]’.  A necessary corollary for understanding the process of Transposition 57
might be, then, to know the ‘higher’ or more complex and subtle medium that is being transposed 
into the ‘lower’ or simpler one. When the spiritual world is represented in the symbols of the natural 
world, only a person who approaches ‘from above, or from inside’  can discern what is being 58
represented - which is not as impossible as we might at first assume, because the spiritual world, 
asserts Lewis, is somehow known to man, and is present to him in the longing or desire that formed 
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such a vital part of Lewis’s own imaginative life, and which he termed ‘joy’.  Herein, as Barfield 59
affirms, is encapsulated Lewis’s theory of the relation of imagination to truth, since it makes clear 
that he sees imagination as the tool of religious faith. A person, alleges Lewis, who approaches the 
phenomenon of Transposition from the ‘lower medium’, in other words without imagination, ‘sees 
all the facts but not the meaning’.  For Lewis such a state of consciousness - a state in which the 60
bulk of readers find themselves - can only lead to severe reductionism. In simpler terms, 
imaginative thinking can provide a glimpse of the supersensual reality through the symbols of our 
natural world; and at times this supersensual reality actually interpenetrates the symbols, creating 
what Lewis calls a sacramental bond.  For Lewis, the spiritual and the material, the mind and the 
body, have a transpositional relationship - the two planes of existence have multiple 
interconnections, which he presents as doorways to other realms in the Narnia series, just as the 
words of his story are doorways through which his readers can pass in order to engage in an 
imaginative experience. 
For Lewis, a clear analogue exists in the relationship between the material and spiritual 
world and the one that exists between a story and the world beyond it - the readers’ world. Reading, 
for Lewis, could be an act of transposition. The interaction between story and reader has 
transformational potential. Lewis describes such an experience in personal terms by claiming that 
his imagination was ‘baptised’ after reading George MacDonald’s novel Phantastes.  And out of 61
the three instances he relates when he experienced the intense stab of joy which is analogous with a 
spiritual longing, in two cases the initial stimulus is literary: reading Beatrix Potter’s Squirrel 
Nutkin, and encountering a line from Longfellow’s translation of ‘Tegner’s Drapa’.  The 
relationship is not of two discrete formal entities encountering one another, but one of actually 
interpenetrating forms of reality. A good example of this is found in the last book of the Narnia 
series, The Last Battle (1956), where the faun Mr Tumnus describes reality as an onion, with the 
layers getting larger the further in you go. In other words, the spiritual and material worlds are 
enwrapped like layers of an onion, so that the material world provides a means of entering the 
spiritual world. Lewis’s own reading experience exemplifies this process. He says that while 
reading Phantastes, ‘I saw the bright shadow coming out of the book into the real world and resting 
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there, transforming all common things and yet itself unchanged’.  This was for Lewis the seminal 62
instance of transposition. 
           In the Chronicles of Narnia, characters who are familiar with stories are much better aligned 
with the world they find themselves in, and better able to identify archetypal good and bad 
characters, than the hard-line rationalists. For Lewis, the flat world of Narnia is analogous to the 
physical book: entry into both these territories is a transformative experience. Not only does the flat 
world – both Narnia and the book – morph into a vibrant, multi-dimensional series of openings into 
new realities, but when the adventurer/reader returns to her or his own world, they find themselves 
equipped with new ways of perception. 
          The point Lewis tries to make in all his writings is that unknown dimensions of reality exist, 
and that the refusal to accept at least a potential area of the unknown is the result of obdurate habits 
of thought, for example those of Eustace in The Voyage of the Dawn Treader; or ideologically 
driven efforts to control the thoughts of others, like those of the Green Witch in The Silver Chair. In 
The Allegory of Love (1936), Lewis suggests that it was the ancient allegorists who first made 
available to poets three worlds: ‘the actual world’, ‘the world of his own religion’ and ‘a third world 
of myth and fantasy’ (82). An example of a text that clearly represents an encounter between these 
three worlds is the Border ballad of Thomas the Rhymer, which Tolkien invokes in ‘On Fairy 
Stories’.  Lewis felt himself to be present in three worlds in a slightly different sense: the world of 63
the books he immersed himself in, the ‘real’ world, and the ‘afterworld’. Not only were these three 
worlds present at all times to him, but they also had a transpositional relationship, which is an 
interpenetrating connection. Symbolic connections can, as he states in his essay ‘Transposition’, 
become substantial - that is, the actual substance of two worlds can merge. As Robert W. Maslen 
has pointed out, Lewis’s stories ‘participate in real events that for him are taking place here, now, as 
he writes and as we read. We ourselves are part of the story they tell, which is a chapter in the 
“universal story” described in Miracles’.  And in his Narnia books, Lewis wants his young readers 64
to experience the same sense of existing simultaneously in three different worlds that was such an 
integral existential fact for him. 
          The central episode in the third of the Narnian Chronicles, The Voyage of the Dawn Treader, 
is when Lucy reads a spell from the Magician’s Book on the island of the Monopods. Lewis begins 
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by describing the library as ‘lined from floor to ceiling with books’ and as ‘smelling old and learned 
and magical’.  He then describes the book itself, its paper crisp and smooth with a pleasant smell; 65
the writing beautiful, with ‘thick downstrokes and thin upstrokes’ and big coloured capital letters at 
the beginning of each spell, each of which incorporates a picture (169). He invites his readers to feel 
the lure of the room, and of the physical book. While searching for a spell to make the Monopods 
visible, Lucy begins to read a story that is intensely beautiful, to the extent that having finished it 
she tries to return to the first page and read it again, an act with which any inveterate reader, 
including Lewis himself, would instantly sympathise. However, she discovers that the pages do not 
turn back, and that she can never read the story again. While reading the story, she had felt she was 
living it ‘as if it were real, and all the pictures were real too’ (175). While Lewis clearly wants to 
posit this as a special story, the sense of ‘realness’ is something that he found in all good stories. A 
good story, Lewis contends, ‘strengthens our relish for real life’.  Having finished reading, Lucy 66
remembers only that the narrative included a cup, a sword, a tree and a green hill. This suggests the 
Grail legend, and Aslan later tells Lucy that ‘I will tell it to you for years and years’ (179), as the 
Grail story has been told over successive generations. The implication that the story will be in some 
sense lived by Lucy, as a religious experience, is something Lewis feels strongly about the best of 
human narratives. The equation between life and story in the episode of the Magician’s book is 
obvious, as narratives that can only, finally and irrevocably, be experienced once. As he says, for 
imaginative readers ‘the first reading of some literary work is often [...] an experience so 
momentous that only experiences of love, religion, or bereavement can furnish a standard of 
comparison. Their whole consciousness is changed. They have become what they were not 
before’.  The world of the book enters the world of the reader, and points to another world beyond; 67
a multifocal vision is created, whereby the reader inhabits three worlds at once. This is the effect 
Lewis wants to achieve in his Narnian Chronicles; and the rest of this chapter is dedicated to the 
question of how he sought to achieve it. 
!
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1.7. The Evolution of Consciousness in The Chronicles of Narnia 
In the Chronicles of Narnia, the intersecting intertexts of ancient myth, Biblical narrative and 
Medieval and epic poetry allow Lewis to bring to life Barfield’s propositions about the evolution of 
consciousness and language.  As we have seen, this evolution proceeds from the ‘first participation’ 
experienced by early humankind, enabling them to understand and articulate the world as composed 
of an interpenetration of the material and the spiritual, to the loss of participation through the 
dominance of rationalism, to ‘final participation’ whereby human beings can recapture by their own 
linguistic efforts the original experience of the world as composed of both matter and spirit. 
However, while Lewis lets his readers glimpse in these books what final participation can achieve, 
he stops short of envisioning a world where it is an established practice. Each novel represents a 
conflict between what might be called Old Narnia, the land of myth and poetry, and New Narnia, in 
which reason dominates and the status of myth and poetry has been diminished to that of a childish 
game. In each novel Lewis shows forms that Final Participation might take, as characters 
laboriously seek out evidence for the truth of the Old Narnian ways and beings that have been 
dismissed as fictional. Old Narnia, then, is repeatedly suppressed and excluded in these books, as 
Lewis presents us with a series of variations on the efforts of the dominant hegemony to assert its 
power through linguistic suppression and control. The struggle of Lewis’s characters to recover Old 
Narnia corresponds to Lewis’s own struggle throughout his life to recuperate the myths and 
fantastic narratives he loved, and to show that they were relevant in the developing contexts of 
modernity. 
A consideration of the form Lewis chose for his project – the fairy tale – is important for 
understanding the sorts of expectations he wished to arouse in his readers. In his essay ‘On Three 
Ways of Writing for Children’ (1952), Lewis recalls how sometime in 1949 he felt that he had to 
write not only a fairy tale, but a fairy tale addressed to children - or else he would burst.  68
According to Lewis, the constraints imposed on the author by this form left him free, or conversely 
compelled him, to write what he calls ‘mere story’, a term he explains in his essay ‘On Stories’. 
Here Lewis defines ‘mere story’, or Story with a capital S, as a narrative that concerns itself first 
and foremost with a ‘series of imagined events’ (‘OS’, 25), as distinct from style or character 
development or social comment. But ‘mere story’ is not just a narrative whose plot is of prime 
importance; it is a narrative in which whatever is being conveyed by the ‘series of events’ is itself 
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important. The emphasis on plot derives from Aristotelian criticism, which privileges Mythos over 
style or character,  and for Lewis, this is only possible in those literary forms where ‘everything 69
else is there for the sake of the story’ (‘OS’, 25).  The pleasure of ‘mere story’ is not excitement 
(‘the alternate tension and relaxation of suspense and curiosity’), as is the common misconception, 
but the ‘atmosphere’ it creates (SIL, 115), on which the whole ‘quality of the imaginative response’ 
depends. The series of events, or plot, according to Lewis, ‘is only really a net whereby to catch 
something else [...] something other than a process and much more like a state or quality’ (‘OS’, 
42-3), a way of being. 
The second and related function of Story is to evoke the feeling of longing that Lewis calls 
Sehnsucht: a longing which is its own satisfaction, and which is the manifestation of the knowledge 
of the spiritual world mentioned earlier.  It is the longed-for atonement – ‘at-one-ment’ – that was 
experienced in ‘original participation’ and can now be recovered by writing and reading stories. 
This longing he calls an askesis, a spiritual exercise (‘OTW’, 65), so that reading itself becomes a 
participatory act.  And since for Lewis mere story – even the dullest – demands active imaginative 
participation, it trains the reader’s imagination towards Final Participation. In other words, by it the 
human being is made aware of the scope and reach of her own creative potential, and discovers the 
intrinsic link between language and creativity which is vital for the creative process.   
Lewis’s significant and lasting contribution to literary criticism is his proposition that ‘mere 
story’ can induce the ‘felt change of consciousness’ that Barfield imputes to poetry, and that is such 
a vital aspect of the evolution of consciousness. Story, says Lewis, can ‘mediate imaginative life to 
the masses while not being contemptible to the few’.  In other words, the ‘felt change of 70
consciousness’ that is imparted by poetry to the educated elite can be offered by ‘mere story’ to 
people who might not be able to appreciate poetry – less educated adults, or children, for example. 
Repudiating the ‘jejune and narrow’  literary canon that denigrates certain forms, Lewis proposes 71
that the ‘Fantastic or Mythic Mode’  requires a certain way of thinking (imaginative) and reading, 72
which can produce an expansion of consciousness. This expansion corresponds with an effect of 
defamiliarisation, so that the world is seen anew.  
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Lewis explains the process thus.  The longing for fairyland aroused in a reader is 
!
a longing for he knows not what. It stirs and troubles him (to his life-long enrichment) with 
the dim sense of something beyond his reach and, far from dulling or emptying the actual 
world, gives it a new dimension of depth. He does not despise real woods because he has 
read of enchanted woods: the reading makes all real woods a little enchanted. This is a 
special kind of longing [...] the boy [...] desires and is happy in the very fact of desiring.    73
!
In other words, the pleasure provided by story is analogous to the pleasure of poetry, which 
induces an enlargement of awareness. According to Barfield, the moment of pleasure is 
simultaneously the moment when consciousness changes from one plane to another. Consequently, 
human beings can bring to their perception of the world more, because they know more. In 
Coleridgean terms, ‘we receive but what we give,/ and in our life alone does Nature live’.  By thus 74
positing fairy tales and fantasy as equally able to induce a change of consciousness, Lewis rescues 
Story from the murky depths to which it had been consigned by literary prejudice.  
The myth of the hundred-year winter in Narnia demonstrates in a short tale what might take 
many books to explain. As Barfield has shown, human consciousness lost ‘original participation’, 
which can also be called the mythical mode of thinking, by gradual increments. In The Lion, the 
Witch and the Wardrobe (1950) the loss of ‘original participation’ is represented not as a gradual 
change over centuries, but as an abrupt imposition by the Witch, who, by forbidding the 
participation of the beasts of Narnia with Aslan, accelerates the process which in our own world 
took many lifetimes: that is, the evolution of consciousness from participatory to idolatry, and its 
effects. By this means Lewis’s critique of the contemporary mode of thinking is rendered more 
accessible, as I shall demonstrate in the next section. 
!
1.8. The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe: Original Participation 
 The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe (1950), begins by recuperating the foundational western 
myth of Adam and Eve. As they enter the land of Narnia, the four Pevensie children from our world 
find themselves addressed by all the Narnians as Sons of Adam and Daughters of Eve. Lewis makes 
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it clear that they belong to a fallen race, and that no representatives of that race have visited Narnia 
for many generations.  Nevertheless, they are meant to rule the land of Narnian animals, as the 
beaver explains in the words of an age-old prophecy: ‘When Adam’s flesh and Adam’s bone/ Sits at 
Cair Paravel in throne/ The evil time will be over and done’.  The chronicles, as is well known, 75
were not planned as a sequence of seven books,  but Lewis is quite consistent on this aspect of the 76
land called Narnia; every book in the sequence reaffirms a hierarchy that was important for his 
Christian-humanist vision, echoing the biblical motif of ‘man’ as the ruler of creation.  In addition, 
the intersecting worlds – Narnia and our own – allow the fictional children in them, and by analogy 
the readers, to reconfigure their own sense of their present experiential data. In The Lion, the Witch 
and the Wardrobe the fallen race of Adam witnesses ‘original participation’ in Narnia, rather than 
experiencing it – with the notable exception of Lucy.  
By making Lucy, the youngest and the most innocent of the four Pevensie children in the 
Lion, the one to discover Narnia, Lewis is able to posit her as the most imaginatively susceptible - 
that is, the one most capable of participation in nature, since she is the least ‘self-conscious’. By 
self-consciousness Lewis understood a state of consciousness where the subject-object dichotomy 
has been rigidified to an extent that nature is viewed as wholly Other – as what Ursula Le Guin calls 
‘wilderness’, fit only to be controlled by human beings.  The Lion begins with Lucy walking 77
through the back of a wardrobe into a snowbound landscape. The subject-object division has not yet 
become rigid in the young girl’s consciousness; perhaps that is why the ‘solid’ back of the wardrobe 
dissolves into ‘particles’ (Barfield’s term for atoms) so that she can walk through them.  The older 78
children find a solid enough back when they seek material proof of her experience. Lewis was of 
the opinion that children, like poets and primitive men, are more likely to make an imaginative 
rather than an intellectual response to the world they live in,  which makes Lucy a good choice as 79
the discoverer of Narnia. 
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The doorway into Narnia further demonstrates Lewis’s view of the nature of reality as a 
potentially infinite process of becoming, rather than a collection of finished products. He agrees 
with Barfield that Mind precedes Matter in the universe. In this, he rejects post-Darwinian 
materialism, which held that matter slowly attained consciousness, through a process of natural 
selection, in a single species. In an essay called ‘Matter, Imagination and Spirit’,  Barfield defines 80
‘matter’ as a ‘form of arrested physical energy’ which can be perceived by the senses, and ‘spirit’ as 
‘part of the totality which is not perceptible through the senses’, which he equates with energy in a 
non-arrested form. He concludes that matter is the ‘occasion of spirit’, or the ‘present expression of 
spirit’,  meaning that spirit (or energy) is realised in images that are perceived as material objects. 81
The Cartesian ‘sword-thrust’ between ‘thinking substance’ and ‘extended substance’ has resulted in 
the radical alienation of what Barfield states are actually forms of consciousness on a spectrum; that 
is, mind and matter are like the two poles of a rainbow, rather than two separate substances. Lewis 
concurs with this view, stating that ‘the real relation between mind and body is one of 
Transposition’.  As consciousness evolves, human beings become more able to exert their will in 82
this act of transposition that transmutes spirit/energy into matter, an activity that remains instinctive 
in ‘original participation’ – that is, the human will does not mediate the process.  
 Besides the mind/body continuum, transpositional links exist between different worlds, 
suggests Lewis. As Professor Kirk declares when the older children confess their misgivings about 
Lucy’s mental health, things do not have to be there all the time for them to be real; furthermore, he 
stresses, nothing is more likely than that there are other worlds ‘all over the place, just round the 
corner’ (LWW, 52). The suggestion, which unsettles his readers’ spatio-temporal assumptions as 
much as the children’s, is that other worlds, or alternative realities, might be ‘there’, but can only be 
perceived by imaginative participation. Here Lewis demonstrates how fantasy can concretise what 
theory indicates in abstract terms. Metaphor and myth, like the magical door, disrupt ossified 
notions of reality, letting the ‘new’ enter language and consciousness. In his essay on Charles 
Williams, Lewis suggests that stories which enact a ‘violation of frontier’, that is, where the 
marvellous impinges upon the mundane or the other way around, can reveal the ‘precariousness of 
our common-sense world’ by the juxtaposition of the strange with the ordinary – an observation 
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which applies equally well to the Narnia series.  The very title of the first book of Narnia produces 83
what Barfield calls a ‘quality of strangeness’ that immediately opens up new possibilities; the 
juxtaposition of the lion, the witch and the wardrobe is intriguing, and the mundane is fractured to 
reveal a new world of possibility, where something as ordinary as a wardrobe is linked to a fairy-
tale character and a wild animal. As Funk says, metaphorical language does not look at the 
phenomenon but ‘through it’.  In other words, metaphor unsettles or dismantles normative notions 84
of reality, showing that the unfamiliar exists within the familiar, a notion that is actualised in 
Lewis’s ‘chinks or chasms’  – a wardrobe, a painting, a backdoor – between multiple worlds. 85
These multiple worlds, moreover, can exist as restrictively categorised discursive fields, like 
‘myth’ and ‘reality’. Lewis foregrounds the potential intersections and border-crossings between 
myth and reality in Lucy’s first encounter with Mr Tumnus the faun. When Lucy meets Mr Tumnus 
carrying parcels and holding an umbrella, she is not in the least surprised, but quite happy to 
accompany him to tea. On the other hand, the faun is so taken aback that he drops all his parcels, 
explaining afterwards that he had never before seen a human being and had thought them only 
‘myths’ - for the faun a derogatory term designating something that does not exist. This way of 
thinking is the result of his having been forced to forsake ‘original participation’ under the sway of 
the hundred-year reign of the evil White Witch, which has made the world ‘all fact and no 
meaning’.   The meaningless array of facts she has imposed on the Narnians is represented in the 86
coldness and aridity of the land under her rule. Although Mr Tumnus is employed by her as a 
kidnapper, with instructions to capture any human he happens to meet, he never expected to see 
one, as is evident from his amazement at encountering Lucy. In the faun’s cave Lucy sees books 
entitled The Life and Letters of Silenus and Nymphs and Their Ways, lying side by side with books 
with titles like Men, Monks and Gamekeepers; A Study in Popular Legend, or Is Man a Myth?  The 
implication of these titles is quite clear: what is conceived as myth in one world might be real in 
another; or what is conceived as myth (untruth) by one person may well be lived reality for 
someone else. Lewis explored this possibility in his science fiction, where Ransom travels to the 
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‘unfallen’ planet Perelandra to be confronted with the myth of Adam and Eve, and become an active 
agent in the re-enactment of the ancient story.  87
In Narnia, this interweaving of myth and reality allows Lewis to show original participation 
at work. Within a very few pages of the Lion, the readers are introduced to a whole host of different 
mythological and fairy-tale creatures, producing generic, thematic and formal hybridity. As I have 
pointed out earlier, syncretism is an important element in the Chronicles of Narnia, and Lewis’s 
exuberant imagination revels in the heterogeneity he creates. In his autobiographical work 
Surprised by Joy (1955) he alludes to his delight in discovering Celtic myths and Greek drama to 
add to his love of Norse mythology, knowing that the enjoyment of such diverse cultural products 
‘is a balancing thing, and makes for catholicity’.  Barfield once perceptively remarked, after 88
reading a letter by Lewis, that the letter was a pastiche.  Pastiche is defined in the OED as ‘an 89
artistic work in a style that imitates that of another work, artist, or period’ or ‘consisting of a medley 
of pieces imitating various sources’. Lewis deploys pastiche as a means of recreating for his readers 
the excitement generated for him by the distinct ‘flavours’ of different mythologies. Pastiche in this 
sense generates syncretism that retains difference, creating a dialogic and dynamic nexus where 
meaning can emerge in interstitial spaces generated by the juxtaposition of disparate stylistic and 
semantic elements.   
Lewis describes the effect of this multiplicity in his autobiography:  
!
Pan and Dionysus lacked the cold, piercing appeal of Odin and Frey. A new quality entered 
my imagination: something Mediterranean and volcanic, the orgiastic drum-beat. Orgiastic, 
but not [...] erotic. It was perhaps unconsciously connected with my growing hatred of the 
public school orthodoxies and conventions, my desire to break and tear it all.   90
!
Even after leaving the public school, the desire to ‘break and tear it all’ seems to have 
persisted, and the displacement of gods by the severe winter of the Witch – signifying the frozen 
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emptiness and blankness of a reality bereft of poetry in his own world – may also stand for Lewis’s 
period of atheism as he describes it in Surprised by Joy. 
In the process, Lewis’s views on archetypes and hieroglyphs as needing no innovation 
become problematic. Lewis suggests, in A Preface to Paradise Lost (1942) and his essay ‘On Three 
Ways of Writing for Children’ (1952), that some images have become trans-historical symbols or 
‘Archetypes’, forming part of the Collective Unconscious of humanity.  When used in a work of 91
art these archetypes are able to elicit richly nuanced responses which would otherwise be almost 
impossible to produce, for their fertile suggestiveness is the cumulative effect of many centuries. 
Adding to this Jungian model, Lewis proposes that the near-human forms created by fairy tales - 
giants, dwarfs and talking animals - act as hieroglyphs, presenting ‘types’ of characters in a few 
words and images that might otherwise take a whole novel to invent.  Representing these requires 92
no innovation, because ‘giants, dragons, paradises, gods, and the like are themselves the expression 
of certain basic elements in man’s spiritual experience’.  Nonetheless, Lewis’s portrayal of the 93
Dionysian element, for example in the faun Mr. Tumnus in the Lion, or the Bacchic revelry in 
Prince Caspian, is an amalgam of tradition and innovation. Even though Lewis does not quite 
follow his own dictum, he achieves the much more interesting goal of transforming these 
archetypes so that the older myths can be read in new ways. The initial expectations and patterns of 
response that the archetypes serve to arouse are at times disconfirmed, for example by Mr. Tumnus; 
but at times the power of the mythic material overwhelms Lewis’s apologetic aims, and proliferates 
into multiple meanings, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
The Lion famously began with the isolated mental picture of a faun carrying an umbrella.  94
Fauns and satyrs are hybrid goat-men traditionally associated with Pan, Dionysus and Silenus; Pan 
and Dionysus (the Roman Bacchus) are among the most syncretistic elements in Graeco-Roman 
mythology, often conflated with each other. Lewis had read The Crock of Gold (1912) by James 
Stephens ‘with great excitement’, and states that ‘Euripides’ picture of Dionysus was closely linked 
in my mind with the whole mood of Mr Stephens’ Crock of Gold’.  This comparison has 95
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interesting implications for Lewis’s use of the Dionysian/Pan myth in Narnia. Euripides’ Bacchae 
portrays vividly the characteristic frenzy and wildness of the god and his maenads; and Stephens’ 
novel explicitly portrays the naked Pan as the god of desire. The mythical associations of fauns - 
followers of the god/s Pan and Dionysus - with wine-drinking, merry-making, kidnapping and 
lasciviousness might make Lewis’s choice seem eccentric; and Mr. Tumnus certainly seems to be a 
‘typical’ faun at first. He lures Lucy under false pretences to his house, and plays the reed pipe 
associated with his famous predecessor, making Lucy want to ‘cry and laugh and dance and go to 
sleep at the same time’.  However, when she awakens the faun is contrite, and tells Lucy of the 96
oppressive regime of the Witch, and his own unwilling role in the proposed kidnapping of Lucy. In 
Lewis’s Narnia, Pan and Dionysus have been banished by the Witch who abhors the participation 
they represent. Their followers, like Mr Tumnus, are forced to work for the Witch or be frozen, 
becoming abstractions like their inanimate counterparts in the western world.   
 Mr Tumnus gives a thrilling account of the time when Nature and animals moved in concert 
together, telling Lucy about: 
!
the midnight dances and how the Nymphs who lived in the wells and the Dryads who lived 
in the trees came out to dance with the Fauns; about long hunting parties after the milk white 
stag who would give you wishes if you caught him; about feasting and treasure seeking with 
the wild Red Dwarfs in deep mines and caverns far beneath the forest floor; and then about 
summer when the woods were green and old Silenus on his fat donkey would come to visit 
them; and sometimes Bacchus himself; and then the streams would run with wine instead of 
water and the whole forest would give itself up to jollification for weeks on end. (LWW, p. 
19-20) 
!
Here Lewis’s exuberant imagination responds vividly and delightedly to the mythic way of 
perception. He sets up a contrast from the very first novel between the overwhelming enjoyment of 
pagan revelry and the bitter, freezing, inflexible rigidity of the dissociated consciousness 
represented by the Witch, who has divided the forces of Nature against each other (‘Even some of 
the trees are on her side’, p. 24), and who detests happiness and participation. When she sees a 
group of creatures (in typical Lewisian mode comprising a diverse range of mythologies: ‘a squirrel 
and his wife with their children and two satyrs and a dwarf and an old dog-fox’, p. 113) enjoying a 
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communal meal beneath the trees, she immediately turns them to stone. Her hundred years’ reign 
has clearly put a stop to any form of participation, and any aberrations are quickly stilled. On their 
second visit, the four Pevensies discover that Tumnus has been captured and probably turned to 
stone by the White Witch. 
By thus creating a division between Old Narnia, described by Tumnus, and New Narnia 
under the Witch’s sway, Lewis enlarges the theme of the duality of good and evil, expressing it in 
linguistic terms: the poetic, participating consciousness is pitched against linguistic manipulation - 
such as the faun’s lies to Lucy, or the White Witch’s dissimulations to Edmund - and frozen 
participation. In the Lion the four children are Sons of Adam and Daughters of Eve: they belong to 
‘fallen’ humanity. As a race, their innocence is lost. It is appropriate, then, that they are pitted 
against the White Witch, who as the beaver informs them, is descended from Adam’s first wife 
Lilith, who was a Jinn, and on the father’s side from the race of giants (LWW, p. 82). Lilith, the 
eponymous character in George MacDonald’s celebrated novel, was the first wife of Adam 
according to Jewish midrashic tradition. Refusing to be considered in any way inferior to Adam, she 
uttered the ineffable name of God, and flew away to live with devils.  In the penultimate novel in 97
the Narnia series, The Magician’s Nephew (1955), Lewis intensifies the connection between Lilith 
and the White Witch as embedded in their misuse of the power of language: Jadis, we are told in 
that story, learns the Deplorable Word and utters it to destroy the whole of Charn and its inhabitants. 
Again, this allusion to Lilith as the witch’s ancestor adds the resonance of myth to Lewis’s history, 
as it were: the sons and daughters of Adam and Eve will confront and subjugate Lilith; Jewish 
midrashic and Biblical characters are pitted against each other. The readers who know their myths 
and stories will have a good idea of which side is the ‘right side’. And they are also made aware of 
the continuing relevance of myth in contemporary life, and the radical reduction in available 
experience that the repudiation of this mode entails.  
            In several subsequent scenes, Lewis demonstrates the effects of participation and 
alienation by dramatically juxtaposing contrasting scenes which portray the two forms of 
consciousness. The first of these paired scenes represents two simultaneous journeys through snow-
bound Narnia, the first made by Edmund to the Witch’s house, the second by his siblings to a 
rendezvous at Aslan’s How. Edmund’s floundering journey in darkness, ‘silence and loneliness’ (91) 
demonstrates his alienation from the environment. No Naiads or Dryads help him or keep him 
company, as he keeps ‘tripping over fallen tree-trunks’, or ‘slipping into deep drifts of snow, and 
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skidding on frozen puddles’. Later, he sees the Witch’s castle, but as a confirmed rationalist has no 
stories to draw on that would help him understand the significance of its design: ‘It seemed to be all 
towers; little towers with long pointed spires on them, sharp as needles. They looked like huge 
dunces’ caps or sorcerer’s caps’ (91-93). The forbidding exterior of the castle, which conflates 
images of folly and sorcery, might have given pause to a person more versed in narrative tradition. 
But Edmund not only lacks affinity with Nature because he cannot ‘participate’: he is also unaware 
of the archetypal signs and symbols which stories provide, and which might have made up for his 
detachment from Nature.          
Lewis uses the Witch as an hieroglyphic character, part of a symbolic economy that can 
engender ‘a deliberate organisation of attitudes’.   Lewis says that ‘stock responses’ – that is, the 98
ability to recognise certain basic human values, such as the convictions that ‘love is sweet, death 
bitter, virtue lovely’ — are not just given, but need to be instilled in the reader through an extensive 
course of literary training. Edmund’s inability to recognise a Witch when he sees one reveals his 
ignorance of fairy tales, folk tales and myths; his inability to recognise her ‘type’ confirms his 
inadequacy as a reader or auditor of imaginative narratives. He lets the Witch lure him and feed him 
with magical Turkish Delight, so that later in the beavers’ house he finds himself unable to enjoy 
the homely, delicious food — freshly caught and cooked fish, potatoes with rich yellow butter, 
creamy milk and sticky marmalade roll — but keeps thinking of the Turkish Delight, which was 
obviously addictive (and, given Lewis’s attitude to Middle Eastern culture in the series, unhealthily 
non-English). While Lucy, the youngest child in the Lion, retains traces of ‘original participation’, 
the eldest two can get help from stories to make the right choices. For example, as the children are 
guided through the woods by a friendly robin, Edmund expresses doubts about their guide, and 
Peter contends: ‘They’re good birds in all the stories I’ve ever read. I’m sure a robin wouldn’t be on 
the wrong side’ (LWW, p. 64). Only Edmund, who on first entering Narnia ‘decided that he did not 
much like the place’ (32), is unable to make the right decisions. 
An alienated consciousness considers all things to be idols, and ‘idols do not participate 
one another’,  but are considered ‘there’ to be used. Edmund’s journey through the blizzard is 99
punctuated by thoughts of modernising Narnia with ‘decent roads’, cars, a private cinema, principal 
railways and ‘laws […] against beavers and dams’ (91-92). In The Magician’s Nephew, Uncle 
Andrew too immediately begins to think of the commercial potential of the rich, uncultivated land 
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he has entered. For Lewis, rapid and irresponsible development and industrialisation evince an 
inability to recognise the integral link between humankind and the non-human environment. The 
next step from this position, as Lewis shows in his science fiction, would be cosmic imperialism.  
The Witch, we learn in the Nephew, belongs to another world; her petrification of Narnia and 
Edmund’s plans for its modernisation are based on personal, individualistic greed. The close 
connection between ecological degradation and the politics of power cannot be ignored, as Lewis 
demonstrates. 
A parallel journey of escape in the snow, by the beavers and the three children, demonstrates 
what a more participatory experience of nature might be. As Mr and Mrs Beaver leave their house 
to escape the White Witch, the shining sides of the valley tower up beside the ‘dazzling brightness 
of the frozen river with all its waterfalls of ice’ and the ‘white masses of the tree-tops and the great 
glaring of moon and the countless stars’ (103). The snowfall helps them escape by hiding their 
footprints from the enemy. They find a hole to sleep in, ‘an old hiding place for beavers in bad 
times’, where they spend the night huddled together for warmth – a perfect model of participation in 
the sense of collaboration between species. And the morning brings nothing less than a tray with a 
piping hot teapot, milk jug and all, brought by ‘Father Christmas’ himself — the archetypal spirit of 
religious and corporeal festivity.  
Another contrast, between the followers of the Lion and the Witch, serves to foreground the 
antithetical impulse within imagination, which can be both good and evil. The children first see 
Aslan at the Stone Table surrounded by ‘Tree-Women […] and Well-Women (Dryads and Naiads as 
they used to be called in our world) who had stringed instruments [...] four great centaurs [...] a 
unicorn, and a bull with the head of a man, and a pelican, and an eagle, and a great Dog’ (124-5). To 
combat Aslan’s forces, the Witch assembles her own entourage, so that the same Stone Table which 
had resonated earlier with the joy of participation is now described thus: ‘Ogres with monstrous 
teeth, and wolves, and bull-headed men; spirits of evil trees and poisonous plants [...] Cruels and 
Hags and Incubuses, Wraiths, Horrors, Effreets, Spirits, Orknies, Wooses, and Ettins’ (148). Since 
language mediates the transition from participation to self-consciousness, it opens up vast 
possibilities for the human act of creativity. As Barfield has said, there is no other ‘thinghood’ but 
what is created by humanity. But it does not follow that the creative act will only produce good; it is 
just as likely to create evil, as the witch has done. This is why Lewis insists upon the fallen nature 
of humanity in the Chronicles, as a warning that even if we realise the power of our imagination, we 
need to keep our nature as fallen creatures in sight. 
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The binary fission within the word, created by the split in language between the immaterial 
and the concrete, was considered analogous to the fall by the Inklings members. In The Problem of 
Pain (1940), Lewis contends that evil was always a natural potential outcome of free will granted to 
humanity. God has paid us the ‘intolerable compliment’ of love, ‘in the deepest, most tragic, most 
inexorable sense’ (33), by giving us free will, a ‘burden of glory’ (39) that led to the abuse of the 
possibilities it opened up. Lewis asserts that we really sinned ‘in Adam’, as the Church Fathers 
believed, not simply ‘by legal fiction’ but in a spiritual sense. The nature of original sin is grounded 
in the awareness of ‘self’ as separate from nature. As man became aware of the dichotomy between 
self and object, the inevitable concomitant was an awareness of the ‘otherness’ of God. And thus, 
says Lewis, ‘the terrible alternative of choosing God or self for the centre opens’ (70). 
Subsequently, the separate self, aware of its own creative potential, is liable to create both good and 
evil. 
Barfield agrees, saying that ‘Freedom and evil are […] very closely connected’.  As self-100
consciousness develops, so does the unconscious – both collective and individual. And even though 
human beings hypostasise ‘representations’ and begin to think of them as wholly other, without any 
link to human consciousness, we continue to participate - only now we are not aware of this. As the 
twentieth century progresses, writes Barfield, and the nature of reality is exposed by science as 
consisting of waves and particles, we begin to become aware once more of our own creative 
potential. Herein lies the danger, according to Barfield, as ‘Imagination is not, as some poets have 
thought, simply synonymous with good. It may be either good or evil [...] in an age when the 
connection between imagination and figuration is beginning to be dimly realized [...] the good and 
the evil latent in the working of imagination begin to appear unlimited’ (SA, 145). 
 One potential outcome of the choice has been identified by both Lewis and Barfield as the 
‘abolition of man’, a concept that can be illustrated in two scenes from the Lion. To elude detection 
by Aslan’s forces, the Witch turns herself into a boulder and her servant Dwarf into a tree-stump, 
abolishing their humanity to avoid facing the consequences of her actions. In stark contrast, Aslan 
reanimates all the creatures petrified by the Witch, including Mr Tumnus. Lewis describes in 
beautiful detail how Aslan breathes on the creatures that have been turned to stone, and how they 
come alive:  
!
 An Interview with Owen Barfield, by James R. Wetmore, Re-weaving the Rainbow, ed. by David Lavery 100
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For a second after Aslan had breathed upon him the stone lion looked just the same. Then a 
tiny streak of gold began to run along his white marble back—then it spread—then the 
colour seemed to lick all over him as the flame licks all over a bit of paper—then, while his 
hindquarters were still obviously stone the lion shook his mane and all the heavy, stone folds 
rippled into living hair. (165)  
!
The image that Lewis uses to describe the infusion of life – analogous to the return of 
humanity, which had been abolished by the Witch – is that of fire consuming paper; an especially 
apposite image since it echoes the Pentecostal image of a flash of fire, which Lewis uses in his 
Narnian creation scene in The Magician’s Nephew, where we are shown how Aslan breathes on 
some of the newly-created animals to endow them with the gift of speech. Aslan’s breath is the 
Spirit infused into earthly creatures, so that the word ‘breath’ should be taken here in the older sense 
of the word pneuma, which (as Barfield shows) once meant breath and soul and spirit at the same 
time, in pre-historic, pre-logical language (SA, p. 100).  And fire, the archetypal emblem of 
knowledge, also symbolises the endowment of each creature with the Lion’s breath of life, soul, 
language and knowledge all at once, in an exhilarating return to original participation.  The word 
pneuma, with its fusion of the physical and the non-material, encapsulates the way Lewis wanted 
words to work in his fantasy, which will be discussed in the final section of this chapter. 
!
1.9. Psycho-Physical Parallelism 
In his essay ‘Bluspels and Flalansferes’ (1939), Lewis draws attention to how alienation from nature 
is a result of analytical thinking and the repudiation of imagination as a mode of knowing.  Lewis 101
suggests that the earliest metaphors indicate that ‘there is a kind of truth or rightness in the 
imagination itself’ and that ‘all our truth, or all but a few fragments, is won by metaphor’, thus 
bearing out the correlation between language and the ‘representations’ of reality figured and named 
through original participation. At that time there was an intrinsic bond between nature and man’s 
thought, so that the earliest metaphors showed the true nature of the universe, as it was apprehended 
by participation. ‘It does follow’, Lewis concludes, that if those original metaphors – the familiar 
equations ‘between good and light, or evil and dark, between breath and soul and all the others, 
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were from the beginning arbitrary and fanciful - if there is not, in fact, a kind of “psycho-physical 
parallelism” (or more) in the universe - then all our thinking is nonsensical’.   102
As early as 1936, when Lewis wrote The Allegory of Love, he claimed that ‘It is the very 
nature of thought and language to represent what is immaterial in picturable terms. What is good or 
happy has always been high like heavens and bright like the sun. Evil and misery were deep and 
dark from the first. Pain is black in Homer, and goodness is a middle point for Alfred [as] for 
Aristotle’.  In the light of this psycho-physical parallelism – that is, of what he sees as the intrinsic 103
bond between thought and the spaces and forms of nature – Lewis further proposes an inherent 
correspondence between the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds of sentient beings. He conceives Narnia as 
an embodiment of this correspondence, its outward physical landscape reflecting the inward 
spiritual state of its inhabitants, so that the dominance of evil manifests itself as unchanging winter, 
the return of goodness as the dynamism of spring. Thus the spiritual re -awakening of Edmund, who 
has succumbed to temptation and betrayed his siblings, and Narnia with them, is concomitant with 
the coming of spring in Narnia. And the description of the advent of Good, with the coming of 
Aslan into Narnia, is uncannily similar to Lewis’s description of his own spiritual awakening in his 
autobiography Surprised by Joy – suggesting that the psycho-physical parallelism of Narnia has its 
equivalent in the lived experience of Lewis and his readers. 
As the snow-clad Narnia awakes at last into new life, we witness a parallel awakening of 
Edmund’s hitherto muffled senses, the necessary prelude to the awakening of his mind and spirit. ‘A 
strange, sweet, rustling, chattering noise’ of running water makes the boy’s heart leap in anticipation 
of the end of the long, long winter. First the bough of a tree, then patches of grass become visible, 
and Edmund finds himself responding to the joy of spring as it emerges from the dead of winter to 
assert the enchantment of mutability. In a riot of sensuous delight Lewis describes how the ‘trees 
shook off their robes of snow [...] the mist turned from white to gold [...] shafts of delicious sunlight 
struck down on the forest floor and [...] you could see blue sky [...] a glade of silver birch trees [...] 
little yellow flowers - celandines’. Then comes the first chirp of a bird, followed by others, till ‘the 
whole wood [is] ringing with birds’ music’ and filled with delicious scents (LWW, 119-20). In 
Surprised by Joy Lewis recounts his spiritual renaissance in strikingly similar terms, coming after a 
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long period of aridity during which he never felt the ‘inconsolable longing’ that he calls Sehnsucht. 
‘This long winter,’ he tells us, 
!
broke up in a single moment […]. Spring is the inevitable image, but this was not gradual 
like Nature’s springs. It was as if the Arctic itself, all the deep layers of secular ice, should 
change not in a week nor in an hour, but instantly, into a landscape of grass and primroses 
and orchards in bloom, deafened with bird song and astir with running water. (82) 
!
Narnia, then, is the objective correlative of the inner psyche in a way that clearly 
demonstrates Lewis’s notion of psycho-physical parallelism, the intimate association of the mind 
with the physical world it inhabits.   
          However, this concept is rendered problematic by the hierarchical binarism that is 
embedded in Lewis’s Christian theology. It is easy to see how a rigid binarism, such as the 
insuperable divide between good and evil which Lewis calls in one of his best known books of 
Christian apologetics The Great Divorce, could reduce the dynamism of the relationship between 
the seen and the unseen, the mental and the physical, which he is concerned to restore. Barfield 
shared with Lewis the view that the associations between death, sleep and winter, or birth, waking 
and summer, inhere within ancient myths – such as the myth of Demeter and Persephone, which 
exemplifies those old, undivided meanings that are ‘logically disconnected but poetically 
connected’.  But the imposition of moral categories on these living, polyphonic webs of meaning 104
threatens to displace the inherent unity between their constituent elements, by associating them with 
human ethical categories as rigid as the categories of analytical logic. Indeed, Lewis’s own fiction is 
often criticised for being excessively dualistic, and it often is so. 
At the same time, his imagination is simply too exuberant and irrepressible to allow such 
neat moral divisions to remain unchallenged within his fiction. Something keeps intruding to 
disrupt them, as he responds with delight to the polar dynamics of widely disparate narrative 
traditions.  For example, all the Narnia books that follow the Lion are in some sense revelations of 
heavenly secrets - cosmological, meteorological, astronomical and spiritual – and the combination 
of these different forms of the celestial often resists crude efforts to decode them as straightforward 
 Barfield, Poetic Diction, p. 84.104
!  62
moral allegory.  In addition, Old Narnia is repeatedly juxtaposed with New Narnia in the later 105
books, as in the first, with the former portraying participation, the latter radical disjunction; and in 
each case the return of Old Narnia is very seldom a simple concept.  The second Narnian chronicle, 
Prince Caspian (1951), offers a perfect illustration of Lewis’s unconscious resistance in his fiction 
to the simplistic dualism he sometimes seems to champion in his philosophical and religious 
writings. !
 Michael E. Stone claims that apocalyptic speculation about the secrets of nature and cosmology form an 105
integral part of the revelatory experience, in ‘Lists of Revealed Things in the Apocalyptic Literature’, Magnalia 
Dei: The Mighty Acts of God (Garden City and New York: Doubleday, 1976), pp. 414-452.
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 CHAPTER TWO. PRINCE CASPIAN: REVELATION IN NARNIA 
!
Prince Caspian (1951) is sub-titled ‘A Return to Narnia’, and the concept of return, as it pertains to 
memory and imagination, is extremely important in the novel. In Barfield’s formulation, memory 
and imagination are vital for the evolution of human consciousness from original to final 
participation. This evolution signifies for Lewis a deepening relationship with God, personified as 
Aslan in his sequence. And for both Barfield and Lewis, the fluctuating relationship between past 
and present, between current experience, memories, and recovery, had been confirmed (ironically 
enough) by the discoveries of those very analytical scientists who had been responsible for the 
philosophical ‘split’ between mind and matter in the seventeenth century.    
 By the late 1920s and early 1930s, physicists such as Arthur Eddington and James Jeans, 
whose work Lewis knew,  had confirmed that the structure of the universe was much less rigid than 1
had previously been assumed. In his 1927 Gifford Lecture at Cambridge, Eddington showed that 
the universe was composed of fields of forces, electrons and sub-atomic particles; while in his book 
The Mysterious Universe (1931) Jeans compares the motions of electrons and atoms to those of 
‘dancers in a cotillion’.  The concept that the universe consists of waves of sub-atomic particles 2
strengthened Barfield’s conception of the universe as an ‘unrepresented’ field of energy that was 
‘Figured’ as phenomena by the human imagination. As indicated earlier, Lewis accepted most of 
Barfield’s philosophy, and in Prince Caspian he explores the role of memory in the development of 
consciousness from simple figuration to conscious and willed participation.  
          In Prince Caspian, Lewis uses the device of the story within a story to create receding 
frameworks of spatio-temporal perceptions within which the categories of myth, history and story 
are explored in the context of their relationship to reality. Within these explorations, Lewis pits the 
Old, participating Narnia against the New, alienated Narnia, much as he had in The Lion, the Witch 
and the Wardrobe. In the process Lewis tries to achieve poetically what he had repudiated in his 
theoretical thinking: that is, a reconciliation of religion with the intensely poetic, almost ‘orgiastic’ 
enjoyment provided by myth. In the process, religious and mythical discursive fields disturb and 
disrupt each other, revealing that neither discourse is as entirely coherent or ordered as its 
proponents would like to believe. Questions of memory, and assertions of its importance for the 
 See, for example, Mere Christianity (London and Glasgow: Collins, 1955), p. 54; ‘Dante’s Similes’ in 1
Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 75; 
‘Historicism’ in Christian Reflections (London: Geofrey Bles, 1967), p. 112; Letters, vol. 3, p. 228. 
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evocation of that spiritual longing Lewis calls Joy, are opened up. Lewis’s own moments of Joy, as 
he recounts them, are often triggered by memory; and the return of the Pevensie children to Narnia 
helps to link memory with longing, which is Joy itself for Lewis.  
          This longing, for Lewis, inheres in the primal rupture between man and nature, catalysed by 
the increasingly prosaic tendency in language towards abstraction. Lewis, like Tolkien, wanted to 
show that abstract language, rather than being factual and referential as the logical positivist school 
proposed, actually concealed living, participative reality beneath a film of congealed and drab 
familiarity; and that poetic language alone could reveal the living, oscillating polarity that was a 
fundamental aspect of reality. According to Northrop Frye, the Greek word for revelation, 
apokalupsis, and the word for truth, aletheia, both begin with a negative particle: the metaphorical 
meaning of both is un-covering. Frye asserts that Apocalypse is the ‘inner form of everything that is 
happening now [...] What is symbolised [in the Bible] as the destruction of the order of nature is the 
destruction of the way of seeing that order’.  Lewis would agree with this ahistorical view, not as a 3
repudiation of historical development, but as an acceptance of the ongoing renewal which historical 
processes can help to bring about. Lewis’s concern throughout his work is to unveil what might be 
concealed behind our common-sense view of the world.  Therefore, in the Chronicles of Narnia he 4
actualises the three stages of consciousness proposed by Barfield. Old Narnia represents the mode 
of participating consciousness, now only retained in memory and stories. Miraz’s kingdom came 
about through a displacement of the gods, revealing an alienated consciousness. And the renewal of 
Narnia is achieved through the return of Aslan – ironically accompanied by a return of the pagan 
gods whom Christianity displaced.  
          Since ‘original’ participation connotes mythical thinking, according to Barfield and Lewis, its 
absence is correlative with the kind of thinking where myths are considered to be lies, or a 
demonstration of ‘primitive’ thinking, and considered irrelevant to the needs of the present. As 
Barfield argues in Saving the Appearances, lack of participation invariably corresponds to a lack of 
imagination. To refute this kind of agnosticism concerning myth, Lewis begins the second novel by 
showing that myth and history can and often do interpenetrate. The chronicle begins with the four 
Pevensie children being pulled into Narnia by the magical horn of Queen Susan, now again a child 
after having ruled Narnia for many years in the previous book. The children find that they are talked 
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about in Narnia as mythical creatures – myth here being used in the sense of untrue stories, with no 
impact on the present. Although Caspian blows the horn in hope of help, not many of the Narnians 
believe any help will come, because they have once again lost faith in the myths that came to life so 
vividly in the Lion. 
!
2. 1. Old and New Narnia: The Displacement of the Gods  
In order to restore mythical discourse to its cultural function as a vehicle of profound truths that 
cannot be conveyed in any other way, Lewis dramatises the processes underlying the eradication of 
myth in Prince Caspian. These processes are concretised as a displacement of gods — a result of 
privileging reason as the only valid vehicle of knowledge, and refuting the epistemic validity of the 
imagination. The dichotomy between reason and imagination was particularly important for Lewis 
because he had experienced the rupture in his own psyche, before his conversion. Barfield’s insight 
that there were ‘two Lewises’  can be better understood in Lewis’s own description of his state of 5
mind in the years between 1914 and 1916: ‘On the one side a many-islanded sea of poetry and 
myth; on the other a glib and shallow “rationalism”’.  But by the time he writes the Chronicles, 6
Lewis clearly realises that imaginative discourse, specially myths and fairy-stories, can convey 
moral and existential truths in ways that are impossible for rational discourse to convey. In all the 
Narnia books Lewis draws attention to the function of story-telling in what he and Barfield thought 
of as the expansion of consciousness. When reading fairy stories, for instance, ‘the dim sense of 
something beyond [the reader’s] reach, far from dulling the actual world gives it a new dimension 
of depth’.   The metaphor of depth he uses here has important implications for Barfield’s theory of 7
the role of metaphor in the ‘revelation’ or uncovering of reality alluded to by Frye as the central 
theme of apocalypse. As Barfield argued, once language has mediated the transition from an 
undifferentiated matrix of consciousness to individualised self-consciousness, the fundamental 
antinomies of inner/outer, mind/matter, subject/object emerge, as human beings become capable of 
analytical thinking. Now the old representations of the world are available as memory-images for 
individuals to manipulate, and Coleridge’s famous dictum of diffusion, dissipation and dissolving 
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comes into play.  That is, the reawakening of Old Narnia depends upon the children’s and Caspian’s 8
capacity of memory and imagination. 
          Initially, the children who return to Narnia enact Lewis’s theory of good reading, for ‘Scenes 
and characters from books provide them with a sort of iconography by which they interpret or sum 
up their own experience’.   A knowledge of stories helps them with practical matters such as where 9
to find food and water.  But stories also help them and Caspian to ‘see’ other phenomena now 10
concealed by the dominant discourse of Reason, as espoused by the tyrant Miraz, under whose reign 
Old Narnia lies comatose. Stories can actualise something ‘that has no sequence in it’, which Lewis 
calls the ‘Kappa Element’ or the hidden element, by which he means an indescribable state of joy.  11
This is a state of being that is always fleeting in real life, but can be captured, even if only for a few 
pages, in a book.  
          In the modern world, fairy tales (as Lewis and Tolkien both affirm) are relegated to the 
nursery like old furniture; but the longing they evoke can often lead to revelation of forms of truth 
not available to strictly rational modes of knowledge. The incipient longings for Old Narnia 
awakened in Caspian’s heart by his old Nurse’s tales are ripened into intense desire by Doctor 
Cornelius’s endorsement of her seemingly childish claim that the Old Narnians once existed. When 
the tutor tells young Caspian that there had been very few men in Narnia when the prince’s 
ancestors, the Telmarines, conquered it, the boy is amazed. ‘Do you mean,’ [Caspian] gasped, ‘that 
there were other things? Do you mean it was like in the stories?’ The fascination with the other, and 
the literal truth that often inheres in story as myth, is once again emphasised when Caspian 
encounters a being he thought of as mythical – Trumpkin the dwarf – and then has to assert his 
belief in Aslan against Trumpkin’s scepticism. ‘I do [believe],’ said Caspian, ‘and if I hadn’t 
believed in him before, I would now. Back there among the Humans, the people who laughed at 
Aslan would have laughed at stories about Talking Beasts and Dwarfs [...] Yet there you are’.  12
Most of the New Narnians do not believe in myths, which they equate with lies; and there is a 
delightful irony in the fact that this scepticism concerning myth is most fiercely articulated by the 
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old Narnians, who are themselves mythical creatures in our own world as well as in the kingdom of 
Miraz. 
         In this kingdom the Old Narnians are thought of as in ‘rebellion’ against the New (rather as 
Lewis’s native Irishmen were considered rebels by their English overlords). Caspian’s mention of 
Old Narnia angers Miraz, who dismisses his talk of Aslan, Dryads, Naiads, fauns and Dwarfs as 
‘nonsense’ and ‘fairy-tales’.  By contrast, Dr Cornelius tells him that after silencing all the 13
creatures the king and his men are now ‘trying to cover up even the memory of them’, a claim 
borne out by Miraz’s earlier injunction to Caspian not to talk or even think about Old Narnia.  As 14
with the White Witch, the suppression of imagination goes hand in hand with the quest for power. 
Caspian discovers that Narnia is an unhappy country because taxes are high, laws are stern and the 
ruler cruel. But Cornelius does not ask Caspian to deal with these political and economic problems 
directly; instead he asks him to find ‘a way of awakening the trees once more’, and the tutor’s 
wistful, somewhat ineffectual longing for participation recalls the nostalgia of Mr. Tumnus. 
‘Sometimes at night, in the woods, I thought I had caught a glimpse of Fauns and Satyrs dancing a 
long way off’,  the old man says. It is, then, an old Nurse and an elderly scholar-dwarf who 15
preserve stories and incite rebellion against tyranny by awakening the imagination of the young. 
The latter might remind us of the scholar hobbits in Tolkien, who take it upon themselves to 
preserve as much of Middle-earth myth and history as possible. Both Lewis and Tolkien identify the 
marginalised as scholars and preservers of stories and myths, as against the dominant powers which 
dismiss these as outdated and unnecessary. 
!
2. 1. 1. Marginalised Images: The Longaevi 
Indeed, most of Old Narnia consists of marginalised figures; marginalised not only in Miraz’s 
country, but in a mid-twentieth-century literary world that privileged realism and denigrated 
fantasy. In order to make his stories enact the evolution of consciousness from participatory to non-
participatory, Lewis creates a world inhabited not only by spirits of nature and gods, but by 
numerous wild, mysterious and ambiguous mythical creatures. As we have seen, Narnia abounds in 
creatures from different mythologies, giving the chronicles a distinct, syncretic flavour: if one 
particular quality that Lewis held to be a distinctive feature of fantasy literature were to be 
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designated for the Chronicles of Narnia, it would be that of syncretism, which permits a joyful 
intermingling, ecstatic interpenetrating and carnivalesque dialogue between a plethora of 
mythologies.  
          In The Discarded Image, Lewis explains that for medieval thinkers mankind itself was 
marginal, and the earth merely an infinitesimal point on the vast circumference of the universe. 
Teeming and diverse forms of life, including fauns, gods, nymphs, Dryads and Naiads, surrounded 
the world of mortals, and Lewis terms these creatures the Longaevi, following the philosopher 
Martianus Capella.  They live in an ambiguous region between air and Earth, and their importance 16
to Christian theology is questionable; and yet, states Lewis, ‘their unimportance is their importance’ 
(TDI, 21). This somewhat ambiguous statement underscores Lewis’s intensely romantic 
imagination, which revels in the elusive, the indistinct, the multivalent. The ‘Medieval Model’ tends 
at times to become ‘too ordered’, in that everything is assimilated so well into it, all the oddities and 
contradictions so thoroughly incorporated that there is no room for vagueness, no ambiguity, no 
blurred boundaries, which for Lewis is an aesthetic fault. Lewis’s romantic imagination responds to 
the element of the ‘new’ that only the unfathomable or the mutable can sustain, as is evident in his 
own stories. 
          The de-spiritualised, post-Enlightenment world provokes in Lewis a yearning for the 
principle of ‘plenitude’  that prevailed in the Middle-Ages, when every corner of the universe was 17
felt to be inhabited by some representation of the cosmic mind. Lewis calls this a ‘realising 
imagination’ (206), which is made possible by belief in ‘a world of built-in significance’ (204). 
‘Realising’ here is meant in the sense of making real, or creating the phenomena around us. This is 
the reason for the inclusion of the Longaevi in the Narnia Chronicles, and provides an answer to 
Tolkien’s critique of this inclusiveness as generating anomalies and inconsistencies in the sequence. 
‘They are marginal, fugitive creatures,’ Lewis writes. ‘They are perhaps the only creatures to whom 
the Model does not assign, as it were, an official status. Herein lies their imaginative value. They 
soften the classic severity of the huge design. They intrude a welcome hint of wildness and 
uncertainty into a universe that is in danger of being a little too self-explanatory, too 
luminous’ (122). The hint of something unexplained and indeterminate is an important element in 
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romantic thought because individual imagination is of prime importance; and regimented and 
disciplined reason could hamper and mutilate imagination, for Lewis as for Keats.  
          These creatures add imaginative depth and resonance to the radical intertextuality of the 
Chronicles, for they can be both good and evil. Like the Native American tricksters Coyote and 
Raven, these are in-between figures,  and no one can be entirely sure of their intentions. The reader 18
has already encountered the figure of Mr Tumnus, the faun, in The Lion. Fauns are one of the 
Longaevi enumerated in the medieval catalogues that Lewis cites in The Discarded Image. More 
striking examples of the ambiguity inherent in the Longaevi can be found in Prince Caspian, where 
we see dwarfs, satyrs and giants capable of being equally good and bad, so that anyone’s belonging 
to any particular species cannot be a guarantee of their moral grounding. While the most obvious 
examples are the dwarfs Nikabrik and Trumpkin, there are others, like Giant Wimbleweather, the 
great ‘twenty tons of living, earth-shaking oxymoron’,  who tries his best to be of help to Caspian’s 19
army but usually fails miserably.  The stupid, quarrelsome giants in The Silver Chair are another 
example, as are the giants who live at the castle to which the Green Witch sends Jill and Eustace, 
who, despite the giantesses’ becoming quite fond of the children, plan to cook and eat them.  Even 
the Earthmen in The Silver Chair are enigmatic figures, ominously silent at first, queer, even bizarre 
to look at, with inscrutable expressions and monotonous utterances, thousands of them following a 
strictly regimented routine; but at the end of the book they suddenly burst into an uncontrolled 
celebration, mystifying the reader when their furtiveness becomes a frolic, and they dance and jump 
their way into the deep land of Bism. The dwarves in The Last Battle prove to be the cause of a 
major turn for the worse for Prince Tirian, when they refuse to join forces with him; but one of 
them, Poggin, stays steadfast till the end.   
          However, in Prince Caspian, the longaevi have been silenced, so that they recede into 
nothingness, as Miraz insists that they be ousted even from memory — much as the elusive 
mythical aspects were erased from Christianity by institutionalised forms of worship. The return of 
the four Pevensies to Narnia allows Lewis to ‘reveal’ Narnia at several levels, and illustrate the 
cognitive validity and the vital power of myth, as discussed below. 
!
!
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2. 2. The Uses of Myth          
         In the Lion, the four Pevensies grow to adulthood in Narnia before being transported back to 
childhood in their own world. In the process they are initiated into the mythical, participatory 
world-view that Aslan re-established in Narnia after destroying the idol-infested kingdom of the 
White Witch. However, their return to Narnia involves a series of  ‘disconfirmations’  of 20
expectations, both for the characters and the readers, which challenges the understanding of the 
workings of Narnia they acquired previously. As Stephen Prickett observes, ‘Disconfirmation or 
failure [is] a condition of growth’,  from childhood to maturity or from one plane of consciousness 21
to another. The children return to a completely different spatio-temporal framework than the one 
they left a year ago, according to their reckoning. They are required to make a series of adjustments 
before they are fit for a new sort of participation, that is on a higher plane of consciousness, in 
Narnia. Two of the crucial new perspectives they acquire are these: that myths and stories are not 
synonymous with untruth, as most of the Narnians seem to think; and that having recourse to the 
past can make things new.  
          In his ‘Preface’ to George MacDonald: An Anthology (1946), Lewis talks about myth as 
being potentially profoundly disturbing, not only at the psychical but at the sensory level, as it 
‘arouses in us sensations we have never had before [...] as though we had broken out of our normal 
mode of consciousness [...] It gets under our skin, hits us at levels deeper than our thoughts or even 
our passions, troubles oldest certainties till all questions are re-opened’.  This is similar to 22
Tolkien’s conception that the fantastic as a mode breaks through the chains of convention, breaks 
‘free and wild’. In this context Lewis, like Tolkien, is keen to suggest that the nature of story as self-
consciously fictional does not equate stories with lies. Not only do stories provide an existential 
iconography, but they can interpenetrate reality in a variety of complex ways. One of these ways 
has been pointed to by Lewis in his essay ‘Transpositions’, where he lays stress on the sacramental 
correspondences between lower (sensual), and higher (spiritual) reality. In other words, by arousing 
new sensations, myths could enhance our consciousness, so that the non-arrested energy identified 
 Stephen Prickett uses the term disconfirmation to denote the encounter with the radically new, that is a 20
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by Barfield as the spirit could be transformed into arrested energy (matter) in more meaningful 
ways. 
!
2. 3.  Revelation in Narnia           
The process of transposition is illustrated in Prince Caspian, where an imaginative effort is required 
to be able to see Aslan. At one point, Lucy finds herself lying awake and feels ‘that the whole forest 
was coming awake like herself’, which evokes in her ‘a great longing for the old days when trees 
could talk in Narnia’.  As we have seen, memory is an integral part of longing or Sehnsucht for 23
Lewis; and in this episode he confirms that Lucy is intensely aware of her own creative ability to 
participate in nature, since she vividly remembers doing so.  The girl feels an irresistible urge to 
arouse the forest to full wakefulness, and experiences startling flashbacks of Talking Trees: ‘She 
knew exactly how each of these trees would talk if only she could wake them, and what sort of 
human form it would put on’, from a slender, long-haired birch to a hearty old oak, or that smooth 
and stately ‘lady of the wood’, the beech. But after her impassioned, unintended attempt at a 
summons (‘Oh, Trees, Trees, Trees [...] wake, wake, wake. Don’t you remember it? Don’t you 
remember me? Dryads, and Hamadryads, come out, come to me’) the rustling of the trees, which 
was ‘almost like words’, dies away. ‘Yet Lucy had the feeling [...] that she had just missed 
something: as if she had spoken to the trees a split second too soon or a split second too late, or 
used all the right words except one, or put in one word that was just wrong’.  That one word, Lewis 24
implies, was me, signifying Lucy’s self-consciousness, which has developed to the point where the 
emphasis lies heavily on the subject. To emerge from the original undifferentiated state of being a 
polarity between subject and object is necessary, for as Barfield says, ‘The experience of oneself 
over against that which is not oneself is the sine qua non of human consciousness’.  But in what 25
might seem like a paradox, but is actually based upon the inherent polarity at the heart of Being, the 
essence of final participation, says Barfield, is to overcome the duality between subject and object.  26
This means not a re-fusion, but the realisation of a dynamic interaction between self and other in 
what Buber calls an I-Thou relationship - a concept I shall be exploring in Chapter Three.  
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          According to Lewis, while the doctrine of Creation in one sense empties nature of divinity, in 
another, paradoxical sense, the same doctrine makes nature ‘an index, a symbol, a manifestation of 
the Divine’.  This is analogous to Barfield’s notion of the similarity between ‘collective 27
representations’ of the original participation and symbols of the Final Participation, in that both 
apprehend the phenomenal world as standing for something else, or as a manifestation of the 
Cosmic Mind. Lucy’s experience on the second night in the woods is a dramatisation of this, as she 
is woken to see the trees moving about in a complicated dance. The dance is Lewis’s favourite 
metaphor to show the harmony within the cosmos which he considers so important, and which is 
maintained in a delicate, precarious balance through the hierarchal structure of the universe. But 
Lucy is not yet capable of fully participating, so she looks at trees alternating between becoming 
people and trees, in a surrealistic scene of immense beauty.  Here ‘original participation’ is actually 
enacted in Lucy’s consciousness, and she tries to join in by recapturing the residual memory images 
embedded in her mind and recreate them in an act of ‘final participation’. This journey, from 
awareness of participation, to the internalisation of nature, and on to willed participation, is made 
clear for us when Lewis explains that ‘[s]he wanted to get beyond [the trees] to something else; it 
was from beyond them that the dear voice had called’ (152). As I explained in the introduction, the 
presence of this ‘something else’ is what Barfield sees as the essence of original participation: ‘there 
stands behind the phenomena, and on the other side of them from me, a represented which is of the 
same nature as me’.   Lucy’s two encounters with the trees, the first when the intrusive self 28
occludes communion, and the second when she joins the dance, reveal the process of the growth of 
her mind and spirit.  
          The purpose of the children’s return to Narnia is not a restoration of original participation, but 
a shattering of the idols produced by Miraz and his followers, giving the children an opportunity to 
undergo a re-creation as conscious living entities – in Barfield’s terms, to undergo Final 
Participation. For Lewis’s Christian friends such as Austin Farrer, the ‘rejection of idolatry meant 
not the destruction but the liberation of images’.  The disconfirmations about time and place, the 29
importance of memory as a means of knowledge, and the intrinsic interconnection between myth 
and reality, are experiences that prepare the children for willed participation, permitting their 
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language and thought to ‘reshape and modify’ one another and their creative potential to be 
unleashed.   30
          The imagery of seeing pervades Prince Caspian. In the post-participation world, it is clear 
that nature can no longer offer ‘collective representations’. Instead the individual has to create her 
own world, investing this by an act of will with the quality of participation. No one can at first see 
Aslan except Lucy; and she is later rebuked for not having followed her vision of him at once, alone 
if this became necessary because her siblings would not follow her. This is the huge change that 
needs to be accepted in the transition from unindividuated to individual consciousness. Like 
Tolkien’s Niggle, each individual has her or his own creative potential to realise.  In this second 31
book of Narnia, Aslan can only be seen with an effort of the imagination underpinned by faith; now 
it is not the grand, golden roaring presence but the ‘still small voice’ that reveals divinity.  The 32
Pevensies are baffled by this change: Lucy tells the lion that ‘I thought you’d come roaring in and 
frighten all the enemies away - like last time’,  and the other children cannot understand why Aslan 33
should be invisible to them, and visible only to Lucy. In a challenge to the ‘logical positivists’ – 
who declared that any empirically non-verifiable statement is meaningless – Lewis makes the older 
children repeatedly assert that they cannot ‘see’ anything, and in the process demonstrates the extent 
to which they have become reacclimatised, since the end of the first novel, to the dominant 
philosophy of the mid-twentieth century.  
          In Prince Caspian, Lewis dramatises the link between imagination and seeing in order to 
illustrate that initial perceptions are not always enough, and that there may be more aspects of 
reality available to enhance figuration, and to unveil what is as yet unperceived.  Once language is 
riven, and words become polysemous, interpretation of word and image becomes necessary.  34
Hermes, the trickster god, becomes active. As we have seen, Barfield claims that as imagination 
becomes capable of enhancing figuration, through consciously conceived metaphor, ‘hitherto 
unperceived parts of the whole field of phenomena necessarily become perceptible’.   Polysemy - 35
the ability of a word to mean more than one thing - comprises the ‘potential [for] creativity 
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contained in the word’.  Metaphor, which expresses the connections and unities perceived by the 36
imagination, is an intervention in the known semantic fields which fractures the known to reveal the 
unknown, the new, so that the creative potential of words can be exploited. The unexpressed or 
unrepresented is always in a dialectical process of becoming through language and the human mind. 
As Professor Kirk points out in the Lion, things do not have to be there all the time; they can come 
into being, cease to be and be reinvented in a subtly different form. Chronological snobbery and 
rigid demarcation of time as severed into ‘past’ and ‘present’, need to be reconsidered if we are 
adequately to understand how language shapes the world. As we have seen, it is only when Lucy is 
able to overcome her subjective focus, and realise the cosmic mind (Aslan) that animates both 
human and non-human nature, that she is able to dance with the re-awakened trees. Subsequently, 
the other children become capable of conscious individual participation and can ‘see’ Aslan. And 
eventually, the Old Narnians themselves see myths become facts when the children they had 
thought belonged to old stories materialise in from of them to help Caspian. The point that Lewis 
tries to make, through the professor and elsewhere, is that the poetic and the prosaic impulses in 
language work simultaneously. The idol-making consciousness will repeatedly reassert itself as the 
prosaic becomes predominant; and the disruptive poetic will emerge from the margins, from the 
mouths of children and in the shape of longaevi, to destabilise the ordered coherence created by the 
prosaic. Stories persist on the borders of things, and tricksters lurk in corners, peripheries and 
fringes, ready to unsettle established meanings and interpretations with unsettling spontaneity. 
          One such trickster is Pan/ Bacchus/Dionysus, a syncretic amalgam of revelry, music, dance 
and eroticism. Lewis’s contemporary D. H. Lawrence recalled the old notion, recapitulated by 
Milton, that Christianity signalled the disappearance of Pan: ‘At the beginning of the Christian era, 
voices were heard [...] wailing: “Pan is dead! Great Pan is dead!” The father of fauns and nymphs, 
satyrs and dryads and naiads was dead [...] Humanity hardly noticed’.  Barfield agrees, saying that 37
‘in particular, the whole Dionysian element [...] did not survive the impact of Christianity’.  38
However, as Lawrence writes, ‘Down the long lanes and overgrown ridings of history we catch odd 
glimpses of a lurking rustic god with a goat’s white lightening in his eyes [..] Pan keeps on getting 
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McDonald (London: Heinemann, 1936), pp. 22-23.
 Barfield, SA, p. 99.38
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reborn, in all kinds of strange shapes’.  Barfield explains that this is because ‘Pan [...] has not only 39
not retired from business; he has only gone indoors; he has hardly shut the door before we hear him 
moving about inside’.  In other words, the disappearance of gods corresponded to the movement of 40
internalisation in the development of consciousness. And Lewis, for one, is keen to have Pan and 
Dionysus back in action. He wants to show that the joyful aspect of Christianity is not averse to the 
pagan lens - at least in his fiction, despite his repeated insistences that they do not go together. 
!
2. 4. Renewal: The return of the gods 
Aslan tells Lucy when he meets her in the forest in Prince Caspian, ‘And now all Narnia will be 
renewed’ (157).  And so it is, but in a most surprising way: Lewis stages a return of the pagan gods, 
both to Narnia and to his young reader’s imagination. The implication is that myth works in 
mysterious ways on the imagination, and conveys profound truth in a unique manner. Certainly, any 
conception of the Chronicles as a simplistic Christian allegory is dispelled in this episode. In The 
Allegory of Love, Lewis states that pagan gods were made available to the Romantic imagination by 
the ancient allegorists; they ‘died’ in allegory, and only thus could they be resurrected, ‘disinfected 
of belief  [...] for gods, like other creatures, must die to live’.  The concept of dying to live was 41
central to Lewis's thought, encompassing as it did the whole history of mankind as well as that of 
the individual soul. All old myths had died in the Enlightenment before being resurrected in 
Romanticism, and each individual soul re-enacted this drama of dying to one’s old self to be re-born 
as someone new. Romantics such  as Shelley recalled Prometheus, and Keats remembered Adonis. 
Surprisingly, Lewis re-awakens Bacchus, with all the physical, even sybaritic associations of 
pleasure he brings with him, in a bid to foreground for his readers the importance of the senses. 
          The scene of the renewal of Narnia, which begins with the re-awakened trees ‘rushing 
towards’ Aslan, has a distinct quality of flow. The imagery of movement in the form of dance, 
metamorphosis, and release from bondage, characterises the scene, recalling the sudden rushing, 
flowing onset of spring in the Lion. This Ovidian imagery of transformation is different from 
Lewis’s treatment of life in his theological writings as a step by step series of mutually exclusive 
 Lawrence, ‘Pan in America’, pp. 22-23.39
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choices.  In the process of the dance of the gods, patterns form and mutate; sequences spill into 42
each other: vines are entwined in everyone’s hair and trail on the ground; schoolboys metamorphose 
into pigs; a stick changes into a flowering branch, the man hitting a boy with the stick becoming a 
tree; Miss Prizzle’s classroom transforms into a leafy glade; and the sense of a surging, swirling 
fluidity permeates these events, showing the poetic impulse of language in action.  
          The exuberant dance of the pagan gods signals the unfettering of the imagination which has 
been shackled by reason, and its release from the bonds of positivism. Re-enacting the progress 
from Enlightenment to Romanticism in narrative form, Lewis also sets free those forces of Nature 
that had receded or vanished due to the ‘great movement of internalisation and [the] consequent 
aggrandisement of man and desiccation of the outer universe’.  This slow process of internalisation 43
of forces had resulted in the valorisation of the subjective as against the objective — what primitive 
man had regarded as ‘collective representations’ had been made into objects to be manipulated for 
human satisfaction. As Lewis writes, humans felt that they were separate from nature, and the 
linking threads of influences that had joined humans and nature from prehistoric to medieval times, 
placing man as the microcosm in the macrocosm, were broken. But, as Lewis affirmed, the gods 
could be resurrected in full consciousness of their aesthetic value, and imaginatively apprehended in 
Final Participation. A conscious control of the primary imagination, voluntarily applied to 
perception, could reveal new areas of reality that could once again apprehend the unities within 
creation. The poetic language which captures this scene is radically unlike the fragmented language 
of modernism, which expresses the disjointed impressions made by a life preoccupied by surfaces, 
inducing a withdrawal and detachment of one thing and person from another as the old narratives 
dissipate. 
          In this episode, ‘the romp’, Lewis shows how liberating imagination can be, and that belief in 
a transcendent truth need not be stultifying and solemn but joyful and happy. In Narnia the gods 
revel with Aslan, following him in the joyous mission of liberating Narnia from Telmarine rule. 
Bacchus, with his wild pretty face, is accompanied by Silenus on his ass and a host of wild girls - 
the Maenads. Fauns and nymphs follow them. The rich imagery of sensuous delight in Lewis’s 
description of the dance of joy, with vines bursting with a luxuriance of grapes and an abundance of 
enjoyment, pleasure and plenitude, is a deliberate evocation of the Dionysian celebration of life. 
 See Owen Barfield, ‘Reflections on The Great Divorce’ in Owen Barfield on C. S. Lewis, ed. by G. B. 42
Tennyson (San Rafael, CA.: The Barfield Press, 1989), pp. 82-89.
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The ‘divine revellers’, as Lewis calls them, disrupt order, the central symbol of this disruption being 
the smashing of the Bridge of Beruna. Aslan asks Bacchus to deliver the river-god from his chains, 
and the god proceeds to wrap the stones in ivy, ‘splitting, breaking, separating them’(215). The 
language reminds us of Lewis’s wish to ‘tear it all up’, which he associates with Bacchic revelry in 
his memoirs mentioned earlier.  The bridge can be said to symbolise a turning away from nature, a 44
hankering for ‘dry’ safe life as opposed to immersion, which involves an abandonment of safety and 
comfort for the risk of saturation, a process that brings about a sacramental bond with nature which 
was an integral part of Lewis’s imagination. As Bacchus shoots out vines that demolish the bridge, 
Lewis recounts how with ‘splashing, screaming, and laughter the revellers waded or swam or 
danced across the ford’ (215); and in contrast, the Telmarines made a great fuss: ‘for they all hated 
and feared running water just as much as they hated and feared woods and animals’ (226). Here 
Lewis evokes not only the sacramental significance of water, symbolising death and re-birth, but 
also the fading of ‘original participation’, and demonstrates how what he has called transposition is 
an important corollary of participation. The Old Narnians and the children participate and therefore 
are baptised as they cross the unfettered river. Bacchus himself can now cure a dying woman 
(Caspian’s Nurse) with ‘the richest wine, red as redcurrant jelly, smooth as oil, strong as beef, 
warming as tea, cool as dew’ (220). Thus the old gods, ‘disinfected of belief’, become a source of 
pleasure, of joy, and of healing that pertains to the senses as well as the intellect, for what is needed 
is not a withdrawal from sensory contact but a ‘transformation and redemption’ of the senses by 
applying them to new purposes.  45
             We can find some illumination as to how Lewis hoped to achieve this if we consider the 
romantic thrust of his imagination. Lewis felt that myths and archetypes reflected certain 
fundamental features of man’s basic spiritual experience. As noted earlier, one aspect of this 
experience that Lewis had not found in the northern myths was evoked by the Dionysian 
mythology, specially as he read it in Euripides’ Bacchae and Stephens’ The Crock of Gold. This was 
the darker, wilder and the more sensual element, absent in the the severe coldness of Teutonic myth. 
The romp in Prince Caspian has strong echoes of the final scene in Stephens’ The Crock of Gold, a 
book whose powerful effect on Lewis is evident by the fact that he repeatedly extols it in his letters 
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from as early as 1916 to as late as 1957.  Lewis’s great admiration for the mixture of strange 46
exultation and mysticism of Stephens’ darkly evocative book resonates in the romp scene. In 
Stephens’ novel, the god Angus Og and his human bride Caitilin are accompanied by the Irish ‘fairy 
host’ - the Shee - leprechauns, the sea people, and countless other beings, including the Mother 
goddess, Dana, in a dance of freedom at the end of the novel. They dance, ‘released from the hard 
bondage of self-hood’, moving with the ‘unity of one being’.  For as the author says, they revel in 47
being part of the ‘mighty organism’ made of the units of ‘God and Man and Nature’(136). In other 
words, the spiritual and the material form one organism, reminding us of Lewis’s notion of 
transposition. This is similar to the effect associated with Bacchus/Dionysus, known as the god of 
fusion. Euripides’ play presents Dionysus as the god of dissolution of polarities — the rational and 
the irrational, order and chaos, or the polis and the wild natural realm — and of an order established 
by virtue of these polarities. The god himself occupies an ambiguous space between an adolescent 
and a man, a god and a beast, so that many basic antinomies are confused in his persona. The god’s 
association with anarchy and chaos is dramatised in the Bacchae, where his Maenads - literal 
meaning ‘mad women’ - tear apart the ruler who tries to imprison Dionysus. By evoking the god 
associated with the destruction of boundaries, both literal and figurative, Lewis dramatises the 
dissolution of strictly prosaic, dualistic language into more poetic, figurative meanings.  
          The pagan gods remain powerful, eliciting the kind of excited delight that Lewis himself 
confessed was aroused in him by pagan stories, not the narratives of Christianity.  It is especially 48
significant that Lewis needed to re-call the pagan gods for this purpose in the light of his remarks in 
The Allegory of Love, where he quite emphatically states: 
!
No religion, so long as it is believed, can have that kind of beauty which we find in the gods 
of Titian, of Botticelli, or of our own romantic poets. To this day you cannot make poetry of 
that sort out of the Christian heaven and hell [...] for poetry to spread its wings fully, there 
must be, besides the believed religion, a marvellous that knows itself as myth.   49
!
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Only thus, maintains Lewis, could ‘that other divinity [...] come to light in the imagination’ (83). 
Imaginative, or poetic striving for truth cannot soar to the utmost heights without a marvellous, a 
mythic impetus that is capable of breaking all known and unknown bounds. Only then can the ‘new’ 
be envisioned. As already indicated, Barfield felt this to be a reason why Lewis refrained form 
making theoretical statements about the role of imagination as a vehicle of truth: he felt an element 
of dissonance between imagination and belief, and preferred to enact the truth of imagination in his 
stories.  In this context, Barfield proposes that there were two Lewises: the imaginative and the 
rational. Many of his friends agreed that Lewis lived this polarity, but many argued that it was the 
source of his power as an imaginative writer of fiction. 
 Austin Farrer, a close friend of both Lewis and Tolkien, was an Anglican priest who served 
in Oxford as chaplain and fellow of both St Edmund's Hall and Trinity College before becoming 
Warden of Keble College. While acknowledging that ‘the imaginative and the rationalistic held [...] 
a curious balance in [Lewis’s] mind’, he refuses to see this as either a split or an integration. Rather, 
he argues, ‘this feeling intellect, this intellectual imagination’ resulted in a creative dialectic, 
producing his most powerful works.  As an instance of this dialectic, the unfettered gods somehow 50
escape doctrinal cohesiveness and generate multiple meanings. Dionysus and Pan, the 
Mediterranean gods associated with mystery and eroticism, might seem a strange choice for a writer 
who sought to represent the resurgence of Christianity in an unbelieving world. But as noted before, 
Lewis found the strongly evocative flavour of these myths an aid to the imagination as the creative 
faculty. 
 This hints at the possibility that Lewis’s work will hold a stronger appeal to non-Christians 
than to his intended readership of believers and potential believers. In fact, I would suggest that the 
potency of his fantastic writing might actually be diminished by a recognition that it has a ‘palpable 
design on us’, in Keats’s words.  Many readers have found this to be so; but only an extended study 
of reactions to the novels by Christians and non-Christians, or by readers who recognise Lewis’s 
doctrinal designs in his fiction and those who do not, will be able to answer these questions. 
Meanwhile, it is worth noting only how many of the best fantasy writers since Lewis have been 
avowed atheists; and that some of these, such as Philip Pullman and Ursula Le Guin, have been 
notable for their radical resistance to the Christianity Lewis champions, using his own tools of 
fantasy against it. !
 Austin Farrer, ‘In HIs Image’ in C. S. Lewis at the Breakfast Table and Other Reminiscences, ed. by James 50
T. Como (San Diego: Harvest, 1992, 1979), p. 242.
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CHAPTER THREE. APOCALYPTIC LANGUAGES IN THE LAST BATTLE 
!
Lewis’s The Last Battle is concerned, as the name makes clear, with endings; and in Christian 
tradition the ‘Four Last Things’ of all are Death, Judgment, Heaven, and Hell.  As has been 
suggested earlier, Lewis concurs with Barfield’s theory of the evolution of collective human 
consciousness as it develops from original participation towards non-participatory self-
consciousness and then final participation.  For Barfield, human imagination is creative: human 
beings create the world through language in an imaginative activity he calls Figuration. Primitive 
Figuration was unconscious, and as original participation is lost, subjectivity emerges and the 
phenomenal world recedes into the background, becoming objectified. The third step of human 
development, Barfield proposes, is not a restoration of original participation but a self-conscious 
imaginative act that will re-create the now objectified world as a lived, dialectical reality. But two 
factors make Lewis stop short from wholly agreeing when it comes to this third stage of this 
evolution proposed by Barfield, final participation. These factors are Lewis’s Platonism – the belief 
that this world is a copy of Forms or Ideas that exist in another world, which is the ‘real’ world; and 
his misgivings about positing final redemption as taking place in the context of this world, which is 
an integral part of Barfield’s notion of final participation. Consequently, in the Battle Lewis vividly 
demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between human and non-human elements as reciprocally 
and organically creative of each other (final participation), but only after Narnia comes to an end. 
This section will discuss Lewis’s concept of Apocalypse, which is a complete destruction of ‘this 
world’ and the entry into another world where final participation is possible. 
          The book begins on a dark note, but Lewis’s imaginative rendering of the ‘real’ Narnia that 
emerges at the end of the book is as sensual and dynamic as anything he wrote. The Last Battle is 
syncretic, like the rest of the Narnian Chronicles: biblical themes, motifs and images get 
interwoven with fragments of classical and Norse myths, underpinned by Miltonic and Dantean 
structures, and Lewis’s dialogic narrative produces meaning through the interplay of the different, 
even conflicting ideologies represented by these narratives. Above all, the real Narnia of the 
conclusion is a delightfully inclusive land, in which these many myths cohere to create an exciting, 
endless vista through which all races and species are shown running, penetrating deeper and deeper 
into the new reality. In this scene more than in any he had written before, Lewis shows how poets 
and artists can ‘reveal’ aspects of the world that have remained unapprehended when only sense-
perception is taken as ‘rock-bottom reality’, to the exclusion of imaginative perception.  
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          To narrate the eschatology or ‘end times’ of Narnia was essential for Lewis if he was to bring 
his fantastic vision to a satisfactory conclusion. For Lewis, with his passionate disavowal of 
Darwinian progressivist post-war ideals, the notion of achieving any sort of perfection through mere 
human effort was unacceptable. As Robert Maslen points out, he roundly rejected the materialistic 
literary iconography developed by science fiction writers like H. G. Wells and scientists like J. B. S. 
Haldane (described by Lewis as ‘scientific humanists’), wishing to replace it with an iconography 
of his own which is based on a biblical model of history.   This biblical model, according to M. H. 51
Abrams, consists of a ‘single and sharply defined plot’ with a beginning, a crisis, and a coming end, 
which will replace the old world with a new heaven and new earth.  This model retained its 52
cogency and affective power for Lewis, as Maslen demonstrates; and in his science fiction Lewis 
challenged the scientific humanists’ efforts by producing his own version of the Bible in the 
tradition of Dante and Milton.  He continued this project in the Narnia series. If Haldane’s essay 53
‘The Last Judgement’ (1927) offers an eschatological vision that the scientist feels is more relevant 
to the twentieth century than religious apocalyptic myths, Lewis seeks to demonstrate that the 
Christian apocalyptic vision is relevant for all times and all worlds. The Narnian Chronicles, but 
especially the last two books, are conscious attempts to present an alternative bible, a living book 
that interpenetrates the world of his readers by encouraging them to participate wholly and finally 
(in Barfield’s terms) with his imagined world, Narnia. 
!
3.1. Apocalyptic Eschatology in The Last Battle 
Clearly situated within the tradition of apocalyptic eschatology, The Last Battle has many of the 
characteristics identified by theologians as typical of this category.  It includes, for example, a 
persecuted people (Narnian Animals), an otherworldly journey (Jill and Eustace, and Tirian in a 
dream), a seer who mediates God’s plan (Roonwit), and of course the description of the end of the 
world, with both a personal afterlife and a transformation of the material cosmos into something 
 Robert W. Maslen, ‘Towards an Iconography of the Future’ in Inklings Jahrbuch 18 (2000), pp. 222-249.51
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new and perfect.   In order to link his work from the beginning with the Christian apocalypse, 54
Lewis wanted to make it clear that his fictional universe was soon to end. The Battle therefore 
begins with the words ‘In the last days of Narnia’ , and in chapter two, Tirian is described as ‘the 55
last of the Kings of Narnia’, phrases clearly devised to shock the young reader who has been 
following the Narnia series devotedly up to this moment.  The human protagonists of the story 56
from Lewis’s own time and place, Jill and Eustace, articulate this sense of shock.  Finding 
themselves transported back to Narnia to help the last king in his final confrontation with Narnia’s 
enemies, Jill expresses a wish that she could return instead to those ‘good, ordinary times’ when 
Narnia existed in peace and prosperity: ‘And then,’ she continues, ‘I hope they’ll go on forever and 
ever and ever. Our world is going to have an end some day. Perhaps this one won’t. Oh Jewel - 
wouldn’t it be lovely if Narnia just went on and on’.   But Jewel, the unicorn, quickly puts a stop to 57
these musings - which echo, as Lewis knew very well, the wishes of his young readers. Lewis’s 
project, by the time he writes this book, is to demonstrate that Aslan’s country is the only ‘real’ 
place to desire – to substitute it, so to speak, for the imaginary country he has invented for the 
entertainment and instruction of children. So Jewel answers Jill by making it clear that ‘all worlds 
draw to an end, except Aslan’s own country’,  thus putting a stop to futile wishes for the 58
perpetuation of any world or species - the kinds of wishes expressed by the scientific humanists of 
the early twentieth century, who hoped for an indefinite extension of human life into future ages 
through technological and political progress. 
          Besides these statements by the narrator and characters, there are certain predictions and 
signs from the beginning of the novel that foreshadow the end of Narnia, although these are 
invariably misunderstood or misinterpreted.  Chief among these, as we shall see, is the loss of 
meaning from language, another concept Lewis drew from Barfield. 
 For a detailed discussion of the relevant terminology, considering ‘apocalypse’ as a literary genre, 54
‘apocalyptic eschatology’ as a religious perspective, and ‘apocalypticism’ as a form of social ideology, see 
Paul D. Hanson, The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible: Supplementary Volume (Nashville: Abingdon,
1976), pp. 27-34; John J. Collins, ‘Towards the Morphology of a Genre’, Apocalypse: The Morphology of a 
Genre, Semiea 14 (1979), p. 3; and Bernard McGinn, ‘Early Apocalypticism: the ongoing debate’, in C. A. 
Partrides and Joseph Wittreich (eds.), Apocalypse in English Renaissance Thought and Literature 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 2-5.  
 C. S. Lewis, The Last Battle (New York: HarperCollins, 2001 [1956]) p. 1. All subsequent references are to 55
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3.2. Apocalypse as Semiotic and Semantic Confusion  
Lewis demonstrates the concurrent loss of meaning and moral values in his imagined world through 
the changing use of language in The Last Battle. As Barfield emphasised, ‘The full meanings of 
words are flashing iridescent shapes like flames – ever-flickering vestiges of the slowly evolving 
consciousness beneath them’.  In fact, what he contends is that language is the tool for an 59
archaeology of evolving consciousness - with its correlative, evolving phenomena. In other words, 
the Logos (which means both Spirit and Word), which was once equally present in human beings 
and nature, and in which both participated, is slowly narrowing itself into the human mind, as the 
microcosm emerges from the macrocosm.  As human consciousness evolves, subjectivity emerges 60
and collective human consciousness transforms into individual centres of consciousness. As subject 
and object bifurcate, language loses its original, concrete meanings and words split into abstract 
meanings. It is the role of language, says Barfield, to mediate transition from the ‘unindividualized 
dreaming spirit [...] to the individualized human spirit’.  Therefore logical positivism, which seeks 61
to abolish referentiality in language except as pertaining to scientific subjects, is in effect abolishing 
nature as well as humanity.  Thinking is participation, Barfield insists, and as language and 
consciousness evolve, so the phenomena they address undergo a corresponding evolution. Nature is 
in a constant state of becoming; the world we see is the world we create through language. Mere 
sense-data are meaningless until the imagination unifies them into concrete, meaningful wholes. 
However, whereas primitive humanity was aware of their connectedness with nature (participatory 
consciousness), post-scientific humanity is unaware (non-participatory consciousness). 
          This is represented by Lewis in the Battle by setting up a contrast between the Calormene 
invaders of Narnia on the one hand (whose invasion has been assisted by the collaboration of Shift, 
an ambitious ape); and the Narnian Talking Animals on the other, along with Tirian, their king. The 
abyss that yawns between the Calormenes’ use of certain words and the way these same words are 
used by the Narnians offers a succinct demonstration of the evolution that is taking place among the 
Calormenes and their allies from what Barfield terms ‘participatory’ to ‘non-participatory’ 
consciousness. 
 Barfield, Poetic Diction, p. 67.59
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           Like Tolkien, Lewis believes that naming is an act of imaginative creation, exemplified in 
the prototypical biblical injunction to Adam - repeated by Aslan to the cabby in The Magician’s 
Nephew - to name all creatures according to their nature. Lewis’s names for his characters, then, are 
always carefully chosen, so that the treacherous ape (for instance) is called Shift, an indication not 
only of his ‘shifty’, devious nature but also of the shifting and blurring of linguistic boundaries by 
which he engages in his quest for power. Shift alters and adjusts meaning according to his desire of 
the moment; mostly the gluttonous desire for food that confirms his commitment to the seventh 
deadly sin. The ape plays with words to confound and perplex the donkey, Puzzle, whose name also 
summarises his identity. As the Battle begins, the reader quickly becomes aware of Shift’s 
manipulative use of language, as he succeeds in making Puzzle do all the hard work, setting up a 
master-servant relationship between them that Shift misrepresents to Puzzle as a friendship between 
equals. Shift’s linguistic misappropriations reach a sinister climax when he sees a lion skin in 
Cauldron Pool. He insists that the skin has been ‘sent’ with the express purpose of being used to 
construct a false image of Aslan – though he never explains who has sent it. The different reactions 
of ape and donkey to the lion skin are illuminating.  Shift regards it as a mere object to be used for 
his own ends, whereas Puzzle understands its significance as the outer shell of that most potent of 
Narnian symbols, a lion, and associates it at once with the greatest of lions, Aslan. As a result the 
donkey wishes to give it a proper burial as a token of respect. This confirms Puzzle’s recognition 
that the skin may stand for something other than itself: a spiritual relationship, for instance, or a 
metonymic representation. Shift, on the other hand, sees it as nothing more than a material asset that 
can be deployed to fool the animals of Narnia. Shift’s semantic distortions are underpinned by a 
materialistic view of the world, regarding all non-human phenomena, animals, trees and so on, as 
‘things’ to be used.  Concomitantly he sees himself as distinct from the other talking animals – as a 
human being – while dismissing his fellow sentient creatures as suitable material to be enslaved.  
The issue here is one of definitions: Shift considers humanity to consist in cunning, not recognising 
that his fellow Narnians manifest their intelligence quite differently from him, by using words in 
their right senses, by respecting the signs that indicate the values they respect, and by serving their 
fellow creatures rather than themselves.  None of these forms of behaviour qualifies as ‘cunning’ in 
Shift’s book, and this shift in his understanding of what it is to be human – or rather sentient, a word 
Lewis translates in his science fiction novels by the invented term ‘hnau’ – is perhaps the most 
significant in the novel. 
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         In the light of Barfield’s conception of language as creative, and as coeval with the evolution 
of human consciousness, this new development (or ‘shift’) in Narnian language usage holds 
important implications. As we have seen, Barfield shows that as language becomes more abstract in 
sync with the development of human self-consciousness, the natural phenomena in which humans 
initially participated increasingly become mere objects to be used. The corruption of Shift illustrates 
this perfectly. Shift is helped in his perverse designs by the Calormenes, who are also driven by 
material greed, and whose corruption Lewis had already demonstrated in The Horse and His Boy 
(1954), where they are portrayed as a predominantly materialistic people. Lewis’s racism is evident 
in his portrayal of the Calormenes, which is clearly modelled on Near-Eastern religio-social life as 
Lewis perceived it.  Yet his exuberantly imaginative portrayal represents many beautiful and 
appealing aspects of the eastern land: above all, the Calormenes delight in using language elegantly, 
which is at its best when they are telling stories.  These positive aspects of Calormene culture, 
largely drawn from Lewis’s love for the Arabian Nights, succeed in making The Horse and His Boy 
delightful reading despite its racist attitudes. In the main, however, the Calormenes represent the 
singular vision that condones and even celebrates the hedonistic life-styles of the rich, itself 
predicated on the necessity of enslaving a segment of the population.  Indeed, part of the pleasure 62
of The Horse and his Boy lies in the frequently amusing disjunction between the ornate locutions of 
Calormenes of all classes and the selfishness of their behaviour.  The Horse’s portrayal of Southern 
culture as fundamentally corrupt, in contrast to the generous and unselfish Northern culture of 
Narnia, is reprised in the Battle, where the Calormenes exhibit the ‘idol-making’, materialistic 
mentality Lewis abhors, and which he warns against in The Abolition of Man.   63
 When phenomena (the Greek word for appearances) are treated as ‘bodies already formed’, 
as valueless and inert objects, they become ‘idols’, explains Barfield.  In The Last Battle the 
Calormenes are represented first and foremost as the followers of a monstrous demon-god called 
Tash, who has usurped the place of a deity in their imagination. Where the true God is loving, Tash 
encourages cruelty in his followers; where the true God, being beautiful himself, delights in beauty, 
peace and affection, Tash delights in ugliness, war and hatred. Tash, then, stands for the appalling 
semantic shift that takes place when the term ‘god’ is applied to something or someone who does 
not meet the criteria for godhood. And the substitution of another set of meanings for the true 
 For example, the supreme indifference of Aravis to how her maid, whom she drugged before escaping, 62
would be whipped; an attitude that evinces the typically English understatement, ‘that’s unfair’ from Shasta, 
who turns out be a Northern prince. C. S. Lewis, The Horse and His Boy, p. 53.
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!  86
meaning of this term brings with it a range of other substitutions, whereby words become utterly 
detached from their proper significations as if by a perverse act of magic. Indeed, this book makes 
clearer than any of the earlier Narnia novels that magic inheres in the ordinary words of everyday 
speech.  The reassignment of meanings by Shift and the Calormenes enables them to cast as potent 
‘spells’ as any sorcerer, actually transforming reality by describing it in inverted terms. As the novel 
unfolds it becomes clear that the Calormenes (and Shift) do not see the same phenomena as other 
sentient beings do, because their consciousness of the world has been profoundly affected by their 
use of language. They inhabit a world of ‘idols’, in which the objectified Other is a lifeless 
substance to be operated upon by the subject.  
          The semiotic confusion generated by the ape produces an increasingly ominous atmosphere 
in Narnia. Reading or interpreting ‘signs’ is an important element in mythico-religious discourse, 
and the magnitude of Shift’s transgression in suggesting that Puzzle dress up as Aslan is made clear 
when a small earthquake throws them both on their faces.   But this sign, too, is contested; Puzzle 64
and Shift interpret it in directly contradictory ways, with Shift’s cunning inevitably permitting him 
to impose his own interpretation on his gullible companion. While the donkey reads the earthquake 
as a sign of Aslan’s wrath at their hubristic plans, Shift claims to read it as a sign of approval from 
above – though the reader may well suspect that he really thinks it a noise devoid of significance 
altogether. It’s clear, too, that the reader is expected to interpret the sign of the earthquake as Puzzle 
does, and to be disturbed by Shift’s willingness to change the meaning of a divine gesture so well 
embedded in different mythological traditions.  The association of earthquakes with divine wrath, or 
with imminent disaster, is by no means confined to a Christian context (where it occurs, for 
instance, in the earthquake that accompanies Christ’s death in the Synoptic Gospels). The end of 
times in the Norse tradition is preceded by earthquakes, while Zeus brings the civilisation of 
Atlantis to an end with an earthquake in Plato’s Timaeus.  Shift’s rebranding of an earthquake as a 65
sign of approval, then, violates the logic of a syncretic web of myths, and drives home the 
bankruptcy of his view of sign systems in general.  It is hardly surprising, then, that as he rises to 
the ascendancy after the Calormene invasion of Narnia his wilful divorce of words from meanings 
spreads, so that the many other signs of the end of the world that follow the earthquake are either 
ignored or misinterpreted. Even the last of the Narnian kings cannot interpret them with any 
 This resonates with the Biblical theme of revelation, as St. Paul and St. John both fall to the ground in the 64
moment of revelation.
 ‘Ragnarok.’ Encyclopaedia Mythica from Encyclopaedia Mythica Online.< http://www.pantheon.org/articles/65
r/ragnarok.html > [Accessed 30 July, 2013].
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precision - a sign of his diminishing ability to participate, in Barfield’s terms, and an inability that 
leads him to misjudge the mayhem being perpetrated by the Calormenes, especially among words.  
          The first explicit verbal warning in the book of something terribly amiss comes in the form of 
a prophecy by the centaur Roonwit, whose name confirms his skill in reading ‘runes’ or signs. The 
centaur’s prophecy is also a generically apocalyptic element signalling that Lewis was conscious of 
his book as an intervention in biblical hermeneutics, in which the conduit of revelation is often a 
non-human ‘seer’ who unfolds God’s design for his people to a human.  The Centaur’s talk of star-66
signs and their meanings recalls an astronomical sign in an earlier book of Narnia, the constellation 
shown to Caspian by his tutor in Prince Caspian. That sign had been auspicious, presaging good 
fortune for Narnia; but the stars bode ill for Narnia in Tirian’s reign, as Roonwit explains. ‘Never in 
all my days,’ the centaur declares, ‘have I seen such terrible things written in the skies [...] I know 
by my art that there have not been such disastrous conjunctions of the planets for five hundred years 
[...] some great evil hangs over Narnia’. He warns Tirian not to believe that Aslan is in Narnia, for 
‘The stars never lie, but Men and Beasts do’ (18-19). Unfortunately, Tirian fails to comprehend fully 
the warning read in the stars by Roonwit, because he is well on the way to losing his awareness of a 
participating cosmos - a concept which Caspian in the earlier books, set in the Narnian equivalent of 
the earthly Middle Ages, understood very well. Evidently Narnia is undergoing something 
equivalent to entropy, of which the disconnection between the spoken word and the comprehension 
of its recipients is a major symptom. 
          Another recognised sign of apocalypse is a persecuted people,  which is most drastically 67
exemplified in Narnia by the murder of the Dryads, the spirits of the Talking Trees. The notion that 
trees can talk is always deeply disturbing to invaders of Narnia. The Telmarines of Prince Caspian 
find it terrifying, and the Calormenes are eager to put paid to the practice for good, thus reinforcing 
their conviction that only the controlled human speech authorised by their rulers can be permitted in 
their territories. We might remember, from this point of view, that there were no Talking Beasts in 
the Calormene of The Horse and His Boy, and that Bree had been forced to conceal his own 
articulacy for years for fear of reprisal.  The first sign of the Dryads’ fate occurs just after the 
centaur has uttered his prophecy.  Roonwit’s conversation with Tirian is interrupted by the sound of 
 See, for example, Bernard McGinn, ‘Early Apocalypticism: The Ongoing Debate’ in eds. C. A. Patrides and 66
Joseph Wittreich, The Apocalypse in English Renaissance Thought and Literature (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984), p. 4. 
 Paul D. Hanson, The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible: Supplementary Volume (Nashville: Abingdon,67
1976), pp. 27-34.
!  88
lamentation as a Dryad runs up with the dreadful news that the ‘holy trees’ of Lantern Waste are 
being felled: ‘Great trees are falling, falling, falling’ (20). This episode derives its force from the 
fact that Lantern Waste was the very first place Lewis’s readers saw in Narnia: Lucy entered it from 
the Wardrobe in the first book of the series, and we witnessed the planting of the lantern in the story 
of Narnia’s creation told in the penultimate book, The Magician’s Nephew.  In other words, the 
phrase ‘Lantern Waste’ has come to stand synecdochally for Narnia itself, and its destruction 
testifies to the Calormenes’ hostility to the whole imaginative construct we have come to think of as 
Narnia.  An attack on that particular locale is an attack on Narnia as a whole, and an attack on 
Narnia is an attack on the imagination, which deploys words to make impossible things happen, to 
conjure up wonders out of nothing.  The reader’s relationship with Lantern Waste, built up over 
years, means that they feel the assault on it more deeply than they could have done if the phrase had 
been casually introduced into this book without its attendant echoes.!
 The pain of witnessing the demolition of an imaginary world in whose creation one has 
participated – something Lewis could assume about every reader who had followed his series so far 
– is brilliantly dramatised in this episode. With graphic immediacy Lewis shows us what a 
participating consciousness would see if a sentient tree were to be felled, the horror of which is first 
articulated in the king’s unbelieving exclamation at the notion of Talking Trees being ‘murdered’.  
Instead of simply hearing his horror, the reader is forced to witness its cause: 
!
‘A-a-a-h,’ gasped the Dryad […] shuddering time after time as if under repeated blows. 
Then all at once she fell sideways as suddenly as if both her feet had been cut from under 
her. For a second they saw her lying on the grass and then she vanished. They knew what 
had happened. Her tree, miles away, had been cut down (21). 
  
This horrific scene demonstrates the state of consciousness of the Calormene invaders (non-
participating) as against the Narnians (participating).  Evidently the Calormenes share the state of 
mind against which Lewis protested so strongly in The Abolition of Man, where he describes the 
‘bleeding trees’ in Virgil and Spenser as ‘far-off echoes of that primeval sense of impiety’, which 
Lewis feels sure was elicited by the desecration of nature even as late as the Medieval period.  The 68
same impiety is enacted in the felling of the talking trees, which are inhabited by divine or semi-
divine beings; the atrocity demonstrates how, in Lewis’s words, non-human phenomena can be 
 Lewis, AoM, p. 70. 68
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‘stripped of [their] qualitative properties and reduced to mere quantity’ in the mind of the 
materialist.  Lewis’s allusion to the bleeding trees in The Divine Comedy makes this a complex, 69
resonant image, as Dante’s guide, Virgil, mentions his own poem (Aeneid 3, 22-48) as an analogue 
to the bleeding trees in the eighth circle of Hell (Inferno, Canto 13, 31-45), thus identifying the 
topos as a theme running through the major epics. In this scene, Dante casually pulls off the branch 
of a tree and is shocked when it starts to bleed.  A voice from inside the tree then tells the poet that 
it is in fact a human who committed suicide and has therefore been arborified.  Virgil’s own 
bleeding tree is also a human being, Polydorus, who has been murdered for his gold and 
metamorphosed into vegetation. As Barfield has noted, participation continued into medieval times, 
and the poets’ symbolism of bleeding trees in Dante’s poem reveals their awareness of the close 
connections between humanity and the environment, an awareness shared by Spenser (who 
introduces bleeding trees into The Faerie Queene) and of course Lewis, who idolised all three 
poets. These intertextual associations point to the epistemic significance of imaginative 
apprehension, in contrast to abstract, deductive reasoning – the reasoning that underpins the 
marketplace, at least according to the market’s rhetoric. 
          The impact of reductive use of language is evident as the king and Jewel advance towards the 
woods in anger. They encounter a water-rat who is sailing on a raft made of ‘Half a dozen splendid 
tree-trunks, all newly cut and newly lopped of their branches’, and the rat tells them he is off to sell 
the ‘logs’ to the Calormenes. Readers who have just witnessed the terrible death of the Dryad will 
feel the acute irony of referring to the trees as a certain quantity of material to be sold. There could 
be no better illustration of the slow conversion of a consciousness that embraces the cosmos as a 
macrocosm and man as a microcosm within it, to a consciousness that has bifurcated all words into 
binary fissions, proposing ‘I’ as living subject and ‘It’ as dead object (in Martin Buber’s terms, 
which I discuss later).  And there’s a further irony here: the water-rat is quite oblivious to the fact 
that he himself will soon be subject to the same process, since in Calormene – and of course in the 
world of the reader – water rats do not speak, and so cannot distinguish between the log and the 
living tree. 
          The desecration of nature is the sign of an advanced degree of non-participatory 
consciousness. Embodied in the empiricist philosophy of thinkers such as Francis Bacon (ironically 
 Lewis, AoM, p. 70. 69
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the chief theorist of the various ‘idols’ that impede clear thinking)  was a desire to control the non-70
human environment, to use it, in a phrase Lewis quotes from Bacon in the Abolition, not as a 
mistress to be pleased but as a spouse to be fruitful.  The conflation of women and nature as the 71
symbolic Other to be dominated is present in Bacon’s formulation, and has provoked fierce 
resistance from contemporary ecofeminist movements; Le Guin’s polemical response to this double 
marginalisation is discussed in the next part of the thesis. The same attitude to the environment 
sponsored the rapid escalation of inter-war techno-industrial development against which both 
Tolkien and Lewis spoke so strongly in their novels. Tolkien especially loved trees, as his creation 
of Treebeard the Ent testifies. In a parallel scene to the Dryad one, when Merry and Pippin tell 
Treebeard of trees being felled to feed the fires of Orthanc, the Ent angrily replies that most of the 
trees are his friends, ‘creatures I had known from nut and acorn; many had voices of their own that 
are lost forever now’.  Le Guin shares this love with Tolkien: in the Earthsea series, all knowledge 72
inheres within the roots of the Immanent Grove and can be discerned from the pattern of its leaves. 
She anticipates this connection between vegetation and wisdom in a note to her short story, ‘Vaster 
than Empires and More Slow’ (1975), which begins with the words ‘Trees again’ and goes on to 
affirm that ‘We all have forests in our minds. Forests unexplored, unending’.  As ecological and 73
environmental degradation becomes a vital concern at the turn of the millennium, Tolkien and 
Lewis’s views have come more and more to occupy the mainstream of the political debate. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, Le Guin represents the end of human life in the later Earthsea novels as 
a reunion with a matrix that includes both the organic and the non-organic worlds, from whose 
fusion, as Barfield argued with Lewis’s concurrence, all consciousness emerges. 
 The image of the dying tree in The Last Battle, then, derives its energy from an associative 
nexus of symbols and intertexts which extends from the biblical myth of the Fall, with its tree of 
knowledge and tree of life, to the reconstruction of the Fall in Milton’s Paradise Lost - and beyond 
to Le Guin. The myth of the Fall offers a concrete representation of Barfield’s theory of the loss of 
original participation and the subsequent awareness of self and other as irreconcilably separate. It is 
therefore an excellent example of the concomitant rational and imaginative apprehension offered by 
 See Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: 70
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myth - that is, the cognitive and imaginative validity of myth - and helps to explain Lewis’s 
introduction of a falling tree as an emblem of Narnia’s approaching fall.  
          Lewis frequently shows the difficulty of reconciling these two modes of thought – that is, the 
rational and the imaginative – without the help of a fund of stories capable of nourishing both the 
faculties. In Barfield’s terms, the rational is the prosaic and the imaginative is the poetic impulse in 
language, and ‘it is only by means of this prosaic spirit that the separate perceptual groups 
(“phenomena”), which metaphor is to combine or relate, could ever have become separate’.  74
Similarly, as Barfield goes on to contend, human consciousness only came into being by the prosaic 
principle, ‘For the rational principle […] is above all that which produces self-consciousness’.  In 75
the Battle, Tirian feels unable for a while to reconcile his vivid imaginative life with his reason; a 
dilemma that Lewis himself contended with for many years. Only in his mythopoeic writing, in fact 
– in Narnia and Till We Have Faces - did he discover a satisfactory means of bringing them into 
harmony.  In the Battle, Tirian’s reasoning is often at fault; he acts rashly and makes mistakes, as 76
when he kills two unarmed Calormene soldiers in passionate rage at their beating a Talking Horse. 
At the same time, it is his imaginative participation that draws him towards the idealised Narnia of 
Aslan’s country. When Tirian is confronted with ever more concrete evidence that Aslan is wholly 
different from the divine being he thought he knew – that the lion is a tyrant, as constructed by 
Shift, rather than the benefactor he has heard about in stories – the young king still refuses to be 
bound by the tyranny of ‘reason’, and persists in believing in the Aslan he has always dreamed of, 
much as the young Caspian persisted in believing the stories of ostensibly mythical Old Narnians in 
Prince Caspian. In other words, the integrative faculty of the imagination is needed to restore 
conceptually what has been lost in perception during the evolution of consciousness. While the 
rational principle ‘shuts off the human ego from the living meaning in the outer world’  and 77
encloses it into fragmented pieces of self-hood, poetic language can reintegrate the fragments to 
discover new semantic fields. The fact that both Tirian and Caspian turn out to be justified in their 
beliefs – that their imaginative convictions prove substantial – argues for a different use of reason 
than the Gradgrindian variety espoused by Narnia’s enemies. 
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          After killing the two Calormene soldiers, Tirian and Jewel stop in mid-flight to consider their 
actions. Musing on the happenings of the past few hours, Tirian is forced to think that Aslan might 
indeed be back in Narnia; as he reminds Jewel, the rat taking logs downriver to be sold in 
Calormene, as well as the enslaved Talking Horse, had asserted that these things were being done 
on Aslan’s orders. Tirian’s decision to hand himself over to the enemy is based not only on his 
shame at having attacked two unarmed men; also, and more importantly, he and Jewel feel desolate 
at the prospect of an Aslan who would endorse such cruelty as the murder of Talking Trees and the 
enslavement of Talking Animals. But Tirian insists that he would rather die than live with the 
‘horrible fear’ that Aslan ‘has come and is not like the Aslan we have believed in and longed for’. 
He uses a striking simile to describe such a state of affairs: ‘It is as if the sun rose one day and were 
a black sun’ (32).  This formulation recalls the Green Witch’s distortions of language in The Silver 
Chair (1953), when she tries to dissuade Eustace and Jill from belief in the world above the ground 
by insisting that the lamp in her subterranean apartment – which Prince Rilian has used as 
analogous to the sun – is the only real source of light, while the sun is ‘but a tale, a children’s 
story’.  The parallel with this episode may well be deliberate on Lewis’s part, reminding his 78
readers of another parable about the truths that fantastic stories can convey. The Narnians’ 
imaginative knowledge of Aslan in The Last Battle – based wholly on stories, since the lion has not 
visited Narnia in their lifetimes – also makes Jewel compare the fear of finding a different Aslan to 
the feeling you would get ‘if you drank water and it were dry water’.  A black sun and dry water 79
are particularly poignant images of un-life, since light and water are basic necessities or conditions 
for the subsistence of living beings. More importantly, they are logical impossibilities; the sun is 
light, no light on earth would exist without it, and water cannot be divorced from the property of 
wetness (except perhaps in dreams).  Language loses all meaning if these properties are removed 
from the things that are their source and origin; and by the same token, as Jewel says, ‘if Aslan is 
not Aslan, what life is left for me?’ (32). Putting these words in the mouth of a unicorn is a 
supremely witty act on Lewis’s part; a non-existent animal insists on the necessity of a non-existent 
lion to his own continued existence, and the reader is constrained by the story’s logic to accept the 
unicorn’s reasoning.  Here logic and the sentient being’s capacity to imagine something better than 
they have in front of them are inextricably entwined, setting up a powerful alternative to the 
materialist reasoning of Aslan’s detractors. 
 Lewis, The Silver Chair (London: HarperCollins, 2001 [1953]), p. 198.78
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          In Shift’s case, this reasoning is shown in a far more menacing light than the magic spells of 
the Witches, which presented the chief threat in the earlier Narnia novels. Instead of using magic, 
like the White Witch or the Green one, Shift and his Calormene helpers distort the meanings of 
words like ‘freedom’ and ‘slavery’ in a manner reminiscent of George Orwell’s Newspeak or 
Doublethink in Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949). When Tirian and Jewel hand themselves over to the 
Calormenes they are taken up to the hill where Shift daily collects all Narnians to hear his 
propagandistic addresses, and nightly collects them to catch a glimpse of the false Aslan – Puzzle 
dressed in the lion’s skin – by the light of a bonfire. The setting up of false prophets is yet another 
sign of biblical apocalypse, as in Matthew 7:15-22;  and the ape’s falsity is apparent in his 80
confused speech, as he repeatedly slips into saying ‘I want’ rather than ‘Aslan wants’ when he 
issues his orders. But his linguistic corruption goes much deeper than this.  Shift is also guilty of 
distorting the basic meanings of words through the deployment of what George Steiner calls 
‘ideological language’, a form of discourse which takes advantage of polysemy to achieve its ends: 
that is, of ‘the capacity of the same word to mean different things, such difference ranging from 
nuance to antithesis’.  The ape uses this ideologically inflected language as he warns the animals: 81
!
Everyone who can work is going to be made to work in the future. Aslan has it all settled with 
the King of Calormen [...] All you Horses and Bulls and Donkeys are to be sent down to 
Calormen to work for your living - pulling and carrying the way horses and such like do in 
other countries. And all you digging animals like Moles and Rabbits and Dwarfs are going 
down to work in the Tisroc’s mines (37-38). 
!
The animals’ dismayed and unbelieving complaints that Aslan has sold them into slavery are 
dismissed by the ape as irrational irrelevancies, since they will not technically be slaves: ‘You’ll be 
paid,’ he tells them; ‘That is to say, your pay will be paid into Aslan’s treasury and he will use it for 
everybody’s good’ (38). This is an excellent example of Orwellian Doublethink, reflecting how 
slavery and paid work, ostensibly wholly different, are in many forms of governance essentially the 
same. Steiner’s ‘ideological language’ splinters meaning to such an extent that any word can be 
used to mean anything that suits the hegemonic discourse. The result of this verbal splintering is 
 False prophets are warned against repeatedly in the Old and New Testaments. For example, Deut. 18: 80
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that the ideology invoked by the ape could be identified equally with Soviet communism, which 
claims to distribute wages fairly while privileging a power elite, and capitalism, which makes wage 
slaves of its workers.  These apparently opposite ideological positions are united in their use of 
language to sustain the hegemony.   
          Politically motivated speech is full of euphemism and generalisations.  Shift’s utilitarian 
slogan, that things are being done for ‘everybody’s good’, actually refers to the advantage of the 
few; and his list of things to be established for everybody’s good is almost comically horrific: 
‘roads and big cities and schools and offices and whips and muzzles and saddles and cages and 
kennels and prisons’ (38). In this sentence Lewis’s satire is again given its point by his use of beast 
fable; the more ‘progressive’ elements of a city, such as schools and offices, are mixed in with the 
apparatus of state control, such as prisons, and both are evocatively intermingled with human 
mechanisms for controlling animals: whips, muzzles, saddles, cages, kennels. The slippage between 
human and animal references offers a neat demonstration of the way loss of participation with our 
environment leads inexorably to loss of participation with one another; deride animals and trees and 
you deride the people who depend on them.  And when the Animals complain that they do not want 
to be subjected to these tools of oppression – that they want to be free – the ape at once questions 
their capacity for reason, reinforcing their non-sentient status in comparison with himself: ‘What do 
you know about freedom? You think freedom means doing what you like. Well, you’re wrong. That 
isn’t true freedom. True freedom means doing what I tell you’.  Here Lewis makes it clear that the 82
ape himself is irrational, since he can think only in subjective terms; his world is solipsistic. In the 
ossified subject-object binary, all value is based on subjective desire - so that ‘you-want’ and ‘I-
want’ rhetoric becomes the ultimate category of meaning. Lewis himself, by contrast, believes in 
objective value, holding that certain phenomena ‘demand certain reactions’ based on an intrinsic 
value that inheres within them.  But the ape is incapable of apprehending this. The depletion of the 83
awareness of the nexus between human consciousness and nature, and the so-called conquest of 
nature by humanity, are here exposed as power gained by a few men over the rest of creation, 
human as well as non-human. The implication is that technological and social progress, with the 
concomitant ‘fatal serialism’ (AoM, 80) that makes post-war and post-industrial humanity believe 
they are on a path of continual improvement, needs to be reconsidered before all consideration is 
rendered impossible by the loss of meaning. 
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 The distortions of language encouraged by the invaders expose not only their ecopolitical 
but also their religious perversity. The nadir of linguistic malfunction is reached when Shift declares 
Aslan and Tash to be one and the same: ‘Tash is only another name for Aslan,’ he insists, and ‘Tash 
and Aslan are only two different names for you know Who’ (40). Now names, for Lewis, are not 
merely empty signifiers – arbitrary sounds to denote the signified, which have no intrinsic link with 
the signifier. As we already know from the intensely physical effect that Aslan’s name had on the 
four Pevensie children when they first heard it in the Lion, names are of immense importance for 
Lewis – another link between Lewis and Plato, who discussed the identity of names and things in 
his dialogue Cratylus. Barfield’s theory of consciousness posits naming as coterminous with the 
formation of ‘things’ at the creation, so that in the primal Adamic language the name and the thing 
were essentially the same; and the concept that the Word is both creative and also generative of 
‘sub-creation’ helped to shape the literary imagination of the Inklings. For Lewis, then, the 
distortion of Aslan’s name to Tashlan would have been the ultimate transgression, as it warps and 
disfigures the primal Narnian Word. In The Magician’s Nephew Aslan was presented as the creator 
of Narnia, just as Christ is the creator in Milton’s Paradise Lost; and it was his breath that conferred 
consciousness and language (‘Think, Speak, Know’) on certain Animals. Speech, then, in 
association with Aslan, is a thing of power, and to defuse the significance of Aslan’s own name is to 
undermine the premise on which Narnia was constructed.  Worse, it binds the lion in an unholy 
alliance with the devilish Tash, whose name yokes the clash of teeth or cymbals with the word that 
denotes nonsense in Edwardian English: Tosh. 
 At first glance, this portrayal of an evil foreign deity, a sower of deadly nonsense among the 
conquered peoples, goes against the grain of the joyous syncretism which informed the Narnian 
Chronicles from the beginning. The heterogeneity exhibited in the wild romp of renewal in Prince 
Caspian would seem to be undercut in the portrayal of the Calormene god as wholly evil, in line 
with the insular prejudice Lewis showed in his representation of ‘Southern’ culture in The Horse 
and his Boy. But an important counter to this apparent resistance to heterogeneity is the Calormene 
soldier, Emeth. Emeth believes wholeheartedly in the goodness of Tash, and learns at the end of the 
book that he has been a faithful servant of Aslan all along. His understanding of divine goodness 
has always been impeccable; he has simply articulated it through a different combination of letters 
and sounds. This could of course be said to problematise the conception of naming as presented in 
the Narnia series. The strong, visceral response of the Pevensie children to Aslan’s name in the Lion 
implies that even for post-participation humans one word at least could have a direct link to what it 
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signified; so that Emeth’s application of the same meaning to a different name in The Last Battle is 
an intriguing incongruity. At the same time, it confirms Lewis’s personal hope that the best 
immaterial things – such as God himself – need not become inaccessible to humankind even after 
the linguistic deterioration to which the Battle bears witness. And it offers, too, a rationale for the 
cultural heterogeneity we have already noted in his earlier works.  Lewis’s erstwhile secretary 
Walter Hooper points out that the salvation of the ‘virtuous infidel’ was an important issue for 
Lewis throughout his life, as a result of his passionate love for non-Christian arts and cultures.  In a 84
letter dated 1954, the year after he finished writing The Last Battle, Lewis cites approvingly Dante’s 
inclusion of Rhipeus, a Trojan hero, and the Roman Emperor Trajan, in his depiction of heaven 
(Paradiso XX), describing it as a sign of ‘uncovenanted mercies’.  It was important, then, for 85
Lewis’s delight in imaginative syncretism that Emeth should have been allowed entry into his 
version of the heavenly city. 
 The radical disjunction between name and meaning which leads even the virtuous 
Calormene, Emeth, mistakenly to assign Aslan’s qualities to Tash, is again illustrated by a secret 
conversation that takes place between Ginger, the cunning cat who allies himself with Shift, and the 
Calormene captain, Rishda Tarkaan.  On the night when Shift first asserts that Tash and Aslan are 
the same, the cat asks Rishda to clarify what he meant by his own statement, in front of all the 
Talking Animals, that Aslan meant neither less nor more than Tash. Did he mean, asks the cat, that 
Aslan meant no more than Tash – in other words, that there was in fact ‘no such person as 
either’ (98)? The Tarkaan’s answer is that ‘All who are enlightened know that’.  Subsequently, the 
Calormenes and their Narnian collaborators plan to include in their plan to depose the Narnian king 
some of the ‘more enlightened Narnians [who] care neither for Tash nor Aslan but have only an eye 
to their own profit’.  This highlights the mode of consciousness that disconnects language from 86
any creative principle – that of the Enlightenment humanists, in fact, who believed that progress 
was predicated solely upon reason. Lewis believed that such ‘enlightened’ reasoning was in the 
majority of cases not so much an exercise of remorseless logic as the specific application of logical 
or quasi-logical techniques to the pursuit of personal advantage. In addition, of course, he wished to 
demonstrate that the reality available to the senses is not the only reality to which sentient beings 
have access. Myth has often been proven to be true in Narnia; the four Pevensies, held to be 
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mythical creatures in Prince Caspian, actually materialise when Susan’s Horn is blown; the Old 
Narnians, thought to be myths by Caspian, help him regain his kingdom; examples abound. So 
Tash, who had been summoned by the non-believer Rishda, actually appears in Narnia, reinforcing 
the notion that language constructs reality – or that unpleasant realities can attach themselves to 
language used rashly and loosely, as when Marlowe’s Faustus summons Mephistopheles per 
accidens, as a consequence of uttering blasphemy, not because of the specific words he uses. 
 Nevertheless, the link between language and consciousness proposed by Barfield, which 
formed the central principle of Narnia since its inception, remains as integral to this apocalyptic 
narrative as it was to the creation story told in The Magician’s Nephew (1955). When Aslan breathes 
consciousness into the Animals in the Nephew, he warns the newly conscious beasts to take care not 
to behave like the dumb ones, since by doing so they may cease to be sentient: ‘For out of them you 
were taken and into them you can return’.  The sentence is clearly a structural and semantic echo 87
of the biblical ‘Dust thou art and unto dust thou shalt return’ (Genesis 3:19). Lewis attributes 
semantic as well as moral and aesthetic qualities of language to divine fiat. In the Nephew, Aslan 
tells the animals he has chosen to make sentient that ‘jokes as well as justice come in with 
speech’ (141). One of the reasons Lewis lays stress on this is because of the concern with the origin 
and nature of language, which was at its height in the mid-nineteenth century, but continued into the 
twentieth. Max Müller was one of the most important thinkers to promulgate the view that language 
constituted the main distinction between, animals and humans.  In his characteristically dramatic 
prose, Max Müller warns in an 1875 article: ‘Let us take continual care [...] lest by abusing the gift 
of speech or doing violence to the voice of conscience we soil the two wings of our soul, and fall 
back through our own fault, to the dreaded level of the Gorilla’.  Laughter, too, was identified by 88
Aristotle as the gift that separates humanity from the beasts; and while the creation scene in The 
Magician’s Nephew is full of laughter, there is little cause for hilarity in the final book of Narnia. 
Humanity has come closer to bestiality in this book than at any other point in the sequence; and the 
profound discomfort that this proximity could evoke is evident throughout the narrative.  
          In an essay ominously titled ‘The Funeral of a Great Myth’, Lewis deconstructs the myth of 
linear progress by insisting that progressive improvement of the species is not the rule in evolution, 
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and that for every case of progress there are ten of degeneration.  In the Narnian Chronicles, the 89
most potent symptom of degeneration is loss of speech.  Readers of The Last Battle have already 
been subjected to the horrifying moment in Prince Caspian when the four Pevensies were attacked 
by a bear and a shaken Susan could not shoot it for fear it might be a Talking Bear gone wild. The 
possibility of regression to a pre-linguistic state makes Lucy wonder if human beings too might 
undergo such a regression, going wild and losing language as they lose touch with one another and 
their communal past. In the Nephew, Aslan tells the Talking Animals: ‘I give to you for ever this 
land of Narnia [...] The Dumb Beasts I have not chosen are yours also. Treat them gently and 
cherish them, but do not go back to their ways lest you cease to be Talking Beasts’ (141). His 
warning is borne out in the Battle in the fate of the sly cat Ginger, one of those who conflate the 
names of Aslan and Tash while denying the reality of either.  His denigration of language as non-
referential makes his punishment unsettlingly appropriate: he is reduced to a state of yowling, 
shrieking inarticulacy in the midst of his efforts to hoodwink his fellow Narnians.  Lewis’s 90
equation of degeneration with loss of language finds an interesting variant in Le Guin’s The 
Farthest Shore ((1973), as we shall see in section two. The dragons of Le Guin’s Earthsea are born 
with a knowledge of the Language of the Making, which is a creative language - that is, it creates 
what it names. In the Farthest, a wizard called Cob uses black magic to conquer death, and the 
unnatural spectacle of the un-dead wizard evokes such deep fear in the dragons that the wizard 
gains power over them and denudes them of speech. Both Lewis and Le Guin raise fundamental 
questions of the relationship between language and cognitive capabilities, verifying Barfield’s and 
Tolkien’s dictum that language and thinking are coeval. Le Guin’s dragons, and the cat, Ginger, 
become wild after loss of language.  
          The episode in the Battle also lends urgency to Lewis’s view that the current perception of 
language, as a system in which signifier and signified have been arbitrarily conjoined and imposed 
upon reality by convention, must be rectified.  The ultimate alternative to such a rectification, it 
seems, would be incoherence, a condition from which not even the self-appointed arbiters of human 
speech and culture could remain exempt.  
!
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3.3 The City of God in Narnia 
To portray the radically ‘other’ world, the location of the Platonic ideal which for Lewis is the place 
the human spirit longs for but cannot attain in the world we inhabit, is a daunting task, but one that 
Lewis took on almost pugilistically again and again in the course of his career. In The Last Battle he 
manages to portray the radical alterity of the heavenly city by setting up a stark contrast between 
this world and the next; a contrast expressed through the polarities of light and darkness, whose 
basic metaphysical opposition plays a crucial role in twentieth-century fantasy. For Lewis, this is a 
primal binary fissure apprehended by human beings as equivalent to the opposition of good to evil, 
and represents an apparent departure from his philosophical affiliation with Barfield, who identified 
crude binarism as a sign of non-participation. The works of Tolkien and Lewis present the tension 
between the two poles formally and structurally in their fantasy, although for Tolkien the 
relationship is a complex one. The equation between light and good and darkness and evil, which is 
deemed to be universally ‘true’ by Lewis (‘Bluspels and Flalansferes’), is ironically inverted by his 
principal modern antagonist, Philip Pullman, who follows Milton (and indeed modern physics) in 
imputing initial creation to ‘dark materials’. Le Guin’s Earthsea series, meanwhile, develops from a 
traditional identification of darkness with evil to an acknowledgment that darkness and light are 
mutually complementary, necessary to one another in generating the tension that preserves the 
wholeness and balance of the universe. For Lewis, however, certain polarities have always existed 
in stark and irreconcilable antagonism. He articulates this view most fully in The Great Divorce 
(1946), his response to Blake’s visionary tract, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell (1790-93); and he 
works it out in richly visual terms in the final book of Narnia.  
 The Last Battle is full of darkness and shadows, with many of the scenes being set at night.  
On giving himself up to the Calormenes, Tirian is tied to a tree at night and fed by small animals.  
Later Jewel is rescued under cover of darkness; and the episode with the Dwarfs, where the king 
exposes Puzzle only to find that the sceptical Dwarfs refuse to believe a thing he says, is set at 
night, as if to invoke the darkness of ignorance. So too is the final battle referred to in the novel’s 
title. In the meantime there are numerous references to the psychological gloom that pervades 
Narnia, and these both embody the oppressive regime under which the free Narnians suffer and 
associate the book with apocalypse as a genre, since darkness is one of the genre’s constituent 
features.  
 One of the ways in which Lewis portrays the persecution of the Narnians is through 
references to sound, or rather the lack of it, the aural equivalent of darkness. The Animals sit in 
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‘dead silence’ as they are told about the new rules and regulations imposed by their Calormene 
conquerors (36, 37), with ‘worried and bewildered’ expressions (34); or they wail and howl in 
disbelief (50), echoing the wailing lament of the Dryad as she dies, and filling the silence with 
inarticulate noise.  As the children and Tirian walk through the woods to rescue Jewel, the woods 
are described as ‘far too quiet. On an ordinary Narnian night there ought to have been noises - an 
occasional cheery “Goodnight” from a Hedgehog, the cry of an Owl overhead, perhaps a flute in the 
distance to tell of Fauns dancing, or some throbbing, hammering noises from Dwarfs underground. 
All that was silenced: gloom and fear reigned over Narnia’ (74-75). The prepositional references - 
‘overhead’, ‘in the distance’, ‘underground’ - help to portray an all-encompassing participatory 
consciousness, which includes all forms of life, now annihilated. Silence is a key method of 
representing the loss of participation in the Lion, too, where the White Witch imposes a reign of 
winter that effectively silences all the natural sounds of streams, leaves, birds or animals.  In the 
underground realm of the Chair, there are no sounds of birds or streams, and the normally garrulous 
Earthmen go about their business in eerie muteness.  The silence that pervades Narnia in the Battle 
echoes these earlier apocalyptic narratives, and points the way to the final silence witnessed in The 
Magician’s Nephew by Diggory and Polly on their visit to the post-apocalyptic landscape of Charn. 
 The climactic moment of darkness in the novel comes when the king’s party - sitting in front 
of a square, dark tower, with its few slit windows and heavy door - witness the approach of an 
appalling figure: the monstrous god Tash. It is preceded by a deathly stench, as the sun goes behind 
the clouds and the world grows cold. The figure offers a stark contrast to Aslan. Its deathly gray 
inverts the luminous gold of the Lion; it has the head of a bird of prey, with a ‘cruel, curved beak’; 
its four arms are held high above its head ‘as if it wanted to snatch all Narnia in its grip’, in a 
reversal of Aslan’s words when he created Narnia: ‘I give to you forever this land of Narnia [...] and 
I give you myself’.  The fact that Tash ‘floated on the grass instead of walking, and the grass 91
seemed to wither beneath it’ is a clear reversal of the soft, steady pacing of the Lion in the creation 
scene, when the gentle, rippling song he sang created grass that ‘spread out from [him] like a pool’ 
and ‘ran up the sides of the little hills like a wave’.  While an allegorical correspondence does not 92
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seem appropriate, Aslan confirms later that ‘we [Aslan and Tash] are opposites’ (205), so that Tash 
is Anti-Aslan, even though it does not lead the battle against his forces.   93
 The reason for Tash’s absence from this final conflict, it would seem, is Lewis’s refusal to 
set up an anti-god because of the putative equivalence such a portrayal might suggest between the 
powers of good and evil. As he indicates in A Preface to Paradise Lost, evil is essentially ridiculous 
rather than terrible,  and Lewis portrays this aspect of it in the ape, Shift.  Even the most appalling 94
aspects of evil are given a speciousness in The Last Battle, an absence of weight and force, by their 
association with showmanship.  The ape Shift is of course the ultimate showman; and it is he who 
sets up the stage, quite literally, for the final conflict in the book.  The stage on which he displays 
the false Aslan – Puzzle dressed in the lion’s skin – is shrouded in the same darkness that attended 
the sighting of the vulture-like Tash; only the flickering, misleading light of the bonfire relieves the 
gloom. As Rishda, the ape and Ginger walk towards the animals, Rishda tells the cat to ‘play thy 
part well’ like a professional actor. The narrator then tells the reader that the whole scene ‘was 
rather like a theatre. The crowd of Narnians were like people in the seats; the little grassy place in 
front of the stable [...] was like the stage’ (125-26). While this analogy points up the deception 
being perpetrated on the innocent Narnians, it also foreshadows the revelation of the ‘real Narnia’, 
so that the Narnia we are reading about will soon be shown as just a stage, on which each life has 
been lived like an actor playing a part.  The stable, which is described as ‘the scenery at the back of 
the stage’ (126), will soon be transformed into a portal leading to reality, as the actors and the 
audience, the whole of Narnia, and Lewis’s readers, undergo the revelatory experience which 
Lewis, the creator of Narnia, has in store for them. As the fire sinks lower, its light becomes ‘less 
and of a darker red’, reminding the readers of the redness of the dying sun of Charn, just before that 
world ended. But the Narnians who have kept faith with Aslan quickly emerge from the twilight 
world of the theatre.  As soon as Tirian enters the stable, he finds himself ‘in strong light’ (164), and 
the surreal atmosphere created by the flickering interplay of flame and shadow gives way to the 
solid reality of sunshine, green grass and bright fruit. 
 This move from the unreal to the real, from the artificial to the natural, has much to tell us 
about Lewis’s attitude to his fiction.  Lewis repeatedly draws attention in his work to the importance 
of stories not simply as a mimetic reflection of the real world, but as something more: a means to 
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access truth. The mirror analogy used by the narrator in The Last Battle when trying to describe 
what the new Narnia was like suggests the kind of access Lewis had in mind:   95
!
You may have been in a room in which there was a window that looked out on a lovely bay 
of the sea or a green valley that wound away among mountains. And in the wall of that room 
opposite to the window there may have been a looking-glass. And as you turned away from 
the window you suddenly caught sight of that sea or that valley, all over again, in the 
looking-glass. And the sea in the mirror or the valley in the mirror were in a sense just the 
same as the real ones: yet at the same time they were somehow different - deeper, more 
wonderful, more like places in a story: in a story you have never heard but very much want 
to know. (216-17) 
!
The sentence construction here is such that it seems to lead the reader deeper and deeper into the 
experience of looking and desiring, with the repetitive ‘And’s’ and the colons that usher the reader 
into the next stage of the visual encounter. Art, as Lewis says, can ‘add to [life]’;  and he is 96
referring specifically to the ‘fantastic or mythic mode’ available to the modern reader in fairy 
stories. The mirror has often been used in fantasy not as a mere device of reflection, but as a portal 
into new worlds - most famously in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass; or in MacDonald’s 
Lilith; and the analogy as used here by Lewis deliberately points out how fantasy, by inviting the 
reader to discover new perspectives on the familiar, has a potentially transformative effect on our 
consciousness. When a reader returns from the story, the real world can be viewed afresh with the 
benefit of this new knowledge; in other words, final participation as defined by Barfield becomes 
possible through the training that imagination receives.  
 The narrator reinforces the impression of looking afresh given by the mirror analogy by 
observing that in the new Narnia  ‘every rock and flower and blade of grass looked as if it meant 
more’.   As Lewis says in his essay quoted earlier, when a reader sees ordinary woods after reading 97
about enchanted woods, the latter acquire a greater depth, in the sense of a wider range of 
associations, a consciousness of extended possibilities for what such a wood might contain, what it 
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might portend.  This process of defamiliarisation or estrangement, one of the key strategies of the 98
fantastic, re-enchants the woods, endowing them with a symbolic or representative power they did 
not previously possess – if you like, making them part of a new narrative, a new fictive language. 
When Tirian meets the protagonist of The Magician’s Nephew shortly after entering the new Narnia, 
Digory explains that this is the ‘real Narnia’, while the one they have left – the one that resembles a 
tawdry stage - ‘was only a shadow or a copy’, with a set beginning and an end.  As Barfield points 99
out, Lewis was emphatic in his belief in transcendence, which finds expression in the Narnia series 
as the Platonic Form (real Narnia) as well as the Christian vision of the divine creator.  
!
3.4. The End of Narnia 
If the end of Narnia is the beginning of Final Participation, a vital component of this mode of 
consciousness is memory. Barfield explains that as self-consciousness develops in humankind, the 
subject and object bifurcate; and this rift can operate in two ways. It can become, on the one hand, 
an irreconcilable opposition, propelling human beings towards a reckless destruction of nature as 
the threatening ‘other’. This is apparent in the techno-scientific post World War II developmental 
projects driven by the ‘knowledge as power’ ethic, which, in the effort to reduce everything into 
controllable, predictable, mechanistic units, will eventually result in the abolition of man – or so 
Lewis and Barfield claim.  On the other hand, however, as human beings became aware of their 100
creative potential, which was unconscious in the participatory phase, the ‘representations’ that were 
created through original participation, but had since become ‘idols’, were retained as memory-
images in the consciousness; and now these memories can be ‘recollected’ to re-create the world. 
The ‘idols’ which these representations became when we began to think of them as ‘dead’ and 
wholly other, can be reanimated. They can be liberated from the petrifaction they have suffered in 
the post-scientific world and live once again. 
 For Lewis, memory was an important aspect of the religious experience, and this link 
between spirituality and recollection is enacted in The Silver Chair.  Here Aslan tells Jill three signs 
that she must remember; he insists that she repeat them until they have been memorised, and Jill’s 
failure to do so almost costs her, Eustace and Puddleglum their lives. The last sign, Aslan’s own 
name, is only remembered in the green Witch’s underground realm when the enchanted prince 
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regains his senses for an hour and begs them to save him in the name of Aslan. The prince has 
earlier warned them not to untie him in this one hour of the day, because the Witch has told him he 
becomes a raving lunatic during this period. But Jill’s fourth commandment was to help anyone 
who asked them for aid in the name of Aslan, and the children decide to obey that injunction, even 
at the risk of setting loose a lunatic. As soon as Aslan’s instructions are remembered and obeyed the 
Green Witch’s illusory kingdom disintegrates, and Rilian and the earthmen are freed from the 
terrible spell of forgetfulness laid upon them.  
 An erasure of memory, in fact, makes the erstwhile prince ‘nothing’, as Puddleglum rightly 
observes. When the children talk of Narnia, Rilian evinces surprise, and even his own name is 
forgotten. Similarly, Lewis makes memory crucial to a person’s identity in The Magician’s Nephew. 
When Polly and Diggory arrive at the Wood between the Worlds, they become vague and forgetful. 
Sensibly, they decide to leave as soon as possible, before they merge with the undifferentiated 
collective consciousness that the wood represents.  
 To eradicate memory, in fact, is analogous to an effacement of identity, whether individual 
or collective.  In this context, what has been termed the ‘problem of Susan’ deserves to be 
recontextualised. In the Battle, when the Calormene soldier Emeth encounters King Peter in the 
‘real’ Narnia,  he asks him about the elder of his two sisters. The curt reply is that she ‘is no longer a 
friend of Narnia’. But it is Eustace who adds the vital information – that Susan has no memory of 
Narnia as a real place. When the others talk about Narnia, she says: ‘What wonderful memories you 
have! Fancy your still thinking about all those funny games we used to play when we were children’ 
(169). This is the crux of the matter. As Aslan makes clear to Lucy at the end of the Dawn Treader, 
the children have been called into Narnia so that ‘by knowing me here for a little, you may know 
me better there’; for as he tells her, ‘you must begin to come close to your own world now’ (271). 
The implication is that the juxtaposition of the two worlds, which represent two modes of 
consciousness, the participatory (Narnia) and the non-participatory (post-war England), serves the 
purpose of defamiliarisation. Having experienced the ‘revelation’ of Aslan in Narnia, the children 
will be better equipped to comprehend parallel instances of revelation in their own world. Narnia is 
an initiatory experience for the children who enter it, a preparation for their own world, where they 
must continue to live. At another level, the child reader’s experiences of revelation in Narnia 
defamiliarise the world of the reader, enabling them to see it, as Tolkien explains, ‘freed from the 
drab blur of triteness or familiarity - from possessiveness’.  Tolkien’s notion of possessiveness is 101
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similar to Barfield’s conception of idolatry. The process entails a loss of primal participation - the 
resultant radical estrangement generates the subject-object dichotomy. As objectified nature is 
denuded of spiritual or ‘inner’ meaning, the phenomenal world becomes a collection of ‘idols’ 
which become ‘possessions’ to be (ab)used. This process is an essential step for the evolution of 
thinking beings towards the stage of final participation. But memory plays a vital role in this final 
step, for if the images or idols are to be resuscitated, they must be available in the mode of memory. 
Only then can a ‘rebirth if images’  be possible. 102
          Memory, however, can be lost in the desert of suspicion - or what the critic Paul Ricoeur calls 
‘the desert of criticism’.  Ricoeur has identified three ‘Masters of Suspicion’ - Marx, Freud and 103
Nietzsche - who have most debunked established images of religion.  In particular, Nietzsche’s 
formulation that God is dead means that the old images of God as father no longer apply, explains 
Ricoeur, so that new forms of belief are necessary, new narratives to motivate our actions. Lewis 
was well aware of such iconoclastic attitudes had seeped into the collective consciousness of the 
post-secular west. When the children go back to their own world, they are clearly expected to 
translate their Narnian experience into terms appropriate for the materialistic post-war world they 
are growing up in. In Ricoeur’s words, a hermeneutic of suspicion is necessary in order to achieve a 
belief based on ‘the full responsibility of autonomous thought’.  The children who visit Narnia, in 104
other words, are required to make the transition from relatively unselfconscious childhood to a fully 
responsible adulthood. Their belief in Aslan and Narnia, then, needs to pass through the suspicion 
of their own critical thought-processes before being recuperated as belief. A ‘re-creation of 
language’  is necessary, for the rational and discursive logic of post-scientific language can only 105
explain already existing meaning - it cannot create new meaning. Ricoeur wants to posit a form of 
belief situated beyond either fear of punishment or desire for protection - ‘accusation and 
consolation’ are his terms.  But as Lewis was well aware, not everyone could make this transition.  106
          In the Battle, we are told that Susan chooses to dismiss Narnia as a set of fairy stories and 
therefore false - an attitude that Lewis has repeatedly exposed as flawed. But Susan is stuck in the 
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sceptical, rationalistic mode which Lewis warns against in his essay ‘Fern-Seeds and Elephants’.  107
Here Lewis expresses his belief that agnosticism seems inevitable when, for example, earlier ideas 
and images presented by religion seem inadequate to modern understanding. In this situation, 
however, iconoclasm, and not nihilism, is the answer, according to Lewis. Susan does not want to 
talk or share stories about Narnia. It becomes for her just a game they used to play as children. 
Clearly, for Susan Aslan (God) is dead. Retrospectively, her deliberate refusal to ‘see’ Aslan in the 
earlier novel, Prince Caspian, can be read as a foreshadowing of her desire for a comfort-zone that 
refuses adventures and physical or spiritual hardship. That might be interpreted as an incipient 
tendency towards the spiritual stasis induced by growing self-consciousness, which for Barfield is a 
danger faced by contemporary society, stuck as it is at the stage where subjectivity has emerged 
from a world that has withdrawn into valueless objectivity. It must be remembered, however, that 
Lewis chose fairy-tale as a form because he wanted to avoid character development or scrutiny, and 
wanted to present unfolding events as patterns that might present certain forms of truth in concrete 
terms; he therefore does not elaborate on Susan’s psychology.  
          In any case, Lewis deliberately shows that no amount of proof can be enough if one gets 
stuck in the ‘desert of suspicion’. This is analogous, in Barfield’s evolution of consciousness, to the 
stage where human beings become self-conscious and cease to think of representations as being 
created by their own participation. Denuded of the last vestiges of participation, at this point 
phenomena become ‘mechanomorphic’ objects, which Barfield also terms ‘idols’.   Ricoeur 108
echoes Barfield when he says, ‘An idol must die so a symbol of being may begin to speak’.  109
Ricoeur’s conception of idols is strikingly similar to Barfield’s, as Ricoeur uses the term to mean 
formerly vital images that have now become ossified - that is ‘gods’ who are now dead. 
Imagination, suggests Barfield, allows human beings to apprehend the ‘outward form as the image 
or symbol of an inner meaning’.  The evolution of consciousness is necessary for conscious and 110
autonomous participation, but the choice of how to create their world lies with each individual. As 
pointed out earlier, the ‘evolution of consciousness’ – on both individual and species level – brings 
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dangers with it: including the danger of never recovering participation at all, which is the case with 
Susan.  
!
3.5. The Blindness of the Dwarfs 
Another illustration of how an inability to participate can lead to solipsistic blindness is provided by 
the Dwarfs in The Last Battle. The dwarfs are deployed by Lewis to make several points about the 
metaphysical structure of his world(s). Led by Griffle, they put up a good fight against the 
Calormenes, which ends soon, however, as they are heavily outnumbered. Eleven of them (out of 
the original thirty) are taken prisoners, and ‘flung or kicked’ into the stable by the Calormene 
soldiers as an offering to Tash. In the scene that follows, Lewis presents his version - or inversion - 
of the Dantean Ante-Hell from the Purgatorio. When Dante enters the gates of Hell, Virgil tells him 
that the tormented cries he hears are those of the souls who refused to make a clear moral choice; 
they exist in the space which is neither heaven nor hell. These ‘neutrals’ are joined by the angels 
who chose neither God nor Lucifer. In Narnia, since the space inhabited by the Dwarfs borders on 
Lewis’s Augustinian city of God, the ‘real’ Narnia, it might be better to call it Ante-Heaven; 
however, the Dwarfs clearly parallel the souls and the angels who did not choose to side either with 
good or evil. Their slogan is ‘The Dwarfs are for the Dwarfs’, and during the battle they first kill the 
horses who come to help the king and his party, then shoot arrows at the Calormenes. As Griffle 
remarks, ‘We don’t want Darkies any more than we want Monkeys - or Lions - or Kings’ (158). 
Earlier - after Tirian’s rescue, and Jill’s discovery that the donkey, Puzzle, has been dressed up in a 
lion’s skin and shown to the animals as Aslan - the sight of marching dwarfs had cheered up the 
little group of resistance fighters gathered round Tirian. But Tirian’s hope of getting the ‘honest 
Dwarfs’ on their side is rudely shaken. Rather than rejoicing at the exposure of the false Aslan, as 
Tirian had expected them to, the Dwarfs decry the king as well as the ape. And even after Tirian and 
Eustace have killed the Calormene guards, setting the Dwarfs free, the ‘honest’ Dwarfs refuse to 
believe anything they are told by their rescuers, casting doubt on Tirian’s and the children’s identity 
as well as refusing to believe in the existence of Aslan.     
          The Dwarfs, like Milton’s Satan, have their own private hell within them, which consists in a 
willing commitment of themselves to perpetual imprisonment. It is the prison of dark chaos, 
produced when language has been denuded of all meaning.  The essential aspect of ‘final 
participation’, as Barfield describes, is the realisation by human beings of the part played in the 
construction of the world by their own creative activity. In original participation, collective 
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humanity created the phenomenal world by unifying the meaningless jumble of sense-perception 
into ‘things’; and later, as consciousness becomes individualised, each human being can 
consciously control their imaginative activity. Imagination, Barfield reminds us, can be both good 
and evil. But the Dwarfs have eliminated meaning from their language by refusing all value-
systems. Their refusal to believe in either good or evil effectively debars them from their creative 
capability, leaving them in the utter darkness of meaninglessness. The tautologous slogan, ‘The 
Dwarfs are for the Dwarfs’ means nothing, since in the closed, dark hole they perceive the world to 
be, they fight even with each other. Tirian and the seven kings and queens of Narnia, who can see 
that the Dwarfs are sitting on a sunny hillside, with fruit tress and flowers growing all around them, 
cannot persuade the Dwarfs to escape from their self-imposed confinement.  
          Clearly, the Dwarfs are stuck in the desert of suspicion, like Susan. The ‘real’ Narnia is the 
scene for final participation, but the dwarfs cannot enter it, since they are mired within their 
solipsism. This scene is reminiscent of Shakespeare’s The Tempest, where the evil characters 
(Sebastian and Antonio) are unable to see the beauty of the island which is obvious to the good ones 
(Gonzalo). Digory points out to Tirian that ‘the [stable’s] inside is bigger than its outside’ (177), and 
all the others find, as the story draws to its close, that the place where they find themselves – the 
new Narnia - is getting steadily larger. Their delight in this expansion of their horizons serves to 
accentuate the irony of the Dwarfs’ refusal to participate in the experience. 
!
3.6. New Narnia 
The Dantean structure of the new Narnia is emphasised from the moment they enter the stable 
through these repeated references to the expanding space in which Tirian and the children find 
themselves. Lucy, for instance, quickly realises on entering it that the stable is unexpectedly 
spacious; and Lewis makes sure that the symbolic meaning of this expansion is clear by the remark 
that Lucy adds about a stable in ‘our world’ having had something bigger in it than the world itself 
(177).  Aslan tells them to go ‘further up and further in’, and as they all set off running, the inside 
seems to get bigger and bigger till they reach the Edenic garden. Here they meet all their old 
friends: Reepicheep the mouse, Tumnus the faun, Trufflehunter the Badger and more. The arrival of 
the four Pevensies, Caspian, Tumnus and the rest constitutes another sort of expansion, whereby 
The Last Battle is no longer a single novel but a sort of portmanteau containing all the Narnian 
adventures. Lucy’s old friend Tumnus explains the expansion by using the analogy of travelling 
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through the layers of an onion, ‘except that as you continue to go in and in, each circle is larger than 
the last’ (225).  
            The exhilarating run that takes them all ‘further up and further in’ is a reprise of the quasi-
pagan romp that Lewis stages at the end of Prince Caspian - which in retrospect seems to have been 
proleptic, signalling the eternal mode of participation in the ‘real’ Narnia. But the pagan gods, 
Silenus and Bacchus, who formed such an integral part of that romp, are absent.  For Lewis, pagan 
myths were ‘lies breathed through silver’, that is, stories that nourish the imagination but have no 
truth value.  Later, however, Lewis came to the conclusion, with Tolkien, that these stories were 111
prefigurations of the ‘real’ story of Christ and the Incarnation.  The typological relationship that 112
the pagan myths had with the Christian story was presumably no longer required in the real city of 
final participation, which accounts for the absence of the gods from the Romp in the Battle. 
          This final romp is also a dramatic enactment of final participation.  Everyone runs without 
getting out of breath; they all swim up a waterfall; they climb with ease up the steep, forbidden hill 
to the Edenic garden where the tree of gold and silver grows – Digory’s tree of Life from The 
Magician’s Nephew. Here is no alienation; the human and non-human are in a state of 
correspondence which allows the subject and object, self and other, to blend without diffusion. In 
other words, the natural environment is no longer resistant to the human body, as it was in the 
mutually fallen state of man and nature on earth. Nature and the body are in a state of equipoise, as 
their ability to swim up a waterfall illustrates. The interpenetration of mind and matter is complete, 
and the transposition that could only be experienced rarely now becomes a mode of being. 
           This final section of The Last Battle has been widely influential on other fantasy writers; part 
of its influence has been to stimulate them to write against it.  In the next chapter we shall see how 
Ursula Le Guin responds to the notion of a transcendent world-order that is somehow more ‘real’ 
than the world we live in. The celebrated children’s author, Philip Pullman has responded with 
equal energy to the hierarchal structure, especially in his own fantasy sequence His Dark Materials. 
Both Pullman and Le Guin use the paradigmatic trope of a journey to the Land of the Dead in 
strikingly similar ways, as a means of repudiating the concept of an individual afterlife. Pullman 
specifically responds to the notion of a ‘higher’ reality as expressed in the Lewisian structure of 
circles of reality - each more real the further in and further up you go, as in Dante’s conception of 
 See Tolkien, ‘OFS’ in Tree and Leaf, p. 82.111
 See Humphrey Carpenter, The Inklings ( London: HarperCollins, 1978, 1981), pp. 42-45. Carpenter 112
recounts the event of Lewis’s conversion in 1931.
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heaven. In its place he offers a model of unlimited parallel worlds, but with no higher reality to 
aspire to, as the Satan-avatar in his novel prepares for a war with heaven in a bid to establish a 
heavenly republic, as against a heavenly kingdom.   113
          Pullman also takes issue with the exclusivity of Lewis’s paradise. Pullman’s trenchant 
critique of the absence of Susan from real Narnia imputes her banishment to Lewis’s misogyny, 
interpreted from the unfortunate remark made by Jill about Susan being interested in ‘nothing but 
lipsticks and nylons’.  Pullman ignores the fact that it is Jill, a character in Narnia, and not the 114
narrator or the implied author who makes this comment.  He also uses the notion of portals into 
another world to reject what he (wrongly) thinks is Lewis’s privileging of the spiritual to the 
exclusion of the physical. Pullman’s own trilogy ends with a moral imperative to close all chinks or 
chasms between worlds, to enable their inhabitants to address the socio-political problems of their 
own cultures instead of meddling, like imaginative colonists, with others.   
          Lewis leaves his reader in the paradigmatic fairy-tale state of ‘happily ever after’, which is 
not available till after death. Although the two worlds, the real and the transient Narnia, are 
obviously placed in a hierarchical relationship, the real Narnia is described in sensory, even sensual 
terms. It is not a denigration of the physical world we live in, or the one we’ve been imagining in 
the other Narnian chronicles, but an intensification of both – a refusal, one might even say, to let 
them go at the point of death. As Barfield points out apropos of the heaven described in The Great 
Divorce, Lewis uses the notion of solidity to describe what is usually taken to be a spiritual - and 
therefore non-solid - realm.  Language regains its lost concreteness when the narrator of the Battle 115
uses a literary gloss to describe the city as a place in ‘a story you have never heard’, and declares 
that ‘every rock and flower and blade of grass looked as if it meant more’ (213).  
          This world, Lewis proposes – whether it be the ‘this world’ we inhabit or the Narnian ‘this 
world’ – is a preparation for the real world, a kind of training ground or schoolroom. In proposing 
this he differs from Tolkien, who ends his epic narrative with a rejuvenation of Middle Earth which 
is quite literally embedded in the soil of the Shire – a rejuvenation that involves planting trees and 
 See Philip Pullman, His Dark Materials (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995, 1997, 2000). See also Philip 113
Pullman, ‘The Republic of Heaven’ in Horn Book Magazine 57: 7 (November/December, 2001), pp. 655-667. 
 See, for example, Susan Roberts’ Interview with Philip Pullman, ‘A Dark Agenda’ (November, 2002) 114
<http://www.surefish.co.uk/culture/features/pullman_interview.htm>. See also Philip Pullman, ‘The Darkside 
of Narnia’, The Guardian (October 1, 1998) <http://www.crlamppost.org/darkside.htm> [Accessed 30 
January, 2013].
 Owen Barfield, ‘Some Reflections on The Great Divorce of C. S. Lewis’ in Owen Barfield on C. S. Lewis, 115
pp. 82-89. 
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giving birth to healthy children. Even though his heroes, Bilbo and Frodo, sail away from the Grey 
Havens to another life, Sam and the other hobbits are concerned with recreating this world, not 
another; and even if the Golden Age of the Shire that is ushered in by their determination and hard 
work is alluded to with regret as something long past, it remains a peculiarly earthly model of ideal 
living. Although Lewis, too, demonstrates renewal and rejuvenation in a delightfully earthy dance 
in Prince Caspian, he also wants to give each individual soul the hope of continuing this dance 
beyond the confines of this world and time. So in his final book about Narnia he leaves his readers 
with ‘Chapter One of the Great Story’, which he suggests will finally achieve the synthesis between 
narrative and theme, so that the tension between successive events and a joyful state that all stories 
aspire towards will finally be resolved. By moving beyond the material world while (in a sense) 
taking it with him, albeit in transmuted form, Lewis leaves his reader with the sense of having taken 
part in a new beginning, not a conclusion. !!
!  112
CHAPTER FOUR. BALANCE AND IMBALANCE IN THE FIRST EARTHSEA TRILOGY 
!
This chapter will discuss the first three novels of Ursula K Le Guin’s Earthsea series, A Wizard of 
Earthsea (1968), The Tombs of Atuan (1972), and The Farthest Shore (1973), showing how these 
develop, continue and above all subvert the rich tradition of literary fantasy writing as it had been 
practised up to that point, in particular by the European school of fantasy writers represented by 
Lewis and Tolkien. The First Earthsea Trilogy (as Darko Suvin calls it)  represents a radically 1
divided, unjust and hierarchal society, for which the Archipelago - sundered bits of land that form 
small pockets of mutually hostile races and cultures - provides a potent metaphor. The world Le 
Guin inhabits and the world she creates seem to be divided into irreconcilable fragments - Barfield’s 
‘islanded consciousness’ (SA, 89) in physical form. Her imagined collection of islands, with its 
diversity of disparate cultures and peoples, forms the perfect setting to ask questions about how 
different cultures interact, in terms of their myths, religions, languages, ethnicities and socio-
political customs. The fragmentation of humankind finds an objective correlative in the 
Archipelago, which symbolises the complete disjunctions artificially produced between people 
based on perceptions of colour, class, gender or culture, generating extremes of animosity and 
biased judgements. Le Guin seeks to create a dialogue that exists in the gaps between the fragments: 
with the sea – as opposed to the islands, the earth part of Earthsea – providing a metaphor for these 
gaps. 
         In Earthsea, power belongs to men; women are either excluded from the narratives of male 
heroic deeds, or characterised in them as wicked, weak or worthless. I will argue, however, that 
there is in the First Trilogy an implicit interrogation both of these apparently established socio-
political norms and of every binary that privileges certain terms at the expense of others. This 
interrogation becomes explicit in the revolution that occurs in the first book of the Second Trilogy, 
Tehanu (1990), where Le Guin challenges and overthrows the hierarchal polarities, transforming not 
only the subject-positions of the socio-politically marginalised groups, such as women and children, 
but also destabilising the logocentric masculinist positions which occupy the dominant centre of her 
invented social structure. This chapter will argue that the First Trilogy foreshadows the imaginative 
and political revolution that takes place in the Second Trilogy, and that this prefiguration of 
 Darko Suvin proposes that Tehanu, Tales from Earthsea, and The Other Wind form what he calls a Second 1
Earthsea Trilogy which continues but strongly modifies the first one, which comprises A Wizard of Earthsea, 
The Tombs of Atuan and The Farthest Shore.  See ‘On U. K. Le Guin’s “Second Earthsea Trilogy” and Its 
Cognitions: A Commentary’, Extrapolation, 47: 3 (2006), p. 488-504. 
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revolution appears as what might be called an unconscious symptom of the text of the first three 
books, so that only a careful reading reveals the undertow of anarchic, oppositional energy running 
through it. 
!
4.1. Language as True Speech in Earthsea 
Le Guin’s first two Earthsea stories, ‘The Word of Unbinding’ (January 1964) and ‘The Rule of 
Names’ (April 1964), as their titles suggest, laid the framework of language as intrinsically 
connected to the physical world. In the second tale, Yevaud the dragon, disguised as a wizard called 
Mr. Underhill, explains that ‘the name is the thing [...] and the truename is the true thing. To speak 
the name is to control the thing’.  While the concept of a language where the subject-object 2
dichotomy has not yet occurred, and where the bond between word and object is intrinsic rather 
than contingent, is ancient and pre-biblical, this concept was reprised by seventeenth-century 
philosophers under the term ‘Adamic language’. It was widely believed that ‘languages [...] in spite 
of their multiplicity and seeming chaos, contain[ed] elements of the original perfect language 
created by Adam when he named the animals in his prelapsarian state’.   As noted in Part One of 3
this thesis, this concept is deployed by Barfield to suggest the notion of semantic unity in primitive 
language, indicating that ancient words denoted not only the material or manifest, but also the 
spiritual or hidden aspects of things, and that using discourse in this way enabled primitive 
humanity actually to create physical phenomena. Barfield attempts to focus on the scientific, rather 
than the magical or mythical aspect of this idea, by pointing out that the substance of the physical 
world is a field force of waves and sub-molecular particles, so that human consciousness and 
language can be said to create the things we see. Both Tolkien and Lewis used this idea to underline 
the creative aspect of language in their fantasy. One of Le Guin’s inspirations for her own take on 
this concept, then, is obviously Tolkien, who is acknowledged in the name Underhill, used by Frodo 
to avoid detection when he leaves the Shire.   4
          Another, and perhaps more important source of inspiration for Le Guin was her father, the 
anthropologist Alfred Kroeber. In fact, Le Guin had the opportunity to experience difference in 
culture, race, religion and language as a young child through the work of both her parents. The 
 Ursula K. Le Guin, ‘The Rule of Names’, in The Wind’s Twelve Quarters, vol. 1 (London: Granada, 1975), p. 2
85. 
 Hans Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 25.3
 J. R. R. Tolkien, The Fellowship of the Ring: The Lord of the Rings (London: HarperCollins, 2001 [1954, 4
1955, 1966]), p. 200.
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concept of the power of names was derived from the Native American culture that Kroeber studied; 
while Kroeber’s wife Theodora wrote a celebrated account of the life of Ishi, the ‘last’ of the 
Californian Indians who lived through his final years at a San Francisco Museum under Kroeber’s 
care.  The subject of this book ‘has haunted the writings of her daughter’ throughout her career,  5 6
according to Robert Maslen, who has traced the influence of this unique encounter between two 
cultures through some of the early writings of Le Guin. Maslen points out that Ishi never divulged 
his name, because telling one’s name was a serious matter for his people, and that the name by 
which he was known simply means ‘man’ in the Yahi language.  Le Guin developed her fascination 7
with the power of words in part from her immersion in this man’s history, along with her 
understanding of linguistic and cultural relativity.   
          In A Wizard of Earthsea, Le Guin extends the conception of True Speech to embrace its role 
in the creation of her imagined world. Segoy, we are told, raised the lands from the sea by using 
True Speech;  and the True Names given to all dwellers in the Archipelago form part of this original 8
language.  They are also kept secret, because knowledge of a person’s True Name can give the 
possessor power over that person. Revealing one’s name to someone else, then, is a major act of 
trust, and moments when this take place afford some of the most emotionally intense episodes in the 
First Trilogy. 
 In the school for wizards on the island of Roke, where True Speech is taught, the students 
are told that changing the name of a thing can transform the thing itself, which can have radical and 
unforeseen effects. As the Master Hand explains to Ged, to alter even a small scrap of the world is 
to change the world – which is why he himself specialises only in illusory transformations. He 
insists that ‘you must not change one thing, one pebble, one grain of sand, until you know what 
good and evil will follow on the act’.  For magic acts by proximity as well as directly, changing the 9
‘names and natures of things surrounding the transformed thing’ (57) in ways few wizards have the 
power to predict.  
 Theodora Kroeber, Ishi in Two Worlds (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962).5
 Robert Maslen, ‘“Towards an Archaeology of the Present”: Theodora Kroeber and Ursula K. Le Guin’ in 6
Foundation 67 (Summer 1996), p. 63.
 Maslen, p. 63.7
 Ursula K. Le Guin, A Wizard of Earthsea: The Earthsea Quartet (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 5. See also 8
pp.109, 267,304, 365. All subsequent references are to this edition. Hereafter cited as WE.
 Le Guin, WE, p. 48.9
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          Le Guin seems to present this notion in an unproblematic way in A Wizard of Earthsea. The 
only hint that she might realise the difficulties involved in this kind of transformative language 
comes when the Master Namer, one of the rare people who reveals his true name (the wonderfully 
convoluted ‘Kurremkarmerruk’), explains to Ged that controlling the sea as a whole is impossible, 
because every small islet, sea, bay and strait connected with the ocean has a name of its own, and 
that ‘a mage can control only what is near him’ (51). This seems to acknowledge the difficulty of 
naming fluid, constantly changing things. As the Namer points out, ‘no thing can have two names’, 
so there is ‘no end to that language’ (51), True Speech. This limits the power of mages over the 
earth, for no one can know the name of everything, and the language here posited would seem to be 
of infinite complexity, since it would seem to include no metaphors, and perhaps few elements 
shared between different words. 
          Nevertheless, Le Guin fails in the First Trilogy to address the question of how she relates the 
concept of the True Name, with its rigid demarcation of the essence of a thing or person, with the 
fluid philosophical system of the Tao that underpins her imaginative vision. A Wizard begins with 
the Creation Song of Éa (and the name Éa is another Tolkienian borrowing);  and this song makes 10
clear at once to what extent Le Guin’s Earthsea is undergirded by the Tao, and the particular 
problems this undergirding generates in the narrative. 
!
4.2. Tao in the Creation of Éa 
The most widely known aspect of the Tao is the yin-yang symbol, a circle    divided into black and 
white sections by an undulating line.  In each half is placed a dot of the opposite colour, called the 
t’ai chi symbol. In this image, oppositions exist in a dialectical relationship, which can best be 
understood with the help of Barfield’s concept of polarity. Barfield affirms that opposites do not 
simply co-exist as opposites, but ‘exist by virtue of each other, as well as at each other’s expense’.  11
That is, there is a perpetual process of the one turning into the other, signified in the symbol by the 
undulating line.  
          The Creation of Éa is a song that opens not only A Wizard of Earthsea but also the first book 
of the second trilogy, Tehanu, where it stands on the title page; it’s clear, therefore, that Le Guin 
wants us to see it as in some sense central to her imagined world. The crux of the song is the 
 J. R. R. Tolkien, ‘Ainulindale’ in The Silmarillion, ed. by Christopher Tolkien (London: HarperCollins, 1999 10
[1977]). Iluvatar says ‘Eä! Let these things Be!’ (p. 9) to create the world.
 Owen Barfield, Speaker’s Meaning (Oxford: Barfield Press, 2011), p. 22. Original emphasis.11
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importance of maintaining Equilibrium, that delicate, precarious balance between opposites that is a 
crucial condition for the world’s existence: 
!
Only in silence the word, 
only in dark the light 
only in dying life: 
bright the hawk’s flight 
on the empty sky  
!
In a fine discussion of these lines, Darko Suvin argues that Le Guin has here shown silence, 
darkness and death to be ‘parental, engendering, motherly’ forces, while the terms ‘word-light-life’ 
are ‘filial, younger, fresher’.  The relationship between the parental and the filial terms is such that 
the latter can ‘never be fully and properly perceived and understood without the co-presence of the 
parental quality’.  The three couples of silence-word, dark-light and dying-life are, observes Suvin, 12
‘intimately participating in each other’, with the first term in each pair having primacy and the 
second term showing a progression. Does the Creation song of Éa privilege the word, he wonders, 
as it is privileged in biblical discourse, or is Le Guin’s vision more symmetrical, maintaining a 
balance between word and silence?  Suvin argues that the song posits a hierarchy, sustained 
formally by its construction, whereby ‘life subsumes cognition which in turn subsumes 
writing’ (490), meaning that words and knowledge are the enabling conditions of life. This does not 
in any way undermine the importance of silence or the dark, but it does associate human life with 
words, and with light, which is a metaphor for knowledge.  
          While Suvin is right about the importance of the co-existence of opposites in the song, the 
‘parental’ quality that he assigns to silence or darkness is in some doubt, at least in the First Trilogy, 
since Ged tells us in The Tombs of Atuan that the powers of darkness hate creativity. Speaking of the 
Nameless powers that rule the Undertombs, he tells Tenar: ‘They are dark and undying, and they 
hate the light: the brief, bright light of our mortality’.  However, darkness, silence and death are 13
certainly given primacy in chronological terms, for as Tenar observes at the end of the book, 
looking at the vast darkness of sea and sky as she and Ged sail towards Havnor: ‘It [darkness] had 
 Darko Suvin, ‘On U. K. Le Guin’s “Second Earthsea Trilogy” and Its Cognitions: A Commentary’, 12
Extrapolation, 47: 3, (2006).
 Ursula K. Le Guin, The Tombs of Atuan: Earthsea Quartet, p. 265. 13
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been before light, and would be after. It had been before life, and would be after. It went on beyond 
evil’ (296). Or, as Ged tells Yarrow in A Wizard of Earthsea, ‘For a word to be spoken [...] there 
must be silence. Before and after’ (152). Life, like a word, is transient, ‘a wave on the sea’,  and 14
the knowledge of one’s own mortality, insists Le Guin, is synonymous with the knowledge of 
selfhood. Light is a power, and ‘time is light’ (150), Ged tells Yarrow, implying that light, like life, 
is temporary. Despite - or perhaps because of - this temporariness, life and light are both creative. 
Both are associated with language.  The impermanence of life is the joy of life, maintains Le Guin, 
since it enables change, and an acceptance of death is therefore absolutely necessary for rebirth. 
          Another important concept of the Tao is wei wu wei, which in her 1998 translation of Lao 
Tzu’s Tao Te Ching Le Guin translates as ‘Doing not-doing’ or ‘Action by inaction’.  In Earthsea 15
this is exemplified by the mage Ogion. Ogion does not interfere with nature; he is not interested in 
the use of things or people, but in their being - their nature. He tells Ged to learn the ‘being’ of 
every flower or herb before learning its true name. The mountains, the river, Ged, Ogion - are, 
explains the old mage: they have no use. They are all part of the Equilibrium, the Balance of the 
universe, a tiny yet essential part of the intricate, delicate, precarious Balance that holds the world 
together. As we shall see, it takes Ged a long time to learn this lesson in the first book of the First 
Trilogy; the young Tenar of the second has no opportunity to learn it, since she exists in a stultifying 
dull routine of ritual till her escape; and in the third book Ged tries to teach it to Arren, but the 
prince, too, struggles with the concept. Le Guin makes no secret of the alienness of the concept of 
Balance to her protagonists, and in doing so she acknowledges its alienness to her Western readers, 
perhaps even to herself. 
          While she based her books on the Tao, Le Guin’s language in the First Trilogy was self-
confessedly based on the male-oriented language sanctioned by the institutionalised Western 
hegemony under which she lived. In her 1992 lecture at Keble College, Oxford, titled ‘Children, 
Women, Men and Dragons’ and later published as ‘Earthsea Revisioned’ (1993), Le Guin confirms 
that she wrote the first trilogy on the traditional pattern of heroic fantasy. She was using the ‘winged 
words’ of tradition, following the pattern set by her European predecessors like Lord Dunsany, 
Tolkien and Lewis. But by the 1990s, Le Guin had come to see her younger self as having been an 
unconscious member of an anti-patriarchal counter-order.  When she began her career as a writer of 
 Ursula K. Le Guin, The Farthest Shore: Earthsea Quartet, p. 410. Hereafter cites as TFS.14
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genre fiction, she observes, heroes of fantasy and science fiction were always male, and female 
authors were performing an approved and traditional task in their role as storytellers.  Yet Le Guin 16
argues rightly that the rules did not wholly bind her: ‘I was writing partly by the rules, as an 
artificial man, and partly against the rules, as an inadvertent revolutionary’.  Subversion, she 17
insists, can be unconscious, and this certainly seems obvious in her first novel, the Wizard, where 
the hero is dark-skinned and the villainous invaders from Kargad are white – a situation Le Guin 
makes little of in the novel, but which has been recognised as marking a sea-change in twentieth-
century fantasy. However, the subversive tendencies do not effect the fundamental premises of 
language and its uses in Earthsea. Le Guin’s notion of True Speech, despite stemming from ideas 
about Adamic language - or perhaps because of this - establishes rigid, hierarchical binary systems 
in Earthsea. This language is the purview of male wizards; women are not allowed to learn it. True 
Speech, moreover, remains a means of controlling nature, as wizards can change anything into 
another by naming it. 
            Even so, another way in which A Wizard of Earthsea accomplishes what may well be an 
unconscious revolution is in its attitude to women; or rather in its exposure of a patriarchal attitude 
against which the Second Trilogy would launch a full-scale rebellion. Ged’s early life as shown in A 
Wizard – his crucial showdown with the aristocratic Jasper which creates the Shadow, and his long 
journey first to escape and then to find the Shadow he has created – are profoundly shaped by his 
experiences with women. Several times, the motivators for Ged’s actions are women, as we shall 
see; not only are his first words of power learnt from his aunt, but time and again an encounter with 
a woman changes the trajectory of his journey, both physically and metaphorically.  And this 
tendency continues in the second book, The Tombs of Atuan.  Here Ged is led to the titular Tombs 
by an artefact given him by a woman in A Wizard of Earthsea, and escapes from them only with the 
help of Tenar, the young Priestess of the Nameless Ones whose deadening presence fills the 
subterranean labyrinth at the centre of the novel. As Le Guin points out, ‘gender expectations are 
reflected/created by linguistic usage’, and despite Tenar’s courage she remains, for readers and 
critics, a ‘heroine’ - a word with vastly different implications and values than the term hero. 
Nevertheless, largely concerned with creation and balance as they are, these first two books yet 
seem to be straining against an order that oppresses the text, discovering a hidden counter-order, as 
it were, which seeks to liberate itself from the dominant patriarchy that controls Earthsea.  
 Ursula K. Le Guin, Earthsea Revisioned (Cambridge: Labute, 1993), p. 616
 Le Guin, Earthsea Revisioned , p. 7.17
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          In The Farthest Shore, while Balance remains a dominant thematic concern, Le Guin more 
specifically addresses the connection of language with creativity and life. As noted above, Suvin 
understands this link as encoded in the creation song. Ironically - for this is Le Guin’s most 
consciously polemical stance in the First Trilogy against the Judeo-Christian world-view - the 
subversive drive seems diminished. An eschatological tone pervades The Farthest Shore: the end of 
time seems near, and evil has apparently triumphed over the Archipelago. But Ged emerges as a 
kind of Christ/Redeemer, whose sacrifice of his magic power saves the world from the urge to 
achieve immortality with which it has been infected by the devilish enchanter Cob. Order seems to 
be restored, and ‘a new earth’ established, with Arren/Lebannen as the Archipelago’s king and Ged 
as its acknowledged saviour. The reinstated order is patriarchal, and women have no part to play in 
restoring or sustaining it. It emerges from this discussion that the first trilogy is more revolutionary 
than its author or readers have given it credit for, but that its revolutionary tendencies are not 
permitted to unleash a revolution. 
!
4.3. A Wizard of Earthsea: Forgotten Stories 
It would be a careless reading of the First Trilogy that missed the revolutionary undercurrent, 
strangely powerful by reason of its nature as an undercurrent, hidden below the surface, so that the 
structure of the books reflect their content. In the seemingly traditional narratives of the Earthsea 
Trilogy there are many fissures and fault lines, through which the undertow of the anarchic energy 
makes itself felt. 
          A Wizard begins as a typical fairy-tale, arousing in the reader expectations of a foreclosed 
narrative structure, where the hero will win out in the end and be rewarded (usually) with wealth 
and marriage. The narrator tells us that Ged is the ‘special’ seventh brother whose six older brothers 
are ‘ordinary’, leaving home to pursue farming or sailing. His mother dies soon after his birth, while 
his father is a ‘grim, unspeaking man’, quick with ‘blows and whippings’ (13). The young boy’s 
use-name is Duny, but the narrator, on the first page, reveals his true name - Ged - and invokes his 
later identity as an Archmage and dragonlord, about whom songs have been made, thus indicating 
that like all fairy-tale heroes, Duny will eventually prove his extraordinary qualities to the world 
that once scorned him. The pattern of response aroused in the readers by this initial presentation of 
the hero is in consonance with the monomyth of Joseph Campbell’s ‘Hero With A Thousand Faces’, 
producing an expectation of a hero who will fight terrible enemies and defeat them, reinstating the 
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normative power-structure of his land and culture. But Le Guin seeks to rewrite the hero myth, and 
in the process reveals the silenced voices in the interstices of the structures of ideology. 
          In rewriting the hero myth, Le Guin evokes many old and forgotten stories, drawing them 
into the narrative of the hero - or narrating the ways in which the hero is invariably drawn into them 
- to indicate the silenced voices and suppressed stories implicated in every hero’s journey. The 
silenced voices to which Le Guin’s text draws attention are mostly those of women. This might 
seem surprising, considering that critics - including Le Guin herself - have pointed out the absence 
of women in the First Trilogy, claiming that even Tenar in The Tombs of Atuan depends on Ged to 
be rescued. However, I will argue that the pervasive marginalisation of women in Earthsea is shown 
as an absence, an aporia in the text and in Ged’s life that threatens always to disrupt the narrative. 
Le Guin uses textual lacunae - untold stories, suppressed viewpoints, lost identities - as a strategic 
tool to explore these silences. 
          The quest in the first two books of Earthsea, Wizard and Tombs, has definite echoes of 
Tolkienian fantasy - the quest-journey, the Ring as a symbol of power, the absence of a king who 
would bring peace and prosperity to the imagined lands of the narrative, a friend who accompanies 
the hero on his final trek to confront his doppelgänger. Ged’s quest is a psychological journey to 
find his own Shadow.  Like Tolkien, Le Guin’s inversion of the hero’s quest from a grand exploit of 
daring and adventure aimed at vanquishing the Other - an alien, a monster, an enemy - to a lonely 
journey to the borders of the world and the self, is quite clearly a rejection of the usual categories of 
the hero-tale genre. In this it follows the trajectory of the Christ myth, since there too the great 
enemy to be overcome is an internal one; as recounted in Matthew and Luke, Jesus is tempted thrice 
by the devil during his forty-day sojourn in the desert. 
          Although heroic adventures occur in the narrative, they are confined to a minor role. For 
example, Ged’s encounter with the dragon of Pendor, who terrorised the islanders of the Western 
Archipelago, is described in racy, exciting prose, but the incident is short, and quickly over, almost 
a parenthesis in the narrative. Contrary to genre conventions, it is neither the main adventure nor the 
motive of Ged’s quest; indeed, he deliberately refrains from giving this episode, performed as a 
public duty, a place in his private narrative, by refusing the dragon’s offer to disclose the Shadow’s 
name. Ged’s quest is something different altogether, as we are reminded when he is returning 
victorious after having guessed the dragon’s name and so gained power over it: ‘As soon as Pendor 
had sunk under the sea-rim behind him, Ged looking eastward felt the fear of the shadow come into 
his heart again; and it was hard to turn from the bright danger of the dragon to that formless, 
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hopeless horror’ (91). A ‘shadowquest’ (147) as opposed to a hero-quest provides the focus of this 
book, the shadowquest becoming an alternative tale to the typical tale of the hero with a thousand 
faces. It is a shadowquest because Ged is, till the last encounter, blind to the other’s identity; that is, 
Ged does not realise that the Shadow is part of himself. He does not know what he follows. 
Archmage Gensher tells him it has no name; but his first master, Ogion, says that all things have a 
name: and as we have seen, the dragon of Pendor offers to disclose it to him. With these bits of 
contradictory information, the wizard begins his journey in an unusual state of perplexity - not to 
gain anything, as in hero-quests; nor even to destroy something, as in Tolkien’s famous inversion of 
the hero quest in The Lord of the Rings. Ged journeys to encounter what he calls ‘my creature’ 
without any previous knowledge. And women, who are also a mystery to him, play a pivotal role in 
his journey.  
          The role of women is supplemented by the role of other absences: silence, darkness, 
powerlessness and the concomitant desire to seize what power is available. In Earthsea, words are 
the source of power, as the young boy Duny learns. They make things happen; they change the 
world. When he inadvertently repeats a few words he has heard his aunt use to call a goat, he is 
astounded and terrified at the effect they have on the herd he is looking after. This first glimpse of 
the power of words is an irresistible means of access to the power he lacks and for which he 
hungers; a hunger triggered by the lack of a loving mother, and exacerbated by the absence of any 
other loving influence from Duny’s life. His feelings of powerlessness are aggravated by a father 
who regularly beats him. So rather than sharing with his playmates, he seeks to ‘know and do what 
they knew not and could not’ (15), revealing the desire to assert himself on others he has learned 
from these two adults. Everything in Earthsea, he learns, has its ‘true name’, and when his aunt 
teaches him certain ‘words of power’ – the true names of birds and animals - he  ‘hungered to know 
more such names’, for the ‘power it gave him over bird and beast’ was a pleasure that ‘stayed with 
him all his life’.  The witch tells him of the ‘glory and the riches and the great power over men that 18
a sorcerer could gain’, and these are his first motives for learning the True Speech of creation. 
!
4.3. Ged’s Journey: Silence and Darkness  
In recounting Ged’s journey into adulthood, Le Guin emphasises the role of the categories 
denigrated as valueless in Earthsea. Ironically for Ged, who hungers for words of power, the mage 
who offers him apprenticeship is Ogion, known as ‘the Silent’ (23). Ged gets impatient within a few 
 Le Guin, WE, pp. 16-17.18
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days, as Ogion walks sturdily and silently on the long trek to his home at Re Albi, sleeping in the 
rain if it was wet, and making no attempt to teach Ged ‘the language of the beasts and the speech of 
the leaves’ - all that the boy had been expecting to be taught, so that he could ‘sway the wind with 
his word’ and change his shape into whatever he desired (25).  Even when they are at Re Albi, ‘the 
mage’s long listening silence would fill the room, and fill Ged’s mind, until sometimes it seemed he 
had forgotten what words sounded like: and when Ogion spoke at last it was as if he had just then 
and for the first time, invented speech’.  This echoes the insight Tolkien’s Frodo gets when he first 19
enters the woods of Lothlórien, and feels that he has newly invented the names of the colours he 
sees there. The point is that as Tolkien insists, language itself can become trite when used without 
thought, and consequently the world it names become drab and familiar. Le Guin, like Tolkien, 
points to the power of ordinary words; but Ged spurns the learning of anything that has no use.  
          When Ged’s impatience for power leads him to the Roke school of wizardry, his expectations 
are again overthrown. When he cannot enter the open door, despite stepping over the threshold 
twice, he immediately thinks of working a spell; however, his carefully woven magic - his aunt’s 
prize spell - has no effect. When nothing happens, he is forced to ask the Doorkeeper for help, who 
mildly tells him, ‘Say your name’, and allows him entry. A very similar incident in The Lord of the 
Rings also points to the error of undiluted belief in the power of words as magical spells. When the 
nine companions comprising the Fellowship reach Moria, the words on the hidden entrance are 
‘Speak Friend and Enter’. Gandalf assumes that this means a magical spell has to be spoken, and 
spends many hours thinking and trying out different spells. In the end, he suddenly realises that the 
words literally mean speak ‘Friend’ and enter - only the ordinary word friend is required to make 
the doors of Moria appear.  
          However, Ged equates language with power, and power with the absence of the fear he 
experienced in his abused childhood: ‘The more he learned, the less he would have to fear, until 
finally in his full power as Wizard he need fear nothing in the world, nothing at all’ (58). As a result, 
he meets the Master Hand’s explanation of the Equilibrium of the world with impatience, telling 
himself: ‘surely a wizard [...] was powerful enough to do as he pleased, and balance the world as 
seemed best to him, and drive back darkness with his own light’ (48). He thinks of himself as ‘a 
word spoken by the sunlight’ (41). It is ironic, then, that he is ineluctably drawn to darkness and 
shadow - principles that in the First Trilogy are identified with the female. By this means Le Guin 
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implies that his inordinate desire for power stems from a radical lack in the boy’s life: the lack of a 
mother. 
!
4.4. Ged’s Journey: Women 
In A Wizard of Earthsea, women are largely absent from the narrative, and the ones we meet are 
trapped in the roles decided for them by the dominant hegemony: roles whose origin is mystified 
and which now manifests itself in popular sayings that carry the sanction of years and frequent 
repetition, such as ‘Weak as woman’s magic’ and ‘Wicked as woman’s magic’ (16).  No one 
challenges the wisdom of these gnomic utterances, although who first said them, who disseminated 
them and through what well-hidden channels of communication, is lost in prehistory. These sayings 
bear potent witness to years of suppressing and trivialising women and of limiting their sphere of 
action; the ‘wise’ on Roke are all men.    
          The lack of a mother means that young Duny has few interactions with women, and this has 
an important impact on his personality, since it triggers a distrust of people that prevents him from 
forming easy friendships. The woman he spends most time with, his aunt the witch, is manipulative 
and conniving, trying to use his gift for her own ends. Her disempowered status in the patriarchal 
system, where despite having the power of magic she has to play a subsidiary role, is obvious. 
Interestingly, we never learn her name, and many years later, as a middle-aged man in Tehanu, Ged 
fails to recall it. His aunt tries to exert control over the boy by spell-binding him into a ‘female’ role 
of silence and servitude: ‘she had tried not only to gain control of his speech and silence, but to bind 
him at the same time in to her service’ (16). But Duny finds an intense pleasure in what his aunt 
gives him, ‘the power […] over bird and beast, and the knowledge of these’ (17). In fact, he learns 
from this disempowered woman how to take pleasure in his own powers, since she also takes 
pleasure in the powers she has, and tries to use them for gain, deprived as she is of any other outlet 
for her talents. 
          His second close encounter with a woman occurs when he is about thirteen, after he has been 
given his true name (Ged) and lived for a while as Ogion’s apprentice.  When he meets the daughter 
of the old lord of Re Albi on a herb-picking expedition, he find himself unable to resist her wiles. 
The girl challenges him to work a spell well beyond his current capabilities, that of summoning a 
spirit of the dead; and his acceptance of this challenge is significant, for it indicates his desire to 
‘win her admiration’ – to impress a woman.  This is something all traditional heroes seek to achieve 
in order to gain a bride, but the protagonist of Le Guin’s fantasy is no traditional hero. His desire to 
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prove his worth to the girl instead leads him to disaster. He begins reading a summoning spell from 
Ogion’s lore-books, and releases ‘a shapeless clot of shadow darker than the darkness’ that spreads 
all over the house as he feels himself impelled by some unknown force to finish reading (30). It is 
only Ogion’s timely entry that dispels the shadow. The girl’s influence, then, exposes something 
sinister in the magical powers that differentiate Earthsea from our own world; and this sinister 
something at the heart of power is what Le Guin is concerned to address throughout the rest of her 
sequence.  
 The incident at Re Albi foreshadows two later incidents in Ged’s early career as related in 
the Wizard.  When he arrives at the School for Wizards to complete his training Ged again attempts 
to summon the spirit of the dead in an act of jealous rivalry with a fellow apprentice, Jasper. On 
their very first meeting, Jasper’s obvious class difference, evident in his refined speech and rich 
confidence, makes Ged insecure. But the rivalry reaches its climax as a result of sexual rather than 
class jealousy, when Jasper demonstrates his magic skills to a woman at a festival, the Lady of O, 
‘slender and young, bright as new copper, her black hair crowned with opals’ (53). In response, Ged 
chooses to demonstrate his own superior powers to Jasper and his peers by summoning a long-dead 
legendary woman, the Princess Elfarran, and he does so by recalling the spell he was provoked into 
reading by the girl at Re Albi.  It is notable that he calls up Elfarran rather than her lover, the hero 
Erreth-Akbe. Clearly, since his competitive spirit found impetus in Jasper’s conquest of the lady of 
O, Ged wants to have an even lovelier woman at his beck and call.  His intense desire for a woman 
he can call ‘his own’ by summoning her at will is clear evidence of how much the lack of female 
influence matters to him, how intensely he desires a woman who can admire him, as the Lady of O 
admires his rival. 
               All the women above have been silenced at the level of the narrative. They either do not 
speak or their utterance is controlled entirely by the narrator’s voice, which describes their feelings 
and motives for us at second hand. The aunt is given just a couple of sentences of direct speech; 
otherwise, she is described as ‘an ignorant woman’ who ‘often used her crafts to foolish and 
dubious ends’ (16). The girl, although she does speak, is never the focus: the incidents of her 
meeting with Ged are all narrated from the boy’s point of view, and we are told too that her will 
may not be her own; Ogion suggests to Ged that it was her enchantress ‘mother who sent the girl to 
talk to you’ (35). Elfarran is known only as Erreth-Akbe’s lover; there is no Deed or lay to celebrate 
her accomplishments. 
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               Ged meets the unnamed girl from Re Albi a second time after he has raised the Shadow, 
left Roke and defeated the dragon of Pendor.  Her name, we now learn, is Serret, Lady of the Keep, 
and she lives in a stone tower to which he is driven as he runs from the darkness he has raised. As 
he crosses the threshold into the Tower, he enters a long-forgotten story: the tale of the Stone of 
Terrenon. The house with the tower resembles a medieval castle, and the lady is clearly the victim 
of an unwelcome arranged marriage of the kind common in medieval Europe. Echoes of fairy-tale 
princesses imprisoned by ogres resound in the background as Ged is immediately drawn to the lady 
by pity for her situation, with a husband ‘thrice her age, bone-white, bone-thin’, looking at his 
young wife with a ‘hard, covetous glance’. To Ged she seems like ‘a white deer caged, like a white 
bird wing-clipped, like a silver ring on an old man’s finger’.  Her being ‘white’ attracts the dark 20
Ged, who is still at the stage where he idealises women, mentally casting them in stereotyped 
‘feminine’ roles as goddesses or victims whom he can worship or save; significantly, she reminds 
him especially of the Lady of O, who had initially triggered his jealousy of Jasper – and the 
resulting release of the Shadow. Although Serret speaks and acts in the novel, she is essentially 
powerless. Her point of view is never given; even as she speaks, either the narrator or Ged are the 
focus, trying to judge her motivations. This is symptomatic of women’s repression as vocal subjects 
in a society where the male viewpoint is privileged. Women’s experience is mostly portrayed 
through men’s perception of it, and one of the central perceptions in the western tradition is of 
woman as temptress, responsible for Man’s fall. 
          So, while her narrative role is crucial, Serret lacks agency. When, using her beauty as a lure, 
the lady seeks to entrap Ged spiritually, making him a servant of the stone of Terrenon, Ged is able 
to resist the temptation by relying on his reason and imagination.  Clearly, the temptation he once 
experienced at Re Albi is here repeated, but Ged’s reactions are now completely different. Whereas 
the young girl’s challenge to summon up dead spirits drove the teenage Ged to take up Ogion’s lore 
books and hunt through them for the dangerous spell, Serret’s challenge of him to touch the stone of 
Terrenon, her taunt that he is afraid, is met with a simple ‘Yes’ (109). He has learned the real 
dangers of magic, and to recognise that there are some things more important than proving his 
manhood.  
          Soon afterwards, as the Shadow tricks him into shipwreck on a desert islet, Ged plunges into 
another long-forgotten story: the tale of a kidnapped young prince and princess of the Kargad 
Empire, left to die there years before by a usurper king. In this incident, Le Guin confirms the 
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importance of stories, forgotten or half-remembered, that still have a crucial bearing on the shaping 
of the self or of the world, such as the stories of the dragon of Pendor and of Elfarran, which 
interact in complex ways with Ged’s journey through life. Ged enters the forlorn old woman’s story 
by reconstructing it from the clues she gives him, and by a physical gift she offers him he becomes 
a continuation of that reconstructed narrative. Ironically, the old woman who cannot communicate 
with Ged at all, because they speak different languages - in fact, she hardly knows any language - is 
the first woman who actually establishes a dialogic relationship with him. While his aunt and Serret 
had never allowed their self-interest to wane, the old, nameless woman is able to have a communion 
based on Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ relationship, creating a space between herself and Ged where both can 
embrace the totality of the other.  Dispossessed of her inheritance and displaced from her home, 21
she clings to the two things she has always known, the only things that belong to her: a little dress 
and a broken ring. She does have agency, however - perhaps because of her isolated position, on the 
unchartered sandbar, where she is not ‘subjected’ to a suitable role in the controlling patriarchal 
systems. She decides to share her belongings with this first human being she has met, apart from her 
brother, since she was marooned. And perhaps her lost childhood helps Ged reconcile himself with 
his own neglect in his early years. 
 Her story, on the verge of being forgotten, becomes immortal, the backdrop to the lay which 
the narrator keeps mentioning, The Deed of Ged. Her act makes Ged realise the importance of a 
dialogic relationship, and in return for her kindness he sets a charm on the spring of salty water on 
the islet so that it becomes sweet and clear, and the islet acquires a name: Springwater Isle.  These 
two results of the encounter testify to the strength of I-Thou relationships as wellsprings of life at 
the cosmic, social and individual level, for through this encounter the islet becomes a resting place 
for sailors and is ‘mapped’ onto the world. The old man and woman have no names - their names 
and identity have been taken (as Ged guesses) with violence. Ged’s act which results in the island 
being named at least partly restores them to a connection with Earthsea by indirectly giving their 
location, at least, a name: making them part of the story of the world, as it were. 
          Ged’s new ability to have dialogic relationships with women becomes apparent soon after this 
adventure when he meets Vetch’s sister, Yarrow, at Iffish. The peace and goodwill he enjoys at 
Vetch’s house for the first time in his life owes a great deal to the cheerful presence of this young 
girl. After the harsh, bitterly lonely journey he has experienced, Vetch’s home is a welcome respite 
for him and the reader, an indication that the male and female principle are mutually requisite for 
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wholeness and balance; that a lone male hero, despite all his efforts, cannot restore balance to a 
disturbed world, be it the microcosmic self or the macrocosmic universe. Vetch’s first words after 
he recognises Ged are: ‘Come on, come home with us, we’re going home, it’s time to get out of this 
dark’ (144). The emphasis on the word home, and on its meaning as a place of communion, are 
significant because they provide a stark contrast to Ged’s lonely, hermetic condition till then.  In 
fact, ‘home’ is a concept that occurs throughout Le Guin’s work as a way of describing the ideal 
community – most notably, perhaps, in the title of her Californian Utopia of the 1980s, Always 
Coming Home. Homelessness stands for stasis, in Le Guin’s universe, and coming home is always 
for her a process of development and discovery. 
 In Vetch’s home, Ged is introduced to another aspect of women, their connection with 
wildness, which is symbolised by Yarrow’s pet, a tiny dragon. Seeing the little ‘winged and taloned’ 
dragon on her wrist, Ged good-naturedly teases the girl about her bravery in tackling the mythical 
‘monster’, hoping, perhaps, to invoke the story of his own encounter with the dragon of Pendor. 
Unexpectedly, however, his mention of the creature - a harekki - reminds the girl instead of Ged’s 
otak, the story of whose saving of Ged’s life she had heard from her brother.  That communication 
between humans and animals is possible emerges clearly from this speech. Even if such 
communication is silent, it still plays a vital role in the communal life on which humans depend.  
After trying to save the life of a little boy by following him into the Land of the Dead, Ged was 
plunged into a coma, and the otak saved him from death with its simple language of touch and 
warmth. In the process it showed him that he needed community, something the lonely adolescent 
had been in danger of forgetting after his neglectful childhood.  
           Le Guin shares the concern of feminism with the devaluing of women’s experiences in a 
culture where they have been ‘othered’. The inscrutable relationship between humans and dragons 
that the little harekki evokes remains an impenetrable enigma, even as the author re-visions 
Earthsea: ‘In the first three books [...] the dragons were, above all wildness. What is not owned’, Le 
Guin explains in her account of returning to Earthsea in Tehanu. ‘A dragonlord wasn't a man who 
tamed dragons; nobody tamed dragons. He was simply [...] a man dragons would take notice of’.  22
In this first inkling of a relationship between dragons and women, the little dragon on Yarrow’s 
wrist stands for an element of wildness in the domestic context, foreshadowing the later encounter 
between Ged, Tenar and the dragon-girl Tehanu.   
 Le Guin, Earthsea Revisioned, p. 22.22
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 The instantaneous bond that springs up between Ged and Yarrow, who runs a household 
where everything was ‘well-founded, peaceful and assured’ (145), makes Ged realise, consciously, 
what he has missed all his life - a comfortable home and the loving presence of a woman. While 
this may be perceived as a limiting role for women – and Le Guin acknowledges as much in Tehanu 
- the author makes the keeping of a home vitally important. Ged likes to talk to Yarrow and listen to 
her; to tell her things and learn from her. He listens to her earnest questions very seriously, and 
when she exhibits self-doubt at her inability to understand some of his quasi-mystical explanations 
of the Equilibrium, Ged is quick to reassure her, blaming her incomprehension on himself and the 
lack of time to speak clearly. But she is self-assured enough about certain things, which pertain 
mostly to the essential needs of life traditionally seen to by women. Seemingly unimportant, these 
aspects of life are absolutely necessary for survival. When Ged teases her by stealing a cake out of 
the batch she is making for his journey, she tells him, prophetically, that he will regret this theft 
when each morsel of sustenance becomes precious on the open sea. Easy camaraderie, comfortable 
conversation and homely luxury become associated with Yarrow even more than with Vetch; but so 
too does life itself, the material needs of the body. 
          However, many of these women  do not have access to language - that is, they are silenced in 
the dominant discourse of men in Earthsea. Their stories remain untold, half-told or told from male 
perspectives. Some of the remain nameless, for example the princess on the island, or Ged’s aunt. 
Le Guin’s acute awareness of the importance of stories, and the act of story-telling, illustrates her 
awareness of how language shapes reality. 
!
4.5. Why Stories Get Told - or Not 
Interestingly, Ged’s great struggle with the Shadow is lost to song or story in Earthsea.  At the end 
of Wizard the narrator’s note tells us that Estarriol/Vetch’s promise to conserve Ged’s quest in song, 
if fulfilled, has since been lost. Instead three different versions of the final incident in the quest, 
when Ged’s boat was grounded on a mysterious shore that in the middle of the open sea, have been 
‘carried like driftwood from isle to isle’ (168), none of them mentioning Ged or his Shadow.  Since 
only Vetch witnessed this incident, it seems fair to assume that he did make an effort to preserve the 
story, though the narrator tells us he failed. The Deed Of Ged tells of his sailing the Dragon’s Run; 
of the restoration of the Ring of Erreth-Akbe; of his becoming Archmage - but not of his encounter 
with his malevolent double. The implication is clear - stories are mediated and reformulated, sifted 
to get rid of any mention of evil as ‘self’. 
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  This raises interesting questions about how and why, and most importantly by whom, stories 
get remembered and told; and about who listens and remembers. Dominant ideologies privilege the 
male hero's physical struggle with wild, untameable outer forces - forces that can be coded as 
Other; but stories of inner struggle repressed. For a tale of inner struggle of necessity accepts the 
possibility that evil resides within the self, so that the ‘Other-as-evil’ becomes a problematic 
category. Fredric Jameson shows how the hegemony prefers to make evil synonymous with 
‘whatever is radically different from me’.  Ged’s story turns this adage on its head, and so got 23
consigned to oblivion. 
           Still, the story has been told - we have read it - by a narrator who knows the true names of 
both Sparrowhawk and Vetch. Le Guin’s first Earthsea book, then, bears testimony to the fact that 
subversive tales do indeed survive somehow, in the interstices of power, silently awaiting their time 
to be released from silence.  
          The next section will explore Le Guin’s last book in the first trilogy, which once again has 
two endings, leaving the readers to decide which, if either, is the true one.  
!
4.6. Loss of Language in The Farthest Shore 
In The Farthest Shore, Le Guin explores the relationship of language to the polarities of life and 
death, and to human creativity and sterility. The link between language and creativity is a major 
concern (as we have seen) in the fantasy of C. S. Lewis and Tolkien. For Tolkien, human creativity 
is also closely linked to the fear of death, since he sees this fear as an effect of the possessiveness 
generated in human beings by the gift of creativity - not only as artists, but as imaginative creators 
of the world.  Le Guin too sees creativity as linked with death, but for her it is the Judeo-Christian 24
promise of eternal life – a fiction, as she sees it, though not creative in its effects – that generates a 
terror of mortality, as it sows the seed of desire for perpetual existence. This desire to escape death 
in turn generates a scorn for life in all its richness, and encourages the urge to hoard whatever one 
possesses – beauty, objects, talents – in a condition of stasis which is finally deathly. If language is 
integral to creativity, as a constantly changing dynamic force, then both can be drained away by the 
fear of dying, which yearns for changelessness. In her Taoist vision, death should be embraced as an 
end to the existential ‘self’, and all desire for an ‘afterlife’ should be foresworn.  
 Fredric Jameson, ‘Magical Narratives: Romance as Genre’ New Literary History, vol. 7, no. 1 (Autumn, 23
1975), p. 140.
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 Le Guin, then, wishes to supplant the biblical narrative of the end times and write an 
alternative version. As we have seen, fantasy writers seem particularly concerned with writing their 
own bibles; and while Lewis seeks to do so in order to prepare his youthful readers for an encounter 
with the real thing, Le Guin’s concern is to replace it with something healthier.  She has often 
expressed her hostility to organised religion, especially the Judeo-Christian vision, branding herself 
‘an unconsistent Taoist and a consistent unChristian’.  In her Guest of Honour Speech at the 19th 25
Annual Mythopoeic Conference, titled ‘Legends for a New Land’ (1988),  Le Guin talks about the 26
‘Judeo-Christian tradition that informs our world-view’, whereby the ‘the City of God is not 
founded on this earth’, but instead ‘the world will [...] be rolled up as a scroll, a play that has been 
acted, a story that has been told. The world has no value except as a sort of waiting room’.  Against 27
this, Le Guin sets the mythical view of the native American peoples: ‘You’re here; it’s here’, she 
insists (‘Legends’, 8). In The Farthest Shore, Le Guin presents this contrast as a theme, showing 
how the peoples of Earthsea get sucked into the lure of eternal life, only to find dust and shadow in 
the promised land.  In the process she presents her readers with her most direct challenge to the 
fantastic vision of C. S. Lewis. 
          In this book, a wizard called Cob makes a breach between the land of the living and the dead, 
in a bid to gain immortality. Cob is a pastiche of the Christ figure, but the precise obverse of Ged as 
Christ.  Cob claims to offer eternal life but in fact offers death, for nothing that lives can be eternal.  
Ged, by contrast, offers life by offering death, since for him death is the condition of life – 
everything that lives, dies. Cob’s offer drains the world of language and creativity; on accepting it 
people continue to exist, but without imagination, without energy. The absence of imagination is 
demonstrated through their loss of artistry, innovation and initiative. Le Guin equates the wizard 
with the artist - most particularly with a writer, as their tools are held in common: words. But when 
Cob’s influence begins to spread, wizards’ spells no longer work. The most visibly distressing sign 
of the end of the world is that wizards have lost the knowledge of True Speech, and thus the 
potency of their spells along with their connection with the language that shaped the world.  Prince 
Arren, who comes to Roke to seek advice, tells Ged that even his father, the king of Enlad, feels 
that the words of True Speech had lost their meaning. But other forms of artistry are also lost.  
 Ursula K. Le Guin, ‘Ketterer on The Left Hand of Darkness’ in Science Fiction Studies, 2 (July, 1975), p. 25
139.
 Ursula K. Le Guin, ‘Legends for a New Land’ in Mythlore, 56 (Winter, 1988), pp. 4-10.26
 Le Guin, ‘Legends’, p. 8.27
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          As Ged and Arren make the long sea-voyage towards the Dry Land, to seek Cob and restore 
the balance he has upset, they witness many forms of loss of creativity, and loss of meaning from 
language. One example is the silkweavers of Lorbanery, formerly the makers of the best silk on 
Earthsea, who now sit idle, their looms silent and dusty. The old men of Lobanery lament that 
‘There’s no more proper singing’ (374). An old witch tells Ged that she has lost her power, because 
‘There is a hole in the world and the light is running out of it. And the words go with the 
light’ (377). Another disturbing manifestation is that the raft people, celebrating the Long Dance, 
forget the words of the Creation of Éa, which as we have seen is the foundational song of Le Guin’s 
invented world. But the nadir of horror for Ged is when the dragon Orm Embar comes to him for 
help, and following it to the Dragon’s Run, Ged and Arren witness the terrible spectacle of the 
dragons who cannot speak. As Ged has explained to Arren, the dragon and its speech are one: ‘they 
do not work magic: it is their substance, their being’.  The dragons’ loss of speech clearly presages 28
the end of the world, because their substance is True Speech, the language of creation. 
!
4.7. Words and Worlds 
 A common recognition that words are creative means that there is an important dialogic 
relationship between the Bible and Le Guin’s fantasy. The biblical concept of the Word as the 
creative force is familiar from the first words of St John’s Gospel: ‘In the beginning was the Word, 
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God’. In this formulation the Word is represented as 
creative and divine; and the creative aspect of language is also of vital importance in Earthsea. 
Significantly, while it is often repeated in the first two novels that Segoy raised the lands from the 
sea using True Speech, the concept of the First Word uttered by Segoy to raise the lands from the 
ocean  is only introduced in The Farthest Shore. This might seem to be an unimportant distinction, 29
but it indicates Le Guin’s consciousness of her fiction as what has been called an unBible.  30
Presumably as a direct result of the link between words and the primal act of creation, language as 
True Speech is very important in Le Guin’s imagined world. Language makes things happen, it acts 
upon Earthsea. Only the dragons, we learn in A Wizard of Earthsea, know True Speech without 
having to learn it. True names are the truth of everything, animate or inanimate, human or non-
 Le Guin, TFS, p. 335.28
 Le Guin, TFS, pp. 304, 365. See also Earthsea Quartet, pp. 50, 109, 267.29
 Richard D. Erlich, ‘Always Coming Home: Ethnography, unBible, and Utopian satire’ in Paradoxa, 21 30
(2008), pp.137-165.
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human. In A Wizard, Ged tells Yarrow that all power stems from one source, and all names and all 
things ‘are syllables of the great word that is very slowly spoken by the shining of the stars. There is 
no other power’ (151). This anchors being in the world in language. Words create and continue 
existence in all its modes, according to Ged’s explanation. How, then, is the ‘great word’ that is the 
source of all life and language in Earthsea, different from the Word in the Fourth Gospel? 
          It is interesting to note how many fantasy writers share an understanding of this link between 
language and reality. Since these writers create their invented worlds with words, it would seem that 
they invest these worlds and the words that make them conjointly with the ‘truth’ as they perceive 
it. The Bible is, in fact, the text that makes the strongest claim to articulate ‘truth’ in western 
literature. Coleridge, in his Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, describes the Scriptures as if they 
were really possessed of this intention: ‘I take up this work with the purpose to read it for the first 
time as I should read any other work, as far at least as I can or dare. […] in the Bible there is more 
that finds me than I have experienced in all other books put together; […] the words of the Bible 
find me at greater depths of my being’.   Coleridge’s words imply that the biblical text is active and 31
energetic, seeking out its helplessly receptive readers like a heat-seeking missile. According to 
Erich Auerbach, ‘The Bible’s claim to truth is […] tyrannical - it excludes all other claims. The 
world of the Scripture stories is not satisfied with claiming to be a historically true reality - it insists 
that it is the only real world’.  But The Farthest Shore encourages us to consider whether there is a 32
difference between remodelling the actual world to our own ends and creating a world that suits us 
in our fictions. The crucial distinction, of course, is that fantasy does not impose itself on the world; 
it merely professes to present alternative worlds, other ways of being. This, however, makes 
Lewis’s blatant desire to proselytise through his fiction problematic, because his fantasy is intended 
to remodel his readers and the world they live in, much as the Bible does as it is read by the 
Christian churches. Lewis’s desire to bring his young readers to the Bible through his fiction, with 
its assumption that both sets of texts are therefore invested with the authority of truth-bearing 
documents, can be contrasted with Le Guin’s attitude to the way myths and symbols function, and 
to the responsibility as opposed to the authority of the author. She affirms that myth or symbol is 
primarily and ultimately a ‘supra-rational given, a datum, which it is not my job to disguise 
 S. T. Coleridge, Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, Letter 2 (London: Adams & Charles Black, 1956).31
 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature (Princeton: Princeton 32
University Press, 1953), pp. 14-15.
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cleverly, but to express vividly and to communicate. I am not a priest. I am a witness’.  The 33
implication is that these are complex structures whose meaning cannot be analysed; and also that no 
one meaning can be assigned to them – that they are open-ended, available for different 
interpretations.  
          Nevertheless, Le Guin shares Lewis’s belief that myth and reality do not necessarily form 
mutually exclusive ‘true’ and ‘false’ worlds. This is demonstrated, for example, in Ged and Arren's 
encounter with the Raft Folk, who save them after Ged is wounded by a spear as they try to land on 
a hostile island. Arren is unable to help Ged, for he is overwhelmed by inertia resulting from a 
feeling of meaninglessness that is a hallmark of the world after Cob. When Ged regains 
consciousness, he tells Arren that even though he had heard of the strange Raft Folk, he thought 
they were merely ‘a fancy without substance. Yet we were rescued by that fancy, and our lives 
saved by a myth’ (408). In other words, Le Guin shares Lewis’s apprehension of myth as a powerful 
source of restoration meaning and truth in an increasingly alienated world, by an appeal to the 
imagination.  
          As indicated earlier, Le Guin roots her imaginative vision in the here and now, repudiating 
any perception of this world as temporary, and therefore of less value than some eternal 
transcendent universe; and she proposes instead a dialogic relationship between peoples and 
communities, which she initiates in The Farthest Shore, but which becomes much more heteroglot 
in the Second Trilogy. In the Farthest, Ged and Arren’s journey allows her to show an Earthsea 
essentially alienated because of Cob, and by presenting the readers with visions of diverse 
communities robbed of their creative impulse, she demonstrates what a loss of interest in the here 
and now entails.  And in the process she shows us what is at stake, for her, in reading and writing 
about imaginary worlds. 
!
4.8. Dialogic Integration  
Martin Buber, whose book I and Thou (1958) is strongly influenced by his study of the Tao, 
expounds in it what he calls an ‘I-Thou’  relationship, a form of dialogue where the connection 34
between self and other is not based on a hierarchical subject-object division. Instead, it springs from 
 Ursula K. Le Guin, ‘Ketterer on The Left Hand of Darkness’ in Science Fiction Studies, 2: 2 (July, 1975), p. 33
138.
 Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans., Ronald Gregor Smith (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958). Buber wrote 34
Speeches and Allegories of Chuang-Tzu, including an ‘Afterword’, ‘The Teaching of the Tao’, published in 
1910, thirteen years before publishing his book I and Thou (1923). Buber’s work in the latter book shows 
strong elements of the Tao philosophy, explaining why Le Guin finds it useful.
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a mutual acceptance of the other’s uniqueness, so that each speaker is accepted as different. 
‘Dialogue,’ Buber tells us, ‘is not merely the interchange of words - genuine dialogue can take place 
in silence [...]. It is, rather, the response of one’s whole being to the otherness of the other’.  Le 35
Guin mentions the ‘I-Thou’ relationship in her science fiction novel The Left Hand of Darkness, 
written in 1969, one year after A Wizard of Earthsea. In it Genly Ai, the emissary from Earth to the 
planet Gethen, tells the Gethenian Estraven:  
Alone, I cannot change your world. But I can be changed by it. Alone, I must listen, as well as 
speak. Alone, the relationship I finally make, if I make one, is not impersonal and not only 
political: it is individual, it is personal, it is both more and less than political. Not We and 
They; not I and It; but I and Thou.   36
Despite these words, for much of the book Genly cannot accept the ambisexuality of the 
Gethenians, and views Estraven as strange, alien, an Other. He mistrusts Estraven because he 
cannot accept him in his wholeness, but views him as an object of his own preconceptions. His 
consciousness is so steeped in these preconceived notions about the Other that it takes their long, 
arduous journey together through the snow-covered mountains for him to finally see and accept the 
alterity of Estraven. 
           In Earthsea, Le Guin shows the personal and political implications of an I-Thou relationship 
by deploying the geographical setting of the novel sequence as a metaphor for the difficulties 
involved in building relationships.  The Archipelago is a powerful configuration for the study of 
‘difference’, with the sea representing the distance between two individual consciousnesses that 
both inhibits conversation and is vital for an I-Thou relationship. The ocean is in constant flux, 
unlike the earth, which is fixed, and this fluidity and movement underlies Le Guin’s vision of 
relationships between individuals and communities. The metaphor is analogous to Lewis’s vision of 
fixed and moving lands in Perelandra, although the dialectic between fixity and dynamism is used 
differently by the two authors. While Lewis uses the stability of the fixed land as a metaphor for the 
ultimate goal for humans, once they have learned to distinguish between good and evil, Le Guin 
suggests that oceanic variation and fluctuation are necessary for the understanding of the Other and 
the self - in fact, that all understanding is rooted in this shifting, changing space where 
conversations between two poles can take place.  
 Martin Buber, Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald Gregor-Smith, Introduction by Maurice Friedman 35
(London and New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 25.
 Ursula K. Le Guin, The Left Hand of Darkness (London: Gollancz, 1969), p. 259.  36
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          To take the metaphor further, in The Farthest Shore Le Guin shows how the closing of these 
oceanic gaps between people, which symbolise what Buber calls the space ‘in-between’, shuts 
down communication and unleashes chaos. The state of anomie and collapse in the Archipelago, 
caused by the wizard Cob in his quest for immortality, has disrupted the structure of the world and 
destabilised the balance between its cultures. There is no commerce between the different islands, 
as the silk-makers of Lorbanery lament. The sea is infested with pirates, who plunder and loot, 
making mutual dealings between the islands impossible. With the sea rendered impassable, the 
bridges between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ cannot be built, and discord and isolation become the rule of the 
day. 
          This is offset by the close companionship that Le Guin shows between Ged and Arren. As 
they embark on their dangerous journey across Earthsea, dialogue takes place between them, 
developing into a homosocial bond which is fairly radical for its period: an emotional and indeed 
physical attachment between men of different ages and classes, and concentrating on this at the 
expense of her earlier and later concentration on gender. The mutual trust between the two men 
allows Ged to complete the task he has set out to accomplish, and to survive it too, as Arren carries 
him back from the Land of the Dead to the country of the living. Their relationship is, in fact, a 
variation on the acceptance of the Other shown in Genli and Estraven’s - or even Frodo and Sam’s - 
relationship.    
          Another unusual dialogic relationship arises from their encounter with the Raft Folk, who are 
radically different from anyone else Ged or Arren have met. Indeed, as indicated earlier, Ged 
confesses that he had thought the stories about them to be mere legends. When Arren tells one of 
the people Ged’s use-name, Sparrowhawk, the complete inability of the man to attach any meaning 
to the word (there are no such birds on the open ocean where the Raft Folk live) demonstrates to 
Arren their radical alterity. Here again Le Guin demonstrates that the otherness of the Other need 
not be a hindrance to communication; Arren swims among the Raft Folk like one of themselves, and 
sings the Creation Song of Éa for them when they begin to forget it under the influence of Cob’s 
magic. 
 The dialogues between Ged, Arren and the Raft Folk stand in direct contrast to the 
isolationism of Cob, whose selfishness effectively robs him of the power to engage in conversation. 
When Ged finally tracks him down to the land of the dead, the Dry Land – an unchanging dust-
filled desert where the stars are fixed and the departed inhabitants of Earthsea have forgotten all that 
made them human – it seems wholly fitting that he should have taken refuge in the place of silence, 
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where communication is impossible. The Dry Land is the precise obverse of the fluctuating ocean; 
it is fixed, and its very fixety renders dialogue redundant – why should the dead speak when 
nothing happens to them, and there is nothing to speak about?  Here it transpires that Cob has 
forgotten his own name, which is emblematic of the fact that his spell of immortality has effectively 
taken him out of the continuous verbal exchange which is what life consists of. As Ged points out to 
his disembodied shade, even in the Land of the Dead ‘All […] bear their true name’ (462) and can 
be summoned by it, as he himself had demonstrated when he summoned Elfarran.  Cob, on the 
other hand, who wished to appropriate for himself only one aspect of the dead’s existence – their 
apparent continuation as themselves – has forfeited this last vestige of his identity.  You cannot 
remain yourself if you live for ever, because the self is a thing of change, and change entails 
mortality.  Having recognised this about Cob, it is not too difficult to bring his narrative to an end; 
though it proves far more onerous for Ged to close the gap he has opened between the Dry Land, 
the unchanging country, and the fluctuating, living world Le Guin calls Earthsea. 
 Ged’s encounter with Cob in the Dry Land raises more questions than it answers. One 
question is: why does Earthsea even need a land of the dead, given its apparent irrelevance to the 
world of the living?  The Dry Land seems to have more in common with Christian or classical 
tradition than with the Taoism to which Le Guin declares herself committed, albeit ‘inconsistently’.  
And what sort of balance is restored at the end of the novel?  Arren, we learn, is to be King of 
Earthsea, and for many readers the notion of monarchic rule is incompatible with any notion of 
balance in the sense of an equitable society. Moreover, both the Wizard and The Tombs of Atuan had 
shown Le Guin’s readers that there is no balance in her fictional world between men and women. 
The end of the novel brings an end to the threat of Cob; but power relations in her world remain 
profoundly unequal. As for Ged, the readers are left in doubt as to where he goes. The narrator 
explains how the Deed of Ged relates that after attending Lebannen’s crowning, Ged sailed off in 
Lookfar, and was never heard of again. The people of Gont, however, insist that Ged went off into 
the forests of the mountains, to wander there in solitude.  
 The problem of gender, and of political, social and indeed economic imbalance seems to 
have nagged at Le Guin’s unconscious for almost two decades. After a lapse of seventeen years she 
finally addressed it in Tehanu.  !!
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CHAPTER FIVE. TEHANU: REVISIONS AND REVELATIONS 
!
This chapter will look at the first book in Le Guin’s Second Trilogy, Tehanu (1990). Written 
seventeen years after The Farthest Shore, this novel radically revises her earlier trilogy, with the 
apocalyptic subtitle ‘The Last Book of Earthsea’ seeming to link it to the final book in the Narnia 
sequence. Then after another eleven years, Le Guin again went back to Earthsea to reveal further 
unknown aspects of her invented world in two more books. In the process, she exploited the gaps 
left in her own earlier texts to adroitly shift the meanings of some of the premises on which her 
world is based, resulting in some remarkable changes in the tenor of her narrative. One of the ways 
she does this is by re-examining the language, metaphors, and symbols she had been using, and 
radically inverting the implicitly patriarchal assumptions they seem to sustain. 
The same revisionist impulse is seen in Lewis, for example in the way he reuses his earlier 
image of a lit lantern from the Lion in The Magician’s Nephew, weaving a whole story around it to 
explain its presence in Narnia. This skilful deployment of earlier elements in new stories is one of 
the main pleasures to be experienced as the Narnia and Earthsea sequences develop; Tolkien’s well-
planned books show no examples of such impromptu invention.  The process of reinvention is 1
aesthetically gratifying as well as exciting, because of the element of the unexpected in the clever 
overturning of an earlier formulation, or in the innovative use of it to give an important 
philosophical insight, while bringing off the paradoxical trick of making the series feel coherent 
even as the later reinventions radically revise some of its premises. 
In Tehanu, Le Guin no longer writes in the style of Tolkienian high fantasy, with its high 
register, and light scattering of archaisms in grammar and diction. As she begins to consciously 
reassess her earlier work from a feminist point of view, her language becomes simpler and more 
colloquial - indeed, more jarringly modern. Concurrently and perhaps paradoxically, her 
engagement with the scriptures becomes more overt as well as more polemical. While existing 
systems cannot be destabilised using the same language and codes that sustain those systems, Le 
Guin seems to recognise the radical potential for dissidence that retellings offer; so her narrative 
becomes more self-consciously intertextual, as she recognises the ongoing relevance of biblical 
themes to contemporary struggles. Ancient folklore, literary fairy tales and the Bible are inter-texts 
 One reason for this, of course, is that Tolkien did not write a series. His larger legendarium shows plenty of 1
revision, overturning of premises and of multiple versions of the same stories.
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and pre-texts, and conversations between these allow Le Guin to explore and expand the archetypes 
she has established in the First Trilogy. 
By archetypes I mean here the original form (of images, symbols or narrative patterns) – as 
far as we can access this – of a series of variations in any given narrative.   In particular, the Second 2
Trilogy sees the archetypes of the witch and the dragon, common features in folk and fairy tales, 
enriched in ways that demonstrate their continuing presence in literary and socio-political 
discourses as symbols deployed for the suppression and othering of women.  Inevitably, Le Guin 
also dedicates her narratives to exploding stereotypes - interpretations of archetypal symbols that 
attempt to fix singular meanings on the complex, variable archetypes  - such as the notions of old 3
woman as abusive witch, abused child as dehumanised ‘monster’, or dragon as fiend. Her re-
visioning of these familiar concepts endows the archetypes with emancipatory meanings, pointing 
the way towards a radical transformation of a world order embedded in hierarchal binary 
oppositions, such as man/woman, self/other, ruler/subject. In accord with this transformative re-
visioning, an apocalyptic tone pervades the first novel in the trilogy, Tehanu, as predicted by the 
novel’s subtitle. 
The claim that Le Guin rewrites the apocalypse myth might seem counter-intuitive given her 
self-description as ‘a consistent unChristian’;  but as we shall see, apocalyptic literature is 4
essentially a literature of resistance, written at times when the socio-political status quo needs to be 
radically changed. The Greek root of the word Apocalypsis, which means ‘uncovering’, resonates 
with the connotations of the Greek word for truth, aletheia, which also means unveiling.  Certain 5
aspects of the Book of Revelation have been specially potent in the formation of western ways of 
thinking, among other things (according to M. H. Abrams) about ‘the nature of history’.  Christian 6
historians have tended to assume that the world has a definite beginning (creation), a catastrophe 
(fall), a crisis (the death and resurrection of Christ), and an end (the second coming of Christ and 
obliteration of evil). This assumption, says Abrams, has pervaded plotting and character delineation 
in western literature, which are shaped by the ‘historical design’ and ‘theological ideas’ inherited 
 Annis Pratt, Archetypal Patterns in Women’s Fiction (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1982), p. 3.2
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 Northrop Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982).5
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from the Bible. While the western peoples ‘continue to live in a pervasively biblical culture’ (342), 
the twentieth century has seen an increasing tendency to transpose the ‘theological model into 
secular terms, in a process of which the author himself [sic] has remained largely unaware’.   7
          As Laurence Coupe explains, apocalyptic narrative is always written as a response to the 
current historical epoch, and has a ‘strategic function’: that of enabling an oppressed minority to 
purge itself of fear ‘by attending to a language that creatively turns the world upside down’.  Le 8
Guin felt compelled to mobilise this inversion in the world she had created after the feminist 
revolution of the 60s and 70s, when feminist theorists began to pay attention to how language had 
played a vital role in historical constructions of gender.  Le Guin felt a strong need to re-view the 9
world she had created and decided that ‘when the world turns over, you can’t go on thinking upside 
down’.  Tehanu is her first attempt at understanding how language governed by male hegemonic 10
systems needs to be re-written as a language which can represent the occluded eye’s vision.  
          In Tehanu, this is mainly the vision of a raped and abused six year old girl called Therru, one 
of whose eyes has been burnt away. In telling her story, Le Guin attempts to recreate Earthsea in 
ways that allow the reader to hope that despite the violent violation of her body, the child’s selfhood 
may be recuperated. Her recuperation requires an apocalypse, a term that ‘signifies a vision in 
which the old world is replaced by a new and better world’.  In the process, the Archipelago is 11
‘revealed’ to contain elements that can usher in radical change, as well as destroy the old world 
where abuse of the weak is prevalent. Unlike the popular conception of apocalypse as all-out 
destruction, without a creative element, the Biblical apocalyptic narratives  presage a 12
transformation based on cataclysmic events that destroy a world that has become too oppressive to 
be borne, but they also represent the ushering-in of a new order. M. H. Abrams, discussing the 
influence of Biblical apocalyptic narrative on the Western imagination, says that while 
fundamentalist interpretations might still envisage the new order as ‘a supramundane existence’ - à 
 Abrams, ‘Apocalypse: Themes and Variations’, pp. 343-44.7
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la Lewis - post-Reformation exegesis has shown ‘an increasing tendency to assimilate the prophecy 
of eternal felicity to the enduring state of the world’ we already inhabit.  As we shall see, Le Guin’s 13
interpretation of ‘eternal felicity’ is underpinned by her Taoist leanings, so that she rejects any 
concept of polarised time that sets the quotidian against eternity, and repudiates the polarised 
categories of good and evil. This allows her to jettison the notion of final judgement, a staple motif 
of biblical apocalyptic narrative. Instead she chooses to anchor change in the here and now,  14
offering no grand narrative of redemption, no final Judgement Day, and no idealised totalitarian 
order. The Second Trilogy addresses issues that have vital contemporary relevance: child abuse, 
women’s oppression, ageism, race and class hierarchies, rabid misogyny and so on; and by 
introducing these issues into an already-extant Earthsea, the new sequence renders it necessary to 
rethink the invented world from top to bottom; to rethink, but not to erase it. The process begins 
with the novel Tehanu. 
!
5.1. Double Vision in Tehanu 
Tehanu begins with Tenar, now a middle-aged farmer’s widow called Goha, coming to the rescue of 
a child who has been raped, beaten unconscious and left to burn alive in a campfire. The text makes 
it clear that the world is in a state of turmoil, so that violence and lawlessness are rampant. As 
Tenar’s friend Lark tells her, ‘You know how it is now [...] If I were you, I’d lock my door these 
days’;  and the sorcerer Beech, who helps the women tend to the child’s injuries, confirms her 15
view that this atrocity is symptomatic of a wider malaise: ‘I think a time in which such things as this 
occur must be a time of ruining, the end of an age [...] It can’t go on so’ (495). Thus early on, the 
text indicates one of its themes as that of imminent destruction, the approaching collapse of a way 
of life that has become brutally oppressive. Later, even Ged reinforces this impression, describing 
the current epoch as ‘an age of ruin, an ending time’ (547). Chronologically, Tehanu is set during 
Cob’s ascendance and immediately after his death. 
          As we have seen, a similar bleakness, a draining of goodness, affect and creativity, pervaded 
The Farthest Shore, in which the approaching apocalypse seems to have more in common with the 
 Abrams, ‘Apocalypse: Theme and Variations’, p. 345.13
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Judeo-Christian tradition. In that novel the ravaged balance of Earthsea is restored by a Christ-
figure, Ged, who dies and is resurrected in the process. Ged’s successful struggle to close the breach 
between the world of the living and that of the dead results in the loss of his magic power, used up 
in his effort to re-engage humankind with the environment from which they have become 
increasingly detached as a result of Cob’s influence. The book ends with Ged on the back of the 
dragon Kalessin, flying off into the unknown like Christ ascending. In the Earthsea chronology, the 
end of The Farthest Shore and the beginning of Tehanu coincide, so that the reader might hope that 
the time of ruining may soon end. But as the critic Darko Suvin points out, since in the Farthest 
Shore Ged had merely ‘re-established a disturbed balance, his function was conservative’, whereas 
when Le Guin re-visioned Earthsea at the end of the 1980s, she realised that the balance itself was 
suspect.  As noted earlier, asymmetrical power distribution in Earthsea is grounded in gender 16
hierarchies, and this is most apparent at Roke, the school of wizards, where no women are allowed. 
For this reason Le Guin decided that more than a single heroic act on the part of a man would be 
needed to restore any kind of balance between the sexes.  
          Inevitably, therefore, the apocalypse initiated in Tehanu is completely different from those of 
the preceding books in the sequence. The impending transformation is prophesied by Ogion; as he 
is dying, the old mage looks towards the west as if watching ‘some act or deed, in that far, clear, 
golden space of light’ and whispers, exultantly and joyfully: ‘All changed! Changed, Tenar’ (502). 
This is a central moment in the series as a whole, the hinge on which Le Guin’s change of vision is 
placed. Ogion says this when Ged defeats Cob in The Farthest Shore; but Ogion’s rapturous claim 
also looks forward to the change in gender (im)balance and the emergence of multiple identities as 
a result of the oneness of human and dragon that unfolds in Tehanu. The central change, we learn, is 
to the concepts of the hero and the heroic. By presenting Tenar/Goha as the ‘saviour’ of a young 
girl, Le Guin shows us that female heroism may go unsung, and its consequences may be complex 
and obscure, but that it matters just as much as – or rather more than – the ‘quest, contest, and 
conquest’ of male heroism.   As Suvin claims, ‘The world can perhaps be saved from one acute 17
danger by a feat of heroism, [...] but the pervasive system of cruel power and privilege [can] be 
righted [...] only by protracted and complex collaboration for life between women, men, and 
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dragons (and animals and plants)’.  And it is the art of collaboration that women have mastered, as 18
men like Ged have not – or at least, not to the same degree. 
          Moreover, Goha/Tenar’s act of redemption does not involve death and rebirth. In 1992, two 
years after writing Tehanu, Le Guin explored her thoughts on women and dragons in Earthsea 
Revisioned. Referring to Tenar, Le Guin states that she is ‘not pure’(ER, 18), and that therefore the 
paradigmatic sacrifice - death and resurrection - is inappropriate to her. In stating this, Le Guin is 
interrogating the traditional mythic motif of death and resurrection that has been associated with 
male gods, ranging from Osiris, Adonis, and Odin to the Christian Redeemer, Jesus. These 
narratives seem to imply that only virgins can hope to accomplish such an act of redemption - virgin 
men, preferably. Tenar is neither male nor a virgin; she gives up her virgin status as Priestess, then 
as ward of Ogion, in order to marry and bear children. As such, says Le Guin, she ‘is whole, but not 
single [...] She has borne, she has given birth to, her children and her new selves. She is not reborn, 
but rebearing’ (ER, 18).  Le Guin uses the image of a mother to reveal the difference between 
sacrificial male gods, who die and are reborn usually as a deity who achieves a higher spiritual 
status, and the rebearing saviour, Tenar. Le Guin’s apocalyptic vision is based on a strong rejection 
of the concept of immortality, so the image of an immortal saviour does not find a place in her 
narrative. Not dying to be reborn, Tenar gives birth instead to ‘new selves’: first the White Lady, 
healer of the Ring of Bonding; then Goha, wife of Flint and mother of Spark and Apple; then Tenar 
again, foster-mother to Therru. And in Tehanu, as I will demonstrate, she ‘rebears’ again - a 
transubstantiated ‘self’ as dragon/woman, to whom Kalessin the Eldest tells its true name, creating 
a symbiotic bond. Tenar’s saving act is private, not consecrated in public songs and legends; yet in 
the long run, it is the generative force that changes Earthsea irrevocably in all its socio-political 
aspects, as Ged’s private, unrecorded struggle with his Shadow did not.         
          This change is exemplified in a significant incident that foreshadows the future course of 
Earthsea’s history. As Goha walks with the child, whom she has named Therru, on a visit to the sick 
mage Ogion, she cuts sticks for herself and the girl to help them along on the lengthy journey to 
Ogion’s cottage. Immediately afterwards, they encounter a group of shady characters, one of them 
Handy, a young man who had lived with Therru’s traveller parents and participated in her rape and 
mutilation. As they walk towards these men, who have arranged themselves in a menacing position, 
Goha speaks loudly: ‘“Out of my way!” she said, raising her alder stick as if it were a wizard’s 
staff’, and the men, nonplussed into ‘mistaking effrontery for witchery’(496), let them pass 
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unharmed. The noun used to describe Goha’s action – ‘effrontery’ – draws attention to the power 
and authority accorded to wizards by the staff, phallic symbols of male supremacy, in contrast to 
which Goha needs insubordination and trickery, for her ‘stick’ is ‘powerless’. However, as the 
narrator remarks, ‘perhaps there was a power in Goha, or in the child’ (496), and the men make 
signs of averting evil once the two are out of sight. What is the nature of this power that is feared by 
men who seek to subjugate women? Goha’s fierce need to protect the child in her care overcomes 
her own natural fear of the hooligans; the men are left fearing what they perceive as ‘other’, as 
indeed Goha’s love and care for Therru are alien emotions for them.  Is this the magic we have 
come to expect from the fantastic setting of Earthsea?  Or is it a more familiar kind of magic, the 
kind we have encountered from time to time in our own world, which takes advantage of the fear 
spawned by half-suppressed guilt and is paradoxically perceived by Handy as strange? The new 
stress in this book on the second kind of power is what marks its effect on Le Guin’s fictional world 
as revolutionary. 
!
5.2. Dragons of a New World 
          Appropriately, in Tehanu - which announces a transformation of the existing, oppressive 
world order - the guiding vision is not that of a powerful adult, or even a powerless adolescent boy 
as in A Wizard, but that of the most disenfranchised human of all: an abused female child. 
Childhood epitomises helplessness, and since Le Guin claims that gendering is the fundamental 
cause of oppression,  a female child is the most disenfranchised person in society. The child, says 19
Le Guin, talking about her inspiration for Tehanu, ‘irreparably wronged, whose human inheritance 
has been taken from her - so many children in our world, all over our world now - that child is our 
guide’ (ER, 25).   
          Faced with the dilemma of how to represent the unrepresentable suffering of this focal figure, 
Le Guin finds an aesthetic conduit in fantasy literature, which is one of the most potent forms of 
resistance literature. In it, archetypes can be inscribed with new meanings to allow the force of hope 
to enter hegemonic discourses by challenging the allegedly stable and universal meaning of ancient 
symbols, loosing them from the stable moorings of antiquity, and generating new meanings by 
means of this act of vandalism. The archetype of the dragon, in particular, becomes a potent sign of 
subversion in Earthsea.  And it achieves this change in status by its association with the abused 
child Therru. In Earthsea Revisioned, Le Guin declares that ‘The mythopoeticists [sic] err, I think, 
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in using the archetype as a rigid, filled mold. If we see it only as a vital potentiality, it becomes a 
guide into mystery. Fullness is a fine thing, but emptiness is the secret of it, as Lao Tzu said’ (22). 
This challenges C. S. Lewis’s conception of hieroglyphs, discussed in Chapter One, where he says 
that witches, dragons and so on are easily interpretable signs, and that even though they can be used 
innovatively within the narrative, their meaning should not be changed. Lewis himself had shown 
the flaw in this argument in the Lion by changing the archetype of the faun, and thus demonstrating 
that writers might not always be in conscious control of their material, as I have often pointed out. 
           As Le Guin explains in her talk at Oxford, ‘There’s no way to repair or undo what was done 
to the child, and so there must be a way to go on from there. It can’t be a plain and easy way. It 
involves a leap. It involves flying’.  Le Guin suggests that the way forward is not through reacting 20
to cruelty with cruelty, which would generate a spiral of violence without end. Moving beyond 
either retribution or despair – a movement embodied metaphorically in the dragon’s capacity for 
flight - identifies ‘a ground of flexible resistance, a space opened for change’.  The renovation of 21
the world is brought about by people ‘othered’ as monsters, the focal trope for which is the dragon.  
 Dragons have traditionally been represented as the archetypal ‘monster’ in Western 
literature, from the Anglo-Saxon epic Beowulf to the legend of St. George, the Volsungsaga, 
numerous fairytales, and the biblical Book of Revelation, where a dragon doubles as Satan. Even 
twentieth-century fantasy continues to present the dragon as a monstrous hoarder of gold (think of 
Smaug in The Hobbit). The dragons in Le Guin’s First Trilogy mostly conform to this image.  
          The dragon Yevaud, for instance, in A Wizard of Earthsea, is a hoarder of gold and treasure, 
like Smaug, sitting on ‘his’ hoard (in this novel the male pronoun is used unproblematically) for 
centuries after plundering Pendor. Ged is able to vanquish Yevaud by saying his true name, which 
he guesses from his knowledge of old lore. As we have seen, Yevaud was first introduced in the 
short story ‘The Rule of Names’ (1964), where he went about as the village wizard, Mr Underhill.  
Mr Underhill is ‘a little fat man of fifty who waddled along with his toes turned in, breathing steam 
and smiling’; as Yevaud, he is a huge, black-winged, steely-clawed, ‘monstrous creature’.   The 22
true name of a person or thing gives anyone mastery over that person, as evinced in the story, where 
the stranger who comes to fight Mr Underhill has learnt his true name, Yevaud, and utters it while 
the ‘wizard’ is in the shape of a dragon, thinking to bring him back to what the stranger thinks is his 
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true form - a man. But Yevaud is really a dragon, who then devours the stranger. It is worth noting 
that already in this early Earthsea story the powers of the principal characters are reversed: the 
humble middle-aged wizard beats his more presentable opponent; the dragon beats the hero; and the 
laws of story-telling are inverted in the process, presenting the reader with an alternative ‘truth’ to 
set alongside the established truths of romance and fairy tale.  From the beginning Le Guin is 
inclined to play with the conventions surrounding dragons, even as she invokes them. 
          The discourse of control and mastery continues to be dominant in relation to true names in 
the First Trilogy, and dragons again provide the strongest illustration of this discourse. In the 
Wizard, we are told that the true names of all things exist only in the True Speech, which is the 
Language of the Making: the god figure Segoy used this language to create Éa. True Speech is the 
dragon’s native speech, so familiar to them that they can even lie in it (as nobody else can); but it 
has to be learnt by wizards in hours of painstaking study. This account of the Old Speech is 
followed consistently throughout the Earthsea sequence, but the way it is used - by dragons and 
women, at least – undergoes a major metamorphosis in Tehanu, as does the gender of dragons, and 
these changes in the attitude to its originary language are the catalysts for what amounts to a 
revolutionary change in the socio-political milieu of Earthsea itself.  
          Le Guin had begun to rethink the gendering of dragons as early as The Farthest Shore, and to 
remould the archetype of the monster accordingly. In The Farthest Shore, Ged tells Arren that the 
dragon Kalessin is the ‘eldest’ being because no one knows how old ‘he’ is. The Archmage then 
corrects himself - and thereby reveals the ideological embeddedness of using the masculine pronoun 
for transcendent beings, like God, angels and so on. ‘I say “he”’, Ged muses, ‘but I do not even 
know that’ (436). Later, when Arren and the half-dead Ged encounter Kalessin on the shores of 
Selidor, having crossed over the Mountain of Pain from the land of the dead, the narrator states: 
‘Whether Kalessin was male or female, there was no telling; what Kalessin thought there was no 
knowing’ (474). This de-gendering leads to a radically new image of dragons in Tehanu, enabling 
Le Guin to present them as embodiments of the equilibrium symbolised in the Tao as the black and 
white circle of yin and yang. 
         According to Le Guin, the dragons in Tehanu - and in Tales from Earthsea and The Other 
Wind, published a decade later - are ‘dragons of a new world, America’  and in creating them she 23
extends the archetypal dragon-as-monster of European literature to include new emancipatory 
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meanings.  America had been ‘the Western site of the millennium’  - the millennium in biblical 24
discourse being the thousand-year reign of Christ after vanquishing the Dragon/Satan - since its 
discovery in the sixteenth century by Europeans, for whom it was a land of millenarian hope, fertile 
soil for the plantation of a better future.  For Le Guin, this hope depends on the achievement of 
equilibrium, which is not a static state but a dynamic process of creative interaction between 
opposites. So when Le Guin claims that the ‘deepest foundation of the order of oppression is 
gendering’, she is identifying creative interaction between the sexes as the chief prerequisite for 
equilibrium.  Le Guin points out that even though Therru will grow up to be ‘fully sexed’, the rape 25
has three effects: she has been ‘ungendered’, her ‘virtue’ destroyed and her beauty marred: in short, 
‘She has nothing left of the girl men want girls to be’.  Le Guin makes her meaning explicit. The 26
categories of an ideal woman that men would want  - beauty, gender, virtue - have first been 
constructed by a male-dominated system; and then the self-conferred power that these very 
categories help to sustain is used to produce new categories of ‘destroyed’ beauty, or virtue. Any 
intervention by the debarred, in this closed system, seems almost impossible. Le Guin, as she re-
visions her created world, poses to herself a question similar to the one posed by the feminist poet 
Audre Lorde (1984),  who questioned the feasibility of trying to destroy the master’s house with 27
the master’s tools: that is, how far can the foreclosed systems of oppression produced by 
patriarchally established linguistic constructs be unsettled using the same language?  
          Archetypes, as Le Guin well knows, can function as powerful, embedded linguistic structures 
that control thought-processes at an unconscious level. As the dragons evolve a new symbolic 
potential in the second trilogy, Le Guin uses it to reject all three male constructs: the dragon as 
gender-less, monstrous and dangerous. Because in the Second Earthsea Trilogy – as in the final 
book of the first – a ‘dragon defies gender entirely’ (ER, 24), the new American dragon becomes 
‘our own imagining, a speaking spirit, wise, winged, which imagines a new order of freedom’ (ER, 
25-26). Clearly, this new order of freedom as against oppression must be grounded in a defiance of 
the gender categories that lock women into certain codes of behaviour best suited to particular roles 
in society. In the Apocalypse of John, the Whore and the dragon are used as embodiments of evil, 
 Douglas Robinson, American Apocalypses (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1985) 24
p. xi.
 Le Guin, ER, p. 24.25
 Le Guin, ER, p. 24. Added emphasis.26
 Audre Lorde, ‘The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House’ in Sister Outsider (Berkeley: 27
Crossing Press, 1984), pp. 112.
!  147
and Le Guin wants her readers to re-think these associations: dragon as ugly other, ‘whore’ as 
promiscuous woman, and both as ‘wicked’. Most of the evil in Earthsea is effected by men hungry 
for power, like the God King, Cob, or Aspen, to name a few. To be sure, there are women who help 
men sustain their particular brand of evil, like the daughter of the Lord of Re Albi, or Kossil, or 
Therru’s mother; but these are mostly trapped into complicity, which makes them as much victims 
of evil as perpetrators of it. And in Tehanu Le Guin refashions the archetypes of witch and dragon 
in ways that fully expose this victimisation of women by domineering men. 
          Using the archetype of the dragon to envision a space that cannot be violated, a selfhood free 
as wind and fire, Le Guin shows that ‘a wrong that cannot be repaired must be transcended’.   28
Tenar, whose affinity with the dragon Kalessin develops in the course of the novel, helps Therru 
move beyond the trauma of her rape and mutilation, by creating a space that is beyond or anterior to 
the space allowed to women by the male-dominated Earthsea society: a space of freedom from the 
symbolic realm of normative categories. In the process, Tenar herself is transformed, becoming a 
hybrid creature whose affinity with the dragons manifests itself in many ways.  
         This hybridity is thematically embedded in Tehanu as a little-known myth of Earthsea, which 
tells of the primal unity between dragons and humans.  This story is not commonly known to the 
inhabitants, which is surprising, as it seems to be integral to an understanding of the early history of 
Éa. Tenar was told the story of the primal unity between dragons and humans by Ogion when she 
studied with him as a young apprentice after escaping the Tombs; Ogion heard it from an old 
fisherwoman in Kemay, a small town; and Tenar in turn relates it to Therru as they walk up to see 
the ailing mage. Dragons and humans, the story says, were once a single species: at the ‘beginning 
of time [...] they were all one people, one race, winged and speaking the True language. They were 
beautiful and strong and wise and free’ (491-92). However as time went by some of them became 
‘more in love with flight and wildness’, and less with study and learning, while others grew less 
interested in flight and instead ‘gathered up treasure, wealth, things made, things learned’ (492). 
Eventually, the latter sailed away to the east to protect their possessions from the ‘wild ones’, and 
thus the single species became two peoples. Yet a few in each group remembered the ancient 
kinship, and some exist still as both dragon and human, ‘both wild and wise, with human mind and 
dragon heart’ (493). Ogion encountered one such person, the Woman of Kemay, who tried to 
explain to him the mutual co-existence of dragon and human that made up her being. Her song of 
explanation was as follows: 
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Farther west than west 
beyond the land 
my people are dancing 
on the other wind 
!
 And the song, of course, furnishes the fifth Earthsea novel with its title. 
 In Tehanu, the dragon is an emblem of freedom from the desire to own - an inversion of the 
archetype of the dragon as hoarder of treasure; and this becomes extremely important in the context 
of the abused child. Therru lives in a culture where even children are sometimes considered to be 
the property of their parents, to be dealt with as the parents wish – a right of ownership that has 
been horribly abused by her father. In Tehanu, then, the traditional dragon as replicated in the early 
Earthsea books is rebranded as an anomaly, a perversion.  Dragons like Yevaud, who are avaricious 
for material possessions, would seem to have alienated themselves from their people, renouncing 
the wind and air for the perverse pleasures of guarding treasure on land. For Tenar, women have 
long been forcibly alienated from their true natures by becoming tied down in similar ways.  The 
value-laden epithets applied to women – virtue, respectability, reputation and so on – are nothing 
but devices to restrict their freedom, to conceal their potential from themselves. In a conversation 
with the Witch Moss, Tenar compares dragons who estrange themselves from their people to 
women who guard their reputation and ‘virtue’. The word ‘virtue’, Le Guin tells us elsewhere, 
derives from vir, meaning man, connoting that a woman’s worth is only the level at which a man 
values her.   The dragon’s dance ‘beyond the land’, on the ‘other wind’ involves a refutation of 29
ownership, a forswearing of possessions with a concomitant refusal to use others because you ‘own’ 
them - children, animals, plants, the earth, your partner. Tenar tries to restore this type of freedom to 
Therru, whose ‘virtue’ has been brutally assaulted, so that she is no longer able to fill a role ‘doing 
what a woman should do’: that is, as Tenar bitterly points out, to ‘bed, breed, bake, cook, clean, 
spin, sew, serve’, all crafts that girls must learn in order to become good wives and mothers. The 
myth of the primal oneness of humans and dragons reveals that every creature always has (or 
should have) an opportunity to choose whether to be bound by material possessions, or to cultivate 
instead physical, intellectual and emotional dispossession. Despite the egregious crime committed 
against Therru which made her ‘other’, she should be able to ‘dance on the other wind’, rejecting 
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the categories that are too narrow to assimilate her. As we shall see, Tenar helps her to embark on 
the path towards this destiny by destroying those categories in a blaze of anger, as unjust and 
arbitrary classifications. As Le Guin remarks in Earthsea Revisioned, dragons are not only 
‘dangerous beauty‘ but also ‘dangerous anger’ (ER, 23), a promise of retribution for past wrongs.               
          The story of the ontological dragon/human hybrid has been suppressed, it would seem, by the 
purveyors of knowledge, the self-appointed male guardians of Earthsea’s culture, in a move 
analogous to the destruction of Native American cultures by the European invaders (and we are 
invited to make this analogy by Le Guin’s hint that she drew the myth of this hybrid from a similar 
Navaho legend).  The successful suppression of parts of history reveals how all knowledge is 30
mediated by discourse, which in turn is shaped by patriarchal notions of what constitutes ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ information. The fact that even Ogion, the wise mage, did not initially know the story is 
significant. The men in charge of disseminating knowledge – which in the largely oral culture of 
Earthsea is often enshrined in songs and lays – obviously deemed it ‘wise’ to suppress this primeval 
portion of Earthsea’s history, and thus ossify the human/dragon binary as unbridgeable. This echoes 
the desperate attempts made by the religious authorities in the nineteenth century to suppress 
Darwin’s propositions about the evolution of species, which included the scandalous proposition 
that human beings were descended from apes. 
          But evolution is vitally important for Le Guin, for as Tenar tells Therru: ‘in time, nothing can 
be without becoming’.   As we have seen, the equilibrium so important in Earthsea is a dynamic 31
interplay of oppositions, akin to Blake’s ‘Contraries’, rather than a static state of achieved 
stability.  Ged tells Arren: ‘The Balance is not a stillness. It is a movement - an eternal 32
becoming’ (TFS, 423). However, liminal or transitive spaces that allow border-crossings and 
transitions are anathema to dominant discourse, because the elision of classifications possible in 
these in-between states can disrupt the rigid binary distinctions that reinforce the hegemony. 
Metamorphoses, observes Marina Warner, constitute ‘the principle of organic vitality as the pulse in 
the body of art. This concept [...] runs counter to notions of unique, individual integrity of identity 
in the Judeo-Christian tradition’.  Metamorphosis is made possible by the process of blurring the 33
borders of identity, for example through the multiple identities acquired by Tenar as her role shifts 
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from priestess to wife, or widow to lover. In addition, metamorphic discourse is inclusive and 
embraces continuity rather than compartmentalisation, for it rejects what Le Guin calls the ‘Judeo-
Christian exclusive focus on one species, the exclusion from sacredness of everything but the 
human’.  Le Guin is particularly interested in processes of transition, as enacted in a flexible 34
personal identity or in the apocalyptic transformations of older perspectives and world orders. As 
she states, a delight in exploring thresholds, ‘with all the danger and promise of liminality’, has 
shaped her writing.  In Tehanu dragons and women of all ages are shown to possess this liminal 35
status, as do the witch/women Ivy and Moss, the child/monster Therru, and the widow/priestess/
witch Tenar. 
          In Tehanu, dragons also become mediators between spirit and body, the intangible and the 
corporeal, the past and the present. Their thoughts and culture remain largely unknown in the 
Second Trilogy, despite their prominence in that sequence.  And that is one of the reasons for their 
association with the feminine by Le Guin, who even after having written Tehanu admitted that ‘The 
dragons of Earthsea remain mysterious to me’ (ER, 22). One of Le Guin’s greatest influences, the 
Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu, ‘feminized mysteries,’ she tells us, ‘in a different way from anybody 
else. These are not “feminine mysteries,” but he makes mystery itself a woman’, and the most 
mystical passages in his book, the Tao, are ‘the most feminine’.  Ged’s description of dragons in 36
The Farthest Shore begins by listing their familiar fairy-tale qualities, but ends by verging on the 
mystical: ‘The dragons are avaricious, insatiable, treacherous; without pity, without remorse. But 
are they evil? Who am I to judge the acts of dragons? […] They are wiser than men are. It is with 
them as with dreams [...] We men dream dreams [...] The dragons do not dream. They are dreams. 
They do not work magic: it is their substance, their being. They do not do: they are’ (TFS, 335). In 
Tehanu, Tenar discovers that she too is a mystery – to herself as well as to the men of Earthsea – 
and that she therefore resembles the dragons, despite or perhaps because of her embeddedness in 
the humdrum businesses of running a household and protecting Therru.  And the sign of her 
connection with the dragons is their mutual knowledge of True Speech, which needs further 
attention. 
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5.3. Language and Power 
 As we have seen, language – as in the True Speech, and in True names – serves mainly as a 
tool of power in the First Trilogy, exploited by wizards and dragons to control their environment 
and interlocutors. Women are not taught True Speech, picking up only a few words haphazardly 
here and there. Although most wizards are supremely conscious of the need to maintain cosmic 
equilibrium, there are always some who seek power for its own sake and exploit their ability to 
change the cosmic order accordingly, among them the hot-headed young Ged, or the depraved Cob. 
True names are fiercely guarded, lest they be used as weapons of control, and are rarely given as 
gifts in the earlier books: the only instance of gifted names in A Wizard of Earthsea, for instance, is 
offered by Ged’s friend Vetch, who tells the young wizard his own true name and that of his sister 
Yarrow. Mostly, finding a person’s name is a skill learned in the School for Wizards on Roke. Ged 
guesses many true names thanks to the scholarship he acquired there, among them the name of 
Yevaud, which enables him to defeat the dragon.  In Tombs he calls Arha by her name, Tenar, and 
when asked how he knew it, replies that ‘Knowing names is my job. My art. [...] there is great 
power and great peril in a name [...] all wizardry […] hangs still upon the knowledge [...] of that 
true and ancient language of the Making’.   The crucial distinction between a ‘gift’ and a ‘power’ is 37
a matter of attitude, and Le Guin has gone on to explore this distinction in her recent fantasy 
sequence Annals of the Western Shore. 
 The difference between discovering a name by ‘art’ or ‘power’ and the bestowal of a name 
as gift becomes clear in Tehanu in the profound connection that evolves between Kalessin and 
Tenar.  The first evidence of this connection is when Kalessin comes to Gont, bearing the emaciated 
Ged on its back, and encounters Tenar on a cliff top.  Tenar is able to look Kalessin in the eye, even 
though she had always been told ‘that men must not look into a dragon’s eye’ (156); but then ‘she’s 
not a man, is she?’ observes Le Guin wryly in Earthsea Revisioned (22). Shortly afterwards the 
dragon addresses Tenar directly, giving her the gift if its own true name: ‘Thesse Kalessin’ to which 
Tenar responds ‘Thesse Tenar’. The subliminal link between Tenar and the dragons, embedded in 
their shared knowledge of True Speech and confirmed by the free exchange of secret knowledge, 
becomes pivotal in the final apocalyptic scene of deliverance in the novel. 
         Tenar acknowledges what seems to be a pre-discursive knowledge of the True or Old Speech 
when she explains to Ged how ‘the words of the Old Speech, they were as easy and as hard in my 
mouth as in [Ogion’s]. That was like learning the language I spoke before I was born. But the rest - 
 Le Guin, The Tombs of Atuan, Earthsea Quartet, p. 267.37
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the lore, the runes of power, the spells, the rules, the raising of the forces - that was all dead to me. 
Somebody else’s language’ (560). This prefigures Ged’s explanation of dragons and their 
understanding of True Speech to Tenar: ‘the dragon and the speech of the dragon are one. One 
being’ (663). As Tenar explains to Moss and Therru how Ged arrived on Gont, the dragon’s name, 
Kalessin, involuntarily forms itself with her ‘lips and tongue’ and ‘mouth and breath’, revealing the 
complex bond that the name has created between them.  Since, as Ged says, the dragon and its 
speech are one, Kalessin has gifted her its ‘being’, its dragonhood, along with the gift of its name, 
and Tenar’s intense consciousness of the physical processes involved in pronouncing that name 
suggests she is taking dragonhood into her body, making it a familiar part of herself. This is a 
radically new form of power: it strengthens relationships and forges bonds, in stark contrast to the 
use of names in the first trilogy, where the emphasis was on how knowledge of the True Speech 
gave one person power over another, who always remained ‘other’ despite the words that passed 
between them. And the strengthening bond between Tenar and Kalessin is revealed in three dreams 
that visit Tenar after their first encounter.  
         In the first, which occurs on the night of the meeting, Tenar flies dragon-like in ‘a vast windy 
space hazy with red and gold’, calls out Kalessin’s name, and is answered from the ‘gulfs of 
light’ (522). This recalls her dream of becoming a bird of fire when she was a priestess at the 
Tombs, oppressed by the malevolent vigilance of the older priestess Kossil. Tenar had dreamt of 
‘great bedraggled birds’, one of whom had golden hair like her mother’s; and of being entombed 
with her arms and legs tied in grave clothes. In that dream her despair eventually ‘grew so great that 
it burst her breast open and like a bird of fire shattered the stone and broke out into the light of 
day’ (TA, 257). Images of entrapment are often used in literature to represent the plight of women; 
and as early as the Tombs, Le Guin is already envisioning freedom in terms of fire, wind and flight. 
Similarly in Tehanu, in the subliminal spaces of her dreams, Tenar feels a connection with Kalessin, 
and wakes up to feel ‘a spark; like the bodily certainty of a conception; a change, a new thing. What 
it was she would not ask [...] You did not ask a true name. It was given you, or not’ (524). So when 
the dragon gave Tenar the gift of its true name, and received hers in return, a connection was forged 
between them based on trust rather than power. This is a ‘bodily certainty’, indicating that not only 
has Tenar become the agent of a fundamental change prophesied by Ogion – its prospective mother, 
so to speak – but that she herself is experiencing a creative metamorphosis. She is effectively ‘re-
bearing’ the alienated Other as an integral part of self, by ‘seeing’ and speaking to it. For as Moss 
says, ‘to see’ is another way of saying ‘to know’; it is a recognition that the other exists - an ‘I-
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Thou’ relationship’.  And not being seen, not being known, is a condition thoroughly familiar to the 
middle-aged women who take centre stage in Le Guin’s novel.  
          The bond with Kalessin is only one of several intrinsic bonds built up in the book between 
Tenar and various others.  This is made clear in one of the most important conversations in all of the 
Earthsea books, between Tenar and Moss, as they split reeds to weave baskets. The splitting is 
women’s work – traditionally men in Earthsea do not weave baskets, nor split reeds to furnish 
material for them. Yet weaving of many kinds is an integral part of pre-mechanical societies, and 
the shared activity allows Tenar and Moss to relate to each other, creating fellowship as they thread 
their way through different topics of mutual interest. As they talk, Tenar asks Moss how men of 
power are recognised in childhood, and what the difference is between wizards and witches. Moss 
compares men to hard nuts, with the shell ‘Full of grand man-meat [...] And that’s all [...] its all him 
and nothing else, inside [...] His power is himself [...] When his power goes, he’s gone [...] Nothing’ 
(528). Ironically, Ged uses the same word to describe his own condition as a powerless ex-
Archmage: his victory over Cob in The Farthest Shore, he laments, has left him ‘nothing at 
all’ (547). He knows no definition of himself that does not involve the exercise of power.  Women 
are completely different, says Moss. Their roots go ‘deeper than this island. Deeper than the sea, 
older than the raising of the lands. I go back into the dark [...] No one knows [...] what a woman is, 
a woman of power, a woman’s power’ (528). But Tenar is unconvinced. Darkness may be the primal 
state, as Moss claims, but can darkness ever be known without the knowledge of light? Can roots be 
known without trees? Nothing can be known without knowing its opposite, Tenar insists. She goes 
on to assert: ‘It seems to me we make up most of the differences, and then complain about 
’em’ (572). She tells Moss how her upbringing in the segregated Place of the Tombs made it 
impossible for her to know women because she did not know men. Similarly, men who live only 
among men, such as soldiers, sailors or wizards, cannot really know men. Insularity can only 
produce one-dimensional perspectives. Knowledge is a matter of weaving together different 
materials, as the women are doing during this conversation. 
Although Tenar here effectively demonstrates that Moss is a gender essentialist in her stark 
separation of men and women, Le Guin herself seems to vacillate in Tehanu between gender 
essentialism and a denial of gender-based difference. As Audre Lord has said, ‘The failure [...] to 
recognise difference as a crucial strength is a failure to reach beyond the first patriarchal lesson. In 
our world, divide and conquer must become define and empower’.  Since her vision is Taoist, Le 38
 Audre Lord, ‘The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House’, Sister Outsider, p. 11238
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Guin thinks in binaries, which exist in a creative, constantly changing dialectical relationship, 
imaged in the yin-yang circle, with its a dot of the opposite colour in each of its dark and light sides. 
Her stance therefore resides between the two extremes.  While she demonstrates how women and 
dragons – both of whom have been ‘othered’ – can collaborate to define a space of liberation for 
themselves, Le Guin refuses to accept gender as fixed.  Since identities are in a state of constant 
creation, gender is a fluid category. 
          Tenar’s conversation with Moss gives her the insight that the categories of evil and good are 
not related to the physical manifestations of darkness or light.  As Tenar realises the similarity 
between what was done to Manan, the eunuch who served her in her capacity as priestess of the 
Tombs of Atuan, and the abuse of Therru, the grim reality hits home: evil can and does occur both 
in darkness and in light, in places consecrated to the service of indifferent gods and in sunlit 
meadows by the river. This enables Tenar to understand that evil subsists in human agency, and not 
in places or natural forces, the dark or the light, the desert or the meadow. This may remind us of 
Lewis’s discussion of ‘psycho-physical parallelism’, in which he claims that all language is 
metaphorical, and that ‘if those original [metaphorical] equations, between good and light, or evil 
and dark, between breath and soul and all the others, were from the beginning arbitrary and fanciful 
[…] then all our thinking is nonsensical’.  Le Guin’s rejection of the ancient equations of dark with 39
evil and light with goodness invites her readers to deconstruct the ideological subtexts inscribed in 
seemingly innocuous figures of speech. In Tehanu, she applies Ricoeur’s ‘hermeneutics of 
suspicion’ by challenging her own earlier associations of the Dark Powers with evil. In this novel 
the primal powers, elemental forces like the Nameless Ones in The Tombs of Atuan, are anterior to 
moral and ethical categories. It is men and women who use children because of their powerlessness: 
who geld boys in Kargad to use as slaves in the Place; who rape and abuse young girls in Middle 
Valley to satisfy their lust. She dreams again that night, the night of the basket-weaving, of ‘flying 
in the light above the sea’, and she hears a voice calling her name this time, Tenar, and she answers 
without knowing whose name she calls.  
          In the next few days, Tenar continues to ponder the difference between men’s and women’s 
power, and comes to the conclusion that it is not the power itself but the attitudes of men and 
women that differ. As a woman ‘she had been a vessel’ for the power of men, and so had been 
accorded a temporary power as wife and mother within a patriarchal culture; a power that passed 
away with her youth, being inscribed in the gender roles framed by society. Yet in her the feeling 
 C. S. Lewis, ‘Bluspels and Flalansferes’ in Rehabilitations and other Essays, p.158.39
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grows stronger that something ‘is coming to be born - has been set free. I know in my sleep and in 
my first waking, something is changed’(538). In the labyrinth Ged had told her a dragonlord was a 
man dragons would talk to, and she wonders: ‘Was that the new thing, the folded knowledge, the 
light seed, that she felt in herself’ ( 538) – that is, the knowledge that a dragon had talked to her, had 
told her its name? The image of a seed is used to suggest that Tenar’s growing knowledge and its 
concomitant power will not be used only on an individual level, but for the community, to serve 
humanity at large.  
          One important aspect of sociolinguistic constructions of gender, of course, is sexuality, and 
Le Guin explores how far gender differences are embedded in biology, and to what extent they are 
produced as ideological agendas. Moss explains to Tenar that wizards take a vow of celibacy, and 
place a binding spell on themselves that makes them unable to think of their sexuality. At this point 
Tenar realises with a shock why she has never touched or kissed Ged. While the first three books 
did not state this explicitly, and in fact the myths and legends of ancient Earthsea heroes included 
mages who were married and had children (the great mage Morred, for example, was married to 
Elfarran), in Tehanu Le Guin is more conscious of the ideology that pervaded her earlier books 
without her knowing it: that is, of the tradition of the hero tale as exemplified in classics like the 
Iliad which had framed her thinking and writing.  
          In Tehanu, Le Guin uses the word celibacy for the first time to describe the wizard’s state, 
thus foregrounding the comparison with Christian priests. Tenar remembers that the Priestesses at 
the Tombs also made a vow of lifelong virginity, which is one of the reasons for the cruel castration 
of boys: to enable them to act as servants in the Place where no man could enter, but where the 
physical strength of men was needed for certain work.  Laura Comoletti and Michael Drout point 40
out that the similarity between celibate priests and wizards resides in their capacity to effect 
physical transformations: ‘the wizards and priests alike are able to perform speech-acts by which 
they can change not only social reality but the physical world as well. Using words, a wizard can 
transform a pebble into a diamond or a person into a bird; using words, a priest can transform bread 
and wine into the body and blood of Christ’.  In the absence of a king the wizards rule Earthsea, 41
and their position seems analogous to ‘the reign of an unmarried ruling caste over a largely married 
 This practice finds a parallel in the castration of boys to be part of the Church choir, which women were not 40
allowed to be part of. Uta Ranke-Heinemann, Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven: The Catholic Church and 
Sexuality, trans. by Peter Heinegg (USA: Penguin, 1990), pp. 134-35.
 Laura B. Comoletti, Michael D. C. Drout, ‘How They Do Things with Words: Language, Power, Gender, 41
and the Priestly Wizards of Ursula K. Le Guin’s Earthsea Books’ in Children’s Literature, ed. Elizabeth 
Keyser and Julie Pfeiffer (Yale University Press, 2001), p.114. 
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mass of people’  – that is, the rule of the Church over the world through a hierarchy of priests, 42
bishops and Pope from the twelfth century onwards, when the celibacy rule became established.  43
The equation of celibacy with power is deeply rooted in the western psyche, stemming from the 
equation of sex with sin and sin with lack of control, and positing sexual desire as a result of the 
Fall. Since Eve is the paradigmatic tempter, Adam the ‘namer’ can hope to regain some of his 
original innocence, and the power of naming, by abstaining from sex, the ‘desire’ awakened in him 
by the temptation of Eve. In this way male continence has been imposed as a necessary condition 
for the preservation of the sacredness of the Word.  
          But Le Guin believes that the Word, and words, cannot be preserved and possessed by a few 
‘chosen’ people, as Kalessin’s gift of its true name demonstrates; and she believes too that the 
liberation of words from the domains of power can have a radical impact on the culture where it 
takes place. Tenar’s third dream in the book is of flying in ‘vast gulfs of wind and light, but the light 
was smoky, red and orange-red and amber, as if the air itself was fire. In this element she was and 
was not; flying on the wind and being the wind [...] the force that went free; and no voice called 
her’ (573-74). This dream symbolises a spiritual metamorphosis that Tenar is to undergo, not 
entering, but becoming the hybrid element fire-air. The intense colours of this vision differ from the 
rose-pink of the earlier dream which welcomed the dawn of a new day, in that the red-orange 
signifies the risen sun of a new day, bright and at its zenith, indicating the birth of a ‘new world’. 
Under these conditions Tenar needs no name, and is freed from the power relations that names 
entail.  She accesses the new world by flying, a gift that has been bestowed on her, imaginatively at 
least, by Kalessin’s verbal gift. The transformation or transubstantiation of Tenar began with and is 
rooted in a word, the true name of the Eldest, which liberates Tenar’s imagination, reminding us of 
Le Guin’s contention that ‘Words are events, they do things, change things. They transform’.  But 44
the transformation of Tenar also opens divergent visual perspectives, as this third dream 
demonstrates; and these divergent perspectives are designed to encourage readers to look at 
Earthsea afresh – to see with new vision the implications of the earlier narratives. As for Tenar, new 
ways of seeing as well as speaking are required if the reader is to follow the narrative into its new 
phase. 
 Ranke-Heinemann, p. 6.42
 For a detailed account of the rule of celibacy as a compulsory requirement for priests, see Ranke-43
Heinemann, Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven: The Catholic Church and Sexuality, pp. 99-124. 
 Le Guin, ‘Telling Is Listening’ The Wave in the Mind, p. 199.44
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5.4. The Double Vision of Tenar 
The gaining of what Le Guin calls a ‘double vision’ by Tenar is prefigured in her ability to look 
Kalessin in the eye. A dragon’s eyes are placed such that a human can see only one of them at a 
time, giving them what is described as a ‘sidelong look’ (476). Meanwhile, the dragon’s eyes see in 
two different, opposite directions, creating a sort of double vision. From the human perspective, 
each human sees and is seen by just one eye; but from the draconian perspective, both eyes see, but 
in different ways. It takes Tenar a little while to understand how this draconian perspective works. 
          The ‘double vision’ of Goha/Tenar is symbolised by the fan she sees in the house of Fan the 
weaver. It is his most treasured possession (as his name suggests). A gift from a sea pirate, the fan 
has pictures on both sides; one side showing men and women painted against the background of 
Havnor City; the other dragons in flight among clouds and mountains. When held up against the 
light, the two sides become one, so that the ‘men and women were winged, and the dragons looked 
with human eyes’(576). As Tenar gazes at the scintillating double vision, Fan asks, ‘Do you see?’. ‘I 
see,’ replies Tenar, and indeed by now she does possess the ‘third eye’, the ability to recognise the 
true value of the ‘other’ which does not reside in the appearance, but in the moral and ethical 
qualities of a person. 
This is possible because Goha/Tenar has acquired the unusual gift of knowing that the other 
exists and might have a valid point of view. Le Guin does not suggest that it is possible to wholly 
understand the other, or to ‘see’ through someone else’s eyes, thus escaping the totalising tendency 
in feminism which purports to speak for the disempowered and marginalised while not really 
‘belonging’ to either group.  The space of radical difference cannot be accessed, demonstrates Le 45
Guin, except in a limited way. Therru belongs to that space, for she has been dehumanised, 
ungendered, made other by rape. But Tenar’s vision, like that of the dragons, is multi-perspectival, 
and she builds, with her love, a ‘bridge of spider web’ (625) across the void that separates her from 
her charge, despite her awareness that the gap will remain.  This is the implication of her name on 
Gont, Goha, which means spider; like Fan she is a weaver, though with threads spun from her own 
substance, and the weaver’s fan enables her to understand what her weaving entails. 
Among other things, it entails the deployment of a different form of knowledge than the 
kind preserved by priests and wizards.  It is a knowledge associated with the domestic; and 
 See, for example, Gayatri Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak’ in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg eds., Marxism 45
and the Interpretation of Culture (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1988), pp. 271-313.
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domestic knowledge and the knowledge of dragons had been linked together implicitly in Le Guin’s 
mind since she wrote the first Earthsea book, A Wizard of Earthsea.  At the end of this first book a 
young girl, Yarrow, wore a little dragon as a living bracelet. In the fourth book of Earthsea, we learn 
that Tenar like Yarrow chose to occupy the domestic sphere after she left Atuan, rather than the 
world of publicly acknowledged power offered her by learning magic from Ogion. As a priestess 
she had known that she had no real authority: ‘Men had given her power, men had shared their 
power with her’ while women had ‘looked at her from outside’. Ogion had offered to teach her the 
runes and names of mastery, but Tenar had refused to enter that space of complicity with patriarchy, 
for if she entered it she would be consolidating the same power structures she had escaped in her 
flight from Atuan. Rejecting that fate on Gont, she renounced the meagre and illusory share in 
men’s power that learning magic would have given her. So ‘she had left the powers of learning and 
skill [...] had turned her back on all that, gone to the other side, the other room, where the women 
lived, to be one of them’ – that is, to be Goha.  Ironically, the dragon/people who had flown west, 46
to the ‘other’ side of the Archipelago, had also rejected learning in favour of freedom; so her 
decision brings her closer to them long before she has cause to think about this proximity. 
When she refuses to learn the True Speech from the educated male elite empowered to teach 
it, Tenar simultaneously rejects the freight of connotations, implications and preconceptions built 
into this learned discourse by its location in an exclusive system of education. Taught in a carefully 
policed, enclosed and privileged male space, this language would have transferred the assumptions 
and prejudices that underpin this system to the learner. Tenar chooses instead to form her own 
perceptions and make her own judgements as a woman, based on women’s experiences. As Le Guin 
has remarked of Tenar, ‘Her insignificance is her wildness’ (ER, 23), and this enables her to 
‘connect with a different world, a free world, where things can be changed’ (ER, 23). Rather than 
learning from a mage, Tenar dreams magic (True Names). In her dreams she forges a connection 
with Kalessin by calling her name and being answered. And this double-vision is imbricated with 
the changing conceptions of language in Earthsea, as we shall see. 
  
5.5. The Double Vision of Therru 
Le Guin suggests in Tehanu that marginalised and excluded identities contain elements that cannot 
or will not be integrated into mainstream culture. For example, what sort of identity does an abused 
child have in any given society? Where will Therru - whose name, as Tenar explains to Ogion, 
 Le Guin, Tehanu, p. 509.46
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means ‘burning, the flaming of fire’ (500), or perhaps ‘inflammatory’ – where will she fit, in a 
culture governed by rules all of which tend to exclude her? She seems to fit nowhere.  
          As Judith Butler tells us, gender plays a constitutive role in the integration of a ‘subject’ into 
the realm of the symbolic , the linguistic structure that sustains the patriarchal laws.   She has no 47
access to language, because language is steeped in androcentric rhetoric, the rhetoric that made it 
possible to abuse her. Therru has no voice in public affairs, and this metaphorical voicelessness is 
symbolised in the harsh rasping sound she makes when she wants to speak, because her ‘voice is 
burned away’ (540). At the same time, there is a definite affinity between her burnt, husky voice and 
the stentorian voice of the dragon. The narrator tells us, ‘The child’s voice was like a metal brush 
drawn across metal, like dry leaves, like the hiss of fire burning’ (654); while the dragon has a 
‘huge voice like a broom of metal dragged across a gong’ and an ‘immense furnace-blast of 
laughter’ (688). The similarities are obvious.  The burned child may have been ‘dehumanised’, as 
Le Guin puts it (ER, 19), but Therru’s indeterminate status can generate a form of power that 
destabilises standard, static power constructions, as her name seems to promise.  In the world of 
power politics, whose dominant residents seek to establish monolithic identities for themselves and 
others, indeterminacy or insignificance can be a tool of subversion, as Le Guin shows us, or as 
Tolkien’s hobbits have demonstrated.                      
                   As Ged mourns the loss of his magic, feeling that he is left with ‘nothing’, he reacts 
with bitterness to Tenar’s assurance that time will heal his loss.  ‘Like the child?’ he asks, and 
demands to know why Tenar saved the little girl despite ‘knowing that she cannot be healed. 
Knowing what her life must be’ (547). The former Archmage’s resentment indicates that despite the 
psychic wholeness he gained by accepting his Shadow in A Wizard of Earthsea, he afterwards 
wholly embraced the socially sanctioned role of the foremost wizard.  His identity as Archmage 
engulfed his whole being, undermining his hard-earned psychic wholeness, rather as if the Shadow 
had succeeded in taking possession of him. Losing his role as Archmage means that his place in 
Archipelagic society is no longer culturally intelligible; he is unable to comprehend who he is, and 
is afraid to face the people among whom he had previously moved with confidence. Ged has in fact 
been gendered into the identity of ‘male hero’ and feels dispossessed without that label. To 
assimilate monolithic, culturally determined identities, in other words, can have severely 
 Judith Butler explains: ‘ According to Lacan, the paternal law structures all linguistic signification, termed 47
“the symbolic”, and so becomes a universal organizing principle of culture itself. This law creates the 
possibility of meaningful language and, hence, meaningful experience’, in ‘The Body Politics of Julia 
Kristeva’, Hypatia, Vol. 3. No. 3, ‘French Feminist Philosophy’ (Winter, 1989), pp. 104-188.
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debilitating effects on one’s conception of one’s identity, as Ged’s complete breakdown after the 
loss of his magic power exemplifies. The difference between Ged’s view of Therru and Tenar’s - 
though Ged later regrets his words - does not reveal gender essentialism on the part of the author, 
but reflects the profound effects of gender construction which lead to entrenched and abiding 
attitudes in both sexes. 
          Interestingly, Ged, a goatherd from Gont and thus marginalised at Roke, found a stable 
psychic identity by accepting his Shadow, and that, with his exceptional magical gift, gave him a 
stable social identity as Archmage of Roke.  Therru, by contrast, is denied the possibility of either 
assimilation or protection. Her marks, like Ged’s scarred face, are a sign of this lack, but tell a much 
more appalling story of utter helplessness before mental and physical violence, as against Ged’s tale 
of an internal struggle born from lack of love. The difference between Ged’s scars and Therru’s is 
inscribed in the difference of sex. Though motherless and physically and mentally abused, Ged 
finds his guide because he is a ‘gifted’ male and can be trained to become a wizard. Therru’s gifts, 
by contrast  – her knowledge of True Speech and her affinity with dragons – remain unrecognised 
or feared, as Ogion predicted, and she can be scarred much more deeply and permanently than a 
boy. The development of Ged’s gift, which is identified early by his witch aunt and the mage Ogion, 
then developed at Roke, is a sign that he is male in a male dominated culture. Therru is never 
offered the chance to develop her gifts as a girl. When Ogion instructs Tenar to ‘teach her’ he has 
the sagacity to add, ‘not Roke’, for at Roke ‘they will fear her’ – and this fear among intellectual 
males of the other-as-woman is enacted in Le Guin’s later novella ‘Dragonfly’. Ogion’s ‘they’, 
though, refers not only to intellectuals but to the men of Middle Valley, Gont and Earthsea.  Most of 
these men see women as marginal, and think that the preservation of the margins’ integrity will help 
to consolidate ‘normal’ male dominated space. A female child with gifts threatens to breach these 
margins, much more if the child is marked out by physical scars which divorce her for ever from the 
patriarchal conventions of female beauty.  For this reason, Therru’s scars do not protect her, since 
her abusers are always seeking to finish off what they began. 
          Ged’s words about Therru haunt Tenar, as she thinks of the ‘averted faces’ Therru will 
encounter throughout her life, ‘the signs against evil, the horror and curiosity, the sickly pity and the 
prying threat’ (549). Victimisation has no end, in other words, since the victims of brutality are so 
often held responsible for the horrifying crimes committed against them. Even Tenar at times shares 
this sense of unending victimhood, as she compares her own past with that of Therru. She had been 
enslaved to dark powers, both worldly and unworldly, had become ‘their servant, their food, theirs 
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to use for their needs and games’; and as such she begins to think that perhaps she has been 
permanently tainted. As she tries to visualise a future for her protégée, Tenar/Goha realises that the 
girl will never have ‘a man’s arms. Never anyone to hold her’ (549). The only other choice open to 
a woman who cannot marry is to become a ‘respectable’ wage earner, and Tenar imagines Therru as 
a weaver, making a ‘decent living’ at an ‘honourable’ if ‘dull’ trade (578), though she balks at the 
idea of Therru having to hide herself in an enclosed space like a weaver’s cottage, unsociable and 
silent. But outside of such a space there seems no way for her to live, let alone to develop a full 
personality, to become part of a community. 
         Stung by Ged’s accusations, Tenar succumbs briefly to a horror of despair. Although she 
refuses to condone the pervasive sense of wretchedness and repulsion with which other people 
regard the young girl, she cannot disabuse herself of the notion that ‘harm draws harm to it’ (549), 
and she watches with caution everyone who comes in contact with Therru.  For example, she at first 
feels some discomfort when Moss, the old village witch, befriends her charge, mistaking Moss’s 
kindness as a perverse attraction, and thinking Moss may have been drawn to Therru ‘not only by 
kindness but by Therru’s hurt, by the harm that had been done her: by violence, by fire’ (512). 
These are indications of the pernicious effects of embedded ideological bias, that infiltrates even the 
most neutral consciousness, or even the consciousness of people who have themselves been 
victimised, like Tenar. When Ged questions what Therru’s life will be in the future, he bases his 
doubts on the gendered roles accepted by society, and this is a well-founded fear, as the attitudes of 
most people demonstrate.  
             Therru is shunned and ostracised by the men of Earthsea society.  The sheep seller 
Townsend who bears Ogion’s message looks at her and quickly looks away (487); the ruffians who 
waylay Tenar and Therru on their way to Ogion’s house make signs for averting evil; the king’s 
men who visit Ogion’s cottage looking for the erstwhile Archmage, Ged, are full of courtesy and 
good manners, but are quick to look away from the child (562). It is hardly surprising, then, that 
Tenar even questions the gaze of the kind young soon-to-be-king, Arren, as he takes her and Therru 
to Tenar/Goha’s village, Middle Valley. As Arren looks at the girl Tenar finds his expression 
unreadable, and wonders if he is wearing a ‘civil mask for revulsion, shock’ (607).  The old Middle 
Valley farmhand, Tiff, makes surreptitious signs of averting evil behind the child’s back, even as he 
apparently fawns over her diligence as a ‘farm-lass’. ‘Like most people’ the narrator tells us, ‘Tiff 
believed that you are what happens to you. The rich and strong must have virtue; one to whom evil 
has been done must be bad, and may be rightly punished’ (630). Some people are more vocal in 
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their hostility, Tenar’s son being one. On first seeing Therru, Spark is openly repulsed, and asks his 
mother, ‘What did she do, to look like that?’ (674).  For him Therru’s half-effaced face and burnt 
‘claw’ are merely signs of abnormality, imputed to some inward wickedness. In this way Le Guin 
shows misogyny and hostility towards women creating stereotypes that stick irrevocably, so that 
nothing short of an apocalypse - a radical obliteration of the old order – will bring this situation to 
an end.     
          Tenar has dreamed of this liberation, embodied in the gulfs of light and air through which she 
flies in her dreams, so she refuses to let Therru be confined. Therru was not ‘wrong’, as men seem 
to label her with their leering or disgusted gaze, but ‘wronged, wronged beyond all repair […] Not 
lost, not lost, not lost’ (549). Tenar repeats these words to herself in a passionate denial of injustice 
and cruelty, on the part of the world as much as of men. And other words give her comfort too.  
Gazing at the white summer star called Tehanu in Atuan, she asks Ged what it is called in the 
Archipelago, and learns it is the ‘Heart of the Swan’, or ‘Arrow’ in Ged’s native village. The arrow 
is a weapon, the heart a private inward space, the swan an acknowledged symbol of grace and 
beauty – so the name Tehanu signifies the beauty and power of what lies within.  The name of the 
star, Tehanu, as well as the dragon’s name, Kalessin, comfort Tenar’s disturbed state of mind, 
although there is no association of the name of the star with Therru at this stage.           
           However, Therru’s affinity with dragons is hinted at throughout the text. When the word 
Kalessin forms itself involuntarily in Tenar’s mouth, ‘A wave of warmth, heat, seemed to flow from 
the child’ (520). The fire that damaged her seems to have entered her, moulding her destiny. She 
gains, Le Guin shows, a double vision, similar to but more intense than Tenar’s double-vision: the 
girl’s blind eye sees what cannot be seen with ordinary sight. One day, Therru sees static flying out 
of Tenar’s brushed hair, and delightedly whispers ‘The fire flying out all over the sky’(574). At this 
point Tenar wonders how Therru saw the world and knew that she ‘could not know what one saw 
with an eye that had been burned away’ (574).  At the same time, we have gained a hint that it is 
well worth seeing; though we must look elsewhere in Le Guin’s work for further clarification.  
          Three years before publishing Tehanu, Le Guin explored occluded sight as the vision of a 
female child in her prize-winning novella, ‘Buffalo Gals’(1987).  A little girl, Myra, falls out of a 48
crashing aeroplane and loses one eye. She is rescued and adopted by the native American trickster 
god Coyote, and given a pine pitch eye by some of the animals, which Coyote licks to make it 
 Ursula K. Le Guin, Buffalo Gals and Other Animal Presences (Santa Barbara: Plume, 1987), pp. 17-54. 48
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‘work’.  The wooden eye permits Myra a double vision: she sees the animals around her as people, 49
and when she is taken near a town her original eye shows her an ordinary place with streets and 
houses, but the ‘wild eye’ sees a blankness, and then a horrifying vision of time going by ‘too fast, 
too hard, not flowing but pounding, pounding, pounding’ (‘BG’, 46). The wild eye, explains Le 
Guin in Earthsea Revisioned, enables her to see what ordinary people cannot; Le Guin calls this 
vision Koyaanisqatsi, a Hopi word meaning ‘life out of balance’.  In Therru’s case, since Earthsea 50
is set in a pre-capitalist world, the life is out of joint due to the blind use of power which has 
dehumanised the child. Therru, whose eye was destroyed by male power, ‘sees with the eye of the 
spirit as well as the eye of the flesh’ (ER, 25), showing that she has gained a different level of 
perception, not based only on rational, empirical categories. The symbol of the transgendered 
dragon seems appropriate for the child who has ‘nothing left of the girl men want girls to be’ (ER, 
24), but is still hounded by those men, who feel the destruction of her body amounts to the ruin of 
her soul and makes her a legitimate target of power play.  
          As Le Guin explores different forms of power, it becomes clear that the human desire to own 
– the desire for which people separated themselves from the dragons – has led to all forms of 
perversion. When Handy follows Tenar and scares the child, forcing her back into the autistic state 
that afflicted her after her trauma, Tenar wonders what kind of satisfaction this might have given 
him: taking away what Tenar had worked for so many months to restore to the child, the freedom of 
childhood? ‘Is power that - an emptiness?’ Tenar wonders (609). Later, when Tenar talks to Ged 
about the loss of his power, she again refers to an emptiness, a potential, recalling Ogion’s account 
of how even before Ged got his power through learning, before he got his true name perhaps, there 
had been a bit of hawk in him: ‘he was what we cannot name. And so are we all’ (551). And Tenar 
tells Ged that even though he has lost his power, there remains something in him from that previous 
state: ‘room for the power’ (660) as she puts it. This is based on the Taoist principle of ‘emptiness’, 
rendered beautifully by Le Guin in her translation of the Tao: 
!
 Thirty spokes  
 meet in the hub. 
 For Coyote’s identity, see Lewis Hyde, Trickster Makes This World (Edinburgh, Canongate, 1998).49
 Koyaanisqatsi(1982) is a film directed by Godfrey Reggio. It has no dialogue, only music, and uses the 50
techniques of time-lapse and slow motion to juxtapose scenes from nature and the city to reveal how human 
beings have become so embroiled in the accelerated technological urban life that they do not see what is 
happening around them. www.koyaanisqatsi.org 
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 Where the wheel isn’t 
 is where it’s useful. 
 Hollowed out, 
 Clay makes a pot. 
 Where the pot’s not 
 is where it’s useful.  51
!
The hollowness that allows something else to exist, like the hub of a wheel, for example, is a 
necessary existential space. Le Guin calls this chapter ‘The uses of not’, and this concept has also 
been translated as ‘that empty innermost’.  Handy’s lust for power is just that - nothing; but Ged’s 52
emptiness is room for otherness. The concept of ‘emptiness’, meaning a space or ‘room’ in one’s 
being, becomes important in the context of the apocalypse that Le Guin envisages, embodied in the 
process of naming, as we shall see. 
  
5.6. Language and Apocalypse           
In Tehanu, the use and implications of True Speech and the process of naming is re-visioned, 
undergirding the vaster apocalypse that is prophesied by Ogion. Le Guin problematises the concept 
of True Speech, with its unambiguous single referent for each word, as creative speech. As Tenar 
thinks of Ogion’s injunction to her regarding Therru - ‘Teach her [...] Teach her all’ (500) – she tries 
to teach the child True Speech, but something seems to stop her. Ironically, the one word she does 
teach Therru, tolk (stone), indicates an object that is flung at her and Tehanu by the village boys. 
Incidentally, tolk is the first and only word of True Speech Tenar learns from Ged in Tombs (287); 
and in A Wizard, when Ged asks the Master Hand to teach him how to change things, the Master 
tells him that a tolk (stone) could be changed into a diamond by changing its True Name, but that 
would upset the Equilibrium of the universe. But in Tehanu Le Guin suggests that human beings 
need a different sort of language, a more pliable and dynamic language. Tenar decides to teach the 
girl songs and stories, such as the Creation of Éa. Stories are not bound within hard and fast 
boundaries, like True Names. Stories use words that are generative of new meaning. Like Lewis, Le 
Guin suggests that certain truths can be told only through stories. Borrowing Barfield’s terminology, 
 Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching: A Book about the Way and the Power of the Way, trans. U. K. Le Guin (Boston and 51
London: Shambhala, 1998), Chapter 11, p. 14.
 Lao Tzu, Tao Te King, trans. by Isabella Mears. First Start Publishing eBook edition (October 2012).52
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once the older, concrete meanings split up, new formations of similarities, unities, fission and 
diffusion can be created; and for Le Guin this is a wholly positive development.  
 For Le Guin, narrative is a ‘life stratagem’, and ‘the primary, survival-effective uses of 
language involve stating alternatives and hypotheses [and] warnings, suppositions, propositions, 
invitations, ambiguities, analogies, hints, lists, anxieties, hearsay, old wives’ tales’,  so that 53
language is not, in its primary usage, a statement of fact, to others or to ourselves. Citing George 
Steiner, she says that statements about ‘what does not exist and may never exist are central to the 
use of language’;  and she compares this function to the weaving of a spider’s web. Like a spider, a 54
maker of stories traverses unknown space ‘between here and there, between then and now, between 
now and sometime, a continual weaving and restructuring of the remembered and the perceived and 
the imagined’.  Tenar’s name Goha, which means a white spider, takes on a special significance as 55
she is presented as a story-teller and a story-maker, in Tehanu and the subsequent books. 
Interestingly, Le Guin used the same image in The Farthest Shore for Cob, whose name also means 
spider, and points to Le Guin’s acceptance, like Lewis and Barfield, that the imagination is not 
exclusively good, and can and does generate evil. Cob’s weaving of stories led to many people, for 
example Sopli, to desire immortality. Sopli is driven mad as his fear of death increases, and at one 
point, as he ostensibly guides ged and Arren to Cob, Arren shares this fear of death with him. 
However, in Tehanu and later in The Other Wind (as we shall see) Le Guin emphasises that the web 
as a pattern that can be configured and changed in complex ways. The web image, with spaces in-
between, is similar to the map of the Archipelago, with blank spaces full of potential between the 
islands. The web is an objective correlative for individual, personal relationships: as always, Le 
Guin demonstrates that the personal and the political have an integral bearing on each other. The 
gaps in-between the woven web allow for different configurations of the patterns woven, so that no 
model ever becomes a rigid structure that cannot be reconfigured. In Tales from Earthsea, Le Guin 
states that the name Segoy is derived from Old Hardic meaning ‘make’ or shape, and also ‘creative 
force, breath, poetry’ (Tales, 276). In fact, it can be compared to the primary words of semantic 
unity described by Barfield, which retain the unity of the spiritual and material, the creative force as 
language and breath. In 1991, Le Guin wrote a poem in which writing and weaving were compared. 
 Ursula K Le Guin, ‘Some Thoughts on Narrative’ in Dancing at the Edge of the World (New York: Grove 53
Press, 1989), pp. 42-44.
 Qtd. in Le Guin, ‘Some Thoughts on Narrative’, p. 43.54
 ibid., p. 44.55
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The images she uses in it for a teller/writer of stories fits Tenar very well: ‘I see her walking/ on a 
path through a pathless forest,/ or a maze, a labyrinth./ As she walks she spins,/ and the fine thread 
falls behind her/ following her way,/ telling/ where she is going,/ where she has gone./ Telling the 
story./ The line, the thread of voice,/ the sentences saying the way’.  In The Tombs of Atuan, Tenar 56
wove webs of stories to keep Ged safe for a while; and Ariadne-like, guided him out of the 
labyrinth.  In Tehanu she tells and re-tells myths and old tales - for example, the tale of Andaur and 
Avad (592), the ontological myth of dragons and humans (489), or lays and ballads of Éa - and in 
the process leads the whole of Earthsea out of the maze in which it had been trapped. 
          In Tehanu, the trap in which Earthsea is held captive is linguistic. What Le Guin calls double-
vision begins to reveal a different world, which needs a different way of using language or thinking 
about language; when two opposing perspectives are visible, for example in the dragon's vision, 
knowledge lies in both rather than either. True Speech designates an unequivocal signifier-signified 
relationship. If the name of a thing is changed, the thing changes wholly, changes its very nature; 
and this stands in sharp contrast to the slow transformation, like a seed sown and slowly growing, 
which the knowledge of Kalessin’s name brings about in Tenar. But in True Speech things do not 
morph into other things; rather, change is a radical disjunction, a shedding of one identity to assume 
another, as Ged tells Tenar she must do in the Tombs.  For Ged, she must decide whether she is 
Tenar or Arha, and the choice is what will decide whether she remains entrapped in the life of the 
priestess or is free to walk the Archipelago as she wishes. But in the event, she proves she can be 
both, carrying her identity as Arha with her to Ged’s own island of Gont.  
          However, the rigidity that True Speech seems to imply for men disappears when it comes to 
dragons, native speakers of the Old Tongue. Interestingly, dragons can lie in True Speech, while 
mages cannot. This implies that it is not the language but the way it is used that produces its 
rigidity. The mages, who spend many years learning the True Names of things, cannot imagine that 
the thing might have another name, so it does not. Dragons, by contrast, live under no such 
constraint, and their imagination is unbounded. 
          In the First Trilogy the dragons were represented as devious, never answering a question 
directly, always speaking in riddles. Yevaud, for instance, uses language cleverly to gain an 
advantage over young Ged, who is forced to respond in kind, using his ingenuity and knowledge to 
find a word that will give him an advantage over Yevaud: the dragon’s true name. This links 
 Ursula K. Le Guin, ‘The Writer on, and at, Her Work’ in Janet Sternberg ed., The Writer On Her Work (New 56
York, London: Norton, 1991). Qtd. in Holly Littlefield “Unlearning Patriarchy: Ursula Le Guin’s Feminist 
Consciousness in The Tombs of Atuan and Tehanu’ in Extrapolation, 36.3 (Fall, 1995), p. 244.
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dragons to Tolkien’s Smaug and his predecessors - the devil-dragon, for instance, about whom the 
Bible says: ‘the great dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which 
deceiveth the whole world’.  Even Orm Embar, who comes to Ged for help when Cob is 57
destroying the world by opening a gap between the lands of the living and the dead, speaks 
inscrutably. As Ged says, ‘It is hard for a dragon to speak plainly. They do not have plain 
minds’ (TFS, 438). But retrospectively, this so-called inscrutability of dragon speech can be seen as 
representing a misogynistic, androcentric view - reflected in the logocentric understanding of 
language which views women’s speech, like the dragons’, as either tortuous or wily. The impression 
of crafty cunning in the speech of dragons is exacerbated by their humorous facial expression: a 
dragon’s mouth curls up at the corners, seeming to smile all the time, and the eye of the dragon is 
described in The Farthest Shore as full of ‘profound and mild hilarity’ and ‘ancient 
laughter’ (474-75).  This amused gaze is mentioned again in Tehanu, when Kalessin meets Tenar 
and lets out ‘a great “Hah!” of orange flame’ (520). In the shifting focus achieved through the 
prismatic alterations and adjustments of perceptions and assumptions, made concomitantly by Le 
Guin and the reader in Tehanu, the sheer inscrutability of dragons along with their physical 
characteristics are offered as an explanation for men’s view that they are wily and guileful - as are 
women - and therefore to be feared. The more pernicious and enduring effects of this unfold as the 
story progresses, in the attitudes of the Roke Masters searching for a new Archmage, and later of 
the wizard Aspen. 
        In Tehanu, the Balance that the wizards and Masters of Roke had so diligently tried to maintain 
is revealed to be absent. The change prophesied by Ogion is reinforced by the Patterner at Roke. 
After Ged was carried off by the dragon Kalessin, Aren tells Tenar, the masters of Roke met to 
choose a new Archmage, as tradition required. Arren was to take the place of the ninth member, as 
the Summoner, Thorion, was absent in the realm of the dead. However, as Arren explains, the 
‘learned’ and ‘knowledgeable’ Masters of Roke were unable to come to a decision: ‘they use their 
differences, as I had seen before, to make their decision strong’ (611), but this time they were ‘all 
difference and no decision’ (611). The only thing the Patterner said was, ‘A woman on Gont’ (612), 
leaving the others utterly baffled. The mystification is grounded in the protracted process of 
subordinating women by narrowing their sphere of existence to that of wives and mothers, or 
othering them as witches and monsters if they did not conform to the prescribed roles.  There has 
never been a place for a woman in the schemes of the wise, and the result is that the Patterner’s 
 Revelation 12: 9. 57
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simple phrase becomes a riddle, a verbal trick, rather as Bilbo Baggins’s simple question ‘What 
have I got in my pocket?’ becomes a riddle in Tolkien’s The Hobbit. 
          The masters are left thoroughly disconcerted by the Patterner’s words, and Tenar’s tentative 
suggestion that ‘things were already altering . . . and that a change, a great change, has been taking 
place, has taken place?’ (614, original ellipses) is met by ‘deafness’ from the Master Windkey, who 
is utterly incapable of understanding the wild suggestion she puts forward, that a woman might 
actually be needed on Roke. And even though the king is ‘silent, listening’ (615) as she speaks, and 
was ‘not deaf’ (616), he seems to be trying to ‘understand a foreign language’ (616). This echoes 
Ged’s assertion in The Farthest Shore that dragons cannot speak plainly. Re-evaluating this claim in 
Tehanu, Le Guin shows that perhaps it is an incapacity in men, who are incompetent to understand 
an-other’s speech, that leads to claims of complexity or confusion in dragons’ - and women’s – 
utterances. 
          For Le Guin, the important aspect of the difference between men and women’s language is 
not that they use different words - although that may be implied – but that language is constructed 
and appropriated by male hegemonic mechanisms in a way that forces women either to use it as 
men do, and so collude with those systems of oppression; or to reject it and speak an alternative 
dialect, which for men is tantamount to riddling or silence. A few scattered examples of both kinds 
of women speakers can be found in the First Trilogy: Kossil, or the sorceress of Osskil, are 
participants in the patriarchal language, while Arha, Penthe, Yarrow, or the stranded princess reject 
or are excluded from it, with the result that they are marginal to affairs of state, or in the case of the 
princess, utterly speechless and therefore redundant. But it is in Tehanu that Le Guin asks herself 
for the first time: what language is available to the excluded?  
          Moss and Tenar engage in ‘gossip’ (as Penthe gossiped in the Tombs); the word is associated 
particularly with women, and has derogatory connotations.  In the process Moss mumbles and 58
hedges, expressing herself in gnomic sayings and proverbs. As the narrator states, most of her 
‘obscurity and cant [...] was mere ineptness with words and ideas. Nobody had ever taught her to 
think consecutively. Nobody had ever listened to what she said. All that was expected, all that was 
wanted of her was muddle, mystery, mumbling. She was a witchwoman. She had nothing to do with 
clear meaning’ (526). Evidently, logocentric discourse is male territory; women are not supposed to 
be logical or coherent, since no one really listens to women. As a witch, mysterious utterance is 
 Jennifer Coates, Women, Men and Language, 3rd edn. (Harlow: Pearson, 2004), pp. 103-104.58
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valuable for her trade, so the tendency becomes exacerbated in Moss. This is an instance of ‘doing 
gender’ rather than just being.  
        But gossip can be a powerful social instrument, according to Marina Warner, who shows how 
‘Gossip was perceived to be a leading element in women’s folly’, and more to the point, ‘in the 
sex’s propensity to foment riot’ (33).  Informal talk and indiscreet exchanges can become catalysts 59
for social processes of change, as Tenar learns through her chats with Moss, which increase her 
understanding of how gender and power hierarchies work. The ‘domestic webs of 
information’ (Warner, 34) shared among women are a source of fear for the wielders of authority; 
and Tenar, in her identity as Goha the spider, is weaving these webs as she interacts with Moss, Ivy, 
Lark, and later even Ged.  Participating in gossip sets her up as a member of an alternative council, 
so to speak, which rivals the Tolkien-esque council of the wise on Roke; and unlike that council the 
procedures of their web of gossip can be said to extend themselves all over Earthsea.  
          One main reason why the Masters reject Tenar’s suggestion that change has occurred is their 
inability to practise the garrulous flexibility of women’s discourse as embodied in gossip: its 
preparedness to hop promiscuously from subject to subject without becoming trapped in logical 
tramlines, so to speak.  The fixed identities into which men have locked themselves 
compartmentalise people into gendered roles that they are forced to play throughout their lives. 
Roke’s belief in its own infallibility has led to a warped and bigoted attitude, an incapacity to 
understand that options other than the current organisational patterns might exist. The derogation of 
women’s magic is tantamount to a derogation of their language, since magic is performed through 
words. The exclusion from the language of the elite results in women’s debarment from political 
and intellectual agency. That women are barred from Roke has become an immutable rule. The 
Masters at Roke are therefore caught in stasis, refusing to acknowledge that the world exists in a 
constant state of flux, a basic tenet of the Tao. Just as the earlier patriarchal order had suppressed 
the myth of evolution which revealed the process of change that separated humans from dragons, so 
the present patriarchal order refuses the evolutionary process that might elevate the current status of 
women.    
             This misogyny is embodied on Gont in the wizard of Re Albi, Aspen. Hungry for power, 
this young man is engaged in an atrocious act of exploitation of the weak on behalf of his powerful 
master, the aged Lord of Re Albi: he is slowly transferring life out of the Lord’s grandson into the 
 Marina Warner, From the Beast to the Blonde: On Fairy Tales and their Tellers (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 59
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old man’s body.  (Strikingly, we learn that this atrocity has been exposed not by official sources – 
the vampiric lord’s control of the region ensures these are kept under control – but through village 
gossip.) When Goha/Tenar goes up to Re Albi to make inquiries about Handy - who had badly 
scared Therru by coming to Ogion’s house to look for her - Aspen’s hatred at once erupts in a lava-
like stream of vitriol. He already bears a grudge against Tenar because of the earlier revelation that 
the dying Ogion had told her his true name, and because she had also prevented the old wizard’s 
burial in the grounds of Re Albi castle. As Tenar guesses, Aspen’s attitude is the result of deep-
rooted misogyny, so that ‘To be a woman was her fault. Nothing could worsen or amend it‘ (588). 
Ironically, Ogion’s true name, Aihal – meaning the Silent - had gone unheard when Tenar first told 
it to Aspen and the wizard from Gont port, because the wizards had been conditioned not to listen to 
women, whose speech was derogated as trivial. Besides the irony of the name ‘Silent’ having been 
effectively silenced, this is doubly ironic because Aihal had privileged the faculty of listening all his 
life, yet suffers what in Earthsea amounts to the profanation of a true name: his name after death is 
not heard, merely because he told it to a woman. In stark contrast to these androcentric attitudes, 
Ogion trusted Tenar with his name, as did Kalessin.  
         But Aspen wants to silence Tenar, silence all women, because he fears them, as the 
vituperative invective he hurls upon her proves: ‘a woman’s tongue,’ he claims, is ‘worse than any 
thief [...] casting calumny and lies, the dragonseed every witch sows behind her’ (586). Aspen’s use 
of the word ‘dragonseed’ to accuse Tenar of lying is significant, for the word echoes Tenar’s feeling, 
that a seed of change had been sown within her, felt by her as a bodily conception, after the dragon 
Kalessin told her its name. The True Name helps Tenar ‘conceive’ the truth about Therru, who is 
labelled ‘monster’ by the men of Earthsea, and so bring her up as her daughter - the ‘seed’ she 
shares with Kalessin, who also calls Therru ‘my child’. The stark contrast that Le Guin sets up 
between the way Aspen and Tenar use the word ‘dragonseed’ - Aspen as a description of women’s 
words as lies, that proliferate and spread discontent and fear; Tenar as the words of a dragon that 
infiltrate her very being, making her capable of helping Therru find a space where she can live as a 
free individual - shows how language is polysemous, so that the same word can mean different 
things for different people. As George Steiner explains, ‘such difference, ranging from nuance to 
antithesis, characterises the language of ideology’.   One of the most potent means by which such 60
ideologically loaded language can be used to cement power hierarchies is interpellation – the 
 George Steiner, After Babel, p. 35.60
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labelling of others - as Aspen interpellates Tenar ‘witch’ and Therru ‘foul imp’, seeking to lock 
them up in these categories.  61
        In order to do this, Aspen steals to Re-Albi in the night to put a spell on Tenar; but some 
intuitive warning allows her to wake up and turn his spell back on him. As she realises, the 
language she learned as the One Priestess has its own uses, one of them being the ability to curse or 
turn a curse (593). Aspen, however, is tenacious in his will to take away Tenar’s words. He casts a 
spell of silence on Tenar, and in the process re-enacts the terrible scene in The Farthest Shore where 
Orm Embar was struck dumb by Cob, arching his back and clawing the air in the agony of 
inarticulacy. In that book, Ged lamented that the ‘Children of Segoy’ had been driven to ‘the dumb 
terror of the beasts’ (TFS, 435); and this prefigures Aspen’s arrest of Tenar’s ability to think by 
taking away her language. Aspen’s spell confuses Tenar’s mind, so that when village children throw 
stones at her she thinks it is because she has dared to speak, to say the word Tolk, the true name of 
stone. To punish her for daring to speak, Aspen violates Tenar’s speech, so that while trying to tell 
the half-wit Heather to look after Ogion’s goats her words come out as abuse, shocking the girl. 
Nevertheless, Le Guin shows how a fluid and multiple identity escapes confining borders by 
demonstrating that Tenar finds she can still think in Kargish, which enables her to make a plan of 
escape. She takes a short cut to Gont Port, knowing (in Kargish) that Aspen would lie in wait for her 
on the main path. This is effective, for she soon begins to think in Hardic, and later picks up a stone 
to utter its true name; and at this point the ‘dragon seed’ sown in her being, the name of the dragon, 
forms itself in her mind, clearing it of all confusion. Evidently, her instinctive thinking - Le Guin 
calls it ‘animal sense’ - guides her well, because she meets Arren at Gont Port, and the young king 
takes her to Middle Valley in his ship. Tenar’s identity as a woman shows her the way to evade 
Aspen’s attempts to enslave her, through a succession of evasive manoeuvres based in her very 
different understanding of words and silence. 
 In this episode, Le Guin enables Tenar to undergo what Blake calls the development of a 
human being from the ‘Perfect Unity’ in Eden – the Primal Man incorporating all polarities – to a 
very different kind of unity or self-assurance. For Blake, the ‘fall into Division and […] 
Resurrection to unity’  is a progress from innocence to ‘organised innocence’, a process which is 62
re-enacted by Tenar as she slowly learns to integrate all the ‘selves’ that have become part of her 
 For ‘interpellation’ see Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ in The Norton 61
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personality, discovering a new integrity or wholeness in the process. This integration involves an 
incorporation of the different languages she knows in her various roles - for example, Arha can use 
language to curse, Goha can use Hardic to tell stories, and Tenar has an innate ability to talk to 
dragons, as we shall see later. In the same way we are invited to imagine the severed and splintered 
islands of the Archipelago learning to create new byways and undercurrents from one to another, 
generating a dynamic interconnection without a collapse of difference.  
          Tenar’s various ‘identities’ continue to harmonise themselves throughout the novel. Just as 
Arha helps Goha in this episode by turning the curse of Aspen, Goha initiates Arha into the 
mysteries of sex and motherhood, and Tenar finds love with the man she saw and loved at first 
sight, Ged. As noted above, this is radically different from the paradigmatic dying-to-be-reborn 
development of classical myth. Tenar does not become a different, transcendent being as she 
changes her identities; rather, as Le Guin has pointed out, she re-bears, retaining the symbiotic 
relationship between all her selves. In the person of Tenar we witness an embodiment of the Taoist - 
and Blakean - concept of the interaction of oppositions: Arha is a virgin priestess, adept at worship 
and sacrifice, knowing how to curse and retract curses; Tenar, a ‘white princess’, the person who 
wears the ring of bonding after the mythical princess Elfarran, and who presages the new dawn in 
Earthsea with the advent of a king; Goha, a farmer’s wife and mother of two children. 
       This is why, as in her farm in Middle Valley Tenar continues to teach Therru songs and stories, 
her words - called dragonseed by Aspen - teach Therru that the little girl’s selfhood is intact, despite 
the severe mutilation she has had to undergo in body, mind and spirit. This helps Therru to turn 
aside the labels of imp, monster and victim - given her by those who have the power to abuse her 
and label her within the narrow category of the abused - and to enter a realm of freedom, of 
dragonhood,  redefining our notions of dragonhood, monster and victim in the process. Tenar 63
teaches Therru the second verse of the song ‘The Creation of Éa’ one winter evening: 
!
 The making from the unmaking, 
 The ending from the beginning, 
 Who shall know surely? 
 What we know is the doorway between them 
 Brian Attebery makes the point that literary fantasy is able to present Therru’s ‘unviolated selfhood’ through 63
the metaphor of the dragon, enabling the readers to re-view her as a free individual rather than as a ‘victim’, 
defined always by her abusers. Brian Attebery, ‘The Politics (If Any) of Fantasy’  in Modes of the Fantastic, 
ed. by Robert A. Latham and Robert A. Collins (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 1-13.
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 that we enter departing. 
 Among all beings ever returning, 
 the eldest, the Doorkeeper, Segoy . . .  64
!
The song questions the limits of human knowledge: our propensity to create beginnings and endings 
may be natural, but these verses emphasise between-ness. The only surety of human knowledge, 
they tell us, lies in the discourse of thresholds, passages from one place to another, doorways 
between the beginning and the end. The sixth line can be connected to the one before it, which 
embeds all beings in the oxymoronic process of entering as they depart through the doorway; or it 
can mean that out of all creatures, only Segoy the Doorkeeper - creator of Éa - is the one who 
always returns. The doorway is the creative space between an individual’s multiple identities, as 
well as the negotiating space between rival beliefs and discourses. Whatever ends or beginnings 
humankind has envisaged for itself, humanity exists, as Frank Kermode points out, in media res, in 
the space between tick and tock.  This song gains its fullest resonance in the final apocalyptic 65
vision of the Earthsea sequence: The Other Wind. 
!
5.7. Apocalypse in Tehanu 
In the novel Tehanu, however, the angst that pervades Éa persists, and is enacted in the climactic 
humiliation of Ged and Tenar, the healers of the Rune of Bonding. At the end of the book Aspen 
captures Ged and Tenar in another spell, forcing the woman to crawl on all fours - a gesture that 
concretises his desire to silence women by literally forcing her mouth into the dust, disabling her 
utterance. At this point the hope of change that runs through the text as a strong undercurrent ready 
to change the tide at any moment seems to be annihilated.  
Desire for change is important in apocalyptic discourse.  As stated earlier, Le Guin is averse 
to Judeo-Christian narratives of judgement day which place all hope in a transcendent realm of 
plenitude. But the discourse of hope, as dramatised in biblical apocalypse, is pervasive in Western 
thinking, and the lure of a sudden dramatic deliverance, which Tolkien calls eucatastrophe, is an 
important feature of fantasy. The apocalypse in Tehanu re-visions and rewrites the biblical version. 
According to Abrams, biblical history is ‘right-angled: the key events are abrupt’; and the Second 
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Coming is the ‘absolute turning point in the plot’.  The apocalypse in Tehanu too constitutes an 66
abrupt, right-angled change in circumstances, an absolute turning point in the plot.  The difference 
is that it heralds a transformation that is firmly rooted in the heaven and earth we became familiar 
with in the First Trilogy. In contrast to Lewis in The Last Battle, Le Guin challenges herself in this 
book to change the world she created rather than construct a new one.  
          In Tehanu, Kalessin, the Eldest, collaborates with Tenar and Therru to defeat Aspen. The 
dragon has already played the role of saviour in the Earthsea sequence, carrying Ged and Arren to 
safety from the shores of Selidor in The Farthest Shore, and transporting Ged to Gont in the book’s 
last action. The dragon’s ‘second coming’ in Tehanu saves not only Ged and Tenar but the whole of 
Earthsea from what is virtually a repetition of Cob’s near-destruction of the world.  
          This time it is the wizard Aspen who is bent upon repudiating death and finding life eternal. 
Aspen confesses to this design when he captures Ged and Tenar in his spell. Mocking the former 
Archmage for having lost his magic, Aspen taunts him: ‘you thought you were safe [...] my master, 
our master destroyed. You thought you’d had your will, and destroyed the promise of eternal life 
[...] My master defeated you. Now do you know it? You did not conquer him. His power 
lives!’ (682). Aspen’s ‘my master, our master’ clearly means Cob, and Cob is his master in the sense 
of his teacher as well as his owner, the possessor of his mind. Aspen’s experiments with the old lord 
of Re Albi and his grandson are obviously a step towards Cob’s ultimate ambition, the acquisition 
of immortality.  When Tenar suddenly realises that Aspen was not a young man, as she had thought 
at first, but ‘withered’ with age and driven by some artificial energy, she realises too that he has 
been indulging in some occult magic to arrest ageing, of the kind Medea practises in classical myth. 
In The Farthest Shore Ged called Cob the ‘Anti-King’,  a clear echo of the biblical Anti-Christ, 67
and Aspen seems set to be another such.  
          However, new ways of perception open doorways into new worlds, as Le Guin goes on to 
show us. Tenar’s and Therru’s gaining of double vision proves to be a doorway into a radically 
alternative ‘reality’, helping them to escape the oppressive regime into which Aspen seeks to bind 
them. As Tenar and Ged are held captive, Therru ‘look[s] into the west with the other eye, and 
call[s] with the other voice the name she had heard in her mother’s dream’ (685). This is the name 
Kalessin, whom Tenar called in her dreams while flying in gulfs of air and light.  Even as Aspen is 
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about to throw Ged and Tenar over the cliffs where Tenar first met Kalessin, the dragon enters ‘from 
the doorway of the sky’ and destroys the old order embodied in Aspen and his cronies. 
          The advent of a new order to replace the old one is signalled by the naming of the burnt child 
by Kalessin. The dragon calls her ‘Tehanu’, the name of the star Tenar had seen as an emblem of 
hope at a time when she had felt particularly alone and particularly doubtful of her decision to save 
Therru.  Tehanu, besides being a burnt and abused child - as male hegemony would describe her - is 
much more, Le Guin insists; she is not just a flaming fire, as the burnt child Therru, but also a star 
of hope, as the dragon-girl Tehanu. And the hope she represents lies in her knowledge of names.  
She is born, like a dragon, with an innate familiarity with True Speech, and uses it to summon the 
dragon. After calling to Kalessin, she goes to see how her peach seedling is faring (it has died); and 
she then goes to Moss, and heals her from the atrocious illness Aspen has inflicted on her by saying 
the witch’s true name.  Kalessin calls Tehanu ‘my child’, as Tenar did earlier; and that these are true 
words is confirmed by the fact that she describes Tenar as her mother when she remembers her 
dream, a dream of being one with Kalessin. The apocalypse that Ogion had prophesied is brought 
about by language, by Tehanu’s unerring knowledge of the proper word to use for each person in 
the community that forms around her. If both Tenar and Kalessin are Tehanu’s parents, the 
meanings of the terms ‘parent’ and ‘mother’ have been reassigned, as happens when we invent a 
strong new metaphor. This process enables new and non-conformist aspects of reality to be revealed 
through language. Le Guin’s narrative is a perfect demonstration of this process, as she creates new 
metaphors for envisioning change even in the most terrible or oppressive circumstances. 
          !
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CHAPTER SIX. UNAUTHORISING THE BIBLE IN TALES FROM EARTHSEA 
!
In Tales from Earthsea (2001), a collection of five tales garnered from the ‘archives’ and oral 
traditions of Earthsea, Le Guin explores the production and maintenance of historical records, 
demonstrating that emerging socio-cultural assumptions are often projected on to history to produce 
notions of normalcy based on androcentric paradigms; and that within these androcentric models, 
women’s leadership and contribution is made invisible. This is achieved mainly by using 
generically masculine language, which functions to suppress women’s role in historical discourse. 
By identifying and deconstructing such linguistic symptoms in her own earlier novels, Le Guin’s 
two most recent Earthsea books formally and structurally enact her thematic concerns. Her short 
story ‘The Finder’, in particular, engages once again with biblical apocalypse and prophecy, to 
scrutinise how foundational patriarchal texts construct power hierarchies. 
 Tales from Earthsea begins with a Foreword by Le Guin that explains how at the end of 
Tehanu, the story had ‘arrived at what I felt to be now’. However, she remarks, ‘Now moves [...] 
now isn’t then’. Almost a decade later, Le Guin writes in her new collection what happened after 
Tehanu (the conventional ‘then’ that moves a story forward); and also addresses what had happened 
before Ged and Tenar’s stories began, ‘back then’ in the history of Earthsea. According to Le Guin, 
history, whether of the real or the fictional world, can only be accessed through narrative: ‘Even if 
we are present at some historic event, do we comprehend it - can we even remember it - until we 
can tell it as a story?’ she inquires.  History and story, for Le Guin, are imbricated, since ‘memory 1
[...] is a form of imagination’.   Believing that no event can become meaningful unless it is 2
‘storied’, Le Guin explores the archival history of Earthsea through imaginative narrative in the 
Tales.  
          As Le Guin opens up the past of the world she created, she dis-covers how narrative 
constructs reality, illuminating not only the constructedness of her own fictional world but the 
constructedness of all worlds, including our own, and thus interrogating the categories of ‘real’ and 
‘imaginary’. Historical discourse, suggests Le Guin, does not give us transparent access to an 
external ‘reality’ that exists independently of it, but constructs our notions of reality; and this 
construction is mostly controlled by dominant groups that suppress and silence the voices of the 
disempowered. As she notes in one of her essays, ‘history is written by the superior class’, who 
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portray the present state of affairs as ‘natural, necessary and unchangeable’.   However, there are 3
subtexts and marginal discourses that exist as the underside of the ideological myths presented in 
history, and these can always subvert and disrupt the dominant accounts. The implied author of the 
Tales confesses to having written a ‘description’ to ‘keep contradictions and discrepancies at a 
minimum’,   which implies that any history is not an Ur-story - there are always variations and 4
inconsistencies within and between the different versions. Le Guin has already demonstrated how 
myths and legends and songs - the main source of historical knowledge in the oral Earthsea society 
- are culture-specific, so that many variations of the same story exist: for example, the story of 
Ged’s encounter with his Shadow is told differently on different islands of the Archipelago; or the 
story of Erreth-Akbe, who is the greatest of heroes for the people of the Inner Isles but a cowardly 
villain on Atuan; or the two versions of Ged’s destiny at the end of The Farthest Shore. In Tales Le 
Guin demonstrates that such variations cannot be eliminated from written records either, and that 
there will always be different versions, sometimes even conflicting accounts, in the historical 
record. In this context, the Second Trilogy abounds in intertextual allusions to and images of the 
biblical apocalypse narratives, which are mined for their subversive content, symptomatic of the 
resistance to the Roman Empire in which they were composed, while at the same time being 
exposed for their complicity with hegemonic patriarchal discourse. This contradictory tendency of 
myth – whether ancient or scriptural - to be both reactionary and subversive at the same time, finds 
rich soil in the two contradictory accounts of creation in Genesis 1 and 2; and in the Book of 
Revelation, which can be read as resistance literature, but also as a text that inscribes women in 
polarised roles as whore or virgin. As different versions of stories struggle to be heard in Le Guin’s 
increasingly complex narrative, she foregrounds the need to reject any accounts that claim to 
articulate a priori truths.  
          Refusing, therefore, to present an ‘authorised version’, Le Guin challenges the very notion of 
authority and author, by stating that while writing Tales she found that ‘What I thought was going to 
happen isn’t what’s happening, people aren’t who - or what - I thought they were, and I lose my 
way on islands I thought I knew by heart’. She further undermines the writer’s authority by warning 
readers that ‘authors and wizards are not always to be trusted’.  Thus Le Guin avoids positing one 5
version, even that of the author, as the ‘correct’ one, and presents instead a variety of versions of 
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constructed reality. By doing this, she implicates the reader in the creative process, by offering her 
multiple subject-positions to choose from, and allowing a plurality of voices to speak in a text that 
is dialogic in the Bakhtinian sense. Her successive responses to Earthsea thus become the most 
potent and paradoxical form of resistance, because they display an evident delight in the stories - 
her own, her predecessors’ – she is concerned to subvert. The perpetual struggle of fusion and 
diffusion, inclusion and exclusion becomes the locus of creative power, making the text a self-
reflexive palimpsest of multiplying stories. 
           The first story in Tales, ‘The Finder’, tells of a fundamentally different Roke school for 
magic than the one we encountered in the first Earthsea book, A Wizard. ‘The Finder’ confronts the 
reader with a radical instance of the ‘epistemic violence’  that can be inflicted on notions of what is 6
seen as ‘normal’ and ‘acceptable’ in a given culture by a process of what Milan Kundera calls 
‘organised forgetting’.  Roke school, it emerges, was founded by members of an organisation called 7
Women of the Hand, originally formed by a league of male and female mages which was mostly 
run by women. The first Patterner - arguably the most important calling for a ‘master’ at Roke - was 
a woman called Ember. Women and men built the school building together, and taught both men 
and women, young and old. The rowan tree in the central courtyard was planted by a woman. The 
beginnings of discord between men and women are recorded in the story, and there are clear 
indications that gender difference might result in harmful divisions and insurgent elements. What is 
clear, though, is that the school we have seen in Ged’s time is a far cry from the shared enterprise 
aimed at disseminating knowledge delineated here.  
          The second story, ‘Bones of the Earth’, relates how important a knowledge of the Old Powers 
was in stopping the famous earthquake which made Ogion one of the most renowned and respected  
wizards in Earthsea. One of the ways in which male gendered ‘inclusive’ language works to create 
assumptions is exposed in this story, in which Ogion and his teacher together stop an earthquake. 
Heleth tells his pupil that he will have to work arcane magic, connected to the old powers of the 
earth. He goes on to tell Ogion that his teacher, Ard, from whom he learned the requisite spell, 
never disclosed how she had learnt it. By this means Le Guin’s readers, like Ogion himself, are 
jarred out of any complacent understanding they felt themselves to possess of Earthsea history. In 
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the Wizard, the narrator tells us that Ogion got his lore books from ‘his own master Heleth Farseer, 
and Heleth from his master the Mage of Perregal’.  The embedded assumption is that the Mage was 8
male, an example of how male gendered language works.  Le Guin shows how some of the most 
pervasive cultural representations are the result of generic androcentric language, which renders 
women’s roles invisible by its grammatical universality.  
          The last story, ‘Dragonfly’, brings Earthsea’s history up to date in that it relates events 
contiguous with Tehanu. The apocalyptic ending of Tehanu left a lot unanswered. The change 
prophesied by Ogion was initiated, certainly, but the overall premises and socio-cultural structures 
of the archipelago remained intact. In ‘Dragonfly’, the rhetoric of imminent change takes on a more 
urgent tone, leading to the tense, strained atmosphere of The Other Wind, where Earthsea seems to 
be on the verge of being destroyed either by the dragons or the dead.  
          Le Guin’s ‘historical’ account is an ideological critique, which focuses on the political, 
ethical, and linguistic dimensions of her earlier Earthsea books.  In Earthsea Revisioned, written 
two years after Tehanu, Le Guin recognised her growing political awareness: ‘now that I know that 
even in Fairyland there is no escape from politics, I look back and see that I was writing [in the First 
Trilogy] partly by the rules, as an artificial man, and partly against the rules, as an inadvertent 
revolutionary’ (7). In Tehanu, by contrast, Le Guin’s project was consciously subversive, and as she 
continues this enterprise in the Tales, she taps the ‘political unconscious’ of the earlier Earthsea 
novels, and invites her readers to do the same.  According to Fredric Jameson’s Marxist definition, 
the repressed in history and narrative is based on class struggle, and the function of the term 
‘political unconscious’ is to help us in ‘detecting the traces of that uninterrupted narrative’ that has 
never been heard, with the single fundamental theme of class struggle.  For Le Guin, however, the 9
fundamental force of oppression is gender inequity, and her exploration of Earthsea history - in the 
form of her tales from Earthsea - cuts through her earlier novels to reveal the politicised gender 
constructions and roles that informed her first three novels as accepted norms and suppositions. I 
will concentrate on ‘The Finder’, which tells the history of the foundation of Roke School on 
Earthsea, to examine ways in which Le Guin engages with different models of reality are created by 
using different forms of language.  
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6.1. The Finder 
‘The Finder’ begins with the narrator citing the first page of the Book of the Dark, which is a 
‘compilation of self-contradictory histories, partial biographies, and garbled legends’ that provides a 
record of Earthsea history form the time of Morred to the ‘dark ages’. The title of this non-existent 
book connotes the political chaos and unrest that reigned in Earthsea after the murder of the last of 
its kings and the breaking of his Ring. From this moment the ‘will of the wealthy’ prevailed.  
Wizards and soldiers were hired to seize land and property; slavery became common, and extreme 
poverty drove people to lawlessness and piracy; the divide between oppressors (the rich ruling 
class) and oppressed (the rest of the people) was vast. As the narrator notes, the ruling class wanted 
‘praise, not history’, and book-burning was one of the strategies employed by the oppressors to 
prevent the disempowered from learning about the inner workings of dominant systems of power. 
Of the few extant written records, the Book of the Dark is the best account, says the narrator, but 
some information can be found written in the margins of lore books, which were given to wizards in 
the pay of the warlords. The implication is that these random records - stories of ‘a plague, a 
famine, a raid, a change of masters’ preserved in margins and endpapers - have a certain authority 
by the very virtue of being marginal, as they are recorded not to convince or teach or serve some 
important public function, but to express what would be read by few, and what would make no 
difference in the larger political and social sphere, yet was considered by the writers important 
enough to be written down despite these disadvantages.  The marginal records reveal instances of 
economic, social and gendered oppression, providing a different perspective to the main account in 
the Book.  In addition, ‘songs, old lays and ballads from small islands and from the quiet uplands 10
of Havnor’ tell further tales of despotism, suppression of freedom, brutality and injustice. The story 
told in ‘The Finder’ - of the founding of the Roke School - is constructed from all these sources: the 
surviving remnants of the Book, the marginal notes, and the songs, lays and ballads.   
          Although the socio-political conditions revealed in the first page of the Book have definite 
echoes of the conditions that led to the apocalyptic ending of Tehanu - petty warfare, unjust 
distribution of power, gender inequality, economic chaos and moral degradation - ‘The Finder’ is 
not eschatological, even though the apocalyptic theme, as a yearning towards change, is woven 
through it. In ‘The Finder’ Le Guin traces beginnings - the beginning of the Roke school, the 
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foundation of the art of magic as an organised institutional knowledge - and shows how beginnings 
and endings are inextricably linked, as becomes clear in the story ‘Dragonfly’ and the novel The 
Other Wind. The Tales is an ‘archaeology of the future’ of Earthsea, the five tales being strands that 
form a pattern in The Other Wind, an alternative ‘history’ of Earthsea revealing the latent elements 
of subversion that lead to the radical interrogation of the status quo in the final novel of the Earthsea 
series.  
          As Le Guin states very often in her writings, ‘returning’ (to the past, to the place where we 
began) is important if we are to understand the present and cherish hope for the future.  Her 
repeated injunction is to ‘Turn and return’,   because the past is as important as the future, or 11
perhaps more so - literary fantasy being one of the most potent forms to foreground this fact, 
demonstrating that re-viewing and retrieving the past is a subversive enterprise, rather than a 
reactionary one as its critics have so often contended. One of the techniques deployed by both 
Tolkien and Lewis for this subversive retrieval, as I pointed out in the Introduction, is  
defamiliarisation (ostranenie) — Victor Shklovsky’s conception of how literature represents objects 
and situations afresh, devoid of their familiar associations, rendering them pristine again for readers 
who may have become immured in habituated modes of thought and action. Similarly, Le Guin uses 
what Tolkien calls the ‘fantastic device of language’ to re-engage her readers with contemporary 
problems that have become so familiar that they are being ignored. For example, Le Guin’s 
identification of Equilibrium as a central aspect of Earthsea’s culture can be read as drawing 
attention to the analogous loss of balance which is being experienced in our world on account of 
environmental degradation, with its attendant symptoms such as global warming. As the narrator in 
‘The Finder’ tells us, in the dark ages wizards used their spells recklessly in a bid for power, and 
this resulted in famines, plagues and the drying up of springs, and the birth of ‘sickly and 
monstrous’ offspring in animals and humans. The wizards’ actions are equivalent to human 
irresponsibility in the exploitation of natural resources and pollution caused by industrial waste. As 
Le Guin says, the post-Enlightenment ‘Euclidean’ vision, based on either/or binary codes, posits 
reason as the prime force of human progress - a one-way journey that human beings are supposed to 
have embarked upon after the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. But Le Guin’s advice 
is to pause, and forswear this drive to relentless progress that comes only ‘at the cost of the 
destruction of all other species and their inorganic matrix of earth, water, and air’ (Dancing, 96). 
 Ursula K. Le Guin, ‘A Non-Euclidean View’, p. 85.11
!  182
The binary mentality that has become part of our make-up, Le Guin points out, has to be re-
visioned; our one-dimensional perspective needs to change.            
          In a fundamental sense, the return advised by Le Guin is a revaluation of language, which in 
the Earthsea series — and our world — is central to human notions of reality. Le Guin traces the 
parallels between the suppression and exploitation of women and the earth by the dominant male 
ideological systems, and exposes the role of language in this double oppression. In ‘dis-covering’ 
the archives of Earthsea, Le Guin shows how different metaphors structure different realities - 
gendered notions of what really exists. This is the central theme of ‘The Finder’, which depicts the 
contrast between Gelluk’s domain of power, with its paralysed puppet king, Losen, the slaves at 
Samory, and hired wizards seething with rebellion; and the community at Roke, existing in 
harmony and peace, but radically isolated from the rest of the world. The story is structured in three 
sections, and by juxtaposing the power formations at Samory and Roke, Le Guin explores the way 
metaphors and imagery establish binaries that promote hierarchical social formations.  
          In a talk in 1986, published as ‘Woman/Wilderness’, Le Guin’s polemical stance is that 
‘Civilised Man’ makes ‘all the rest’ - women, animals, trees, the earth - into the Other. He, the male 
white adult, is ‘I’ and ‘the rest is women and the wilderness’; and while the ‘I’ is linguistically 
centred, the feminised Other has been silenced, edged out of the dominant discourse to exist as the 
mute outsider.  Le Guin addresses this schism, and seeks to re-vision this parallel between nature 12
and women rather than deny it.  As Le Guin became more conscious of the ecofeminist movement 
that interrogates the equating of the feminine with nature, and recognised the degradation of nature 
as a way of denigrating the female (and vice versa), she reworked her conception of the Old Powers 
of the earth, demonstrating that the human, the non-human and the environment are interlinked, so 
that the ‘othering’ of nature by man is leading to an ecological catastrophe that humans would do 
well to recognise. Le Guin’s decentring of ‘Man’ involves giving voice to all that has been silenced. 
Historically, she tells us, men mastered nature by going into the wilderness and hunting, and their 
exploits became legends. Once he had dominated that wilderness, women’s sphere was made wild 
too, with the aim of subjecting it to a similar domination. In response to her increasing focus on this 
story, as we shall see, Le Guin’s conception of the Old Powers becomes more explicitly associated 
with the feminine principle, and with knowledge. And in the process, as in Tehanu, she sets about 
rewriting the Christian scriptures in a manner that would have taken C. S. Lewis by surprise. 
!
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6.2. Sacramentalism in Samory       
 As I have noted before, the claim for Le Guin’s engagement with scriptural texts seems 
counterintuitive, since she has called herself a ‘congenital non-Christian’.  However, her 13
conception of True Speech as acting upon the world and changing it has too many parallels with the 
biblical concept of the creative word for her not to explore the ramifications of these similarities. 
One of these similarities is the way language constructs notions of purity, associated with the male 
and the sky, as against the impure earth, which is gendered female.  She questions the concept of 
‘purity’ throughout her work. In Tehanu, she examined the question of male ‘purity’ preserved by 
avoiding sexual contact - another concept that finds a parallel in the medieval priestly tradition.  In 14
Tales from Earthsea she turns her attention to one of the manifestations of this quest for purity in 
sacrificial rituals, represented in many religions as a pathway to some sort of eternal disembodied 
existence. 
          At Samory, to which young Otter has been sent as a ‘finder’ - he has the magical gift for 
finding things - the earth is mined for cinnabar, the ore of water metal, commonly known as 
mercury. Here the wizard Gelluk works for the pirate Losen and allows this thug to think of himself 
as king, while using him to consolidate his own power.  With Losen’s help Gelluk secures for 
himself countless slaves and economic resources to mine the ore for his peculiar purposes. The 
wizard’s rhetoric is saturated in religious imagery, which demonstrates the role of organised 
religions in setting up gendered notions of the world. When he meets the slave boy Otter for the 
first time, Gelluk reveals to him his ‘magical’ secret.  Gelluk calls the refined metal the King, or the 
Allking, while the ore in the mines is the ‘vile’ Red Mother, refined, as Gelluk explains, in the long 
stone tower where huge fires tended by naked slaves burn constantly, in room above room, until the 
purified mercury is gathered in the topmost room. The fumes from the metal poison the slaves, so 
that they die within a year or two. But according to Gelluk, the running sores on their bodies make 
them ‘pure’, so that after being ‘burned clean’ these slaves, both male and female, can eventually 
‘fly up, fly up into the Courts of the King’ (23). The physical movement from impurity to purity is 
upwards, form earth to sky. 
           This salvation rhetoric of ‘evil souls’ becoming pure by contact with the male ‘seed, the 
fructifier’, till they reach the sublime heights of eternity, soon takes on sacramental tones. When the 
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slave in the top tower room gives Gelluk the few drops of quicksilver, the wizard croons over the 
metal, calling it ‘the baby lord’.  Telling Otter that in True Speech the metal is called Turres, which 
means ‘Semen’ (21), Gelluk proceeds to eat the metal, and his ensuing speech is a strange 
combination of the sacred and the profane: 
!
Now the King is in my body [...] he enters into my veins and arteries [...] My blood runs 
silver. I see things unknown to other men [...] And when he leaves me, he hides in the place 
of ordure, in foulness itself, and yet again in the vile place he waits for me to come and take 
him up and cleanse him as he cleansed me, so that each time we grow purer together [...] 
And more than that, more than that, the king enters into my seed. He is my semen. I am 
Turres and he is me (25). 
!
In this pastiche of sacramental discourse reverberate perverse echoes of the seed of change Tenar 
felt within her when Kalessin told her its name. In the process Le Guin shows how for the wizard, 
the name of the metal he thinks all-powerful acts to buttress his own self-importance, in contrast to 
the transubstantiation undergone by Tenar after learning the dragon’s name. Tenar’s transformation 
gave her the capacity to embrace her own multiple identity as Tenar and Arha and Goha, reconciling 
all the selves within her, while confirming her ability to enable the burnt child, Therru, to see 
herself as more than just a victim of abuse. Gelluk’s talk, hinting at what he thinks of as a bodily 
transubstantiation, is a travesty of this process. His identification of the metal as ‘semen’ alludes to 
the male desire for perpetuation through their (male) children - I am Turres and he is me is an 
allusion to the distorted desire for immortality that some fathers consider is the main purpose of 
their sons, as Le Guin mentions in her short story ‘The Bones of the Earth’ (147-8). The mercury 
Gelluk eats becomes for him a source of knowledge that cancels out all other sources, all arts and 
crafts, so that in his totalitarian discourse ‘one true element’, quicksilver, controls all other elements 
- since it can destroy them all, including gold – just as the ‘one true knowledge’ it stands for 
subsumes all others, so that its consumption makes him the ‘one true king’ ( 30).  
          Through this totalitarian rhetoric with its religious overtones, Le Guin shows how Gelluk 
structures a hierarchical binary opposition between male and female principles that subsumes other, 
non-human categories such as earth and sky, light and dark, life and death. It is clear that he 
associates the female with the earth, since as well as dubbing cinnabar the vile Red Mother, he calls 
the lode containing the ore ‘the true womb’, which holds the ‘moonseed’, mercury. In this way, 
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presenting the earth as a female body reluctant to ‘yield’, he makes the denigration of women and 
nature seem to be biological imperatives rather than linguistically constructed, arbitrary structures. 
He asks Otter: ‘Did you know that the Moon is the Earth's father? Yes, yes; and he lay with her, as 
is the father’s right. He quickened her base clay with the true seed. But she will not give birth to the 
King. She is strong in her fear and wilful in her vileness. She holds him back and hides him deep, 
fearing to give birth to her master. That is why, to give him birth, she must be burned alive’ (33). He 
is not only denigrating the earth, but also ‘hysterisizing’ women’s bodies, reducing them to a kind 
of walking womb.  And Otter — who can glimpse his thoughts because the wizard has intruded 15
himself into the boy’s mind, forging a connection that works both ways — sees visions of burning 
bodies in his head, which ‘screamed as green wood screams in fire’, because the wizard has decided 
that purified metal must be further purified in a fire made of living human bodies, eliciting ‘Purity 
from foulness: bliss from pain’ (31). The analogy underlines the ecocide that human beings are so 
blithely driven towards by the irresponsible spread of pollution and the destruction of the earth, and 
Gelluk’s linking of the earth with the female foregrounds the historically rooted domination of both 
women and nature by irresponsible men.  
         In this story, Le Guin reinvents her earlier representation of wizards as possessing the power 
to change the nature of a thing through their mastery of True Speech.  Here this mastery connects 
them to the Christian priest’s ability to change bread and wine into the body of Christ in the 
Eucharist, as Comoletti and Drout have pointed out.  Gelluk’s references to mercury as the ‘baby 16
lord’ and the transformation he declares is happening to him clearly echo the sacramental language 
of the Mass. But Gelluk, despite being a powerful wizard, does not know the true name of cinnabar, 
with the clear implication that his radical estrangement from the earth has alienated him from the 
true names of ores and metals. Otter knows by his gift that the only word of True Speech used by 
Gelluk - Turres - does mean semen; but it is not the True Name of quicksilver. The fact that Gelluk 
knows or at least utters only a single word of True Speech, the word for semen, demonstrates that 
for him his maleness is a means of control and subjugation, just as the mercury he collects is a 
means to make him King. The bodily images he invokes of sacramental change and fusion with the 
metal are all false, since he is ignorant of the metal’s true nature as embodied in its name. The 
wizard’s megalomania is an extreme form of the desire for power that stems from male pride in 
being the bearers of the ‘seed’ of progeny - radically opposed to what Le Guin terms the female act 
 See Sylvia Walby, Theorizing Patriarchy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 109-127.15
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of ‘rebearing’. In contrast to the feminised earth, Gelluk constructs hierarchical male relationships 
to suit himself: he asks Otter to call him Father, telling him that the ‘wise child loves his father and 
obeys him, and the father rewards him as he deserves’ (34). The allusion to the male-centred 
relationships that structure Judeo-Christian religious discourse reveals how organised religion has 
promoted language that pushes women to the margins, while privileging the discourse of reward 
and punishment that Le Guin repudiates in each of her apocalyptic visions. But Gelluk’s rhetoric 
cannot conceal from Otter the fact that his words are empty.  Clearly, he knows nothing of any ‘true 
power’ residing in the earth. And his textual knowledge, which is a source of power since it enables 
him to read the books of magic that are written in the True Speech — another connection to esoteric 
priestly knowledge in Judeo-Christian discourse — is corrupt, since he interprets and reinterprets 
the lore of the Book of Way to suit his own delusions of grandeur. 
          It is Anieb, the half-naked female slave in the top room whom Otter takes at first for a young 
boy, who reveals to him the true name of the metal she works.  Speaking through Otter so that ‘his 
lips parted, his tongue moved’ to utter her words, she helps him to speak the word for mercury, 
‘Ayezur’. This incident recalls the one in Tehanu where Kalessin’s name formed itself in Tenar’s 
mouth; and this echo in ‘The Finder’ helps to link the ore with dragons.  As the narrator puts it, 
‘Mining and refining were indeed great crafts with their own mysteries and masteries’, and it is easy 
to see the link between the mystery of the power of the earth and the mysterious beings that live in 
the West. Although Anieb has been degendered, her breasts empty, her body emaciated, yet she 
knows the true name of the element she works with, for she is connected to the earth in a way that 
Gelluk can never be.  Anieb’s power was born with her. Her mother and aunt, to whom Otter later 
delivers Anieb’s dead body, tell him that she had the gift as a child, and that ‘She knew the old 
powers [...] the powers of the earth’ (44). That is why she is able to tell Otter the true name of 
quicksilver; while Gelluk, who does not know it, is manipulated by Anieb (through Otter) to say his 
own name and thus plunge to his death within the earth he so despised. As Otter takes Anieb away 
from the Tower after Gelluk’s death, the spittle falling from her sore lips onto her chin and breasts 
remind the boy of the gushing spring that burst out of the ground that Gelluk had ruptured in order 
to enter the ‘womb’ of the earth. The association in Otter’s mind signals the slave girl’s intrinsic 
connection with the earth, and with water, the source of all life — a connection that gains resonance 
in the third section of the story.  
!
!
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6.3. The impurity of Roke         
 Since the readers have become familiar with Roke School in the First Trilogy, the story of its 
foundation comes as a surprise, as it overturns all the notions about it they have so far taken for 
granted. The school’s foundation is based on a totally different value-system from the one we 
encountered in the First Trilogy, thus confirming that the power structures operative at Roke are 
contingent and temporary, not timeless and immutable. The contrast between Roke ‘then and now’ 
vividly demonstrates how social systems and relations, by appearing to be constant, can become 
invisible and therefore unchallengeable.  
          When Otter finally comes to Roke — seven years after having restored Anieb’s dead body to 
her family — he flies there in the form of a tern, landing on the round green hill he first dreamed of 
in his prison cell at Samory, on the night when Anieb came to him as a visitation. This hill is Roke 
Knoll, and Otter soon discovers that the hill and the Grove are the foundations and centres of all 
power in Earthsea. On Roke, Otter finds a community at peace: no one in need of food and shelter, 
all living frugally but contentedly. Yet it soon becomes clear that this seeming utopia is just that - a 
‘no place’.  Otter is told the history of Roke by the two sisters Veil and Ember, who seem to be the 
decision-makers at Roke. The organisation known as Women of the Hand — ‘though there were 
men among us’, as Ember points out — had gathered on Roke a century before Losen’s time, to 
form a secret ‘league of mages’ (61) which hoped to become strong enough to revolt against the 
oppressive regime of rich landowners and the powerful wizards in their pay. Women had been 
leaders in this league, and travelled in disguise around the Ninety Isles, ‘weaving a wide, fine net of 
resistance’ which still leaves traces, ‘strands and knots’, such as the wise women who were Anieb’s 
mother and aunt.  Ember explains to Otter how the league of mages at Roke was betrayed by one 17
of their own number, who let down the island’s powerful spells of defence and allowed the lords of 
Wathort to enter the island. The invaders plundered and pillaged, killing children and the old and 
taking young men and women into slavery.  As a consequence of this betrayal, these people, now 
mostly women, had sequestered themselves from the rest of Earthsea, building even more powerful 
spells to secure the island, which was also protected from invasion by seas and storms. Ironically, 
however, as Ember confesses, their security was also their prison. They could not leave the island, 
or allow anyone else to enter it.  
          The way to protect their knowledge and power chosen by the women of Roke is not the way 
Le Guin endorses. At Roke, women are afraid of men, and this lack of trust produces separatist 
 Le Guin, ‘TF’, p. 61.17
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attitudes embedded in the fear of the other. Veil tells Otter that on Roke they did not trust men; a 
man betrayed them, men attacked them, and as a result ‘We do not deal with their 
governments’ (60). But this lack of trust makes Roke a dead end, which exerts no influence on the 
rest of Earthsea. Otter’s passionate outburst when he first hears about the secret organisation at 
Anieb’s home becomes extremely relevant in this context: ‘Will the slaves go free?’ he asks, ‘Will 
beggars eat? Will justice be done?’ and the answer to these questions must be negative, as long as 
Roke maintains its isolationist policy. At the same time, Otter is conscious that the mutual trust 
between him and Anieb had been capable of destroying even a wizard as powerful as Gelluk. Their 
victory illustrates Le Guin’s belief in the power of resistance even at the margins, when it occurs in 
unexpected spaces ignored by the dominant groups. Anieb’s understanding of the Old Powers 
allowed her and Otter to trick Gelluk where they could not subjugate him by force. Crucially, 
however, neither could have performed this act individually; it was their mutual effort, symbolically 
a dialectical fusion of yin and yang, that made it possible for them to defeat the apparently 
invincible wizard. Remembering this, Otter questions the compartmentalisation that the women at 
Roke consider a means of safety. For Le Guin, this is not an answer. Integration and wholeness is 
achieved by sharing the common bonds of earthly existence, even if that involves huge risks and 
means a lowering of defences, dismantling the borders of utopia. Le Guin insists that the ‘no-place’ 
has to become a part of the world to become ‘eu-topia’, the place of good living. 
          The cosmos, in other words, is a complex web of connections with everything held in delicate 
balance; and this in turn revokes the concept of ‘purity’ that has formed part of the masculine 
rhetoric of mages since before the foundations of Roke School were laid. In ‘The Finder’ Ember 
tells Otter how some of the men — ‘And they are men’ (81) — want to separate themselves from 
women and remain celibate, so they can be ‘pure’. These men, Ember says, ‘put men where we put 
the world’ — the androcentric formation automatically repealing belief in the ultimate unity of all 
true power, and the egalitarian conditions of existence that this implies. For these men, she points 
out, ‘Old Powers are abominable’ and women are linked with the Old Powers (81). The narrator has 
already told us of warring wizards whose reckless use of magic ‘in duels and combats of 
sorcery’ (3) resulted in famines and droughts. The wizards ascribed these effects to female witchery, 
and so brought women’s magic into disrepute. The Roke School was set up by Otter and Ember to 
gather like-minded people who could be trained to form an alliance against the powerful; but the 
institution quickly breaks down into gender factions. 
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          In the First Trilogy, as we saw, the celibacy of wizards was an accepted, ‘invisible’ 
assumption, but in Tehanu Le Guin questioned the motives behind that celibacy, and made clear that 
witches do not share it. ‘The Finder’ demonstrates that celibacy for wizards is already a question, 
though not an established rule, in Otter’s time, even before the Roke School was founded. 
Significantly, Otter suppresses his feelings of attraction towards Ember because he has been told by 
his master Highdrake that ‘to make love is to unmake power’ (64).  When Otter asks her if making 
love depletes power, she tells him that all powers at root are one.  The concepts of purity or 
purification, as upheld by Gellek, are exposed in all their absurdity by her insistence that power – 
and Le Guin includes cosmic forces, chemical elements, human consciousness, language and 
sexuality under the umbrella term ‘power’ — is one at source. 
!
6.4. Revelations  
Since (as we have seen) the biblical Book of Revelation is a foundational text of Western utopias, 
images and symbols from the book can become powerful tools of Le Guin’s iconoclastic endeavour 
to defamiliarise embedded presuppositions in ways that allow for different perspectives. In ‘The 
Finder’ Biblical imagery is deliberately inverted, as Ember’s sister Veil declares that the strength of 
Roke should be hidden and hoarded as a ‘young dragon hoards up its fire’.  After all, she adds, ‘one 
day the dragon will come into its strength. If it takes a thousand years . . .’ (67, 68). The allusion to 
the biblical dragon (Satan) who is chained for a thousand years can hardly be missed: 
!
And I saw an angel come down from heaven, having the key of the bottomless pit and a great 
chain in his hand. And he laid hold on the dragon, that old serpent, which is the Devil, and 
Satan, and bound him a thousand years. And cast him into the bottomless pit, and shut him up, 
and set a seal upon him, that he should deceive the nations no more, till the thousand years 
should be fulfilled: and after that he must be loosed for a season’ (Apoc. 20: 1-3) 
!
In the course of the thousand years of Satan’s imprisonment, the ‘souls’ of people who sacrificed 
themselves for the word of God will have ‘lived and reigned with Christ’ (Apoc. 20: 4). But the 
identification of Veil’s dragon with Satan points up a problem with this attitude, since Satan’s 
segregation from the world – the hoarding up of his powers, so to speak – works to very different 
ends than the ones Roke should serve. Otter answers Veil by saying that outside Roke ‘there are 
common people who slave and starve and die in misery. Must they do so for a thousand years with 
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no hope?’ (68). Le Guin here questions Christian millennialism once again by drawing attention to 
the implicit binarism involved in the millenarian perspective, which divides the world into insiders 
and outsiders, the saved and the damned. Her concern is with all marginal peoples, not merely those 
who place their trust in the promises of biblical eschatology. And Otter’s question is pertinent for 
utopian/millennial discourse in general when he asks Veil: ‘if all but us are slaves, what’s our 
freedom worth?’ (68). The people ‘outside’ the island suffer and wait, and while this lasts, Le Guin 
questions how any people can be happy in security when this is gained at the cost of a xenophobic 
segregation that gives no thought to anyone beyond the home community.  Through her ironic 
inversions of biblical imagery, she encourages readers to rethink the category of the outsider in its 
etiological and ontological contexts.  
          In this story Le Guin undermines the designations of good and evil in the ‘authorised’ version 
of western history, uncovering the androcentric subtext of the narrative of Revelation. in doing so, 
she problematises the dualistic gender discourse of biblical interpretations. Dragon and women have 
been symbolically associated in Tehanu. And despite the ontological oneness of dragons and human 
as told in the myth of the woman of Kemay, all hybrid dragon-humans in Earthsea are women. Thus 
Le Guin is able to interrogate the monster/dragon/woman paradigm of Revelation that inheres in the 
presentation of both dragon and Whore as monsters. Le Guin re-presents the dragon as victim rather 
than victimiser, friend rather than fiend. Each instance of an ideological struggle is a specific 
articulation which is concrete and contingent, while universalising tendencies ‘veil’ the struggle as a 
battle between good and evil – hence the resonance of Veil’s name. By infusing archetypal symbols 
with radically new connotations, Le Guin draws attention to the plural nature of historical 
discourse, pointing out the fact that there are always ‘other’ versions of his-story that need to be 
considered. Labels encourage stereotyping which forms webs of connotations that become fixed as 
the only forms of truth. As the biblical scholar Austin Farrer claims in his study of John’s 
Apocalypse, images and symbols are not discrete components that can be accepted or rejected 
individually; rather, they ‘form a ‘complex web of interrelated significances’  that buttress and 18
support each node and connection in the web, so that traditional myths of a culture, with all the 
associative images and symbols they carry, become an intrinsic part of that culture’s consciousness.         
          In this context, Le Guin’s consistent association of women and dragons is a startling image-
association, at first, since dragons have been traditionally monsters and hoarders - but as Le Guin 
says, these are dragons of a new world. The solution offered by the author to the problem of 
 Austin Farrer, A Re-birth of Images: The Making of St. John’s Apocalypse, p. 14.18
!  191
resisting an oppressive regime is especially courageous. Le Guin rejects not only separatism, but 
also the concept of utopia as ‘no-place’, a segregated area. Security at the cost of ghettoising a 
certain group - in this case the women of Roke - is useless, creating boundaries that imprison the 
ones it claims to protect. Underlying Le Guin’s interrogation of such exclusive, select groups is a 
critique of the paradigmatic ‘chosen’ people in the biblical Apocalypse, the 144,000 of the ‘saved’.  
Le Guin puts in doubt the validity of a ‘new heaven and new earth’ that exclude so many others, 
identified in Revelation as ‘the dogs and sorcerers and fornicators and murderers and idolaters, and 
everyone who loves and practices falsehood’ (Apoc. 22:15). Le Guin’s fantasy, however, celebrates 
the diversity of life on earth, which contains intrinsic links forming patterns and configurations that 
sustain the balance of the universe. Pertinently, the ‘chosen’ in the biblical text are described as 
those who are ‘not defiled with women; for they are virgins’ (Apoc. 14: 4). The androcentric, 
paradigmatic purity legitimised by Scripture is here imputed only to men, who have kept 
themselves from defilement by keeping away from the opposite sex; the obvious implication is that 
the chosen are only men, and that this phallocentric discourse provides the impetus behind the 
celibacy practised by Christian priests.  
          The answer for Le Guin does not lie in setting up oppositional structures. Veil insists that the 
Roke community is safe only so long as they are a group of women, as men only consider other 
men to be important - a group of women would not bother men. But grouping based on gender 
produces an internalised spiritual anomie, with nothing for ‘the young dragon [to] feed on’ (68). 
The implications of the name Veil have already been mentioned, but it is also significant in an 
apocalyptic context, since apocalypse means ‘unveiling’, though in a paradoxical sense, as Tina 
Pippin observes: ‘“Apocalypse” is the re-veiling of women - the silencing and marginalizing of 
women. It is also the revealing of women in that it constructs their sexual natures in good or evil 
terms [...] And this apocalypse of women is the destruction of women as women, through rape or 
pornography or stereotyping’.  The wall of spells protecting Roke prevent any unveiling, any 19
interchange of ideas with the outside world, as happened with the utopian anarchic society in Le 
Guin’s great novel The Dispossessed (1974).  And the consequence of this ‘hoarding’ is 
degeneration.  In ‘The Finder’, Veil is the one who keeps pointing out the dangers involved in any 
lowering of their guard, any concession to the possibility of being ‘dis-covered’. She insists on 
keeping their stronghold at Roke -  consolidating a segregated group - because ‘This is the center 
 Tina Pippin, Death and Desire: The Rhetoric of Gender in the Apocalypse of John (Louisville, KY.: John 19
Knox Press, 1992), p. 47.
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[...] We must keep to the center’ (68), refusing to ‘reveal’ their knowledge for fear of the other.  Le 
Guin, however, interrogates the very concept of the centre, pointing out the dangers inherent in 
centring any one place, culture, people or species and pronouncing all others peripheral; and she 
reinforces this interrogation by explaining the origins of Roke island, where the school is based. 
 Ember tells Otter that Roke was the second land, after Éa, that Segoy raised from the sea. 
The green hill that embodies its power, Roke Knoll, is ‘founded deeper than all islands’; and the 
Immanent Grove, made up of the ‘oldest trees in the world’ whose roots are the roots of all 
knowledge’, was the ‘source and center of magic’ (59).  But this is no conventional centre as this 
would be understood in human geometry. The two most important aspects of the Grove are that it 
never remains in one place on the island, and that no one knows its extent.  When Otter asks Ember 
how far the forest goes, she says, ‘As far as the mind goes’ (62). These two aspects of Earthsea’s 
‘centre’ demonstrate Le Guin’s rejection of Eurocentric paradigms that posit a single centre - ‘the 
White West’ - and all else as the marginalised other. Instead she posits a multiplicity of centres, 
from which all peoples can make their own negotiations and define their own relationships with 
each other and the universe. This conception is very similar to Lewis’s vision of the universe as the 
Great Dance in Perelandra ((1943), where Ransom sees a vision of ‘intertwining undulation of 
many cords or bands of light’,  and each cord seems to become the centre of a design as he looks at 20
it. In a similar vein, Le Guin states, ‘The center of the world is a bluff on the Klamath River, a rock 
in Mecca, a hole in the ground in Greece, nowhere, its circumference everywhere’ (Dancing, 98). 
The conversation between communities and cultures, then, should be heteroglossic, involving a 
plurality of voices and value-systems measuring themselves against each other rather than always 
being focused on a single dominant authority. The Grove is axiologically central, but no particular 
part of Earthsea, including Roke, can claim to be the site whose value systems the rest of the world 
should consider as normative. 
          However, the tacit acknowledgement in ‘The Finder’ that while a fundamental asymmetry 
exists at the very centre(s) of knowledge emancipatory hope might be uncertain, indicates that Le 
Guin’s vision of a harmonious integrated society is not based on simplistic attitudes. A stable but 
diverse and open community is hard to maintain.  Once other people are brought to Roke from 
islands near and far, dissent and discontent follow. The first point of contention, interestingly, 
concerns the segregation of men and women. Ember tells Otter that the men and the women could 
not agree on the ‘Way’, with some men even insisting that the word ‘Rule’ should be used instead 
 C. S. Lewis, Perelandra (London: HarperCollins, 1943), p. 277.20
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of ‘Way’ (and ‘Rule’ again has Christian overtones, invoking the governing principles of religious 
foundations such as the Rule of St Benedict). Since readers are already familiar with the term ‘rule 
of Roke’ from the previous books, it is clear who eventually wins this dispute. The Way, on the 
other hand, is associated with the Tao, which devotes many chapters to defining it, for example as 
‘the mother of all things’.   ‘How the Way does things’, the Tao explains in Le Guin’s translation, 21
‘is hard to grasp, elusive [...] obscure/ yet there is spirit in it [...] There is certainty in it’.  In a note 22
on her translation, Le Guin explains the ‘something’ that underlies this concept (‘Not knowing its 
real name,/ we only call it the Way’) as an ‘unshaped, undifferentiated lump, chaos, before the 
Word, before Form, before Change’.  The echo of Le Guin’s description of the Shadow in the first 23
book of Earthsea is unmistakable here (‘a shapeless clot of shadow’, WE, 30). Clearly, the 
implication is that from the Way emerge the fundamental polarities essential for life.   
          The Shadow is one of the Old Powers of the earth that crop up throughout the first trilogy, 
and in Tales and The Other Wind Le Guin extends and modifies her earlier presentation of dark 
powers as mostly evil. Even though they are not presented as unambiguously evil in the first trilogy 
- Ged embraces his Shadow to become whole - the Stone at Terrenon is evil; and Ged tells Tenar in 
The Tombs of Atuan that the Nameless Powers ‘hate the [...] brief light of our mortality’ (TA, 265). 
But in ‘The Finder’ the Old Powers are closer to Suvin’s comments on the Creation Song of Éa, that 
darkness and silence are presented it it as ‘parental, engendering, or motherly’.  This change is the 24
subject of the next section. 
!
6.5. Old Powers Renewed  
In true Le Guinian style, the narrator in ‘The Finder’ presents a second version of the story of the 
foundation of Roke School to rival the tale of Otter and Ember; a version that unveils the 
beginnings of the association between women and the Old Powers of the earth, even as it seeks to 
denigrate it. In this alternative story, ‘They say that Roke used to be ruled by a woman called the 
Dark Woman, who was in league with the Old Powers of the earth. They say she lived in a cave 
under Roke Knoll, never coming into the daylight, but weaving vast spells over land and sea that 
 Ursula K. Le Guin, Lao Tzu Tao Te Ching: A Book about The Way and the Power of The Way (Boston & 21
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compelled men to her evil will’ (70). The narrator points out that the Old Powers were revered in 
the time of Medra (Otter’s true name) and Elehal (Ember’s true name), but that ‘That changed with 
the years’ (70).  Both versions of Roke’s founding, however, can be challenged, and the narrator 
points this up at the beginning of the story, where she announces it as ‘a tale of the Founding of 
Roke’ – by implication, one of many – and challenges its detractors to tell a better one: ‘if the 
masters of Roke say it didn’t happen so, let them tell us how it happened otherwise. For a cloud 
hangs over the time when Roke first became the Isle of the Wise, and it may be that the wise men 
put it there’ (5). While the narrator remains anonymous, her attitude towards the Masters and their 
occlusion of women from Roke’s past suggests that she is a woman; and it also situates her at a time 
when Roke has become a male preserve. The narrator’s use of ‘us’ implicates the reader in the 
narrative constructing the history of Roke School, allowing us both to make a choice between the 
two versions of the story and to choose our own reading of each version.  The very fact that ‘we’ – 
all of us – are invited to judge the origins of Roke urges the reader to side with those who wish their 
ideal societies to be inclusive. 
          The process described by the narrator of the changing role of the Old Powers, from being 
revered to being associated with an evil Dark Woman, finds many parallels in history. Genevieve 
Lloyd tells us that at the onset of philosophical thought in Greece, ‘femaleness was symbolically 
associated with what Reason left behind - the dark powers of the earth goddess, immersion in 
unknown forces associated with mysterious female powers’.  In other words, Reason was gendered 25
male and associated with daylight, while the irrational or mysterious was gendered female and 
connected with darkness and earth.  In a similar vein, echoes of the biblical Revelation  in ‘The 26
Finder’ function effectively to draw attention to the discrepancy between the discourses of the 
dominant and the disempowered. There is no rigid system of correspondences with biblical 
symbolism in the story, but Le Guin’s narrative draws on some biblical archetypes that have seeped 
into western consciousness as representations of good and evil - dragon, scarlet woman, the 
‘chosen’ group, the perfect city - to jar the readers’ minds out of embedded normative suppositions 
created by such ‘authorised’ associations. The story of the Dark Woman in her cave, for instance, 
echoes the embodiment of women as evil in religious discourse, most vividly embodied in the 
‘Whore’ of Babylon, and is clearly a later intervention by patriarchal hegemony designed to justify 
 Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy (London: Routledge, 25
1993 [1984]), p. 2.
 The Book of Revelation contains many elements from the Old Testament apocalyptic texts, specially 26
Daniel and Isaiah.
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the exclusion of women from the Roke School. Can other symbols and signs be thus ideologically 
motivated? That is the implicit query in the text. According to Fredric Jameson, ‘master narratives’ - 
by which he means allegorical and typological readings of texts that encode their meanings in terms 
of the hegemonic discourse of a particular historic period - ‘have inscribed themselves in the texts 
as well as in our thinking about them’.  The fabricated story of the Dark Woman is a demonstration 27
of how elements of factual happenings are twisted and deformed to suit the controlling authority.  
 The narrator in ‘The Finder’ points out that a mage did open and enter a cave, as the Masters 
claim, but that the mage was Medra (Otter), and the cave was not at Roke Knoll: she tells us the 
details in her account of how Otter and Anieb defeated Gelluk. The mutation of the event 
exemplifies how hegemonic (mis)appropriations work. The narrative voice points out the 
deployment of different sources - ‘authorised’ versions like the Book of the Dark, with marginal 
notes and oral tales - to make the ‘airy quilt’ of the story; and draws attention to the discrepancies 
and conflicting accounts of events within these sources.  The interwoven biblical images and 28
motifs operate to point out how similar processes have been at work in our world to crystallise 
assumptions that reinforce the version of events preferred by the status quo. By implication, readers 
are invited to reinterpret foundational cultural texts that have acquired the status of unquestionable 
conduits of the ‘Truth’. 
           In ‘The Finder’, however, Le Guin does not simply deny the symbolic link between women, 
darkness and the earth that has been exploited by misogynistic tradition; instead she seeks to tease 
out its implications. In doing so she exposes how the devalued and excluded entities in this 
symbolic cluster are necessary to maintain the world’s balance. After Gelluk’s death, his place is 
assumed by an equally deadly and malevolent wizard called Early, who chases Medra/Otter from 
his home on Havnor (Medra in the form of an otter, Early as an eagle) in an attempt to erase him 
from the earth and effectively expunge his name from history, blotting out all memory of Gelluk’s 
death.  In the course of his flight from Early, Medra finds himself in a stream on the same hillside 
where he and Anieb had tricked Gelluk into falling into a crevice he himself had opened. Medra 
remembers the incident, and although his hands are powerless (he has used up all his strength to put 
 Jameson, The Political Unconscious, p. 19.27
 Biblical scholars have pointed out that the Bible itself is a collection of generically, historically, and 28
aesthetically heterogeneous material, originally preserved as individual scrolls, including ‘history, prophecy, 
law, devotional verse, proverbs and even love poetry and fiction’ in the OT, and ‘letters from named 
individuals’ in the NT. See David Jasper and Stephen Prickett eds., The Bible and Literature: A Reader 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 3. See also C. S. Lewis, ‘The Literary Impact of the Authorised Version’ in They 
Asked For A Paper (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1962), pp. 26-50.
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a binding spell on his pursuer), he bends to the earth and implores it: ‘Mother, open to me’ (93). The 
earth opens up at once and he jumps in, and as he does so he notices that it is not the grand red 
palace with silver runes of Gelluk’s imagination: ‘It was […] only dirt, rock, water’ (96). That no 
words of True Speech are needed for this act of magic, and that the earth is not as Gelluk imagined 
it, separates the incident from the discourse of patriarchal power and identifies a rival, maternal 
power at work in Earthsea.  
           This maternal power stands at the centre of ‘The Finder’ and ‘The Bones of the Earth’. In 
Tehanu, Moss told Tenar that a woman’s power ‘goes down deep. It’s all roots. Its like an old 
blackberry thicket’, while a man’s is ‘like a fir tree, maybe, great and tall and grand, but it’ll blow 
right down in a storm’ (572). Tenar remains sceptical, rejecting the essentialist tendency in the old 
woman’s words. She thinks that linking women with the earth, roots and darkness, and men with the 
sky, heights and light, has helped to establish hierarchies, denigrating both women and the earth as 
belonging to the ‘lower’ rungs on the scale of cultural values. But Le Guin’s narrator in ‘The 
Finder’ seems more willing to see the association as a form of empowerment. Hidden underground, 
lamed and half-dead, Medra calls on Anieb to guide him even though he knows she is dead. ‘He 
saw darkness,’ the narrator tells us, ‘heard silence’ (96), and the oxymora identify darkness and 
silence as real presences, as in the Creation Song of Éa (‘Only in silence the word / Only in 
darkness, light’). Since Anieb’s death Medra often dreams of her, feeling her presence so vividly at 
times that he fears ‘she might summon him’ to the Land of the Dead (84). This is because their 
collaborative effort to destroy Gelluk imparted to Anieb and Medra a double-vision of the kind we 
learned about in Tehanu: Medra ‘saw through her eyes’ (33) how to free himself from the tangle of 
spells that bound him, how to allow her voice to speak through him. Anieb again helps Medra as he 
flees from Early, guiding him out of the underground cavern to safety. The parallel between Arha/
Tenar leading Ged out of the labyrinth in The Tombs of Atuan and Anieb guiding Medra out of the 
subterranean tunnels identifies the link between women and earth as a sign of power rather than of 
weakness; and this potency is further reinforced by the clear echoes here of the myths of Ariadne 
and Persephone. Women, it is implied, have retained ways of knowing rejected and undervalued by 
men, and this knowledge remains embedded in certain myths. The recognition that knowledge 
cannot be limited or restrained - how far does the forest go? As far as the mind goes - if we embrace 
the unconscious as well as the conscious, imagination as well as reason, becomes apparent in this 
analogous and mutually sustainable relationship between humans and nature. 
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 In the context of the comparison between men’s and women’s ways of knowing, the 
interrogation of the knowledge of True Speech that Le Guin begins in Tehanu is expanded in the 
Tales to include the use of True Speech, and to the scrutiny of how True Names function in identity 
formation. At Roke, Medra joins the eight Masters, asking to be called the Doorkeeper. He explains 
that before letting anyone in he would ask them their name, and that at the end of their studies he 
would let them go if they told him his. This undermines the concept of the secrecy of names held so 
dear by the wizards; as we saw in the first book, Ged was reluctant to tell his name to the then 
Doorkeeper. Instead it implies that names are for sharing, and that communities cannot be 
constructed around the obsessive protection of privacy and individualism. In stark contrast to Ged, 
and indeed all people of the Ninety Isles, Tenar bears her true name openly. 
          Elsewhere, Le Guin suggests that a name does not wholly inscribe a person, who is always 
more than a name. There is a hint of this in Ogion’s remarks about Ged, when he says to Tenar that 
before Ged had his name or knowledge or power ‘the hawk was in him, and the man, and the mage, 
and more - he was what we cannot name. And so are we all’.  This is analogous to the ‘room for 29
power’, or ‘emptiness’ (Tehanu, 660) that Tenar proposes is present in some people, and that signals 
something more than their name can express. In Taoist terms, this is the empty hub that allows the 
wheel to function, or the empty space that allows the pot to hold things.  In drawing attention to it, 30
Le Guin undermines the supremacy of the circumscribed and coded discourse of True Speech. In 
the second trilogy, she privileges the words of ordinary speech – Hardic or Kargish – which are 
creative, but not limited to single meanings. 
          By suggesting that there is some space in every human being which a name does not inscribe, 
Le Guin does not lessen the importance of the name, but enlarges human potential, as well as the 
potential of each word to have more than one meaning. In the First Trilogy, what was held to be a 
universal principle, the fear of being overpowered by someone else’s knowledge of your true name, 
worked only in one instance, that of Yevaud. Orm Embar and Kalessin do not hide their names; and 
nobody’s name is secret in the Land of the Dead. Yevaud is one of the few dragons who, despite 
being free, chooses ownership: and fear comes with ownership, Le Guin suggests.  
          In another short story, ‘Dragonfly’, the girl whose use-name is Dragonfly asks the witch in 
her village to name her. When the witch whispers her True Name, Irian, the girl is furious, for Irian 
is the name of her abusive father. As she grows up she realises that there is something different in 
 Tehanu, p. 551.29
 Tao, chapter 11, p. 14; also chapter 37, p. 48.30
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her, and after trying to get into Roke School to study, where she is met with fierce resistance, she 
finally goes to Roke Knoll and transforms into a dragon, Orm Irian. The point is that in this case, 
her use-name seems to be better suited to her than her ‘true’ one. As she tells the wizards, ‘I am not 
only Irian’, reinforcing Ogion’s insight that everyone is more than what they are called. 
          In this context, the function that Medra chooses for himself, that of doorkeeper, reminds us of 
the last line of the second verse of the Creation of Éa, which refers to ‘the eldest, the Doorkeeper, 
Segoy’. The liminal space signified by the doorway is an example of the space of indeterminacy; 
and the imagined creator of Earthsea is evidently not a monolithic, authoritarian deity, but Janus-
faced, double-visioned, like a dragon. It is significant that Medra, a passionate champion of 
freedom, is the first Doorkeeper, a title that becomes important as Le Guin re-examines the creation 
myth of Earthsea in The Other Wind. 
!!!
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CHAPTER SEVEN. THE OTHER APOCALYPSE IN THE OTHER WIND 
!
The Other Wind is a book about death. If, as I have argued, Le Guin’s Earthsea series is made up of 
two distinct trilogies, the second of which rewrites the first, The Other Wind helps to point up the 
structural and thematic parallels between the two trilogies, both of which end in a vision of 
apocalyptic eschatology for Earthsea, a calamitous confrontation with the concept of humankind’s 
mortality. The Other Wind concludes and completes the second trilogy just as The Farthest Shore 
completes the first; but it radically overturns the premise of the earlier novel. 
 In The Other Wind, the border between the two worlds which had been ruptured by the 
wizard Cob is breached for a second time, and the opening that Ged gave up his power to close 
needs to be reopened. However, there is a radical difference between these two openings or 
breaches. The second opening is not intended to enable a single living man to avoid his end; this 
time, the dead themselves want the border between the worlds to be finally demolished. Clearly, a 
new way of seeing the world is struggling to assert itself. Here Le Guin, who has been preparing to 
renew her imaginary land of Earthsea since she wrote Tehanu, enlists all the species in her 
imaginary world – human, dragon, animal, even trees – in a concerted act of renewal. The clear 
implication is that Revelation - the unveiling of the radically new that lies hidden behind ossified 
systems of thought and language - requires a demolition of hierarchies and categories, a recognition 
that rigid binaries need to be dismantled in order for the new to emerge. Le Guin appropriates the 
unique design of biblical history as a discourse that allows for radical innovation, implicitly 
adopting as the keystone of her philosophy the famous phrase from Revelation 21:5, ‘Behold, I 
make all things new’, as against the Greco-Roman cyclical understanding of history.  While her 
apocalyptic eschatology in The Other Wind topples the ideological systems of Earthsea, she 
manages to incorporate the old ethical and aesthetic structure of her world into her new vision to 
create a subtle and satisfying narrative structure. 
          The apocalypsis - an unveiling or uncovering - in The Other Wind involves the discovery of 
the latent, unconscious energies both in the scriptural apocalyptic texts and in Le Guin’s own earlier 
Earthsea stories. As Le Guin herself has pointed out,  The Farthest Shore too is concerned with 1
death; but the terrible vision it presents of the land of the dead seems to be horribly out of alignment 
with the celebration of life and death as inextricably intertwined that underpins her Taoist 
 Le Guin, ‘Dreams Must Explain Themselves’(1973) in The Language of the Night, p. 55.1
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philosophy as manifest in Earthsea. Similarly, the radical re-visioning in Tehanu, which recuperates 
the silenced female voices of this imaginary world, still leaves its wider socio-political systems 
largely unchanged. In Tehanu, Le Guin transforms a long-established archetype - the dragon as 
‘monster’ - represented in foundational Western texts such as Beowulf, the legends of King Arthur, 
numerous folk and fairy-tales, and her own earlier stories – and substitutes for it the myth of the 
dragon as creator.  In it Kalessin is revealed as Segoy, creator of Earthsea - a radical destabilising of 
the anthropomorphic image that underpins scriptural representations of God.  Yet the dragon’s role 2
as deux ex machina in Tehanu re-establishes the saviour-as-God motif that is such a central aspect 
of the biblical narrative. 
 In The Other Wind, the relentless drive towards change that starts in Tehanu takes on a new 
energy because there is no longer any single figure who represents power in the narrative. Ged, the 
Christ-substitute who saved the world in The Farthest Shore, plays no part in the cosmic shifts that 
are occurring. And though Kalessin comes in at the end, it comes not as a saviour but as a border-
crossing Trickster god, an airborne Coyote. The apocalypse, or revelation, is rooted in this novel in 
a bunch of trees, the Immanent Grove; and the name of this wood signals the mode of this particular 
apocalypse as immanent (this worldly) rather than transcendent (otherworldly).  The human or 
quasi-human leaders of the revolution are ordinary, unimportant people: a sorcerer, a dead witch 
and a disfigured rape victim. It is through the de-centring of Earthsea, so to speak – the unsettling of 
our assumptions about it that the prominence of these unexpected elements brings about – that the 
apocalypse is exposed as an unveiling of the new hidden beneath the sedimentary layers of the 
contemptibly familiar and the oppressively entrenched.  
 The hierarchical binaries that Le Guin seeks to demolish in this novel are created by and 
embedded in linguistic structures. Le Guin calls this the ‘father tongue’. Speaking at Bryn Mawr in 
1986, a few years before writing Tehanu, Le Guin described the ‘father tongue’ as the ‘language of 
power’, the ‘forked tongue’ that creates hierarchical binaries which establish a subject/object 
dichotomy, ‘exposing and exploiting the object but disguising and defending the subject’.  This 3
division subsumes subsequent re-divisions into its structure, so that certain fundamental terms are 
privileged over others: man over woman, self over other, mind over body, life over death, human 
over animal, consciousness over the unconscious, and so on. The monologic discourse of the ‘father 
 Tehanu, p. 688.2
 Ursula K. Le Guin, ‘Bryn Mawr Commencement Address’ (1986) in Dancing at the Edge of the World, pp. 3
149-151
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tongue’ is contrasted with the dialogic ‘mother-tongue’, which makes connections and creates 
networks of communication, involving in its exchanges the ‘whole intellect’ - by which Le Guin 
means both reason and imagination. Tehanu represents her first effort to write in something akin to 
this mother tongue, exemplified especially in the conversations between Tenar and Moss, and the 
discussions near the end of the novel between Ged and Tenar.  In these conversations, Le Guin 
explores the difference between male and female power and language from the different subject-
positions of an old witch, a man who has lost his power but discovered love, and the multiple 
perspective that Arha/Goha/Tenar provides through the diversity of her experiences. 
 Yet apart from these few characters, the dominant language remains the forked father 
tongue, as spoken by the wizardly men of Roke; the Roke wizard Onyx, for example, whose every 
utterance is impaled on a binary fission that enunciates a certain term while its opposite seethes in 
silence underneath. The most striking example is his interpretation of the prophecy ‘A Woman on 
Gont’, which for him cannot imply anything but a woman who will guide the Wise to the man who 
is to be the next Archmage. The Other Wind, by contrast, is thematically, structurally and formally 
expressed in the mother-tongue throughout. The repetitive structures: for example the myth of the 
separation of the human and dragon species, which is told many times and from multiple 
perspectives; the dialogic themes; and the complex, beautifully orchestrated plot which shows 
human and non-human life as intertwined, are all examples of the mother-tongue deployed as 
narrative. Also, Le Guin repeatedly deconstructs asymmetrical divisions as she foregrounds not 
only other forms of knowledge than the ones privileged by the patriarchal order, but other ways of 
knowing, which emerge from the mother tongue. In this novel, the disempowered in each binary 
division, the dark underside of each hierarchy that seethed beneath privileged discourse in the 
earlier novels, finds a collective voice.  
          One of the asymmetrical divisions that has become a particularly potent tool in the oppression 
and denigration of women and nature (and as we have seen, the two are often conflated) is that of 
body and soul.  The reification of concepts like ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, with the concomitant denigration 
of the body, which is predominantly sponsored by institutionalised religious discourse, has led to an 
unfortunate alienation of men and women from their complete selves, which is also the result of 
grounding hope in a hypostasised ‘eternal’ existence of the soul in another realm. One of the most 
terrible consequences of this notion is the careless and irresponsible attitude it encourages towards 
what for Le Guin is the only realm of human existence - the earth and all that is in it - as hope for a 
better future is transferred to another existence.  
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         In order to subvert such conceptual paradigms, in The Other Wind Le Guin initiates 
conversations - a word whose root means ‘turning together’  - between the fissured dichotomies 4
familiar to her readers so as to reveal that the universe exists as a continuum of interacting polarities 
rather than as rigid bifurcations. These conversations - for example between the living Alder and his 
dead wife Lily, or between dragons and the mages of Roke - are made possible by the potential 
disintegration of all established systems, a danger that confronts Earthsea at this juncture in its 
history. Several signs point towards this disintegration. One sign is the dreams that the sorcerer 
Alder is having, in which the souls of the dead clamour to get out of the land to which they have 
been confined.  Another is that the dragons, after many years of peace, have begun to attack human 
communities. Events unfold in such a way that Roke wizards, witches and sorcerers, a Pelnish 
wizard, the king and his councillors, Tenar and Tehanu, the Kargish people, dragons, and animals, 
all need to intervene if Earthsea is to be saved. This allows Le Guin to launch a series of dialogues 
between the seemingly incompatible metaphysical oppositions, created through language, that have 
formed the infrastructure of Earthsea society: the conscious and the unconscious, human beings and 
the non-human, and the living and the dead.  
          The Immanent Grove at Roke is at the epicentre of this dialogue. As Le Guin showed us in 
‘The Finder’, the forest and the human mind are parallel structures; when Medra asked Ember how 
far the forest goes, the answer was ‘as far as the mind goes’. Moreover, the roots of trees are the 
‘roots of all knowledge’.  The paths in the forest are always different, and the extent of it is 
indeterminable, because, as Ged tells Tenar, all the forests in Earthsea are in some sense part of the 
Grove. All this indicates Le Guin’s growing consciousness of the interconnectedness of the human 
and non-human elements in the cosmos. At the turn of the millennium, in 2001, as she reconfigures 
the conception of death in her created world, Le Guin’s Earthsea narrative becomes more overtly 
conscious of the ecocritical  and ecofeminist  movements that had gained momentum in the last 5 6
 Le Guin, ‘Bryn Mawr Commencement Address’, p. 149.4
 Ecocriticism is the study of the relationship between literature and environment conducted in a spirit of    5
commitment to environmental praxis. See Lawrence Buell, The Future of Environmental Criticism: 
Environmental Crisis and Literary Imagination (Malden, MA.: Blackwell, 2005).
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of women by men, exploring the connection between the two processes’. ‘Glossary’, The Green Studies 
Reader: From Romanticism to Ecocriticism, ed. by Laurence Coupe (London and New York: Routledge, 
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decades of the twentieth century.  Within these traditions the semantic and structural parallels 7
between the human mind and the forest are illuminating in several ways.  The roots of trees delve 
deep into the earth, embracing dirt and darkness; at the same time, they grow towards light, and 
their leaves form patterns in an interplay of light and shadow. This is a beautiful symbolic 
representation of the human psyche, which has its dark aspects - as symbolised in Ged’s Shadow - 
as well as its correlation with light as a life-sustaining force and as a symbol of knowledge. Since 
the trees of the Grove are described by the author as ‘the oldest living children of the earth’,  human 8
beings can learn from and be guided by their wisdom - in other words, Le Guin suggests that the 
anthropocentric view of Man as the highest intelligent form needs to be reconsidered. At the same 
time, through this representation of the analogous and mutually sustaining relationship between 
humans and nature Le Guin shows us the illimitable capacity for knowledge of which the human 
mind is capable if we embrace the unconscious as well as the conscious, imagination as well as 
reason as valid epistemic categories. For Le Guin this capacity can be activated by using the 
dialogic, repetitive, powerless ‘mother-tongue’, in which the rigid subject-object boundaries are 
wittily and inexorably broken down. 
!
7.1. Walls, Veils, Doorways and Dreams          
As we have seen, the prophet of change in Earthsea is a socially marginal figure: the sorcerer Alder, 
whose humble origins might remind us of the humble beginnings of many biblical prophets, most 
notably John of Patmos, whose vision of the end of the world came to him despite his low social 
status as a fisherman’s son. In Earthsea, too, the prophets we have encountered so far have always 
eschewed the limelight, turning to powerless people for guidance and instruction.  Ogion, for 
instance, who first prophesied change in Earthsea, was famous for having refused to take part in the 
institutionalised power system at Roke. Instead, as we learned in ‘Bones of the Earth’, he left Roke 
to choose his own teacher, Heleth of Gont.  Heleth, too, had had unconventional training: he was 
taught by a woman, Ard, who initiated him into the secrets of the earth, thus enabling him to stop 
the great earthquake with Ogion’s help. Thus, before The Other Wind Le Guin has linked the 
unsettling talent of prophecy with an unorthodox and non-conformist background. 
 By general consensus, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) heralds the advent of modern 7
environmentalism. See Greg Garrard, Ecocriticism (London & New York: Routledge, 2012).
 Ursula K. Le Guin, The Other Wind (London: Orion, 2001), p. 223. Hereafter cited as TOW.8
!  204!
 Alder’s marriage to a witch further confirms his low status in the eyes of Le Guin’s readers, 
who have learned by now that women’s magic is regarded as ‘weak and wicked’ by the men of 
Earthsea – not to mention that women are supposed to have a weakening effect on the powers of 
male magic-workers. By representing the prophets of change as disempowered people, Le Guin 
underlines the revolutionary nature of prophetic eschatology, which signals hope for the radically 
disenfranchised, even as it makes it easier for dominant groups to ignore or refute their predictions. 
 If Alder is socially marginal, his dreams are beyond the pale, violating the basic rules of 
magic as we have understood them so far in the Earthsea sequence.  For one thing, he should not be 
able to have them.  When he tells the Master Summoner on Roke about his visions of his wife after 
her death, Thorion accuses him of having committed a deliberate transgression against the rules of 
wizardry triggered by his desperate desire to see her: he has gone to the ‘wall’, a boundary that can 
only be reached and crossed by the most powerful of wizards, and then only at direst need. The fact 
that Alder can reach the wall despite his lowly status in the magic hierarchy raises fundamental 
questions for the readers not just about the nature and function of that wall, but perhaps of other 
walls too – such as the arbitrary structures that divide one magic-worker from another, or that 
separate the two halves of a binary. 
 Other apparently fundamental laws of Earthsea are also breached in these visions.  When 
Alder tells Ged how he met his witch-wife Lily at the wall, it is not the fact of Alder’s access to the 
boundary between death and life that horrifies the former Archmage but something Lily’s ghost 
says to her husband. As she begs Alder to ‘set me free’ (18) – a plea that is later repeated by a whole 
‘crowd of shadowy people on the other side’ (21) – Lily addresses him by his true name, Hara, as a 
token of their intimacy; but she refuses to acknowledge her own true name, Mevre, when he speaks 
it.  ‘That’s not my name, Hara,’ she tells him, ‘that’s not my name any more’ (18).  This shocks Ged 
profoundly, educated as he is in the belief that true names hold the essence of a soul, and are 
binding to a person living or dead.  And it is this linguistic detail that leads him to his conviction of 
the dreams’ significance.  Recalling Ogion’s prophecy to Tenar, where the dying mage exultantly 
whispered the words ‘All changed’, Ged confirms that Alder’s going to the wall, even in dream, 
signifies a change in the very laws of the universe, a change in the unbreachable laws of life and 
death. As Ged writes in a letter to Lebannen that he sends to Havnor with Alder, ‘He [Alder] will 
tell you of [...] change where no thing changes’, and concludes that ‘Now the wall itself maybe is to 
fall’ (62-63). What the falling of the wall might signify is a mystery at this point. If there is no 
separation between the living and the dead, where will the souls of the dead go? Or is death itself to 
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be vanquished, as in the verse from Corinthians, ‘The last enemy that shall be destroyed is death’ (1 
Corinthians 15:26)?  The truth is veiled from Alder and Ged at this point, as if it is being spoken to 
them in an unknown language.  And we learn in due course that this veiling is itself part of the 
puzzle they are struggling to decipher. 
         If the wall is an important and complex symbol in The Other Wind so too is the veil, whose 
centrality to the novel should remind us again of the meaning of the Greek word Apocalypse, 
uncovering. In describing Alder’s dreams, Le Guin follows the practice of commentators on the 
biblical apocalypse – as she did in ‘The Finder’ – in her frequent use of the metaphor of the ‘veil’, 
in this case to articulate the ephemeral nature of supposedly rigid distinctions between waking and 
dreaming. The oneiric realm and the ‘real’ world are never far from each other in Alder’s mind. He 
tells Ged how the ghosts of the dead are always present to him even when he is awake: they are ‘in 
him, with him, around him, veiled’ at all times (25), and the noises of the wind and the sea contain 
echoes of the voices of the departed. On the ship to Havnor, where Ged sends Alder to take council 
with his friends Lebannen, Tenar and Tehanu, Alder keeps a close hold of the kitten Ged has 
procured for him, whose touch keeps him from dreaming of the wall and the dead; but though the 
visionary does not dream, he senses the presence of ghostly voices ‘just through the veil of sleep in 
darkness’ (58). When he reaches the king’s palace at Havnor, Alder thinks that ‘the walls of the 
room might melt away and the evening sky and the floating mountain crown vanish like a curtain 
brushed aside’ to leave him standing once again beside the wall (64). The recurrent image of the 
veil or curtain is used to show the proximity between the worlds of dreaming and waking, the 
conscious and unconscious mind. In an interview given in 1982, Le Guin argues that the western 
tendency to rationalise has produced a rigid dichotomy between ‘waking-time’ and dream-time’, 
and that the former is considered to be the only ‘real time’ for all practical purposes. This distinction 
has the effect of limiting access to what Le Guin considers to be vitally important epistemological 
avenues, represented in the Earthsea sequence by the chthonic realm of the Dark Powers, which are 
associated with women and nature and excluded from mainstream knowledge-structures because of 
the dangers they are supposed to contain. This self-imposed restriction is a fundamental concern of 
twentieth century fantasists, as is amply demonstrated in the work of the authors in this study.  
          The role of the artist, argues Le Guin, is that of an interpreter between these two modes of 
consciousness: waking and dreaming, consciousness and the unconscious.  The artist, then, is for 9
 Carl Freedman, ed., Conversations with Ursula K. Le Guin (Jackson: University Press of Missisippi, 2008), 9
p. 20.
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her analogous to the Trickster figure of Greek tradition, who is also the god of interpretation – 
Hermes – and like him habitually crosses borders to divulge the meaning of the gods’ 
pronouncements to mortal listeners.  A similar Trickster figure is Coyote, to whom Le Guin often 
alludes in her non-fiction work as the creator/destroyer who introduces death and sex to the newly 
created world in North American mythologies.  As Lewis Hyde has demonstrated, Coyote - like 10
Hermes - is associated with boundaries, thresholds and ambiguous spaces. This makes him/her 
particularly apposite as a metaphor for the artist/creator/interpreter of fantastic fiction, such as the 
writers in this study, both of whom affirm the role of the unconscious as operating alongside 
conscious artistry in the creative process. Lewis’s friend Tolkien goes so far as to call The Lord of 
the Rings a ‘monster’ that he has engendered more or less against his own volition;  and in his 11
letters he repeats several times his feeling of having reported rather than created certain aspects of 
his narrative, for example the ents.   Lewis, too, as we have seen, recognises that unconscious 12
forces are operative in the production of a text, so that writers are not always aware of how they 
arrived at their representations or textual figurations.  This problematises the authority of both text 
and writer, and situates the text as an ambiguous space between reader and writer, both of whom 
find themselves in the position of needing to negotiate its meanings from a position of partial 
ignorance. Tolkien and Lewis shy away from describing their writerly role as that of a godlike 
creator - Tolkien by deploying the term sub-creation for human creativity, which positions him in 
subordination to God; and Lewis by escaping into allegory to convey his Christian message, which 
effectively turns his work into a gloss on the authoritative narratives of the Bible. Both Tolkien and 
Lewis, then, present themselves as somewhat ambiguous servants of the ultimate Christian 
authority - ambiguous because unconscious forces repeatedly undermine the authority of the verbal 
resources and tropes they deploy, as I have demonstrated in my work on Lewis in the previous 
section. Le Guin in her later work, by contrast, presents her fantasy as resolutely anti-authoritarian. 
Coyote is messy, irregular and destructive, and her work increasingly takes on his characteristics. 
While Tolkien and Lewis, following Medieval principles, deploy music as a representation of the 
cosmic harmony that underpins their work – above all in the creation myths of The Silmarillion and 
The Magician’s Nephew – Le Guin prefers Coyote’s chaos, which precedes creation and can follow 
 Le Guin, ‘Dreams Must Explain Themselves’, p. 43.10
 Tolkien, Letters, no. 124, p. 136.11
 Tolkien, Letters, no. 163, pp. 211-12.12
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it. She describes Coyote thus: ‘Just when your ideas begin to get all nicely arranged and squared 
off, she messes them up [...] Obviously, we need a trickster, a creator who made the world all 
wrong. We need the idea of a God who makes mistakes, gets into trouble, and who is identified with 
a scruffy little animal’.  The paradoxical role of the Trickster as creator-destroyer has its 13
counterpart in the central movement of The Other Wind, which is one of dynamic polarity: the 
Mender, Alder, is asked to break (the wall); what was built needs to be unbuilt. In The Farthest 
Shore, Ged tells Arren that ‘a mage is a trickster’ (420). By the 1980s, Le Guin’s identification of 
the artist/wizard with the Trickster is well established.  In her Foreword to Tales from Earthsea, 14
she tells her readers that ‘authors and wizards are not always to be trusted: nobody can explain a 
dragon’.  We see this insight operative in her texts as she not only interrogates the creation myth of 15
her narrative, but also foregrounds the constructedness of her imaginary world.    
 This is made possible by Le Guin’s exploration of the role of dreams as doorways or veils 
that give access to the unconscious, making it possible to ‘de-alienate’ our consciousness, as Darko 
Suvin puts it, from the radical estrangement produced by binary fissures.   Ged tells Alder that the 16
love he shared with his witch-wife Lily has made possible the violation of the seemingly 
unbridgeable boundary between life and death. In The Farthest Shore, this boundary was shown to 
be necessary and permanent; life was transient and therefore joyous, and its difference from death 
confirmed its transience. In The Other Wind, by contrast, the division is revealed to be in a state of 
transition towards a world where life and death are both joyous; and the engine of this transition to 
a new state is dreams. In The Other Wind dreams take on a significance seen earlier in Le Guin’s 
novel The Lathe of Heaven (1971), in which the protagonist, the mild and biddable George Orr, has 
the power to change reality with his unconscious visions. Likewise Alder, whose modest magical 
gifts are not important enough to earn him a place among the ‘higher’ arts practised at Roke, 
becomes the means of changing human destiny through his dreams. Like Orr, Alder has no control 
over his visions. And like Orr’s, his visions have the power to change the world.  
 Ursula K. Le Guin, ‘Coming Back from the Silence’ in Jonathan White ed., Walking on the Water (San 13
Francisco: Sierra Club, 1994), pp. 119-20.
 For examples of Coyote in Le Guin’s work, see Always Coming Come ( London: Grafton, 1985).14
 Le Guin, ‘Foreword’, Tales from Earthsea, p. xv.15
 Darko Suvin suggests that a quest for ‘de-alienation’ informs all of Le Guin’s work. See Darko Suvin, 16
‘Parables of De-Alienation: Le Guin’s Widdershins Dance’, Science Fiction Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, The 
Science Fiction of Ursula K. Le Guin (Nov., 1975), pp. 265-274
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          One way in which the real world and the dream world begin to impinge on each other is that 
Alder’s dreams begin to affect other people, drawing those around him to make the journey to the 
wall with him, or to dream of life after death. On the night Alder arrives in Havnor, Tenar dreams of 
a room full of bird-winged people, some with the heads of vultures or hawks. On waking, she 
remembers that these are the souls of the ‘damned’ as painted in a room in the labyrinth at Atuan. 
Dreams provide a doorway to the unconscious, which is a space where rigid binaries blur and 
dissolve, so that oppositions slip into each other, meaning wavers and hesitates, and uncertainty 
gives rise to new configurations and implications. Because of Alder’s dreams, the whole of Earthsea 
is forced to review its ontological and teleological myths, by pooling the mythological resources of 
the discrete units formed by the various islands of the Archipelago and the Eastern Reaches and the 
Kargad Lands. As the carefully built, systematically controlled world moves inexorably towards 
disintegration, the Roke wizards, the king, and the people of Earthsea are forced to pay attention to 
forms of knowledge that they cannot control, such as vision, prophecy, and the myths and stories to 
which these experiences are so closely allied.   
!
7.2. Prophecy in Earthsea 
Prophecy, dream and rapture are some of the forms that biblical revelations take, and Le Guin 
accepts these as valid modes of gaining insight and knowledge.  As John Collins points out, Biblical 
apocalypses invariably involve ‘otherworldly journeys’ and ‘eschatological prophecy’, both 
ultimately deriving from Hellenic and post-Hellenic texts such as Cicero’s Somnium Scipionis, 
Virgil’s Aeneid and a range of other oracular writings.  In the Earthsea series, dreams and prophecy 17
have consistently played an important role. In The Farthest Shore, we are told of an ancient 
prophecy by the last of the kings of Earthsea, Maharion, who said: ‘He shall inherit my throne who 
has crossed the dark land living and come to the far shores of the day’ (316). This prophecy is 
fulfilled through Ged and Arren’s journey through the land of the dead.  Similarly, there is the 
prophecy in Tehanu, ostensibly about the new Archmage, which states simply ‘A woman on Gont’. 
And in the short story ‘Dragonfly’, which constructs a bridge between the Earthsea novels by 
telling of events that occur midway between the ending of Tehanu and the beginning of The Other 
Wind, Azver the Patterner tells the girl named Irian about this prophecy, and so helps to bring it 
about. 
 John J. Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination (New York: Crossroads, 1984), p. 26.17
!  209!
 As Azver relates the incident to her, he recalls how he himself spoke the prophecy with ‘the 
other breath’, signifying that he was in a state of trance.  This confirms that the prophecy was a 
visionary revelation, and illuminates Le Guin’s conviction that unusual dimensions of reality might 
be accessible to individuals who learn and respect the pattern of life – the delicate, dynamic web of 
balances that holds Earthsea itself in equilibrium, and which is epitomised by the Grove where 
Azver lived. This access, Le Guin suggests in her narrative, can provoke the person who gains it 
into exploring ‘other’ ways of speaking, which fall outside the usual processes of self-expression 
valued by Roke wizards such as Onyx.  Onyx, who accompanies Alder and the king on their 
journey to Roke, chooses each word in his speech with care, certain not only of the power of words 
but of his own power over words - and over most of the people he uses words to address. This 
controlled and controlling language is aligned with the father-tongue, which makes gaps and spaces 
between self and other, producing an alienated consciousness. Each word of True Speech can 
change the reality of the Other, the wizards are aware: stones can be transformed into butterflies, 
and vice versa. The involuntary language of prophecy, on the other hand, is an ‘undifferentiated 
engagement’  between self and other, which eschews control, speaking in dreams and visions from 18
within a cosmic consciousness, as in Azver’s prophecy or the cries of the dead in his dreams.  
          In The Other Wind Le Guin could be said to deploy the Biblical principle of prophetic 
eschatology, which the Biblical critic Paul D. Hanson describes as the Jewish prophets’ witnessing 
of the ‘divine plan’ for Israel.  This plan is supposed to be fulfilled within the context of this world 
through human instrumentality,  and it has significant implications for the final Earthsea novel. 19
Hanson distinguishes between prophetic and apocalyptic eschatology: the latter tradition is 
postulated as a development of the former, and situates salvation in the context of divine 
intervention as the advent of a new heaven and earth. One of the reasons for this development, 
Hanson argues, was a growing schism between the visionary and hierocratic factions - the former 
following prophets and seers, the latter systems of priestly and ecclesiastic government - in the third 
to second century B.C. A similar discord can be seen between the Roke Masters in the story 
‘Dragonfly’, where the ‘visionary’ faction, led by the Patterner, feels that the coming change that 
 Le Guin, ‘Bryn Mawr Commencement Address’, p. 152.18
 Paul D. Hanson, The Dawn of Apocalyptic (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975) p. 11. Hanson 19
distinguishes between prophetic eschatology as translating into ‘real politics and human instrumentality’ and 
unfolding in ‘real history; while ‘apocalyptic eschatology’, which develops out of the former tradition, 
envisions divine intervention establishing a radical new heaven and new earth. See also Mara E. Donaldson, 
‘Prophetic and Apocalyptic Eschatology in Ursula Le Guin’s The Farthest Shore and Tehanu’, in Semeia 60, 
pp. 111-122.
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the Patterner discerns in the pattern of the leaves involves the girl Irian; while Thorion the Master 
Summoner leads the other faction – which resembles the medieval priesthood in its dogmatic 
adherence to hegemonically established rules - in a rigid rejection of any possible change in the 
Rule of the Roke, which prohibits women from entering the school. In the crisis-ridden time faced 
by Earthsea in the final novel, Le Guin reaffirms the prophetic strain, which situates the radical 
change within history through human instrumentality, rather than the apocalyptic perspective which 
proposes the necessity for the annihilation of the world before a new world can take its place.              
          These traditions are deployed by Le Guin to reveal the artificiality and constructedness of 
normative values and conditions that are accepted as given, mainly due to knowledge 
systematisation and codification by dominant powers. As Rosemary Ruether points out, some of 
these traditions can be appropriated to unlock their liberating potential.  Prophecy, Ruether insists, 
is a subversive mode, as the prophet’s critique of the establishment signals the dire need for a 
change in the status quo.  The visionary faction in Earthsea includes Ogion, who makes his 20
prophecy to Tenar, who is a woman and therefore beneath the notice of most wizards. But on Gont, 
Ged reaffirms Ogion’s prophecy as he tells Alder ‘it is changing. It is all changing’ (41). The tone 
and the tense used in this sentence points to Le Guin’s Taoist philosophy, which proposes that 
change is the only constant condition of life. Even though change in any form is shunned by 
established systems, Ged’s repetition of Ogion’s prophecy stresses the instability and flux of all 
things. Change, as silent subversion, active dissent or violent revolt, cannot be stopped. And this 
change is made most manifest in the physical and psychic border-crossings that begin to destabilise 
established Earthsea systems. 
                     
7.3. Border Crossings 
Many different kinds of border crossing occur at the crucial juncture in Earthsea history at which 
The Other Wind is set. Le Guin’s project of reviving Earthsea history by visiting the ‘Archives’ in 
the Tales is supplemented in The Other Wind by the creation of networks between peoples of 
Earthsea, which revive oral tales and myths from disparate geographical loci in Earthsea. In the 
process of recovering these stories, the people of Earthsea rediscover (or dis-cover) hidden aspects 
of their mutual history. The first of these border-crossings is made by the Kargish princess, 
Seserakh, sent with the peace emissaries of the new king of the Kargad Empire, who has 
 Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk (London: SCM, 1983 [1996]).20
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vanquished the priestly theocracy of the Godking. Seserakh is to wear the Ring of Peace, reads the 
Kargish king’s message, as a sign of peace between the east and west. She represents the linguistic 
and cultural barriers between the peoples of east and west that seem unbridgeable at first. She has 
spent her life in Hur-at-Hur, the easternmost island of the Archipelago, which is widely considered 
the most backward of the Kargad lands. She cannot speak Hardic, the language of the western 
people. As a woman, she has no say in the matter of her marriage. As such, she is excluded from 
language altogether.  
          These socio-cultural barriers are represented by another sort of barrier or border, the veil. The 
princess is covered from head to toe in red veils; she wears a flat-brimmed hat, so that, says the 
narrative voice - writing from the point of view of King Lebannen and his courtiers - she ‘appeared 
to be a red column or pillar, cylindrical, featureless, motionless, silent’ (69). In her subsequent 
appearances in the novel, Seserakh is variously described, by the narrator and different people in 
Havnor, as ‘a brick chimney’, ‘hidden in [a] red sack’, ‘a tent pole’, and an ‘immobile cylinder of 
red and gold’ (72, 74, 75, 162).  Questions of interpretation surround her: ‘what was under the stiff 
red veils? Who lived inside that unrevealing tent?’ (72). The narrator even uses the pronoun ‘it’ to 
describe Seserakh climbing the gangplank of her ship when it docks at Havnor (179). These 
examples of gendered objectification demonstrate what Edward Said describes as the totalising 
tendencies of the west to ascribe monolithic, essential identities to the ‘orient’, which can then be 
inscribed as backward and barbarian, in need of being civilised by the progressive west. Le Guin 
attempts to jar the codified discursive fields of the west and the orient by the fact that Seserakh is 
white.   
          The veil has long been an iconic synecdoche serving to represent women as repressed and 
their ‘repressors’ as backward; and this tendency is apparent in Lebannen’s attitude as he tells Tenar 
that daughters are regarded by the Kargads as nothing but ‘goods’ for a ‘barbarian king’: ‘You know 
that! You were born there!’ (74). The inscription of women’s bodies as justification for essentialist 
critiques, political violence and strategies of control is demonstrated in the Whore of Babylon from 
the Book of Revelation; and women’s bodies continue to be so inscribed as these agendas continue 
into the twenty-first century. Although Le Guin keeps the narrative voice neutral with reference to 
the dehumanising descriptions of the princess, it is made clear that Seserakh must unveil in order to 
communicate with the king, making him ‘like her’ (as Tenar ambiguously advises the Kargish 
woman).  Lebannen’s violent reaction of dislike and resentment shows that deeply embedded 
prejudice - gender hierarchy being the most vicious and enduring of prejudgements, as Le Guin 
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often points out - can be almost impossible to erase, and can generate situations that spiral out of 
control despite the best efforts of some people. Lebannen is caught in such a no-win situation.  He 
claims to dislike Seserakh because she represents to him the degradation of women, a degradation 
he despises – though of course his despising of her degrades her in his eyes.  And he resents her 
because he is as much obliged to marry her as she is to marry him.  There is a fascinating weight of 
cultural obligations on both. 
          Meanwhile, the persistent attacks by the dragons are another incursion into western borders 
that need to be encountered. To deal with this, the king has requested the presence at Havnor of 
Tehanu, who as a child called Kalessin to destroy the sadistic wizard of Re-Albi. This time, 
Tehanu’s call to the dragons is answered by Irian, the girl whom the Roke wizards refused to let 
enter the school in the story ‘Dragonfly’. In that story Irian, whose use-name was Dragonfly, 
transformed into a dragon, destroying Thorion the Summoner even as he attempted to destroy her. 
Now Irian is met again with bigotry and bias from the people of Havnor, as she returns as Orm 
Irian, to parley with the peoples of Earthsea whose lands are being destroyed by dragons. 
         But the Archipelageans must learn to be less insular, and allow more weight to other versions 
of history, if Earthsea is to be regenerated. Seserakh and Irian both reveal crucial aspects of 
Earthsea history as they tell their own versions of ontological myths, recognisable variants of the 
story told by the Woman of Kemay to Ogion, about the common origin of humans and dragons. 
This story, in its diverse renderings, is pivotal for the future history of Earthsea, as we shall see.            
          The princess proves to be invaluable in opening the eyes of the people of the Archipelago to 
aspects of their past they have chosen to forget. Seserakh is able to provide information, in the form 
of mythic stories from her island, Hur-at-Hur, that reminds the peoples of western Earthsea of the 
pact between dragons and humans when they first divided into two distinct species. According to 
the princess, in the ‘first time’ dragons, humans and animals too were all one species. As they 
separated they made a ‘Vedurnan’, a kind of pact, to which (according to Sesarakh) the western 
people subscribed, whereby they agreed never to die or be reborn in exchange for the ability to do 
sorcery. Dragons and the Kargish people die to be reborn, as one kind of being or another; and 
neither race practises magic. But the ‘accursed-sorcerers’ do not die; only their bodies die and ‘the 
rest of them stays in a dark place and never gets reborn. And they look like birds. But they can’t 
fly’,  Seserakh explains.   21
 Le Guin, TOW, pp. 124-25.21
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          Tenar, as we saw in Tehanu, has acquired double-vision and the language of the dragons; that 
is, she no longer views the world in terms of binary oppositions, or believes in either/or choices.  As 
a result, she is the first to make the connection between Seserakh’s story and the myth of the 
Woman of Kemay. Tenar is reminded of a dream she had a few nights before her meeting with 
Seserakh - a dream even worse than her earlier dream of a foul-smelling room full of bird-people 
who cannot fly. In her later dream, one of these flightless bird-humans is Ged, who has a ‘vulture’s 
head’ and long black wings (115).  As Tenar comes to the conclusion that this fate is not very 
different from the fate of the lost souls who inhabit the dark, dry land of death as Ged has described 
it, Tenar recoils from Ged’s helpless image in anger and revulsion. Shocked by this barbaric vision 
of Archipelagic culture, she is able to convince Lebannen of the importance of the myth of the 
ontological dragon/human hybridity, and by this means help him to become less intolerant of 
Kargish ways. Here dreams once again play a major part in the narrative. They help to steer world 
politics, acting as catalysts for Tenar’s intervention in the apparently irreconcilable differences 
between the east and west represented by Seserakh and Lebannen.  
          Orm Irian’s alternative version of the myth of original oneness between humans and dragons 
emphasises the basis of the original separation in the choice either to own or to disavow ownership 
and be free. In the form of a woman, Irian repeats what Kalessin the Eldest told the dragons - 
reminding them of the primal choice made by the dragon/human hybrid, when dragons chose 
freedom (the west) and humans chose ownership (the east). Kalessin addressed the dragons after 
Cob’s destruction, reminding them that they had let evil turn them into evil - when Cob took away 
their speech, they killed each other and themselves. The dragons’ answer, Irian says, was that ‘Men 
in their envy of us long ago stole half our realm beyond the west from us and made walls of spells 
to keep us out of it’(152).  According to Kalessin, men wanted both ownership and freedom, and 
sought to gain the latter by appropriating the dragons’ territory. In revenge, explains Irian, the 
dragons set about raiding the lands of men. Kalessin, however, told the dragons that as a sign of 
their original oneness, in every generation of humans there are one or two who are born dragons; 
and among dragons there is one in every generation who is also human. Kalessin also told them that 
two hybrid individuals exist at this time - obviously meaning Irian and Tehanu - and that these are 
‘the messengers, the bringers of choice’ (151-52). The implication is that the choice to be human or 
dragon has remained in some sense open, and is represented by the hybrid beings that occur in 
every age. 
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  The ‘yoke of good and evil’, that is, the enslavement to the ethical categories of good and 
evil, as Irian’s narrative makes clear, belongs to humans. The balance is changing, Kalessin 
explains, and the last to make a choice between being dragon and human will be Tehanu, and after 
that no way west will remain - ‘Only the forest will be, as it is always, at the center’ (152). The 
implications of this for dialogism and hybridity are clearly devastating. This ominous warning, of 
changing balance and an irrevocable bar between east and west, increases the sense of an ending of 
things as they are in Earthsea. As Tehanu points out, the forest at the centre means the Immanent 
Grove, the place where the Patterner made the prophecy ‘Hama Gondun’, now accepted by most 
people to mean Tehanu.   
          These competing or complementary oral narratives help to unsettle the hegemonic versions of 
history formerly taken for truth in Earthsea. Oral narratives/myths are dialogic because they wander 
from place to place, gaining multiple socio-cultural perspectives as they are told and re-told; their 
wayward, fickle nature gives these stories their transformative power. The mages of Roke, by 
contrast, have become hidebound by reason of their pride in the knowledge of true names that 
confers on them the ability to control all other beings. But their insularity and stratified knowledge-
systems prove inadequate for the crisis confronting Earthsea. As Bakhtin puts it: 
!
The dialogic means of seeking truth is counterposed to official monologism, which pretends 
to possess a ready-made truth, and it is also counterposed to the naive self-confidence of those 
people who think that they know something, that is, who think that they possess certain truths. 
Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born 
between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction.   22
!
The ‘official monologism’ in Earthsea has belonged since its Dark Years to the wizards, who ousted 
women from this authorised discourse, as detailed in ‘The Finder’ and ‘A Description of Earthsea’ 
at the end of the Tales. To renegotiate and reconfigure the denigration of women and Old Powers - 
both made Other - stories need to be retrieved, reviewed, retold. As Diane Purkiss and Clare Brant 
have pointed out,  re-telling can be an effective strategy to challenge paradigmatic narratives, 23
 Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, ed. and trans. by Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis and 22
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opening up the elisions due to which diversity has become homogenised, and male supremacy 
hailed as natural rather than socially determined. For Le Guin, fiction has a transformational role - 
stories can change our attitudes and lay bare the prejudice in our assumptions.  
!
7.4. Webs of Alliance 
The presiding metaphors of the archipelago and the web in Earthsea - both negative in the first 
trilogy and positive in the second - become pivotal in The Other Wind, by being set against the 
images of walls and veils. The implication that collaboration rather than isolation is necessary if the 
world is to go on is central to Le Guin’s vision. Lebannen, as the prophesied king, realises that a 
concerted effort is required to save Earthsea from destruction by ‘the dragons and the 
dreams’ (221). He recognises the acute need for new forms of conversational exchange between the 
peoples of Earthsea. As Mike Cadden reminds us, the cooperative participation of Anieb and Medra 
in ‘The Finder’ becomes a model for forging identity through ‘the stranger, the other’, leading to a 
‘creative collaboration with equality’.   The ability to forge identity through the other, to see 24
oneself as another, was acquired by Tenar in her dreams, as recounted earlier. This is why Tenar is 
able to help Lebannen create the webs of alliance necessary to face the double threat.  
          As the ship called the Dolphin carries representatives of different cultures and species 
towards Roke, the vessel (named after another hybrid creature, a sea-dwelling mammal) itself 
becomes a site of hybridity and heterogeneity, and of the interpenetration of dreams and the waking 
world. On the last night before the ship arrives at Roke, dreams seem to be engulfing wakefulness: 
the Masters on Roke dream that a vessel is sailing towards them with a cargo, they variously dream, 
of ‘black rocks’, ‘burning fire’ or ‘dreams’ (209). The people on the Dolphin certainly bring with 
them dreams, some of which include the black rocks of the mountain of Pain in the land of the dead. 
The significance of some of these dreams seems clear to the reader at this point, while others are 
ambiguous, creating uncertainty and raising a good many questions, for the readers as well as the 
dreamers, who remember their dreams next morning.  
          Even though the dreams, of necessity, offer no clear cut logical meanings that can be 
decoded, the point is that the diverse group of people on the Dolphin are having dreams with 
identical images and motifs. Irian dreams that her flight is checked by cords of lightning that dash 
her onto black mountains. As Irian has made clear earlier, dragons do not die to go to the bleak land, 
 Mike Cadden, Ursula K. Le Guin Beyond Genre, p. 105.24
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so the cord that checks her flight and the lightning that dashes her onto the mountains signal a loss 
of her freedom and immortality, a sign of the end of the world. Onyx, too, dreams of cords that tie 
him, but these cords spread over land and sea, dragging the ship towards ‘blind sands’ of death. The 
Pelnish wizard Seppel dreams of Lily, Alder’s dead wife, holding a black rock in her hand, at first 
pleading with Seppel to send her husband to her, then raising the rock as if to strike him. Seppel has 
used the lore of Paln to help Alder stop dreaming. For this, the wizards took the Mender to the Lips 
of Poar, one of the few known places where the Dark Powers of the earth are strong, and with their 
help, Alder’s dreams drained away from him, as did his power of mending. Clearly, Lily is aware of 
this, an awareness that emphasises the interwoven texture of the dreams of the living, and their 
conversations with the dead. 
           The manifest interconnectedness of dragons, Dark Powers, death and dreams becomes 
increasingly apparent as the story progresses. Both Seserakh and Tenar dream of transgression. The 
princess walks in her dream on the forbidden ‘dragon’s way’ in her home town; Tenar dreams of 
climbing the forbidden steps of the Throne of the Nameless Ones. The significance of these 
transgressions is not entirely clear at this point, but dragons and Dark Powers occupy a space 
forbidden to humans, as the dreams of the two women seem to suggest. Lebannen dreams of people 
starving, and an unhappy child calling to him; and of a green hill, which is obviously Roke Knoll, 
the centre of all powers in Earthsea. Tehanu, who has been prophesied as the saviour by the 
Patterner, dreams of crawling through a dark, narrow underground tunnel; significantly, ‘the 
glimmering roots of trees’ give her handholds so she can pull herself forward, signalling the 
immense importance of the Grove and its ‘glimmering’ roots for Earthsea’s destiny. As the dreams 
go on, an unknown terror overwhelms all the peoples of Earthsea, as their world seems on the verge 
of unravelling, and history as they know it draws towards an end. The Patterner dreams that he 
looks up at the sky, and instead of the shifting patterns made by the dance of stars twinkling and 
leaves stirring in the wind, he sees the small, unmoving stars of the Land of the Dead. Watching 
them, ‘He knew there would be no sunrise’;  time is coming to an end, or as the Revelations says, 25
‘there should be time no longer’ (Rev. 10: 6).  
          The people who disembark from the Dolphin meet the Masters of Roke in the Grove. As 
Lebannen declares, the passengers are drawn from ‘three peoples: the Kargish, the Hardic, and the 
People of the West’ (222). Within each of these groups there are widely divergent and even 
 Le Guin, TOW, pp. 205-209.25
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conflicting views; for example, among the Hardic people there are the mages of Roke, a mage of 
Paln, a sorcerer and a king; among the people of the east, a princess who was earlier a pauper, a 
priestess turned farmer’s widow, mother, and now wife to the ex-Archmage, and the Kargish 
warrior Azver, now the Patterner of Roke. The dragons, Irian and Tehanu, are both hybrids. As they 
negotiate ways of handling the looming danger from ‘dragons and dreams’ that Lebannen makes 
clear is drawing towards ‘some event, some end’ (221), their wills clash. The Roke wizards claim 
that only they can save Earthsea from the impending doom. The insularity displayed by Roke 
wizards in this council has been foreshadowed by the way men and women at Lebannen’s court 
have discussed the onslaught of dragons, describing the dragons as ‘mindless beasts’ which can be 
overcome by force (140-141). As these peoples argue and debate, various world-views are 
defamiliarised for the readers, who are able to situate themselves between different subject-
positions, diverse religious persuasions and gender situations, a kind of cognitive estrangement that 
may result in a rethinking and re-evaluation of their presuppositions.  
          The myth of the creation and separation of dragons and humans is rendered once again in the 
Grove, gaining resonance and meaning as all the versions are put together, interpreted and 
reinterpreted, to reveal their significance - an example of the mother-tongue in action. As the 
Kargish Master Patterner Azver takes up the story, he points out that the ‘villagers at Gont and Hur-
at-Hur remember what wise men of Roke and the priests at Karego forget’ (225), underlining the 
importance of knowledge that is retained in margins and borders, in forgotten myths and stories. It 
is significant that the knowledge of the wizards, their spells and incantations are useless at this 
juncture. Only the exchange of stories brings any understanding of their situation. Azver describes 
the initial agreement to separate, with humans going east and the dragons west; the humans 
agreeing to give up True Speech while retaining craft of hand and ownership of land; the dragons 
disavowing ownership but keeping the True Speech and their wings. Then Le Guin once again 
appropriates Biblical language, as Azver tells of the breaking of the ‘covenant’ with the dragons. 
The ‘Dark Folk’ of the Archipelago broke the ‘covenant’, according to myth; they ‘caught’ the 
language of the Making, which they had agreed to give up as part of the bargain, in their craft, by 
which is meant the craft of writing.                
          The Patterner explains that the Rune Makers - whose actions clearly echo those of the early 
Church Fathers – invented runes, the earliest form of writing, to preserve True Speech, the language 
of the Making. By capturing speech in script, it could be said that they conquered it and rendered it 
unchanging, giving an ‘authorised’ version of events that could not be contradicted.  As Carl E. 
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Braaten explains, in the patristic era the early Christians’ hope of imminent apocalypse was 
repeatedly disconfirmed, so that individual death became for the first time a more pressing concern 
than the cosmic ‘last things’. ‘Fear of one’s personal eschaton in death,’ Braaten goes on, ‘provided 
the occasion for the church to take control of the eternal destiny of each individual’, enabling the 
newly ‘organised church’ to demand obedience as a condition for salvation.  This situation is 26
clearly paralleled in the story of the Rune Masters, the first and oldest mages, whose awareness that 
the dragons, in choosing freedom from possession, had gained (or retained) a realm where they 
could continue to exist forever, an eternity ‘outside of time’ (227), led them to annexe this space/
time by building a wall where humans too could live forever - with the radical difference that they 
would exist in a disembodied state.  They also ensured, with their spells, that no living body, either 
dragon or human, could cross this wall. The Patterner explains that as the wall was built, ‘the wind 
ceased to blow, within the wall. The sea withdrew [...] The mountains of sunrise became the 
mountains of the night’ (228). The metaphor of the wind here is very important, as the wind is a 
widespread and ancient signal of change. Their knowledge of True Speech made it possible for the 
Old Mages to ‘save’ the soul of a person by bestowing on her a true name, which the Namer says is 
the truth of the self. However, Le Guin proposes that this ‘essence’ pertains only to part of the 
individual - the shadowy ghost that continues to exist in the changeless realm annexed by the 
mages. In giving humans a ‘True Name’, the mages of Earthsea violate the body/soul bond, since 
the true name makes the disembodied soul exist in endless isolation. This radical alienation from all 
contact with material life is contrasted to the ‘end’ experienced by the Kargs, the animals and 
dragons. Tenar insist that it is the dragons and the Kargs who are immortal, because they die to 
rejoin the ‘undying world’ (223).  
          The Pelnish wizard Seppel - who comes from the same island as Cob, associated with a dark 
alternative magic - gives a description of the land where the ‘immortal souls’ of the dead would go, 
as taught in Pelnish lore, which includes a set of stories and myth associated particularly with 
matters of death. This is ‘a great land of rivers and mountains and beautiful cities, where there is no 
suffering or pain, and where the self endures, unchanged, unchanging, forever’.  The link with Cob 27
here is obvious. The echoes of the city of God, as described in Revelation 21 - measuring 144 
cubits, a perfect square, with walls of jasper, gates of pearl and ‘a pure river of water of life, clear as 
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crystal’ running through it - are clear enough.  But this perfect, perfectly symmetrical city is clearly 
not attractive to Le Guin, for whom constant change is the necessary principle of life; hence no 
doubt her placing of this account in the mouth of Cob’s counterpart, a wizard conversant with the 
Pelnish lore. The city is the epitome of what Le Guin calls the rational utopia, the not-place which 
is detached from the conditions under which its inventors live: ‘not here, not now [...] It is pure 
structure, without content; pure model; goal’.  This Euclidean utopia, she suggests, is like a 28
labelled diagram, mapped to posit one centre - in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the city of 
Jerusalem, in the European tradition, the ‘West’.  But the unmapped utopia, the one Coyote built, 
has multiple centres and its circumference is ‘everywhere’ (Dancing, 98). This has clear echoes of 
Le Guin’s Immanent Grove, which Le Guin posits as the centre whose roots are everywhere and 
which is always changing place. The souls of the Earthsea dead, by contrast, exist not in a land of 
rivers and beauty, as described by Seppel, but in the lifeless desert already witnessed by readers of 
The Farthest Shore.  
          This land is a wasteland, Ged tells Alder, whose stars are little, mean, and unmoving. Ged’s 
voice is dry and low as he describes it: ‘No moon, no sun. Roads and cities [...] Nothing grows [...] 
Dark cities’. And as he describes the land’s inhabitants, echoes of Eliot’s ‘Wasteland’ (1922) and 
Lewis’s The Great Divorce (1946) become stronger: ‘The multitudes of the dead stand in the 
streets, or walk on the roads to no end. They don’t speak. They don’t touch [...] No bond’ (TOW, 
39). The ability to touch, in fact, is what saves Alder from the terror of his recurring dreams, where 
the dead implore him to set them free. At Roke, when the Master Herbal kept his hand on Alder, the 
human touch kept him from dreaming of the wall; Ged does the same for Alder at Gont. But as Ged 
sits with his hand on Alder, he suddenly finds himself near the wall, looking down at the dead grass, 
and waking up he remembers the ‘black dust, black rock’ and the ‘Dead Stream beds where no 
water ever ran. No living thing. [...] Only the dead, with their empty eyes and silent faces’ (44). This 
is a very different land from the land of milk and honey of the Pelnish myth - or of Christian 
tradition. 
          The fate of the dead that we see in the land on the other side of the wall is a radical 
interrogation of the desirability of such an end, either as conquest of death or fulfilment of life. As 
Le Guin insists, ‘the view presented of life and death in Earthsea is not only non-Christian but anti-
 Le Guin, ‘A Non-Euclidean View of California as a Place To Be’, Dancing at the Edge of the World, p. 81.28
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Christian’,  which makes it clear that her polemical stance is a conscious rewriting of biblical 29
apocalypse. The implicit suggestion is that with all its ugliness and beauty, its goodness and cruelty, 
the earth is our home, to be protected and celebrated. The glazed gaze of the dead, devoid of 
emotion or feeling, is an ironic comment upon the desire of immortality by Gelluk, the mad wizard 
in ‘The Finder’, or Cob in The Farthest Shore . In contemporary terms, this translates into the 
reified human machines produced by capitalism, whom ‘death had undone’,  designated as ‘hollow 30
men’ by Eliot, the living who exist as ‘Shape without form, shade without colour’,  and who need 31
what Tolkien calls ‘Recovery’ - the ability to see the world ‘freed from the drab blur of triteness or 
familiarity - from possessiveness’.   The world in which we live, suggests Le Guin, is much more 32
aligned with our human needs than the illusory prospect of a future disembodied existence.  
           At the Council, some of the Roke wizards speak in the father-tongue, which makes 
statements but does not want answers. As the Summoner speaks, ‘each word heavy and 
separate’ (222), he insists that only Roke wizards can find a solution for the current crisis. He 
emphasises that the dragons and humans are now separate, whatever their origin may have been, 
which means that dragons cannot aid them; and that the Kargs have foresworn immortality by 
forgetting True Speech, so they cannot be involved in the current debate. He wants separation and 
division, reflected in the way he uses his words as discrete entities. Each word has a fixed meaning, 
and does not commerce with its neighbour lest it be tainted or transformed. His use of the word ‘us’ 
is exclusive, meaning the people of the Inner Lands; eastern peoples and dragons are excluded from 
its compass. This is analogous to how contemporary institutional hegemony operates, as Le Guin 
points out: in western literary discourse, ‘us’ means straight white Christian men.  33
 On the one hand, then, the Summoner refuses to accept the link between human and dragon, 
while on the other he dismisses the Kargs because they have forgotten True Speech, the dragons’ 
language. The Summoner’s speech exemplifies the frigid discursive practices that refuse to accept 
any outside influences.  The elitist book-knowledge of Roke is producing stasis, leading to entropy. 
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The world that is on the verge of destruction is in fact the one seen through the single-vision created 
by the father tongue. In this, Le Guin’s conclusions about language are very similar to Barfield’s. 
Prosaic language, which produces lexically fixed meanings, cannot add anything to the sum of 
knowledge, because it can create no new meaning. Only poetic language, such as metaphor and 
symbol, allows itself to be distended, creating space for new configurations. At Roke, only the 
Patterner has some knowledge of what is happening - he can see the patterns in the leaves and in 
words, as if they were metaphors; and he is in the Summoner’s eyes a stranger, a barbarian.  
          One of the meaning-patterns that undergoes a change in the novel is the meaning of 
immortality, as Tenar claims that animals, dragons and Kargs are truly immortal because they live in 
the knowledge that they will die to return ‘in a woman’s womb or the tiny egg of a minnow or a 
windborne seed of grass, coming back to be, forgetful of the old life, fresh for the new’ (87-88).  34
This meaning-shift is an example of how embedded belief needs to be stirred, like a still pool of 
water, to allow its stagnant silence voice and movement, to allow its submerged stillness to erupt 
into new patterns.  
          The core of their dispute is the function of language, which has been used and abused in 
various ways by the people of the Archipelago – most prominently by the wizards of Roke, 
descendants of the First Mages. As we have seen, it emerges from the discussion that the wizards 
broke covenant and ‘caught’ the language in their books in order to use it, to wield its power over 
things and people. While the dragons speak the language to communicate, the wizards speak it to 
get control, which makes them so fearful of its power that they hardly dare talk in it. 
         As I suggested in the previous chapter, fantasy writers make worlds with words; a very 
different way of wielding power than that of the wizards. Creating a world necessitates the 
representation of dialogue in many tongues and from many perspectives: heteroglossia.  And in her 
constructions and deconstructions of her world, Le Guin is especially concerned to show through 
her language the many different ways of being in it.  
!
7.5. Weaving Worlds with Words 
We have noted many times that language as True Speech is an intrinsic aspect of Earthsea 
metaphysics, since the act of naming is integral to the art magic. In The Other Wind, Le Guin’s 
imagined linguistic framework is modified to encompass the expanded vision of her later novels, 
 This conception of death as rejoining the earth is in fact very close to the Biblical notion of ‘dust thou art, 34
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without impairing the inner logic of their ethical and aesthetic structure. The Language of Making 
(True Speech) as well as ordinary language (common speech) play a vital role in the apocalyptic 
eschatology of The Other Wind. The apocalyptic narrative has seeped into the American 
consciousness since the early seventeenth century, when the Puritan fathers hoped to witness a 
historical manifestation of the promised millennium. It’s hardly surprising, then, if American 
fantasy writers, like European ones – since they are creators – feel compelled to write their own 
versions of the Bible.   35
          Le Guin’s version is polemical: she writes an ‘unBible’, designed to liberate her readers from 
the entrammelling effect of this particular Religion of the Book. The evocative power of 
apocalyptic symbols in Daniel and Revelation renders these books especially effective as tools of 
subversion. A number of critics have recognised the counter-myths that Le Guin writes in an effort 
to present an alternative to the prevailing western worldview largely informed by Judeo-Christian 
principles. Mara E. Donaldson, for example, writes a cogently argued article about Le Guin’s 
deployment of biblical prophetic and apocalyptic eschatology as ‘subversive literature’ to show the 
‘role it plays in sustaining or criticising the radical impropriety of injustice or evil in a good 
world’.  However, as I will argue below, one of the key notions Le Guin rejects in her vision of 36
end-times for humans is that of a biblical ‘good world’; the world, she demonstrates, is anterior to 
the human categories of good and evil.  As Ged tells Tenar in the Tombs of Atuan: ‘The Earth is 
beautiful, and bright and kindly [...] The Earth is also terrible, and dark and cruel’ (266). The 
knowledge and choice to do good and evil lies only with humans - an insight that is foreshadowed 
in The Farthest Shore. When Arren asks Ged what or who might have caused the loss of creativity 
in Earthsea, Ged answers that ‘There is only one creature who can do [evil]’ - human beings. The 
desire for ‘power over life - endless wealth, unassailable safety, immortality’ (TFS, 333), according 
to Ged, leads human beings to do evil. In The Other Wind, Le Guin extends this perception by 
suggesting that the knowledge of good and evil is embedded in language, and the apocalyptic 
eschatology in the novel is aligned with this insight. 
          In The Other Wind, the knowledge of good and evil is linked with the giving up of True 
Speech by humans. It is repeatedly stressed that the dragons, who use that primal speech, are 
beyond these human ethical categories, as are animals without speech. The wizards agree that the 
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primal choice of separation included the knowledge of good and evil. In an important speech at the 
beginning of the Wind, worth quoting at length because it adumbrates many of the apocalyptic and 
linguistic strands that are woven together in a beautiful, dynamic pattern at the end of the novel, 
Ged deliberates upon the link between the various species in Earthsea - animals, humans and 
dragons. Remembering how his otak had licked him back to life after he had followed a little boy 
too far across the wall between life and death, Ged wonders at the strong bond that exists between 
animals and humans. Animals, Ged says, can certainly communicate at need, ‘but they can’t tell 
stories, and they can’t tell lies. While we can’. But the dragons, continues Ged, know ‘True Speech, 
the language of the making, in which there are no lies, in which to tell the story is to make it be! Yet 
we call the dragons animals’(52-53). Interestingly, in the Wizard we were told that the dragons can 
lie in Old Speech, even though humans cannot, and the way Le Guin incorporates this information 
into her revised narrative is discussed below. Ged goes on to point out that ‘animals do neither good 
nor evil. They do as they must do. We may call what they do harmful or useful, but good and evil 
belong to us, who chose to choose what we do. The dragons are [...] beneath our morality [...] Or 
beyond it’ (52-53). 
It is perhaps because human beings, as Ged puts it, ‘chose to choose’, that ordinary speech 
serves them better than True Speech. True Speech, in which an intrinsic inviolate bond exists 
between the signifier and the signified, was relinquished in the ‘covenant’ made when the dragon-
human hybrid splits into two discrete beings. The result is a human language where the signifier and 
signified exist only in an arbitrary relationship – where the sign is fractured. Le Guin uses the 
concept of True Speech to contrast and compare polysemic language - in Earthsea, ‘ordinary 
languages’ such as Hardic and Kargish - in which the meanings of a word can be fiercely disparate, 
and True Speech, where the word and the thing are one. Ordinary language is mutable, and can 
produce heterogeneous meanings. This is analogous to Barfield’s conception of the poetic and 
prosaic impulses in language. As noted in section one, the poetic is the vital principle - it can 
enhance, transform or mutate meaning; while the prosaic id the death principle, concerned with 
fixing and ossifying meaning. As Le Guin says in an interview, ‘Language is for saying what might 
be, what we want to be, or what we wish wasn’t. Language is for saying what isn’t.  In other 37
words, language allows human beings to imagine new ways of being. This is consonant with 
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Northrop Frye’s view of the human imagination, ‘that it is always a form of “lying,” that is, of 
turning away from the descriptive use of language and the correspondence form of truth’.  38
          As Ged’s remarks make clear, using ‘ordinary’ speech, humans can both lie and tell stories; 
Le Guin seems to be conflating the two processes. The Pelnish wizard Seppel confirms that 
ordinary language, ‘if it allowed lies and errors, also permitted uncertainty and retraction’(186). 
Words have no rigid referent, and therefore meaning can be mutated, changed, travestied and 
questioned. A world where border crossings, slippage and blurring is the preferred mode of 
existence, a world whose ossified gender, race, and class distinctions need radical redefining and 
reconfiguring, would need a language which could tell stories - new stories and revisionary stories, 
to achieve authentic freedom. This has obviously important implications for the faculty of 
imagination - something that human beings might have developed after the historic rupture, it 
would seem, for perceiving the world in the context of True Speech requires no imagination, since 
the semantic bond between each signifier and signified is intact and inviolate. The poet D. J. 
Enright encapsulates this succinctly in Paradise Illustrated, in the scene where Adam views the 
richly sensual beauty of Paradise:  
!
‘It’s unimaginable!’ sighed Adam. 
‘You’re not obliged to imagine it,’ 
Snapped the landlord. ‘Yet.’  39
!
The necessary fluidity between signifier and signified required to imagine alternatives is only 
possible in the ‘fallen’ language, as Barfield makes clear; and even defamiliarisation, which 
Shklovsky says is a device of poetic language, is impossible in the perfect, pristine accord of True 
Speech. This is beautifully expressed in the short story ‘She Unnames Them’ by Le Guin, which 
relates how Eve unnames all the creatures which Adam, with his ‘father’s’ permission, had named. 
The result is radically emancipatory: Eve gives back her own name too, and as she walks away 
uncertain, hesitant, she realises that ‘my words now must be as slow, as new, as single, as tentative 
as the steps I took going down the path away from the house, between the dark-branched, tall 
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dancers motionless against the winter shining’.  Taking away the names of the trees turns them into 40
dancers, and restores a fluidity that names had deprived them of. 
The liberatory potential of not having true names that bind is important for humans, 
demonstrates Le Guin; humans have dreams, and want to fulfil them, unlike the dragons, who are 
dreams, and exist within a harmonious body/spirit unity that continues on the ‘other wind’. Unlike 
the bond(ed) named life where no true contact is possible between them, animals and the (female) 
human in ‘She Unnames Them’ are able to experience sensual touch as an integration – an act of 
communication, a form of language – that negates the subject/object dichotomy.  As the story’s 
protagonist puts it: 
!
They seemed far closer than when their names had stood between myself and them like a 
clear barrier: so close that my fear of them and their fear of me became one same fear. And 
the attraction that many of us felt, the desire to feel or rub or caress one another’s scales or 
skin or feathers or fur, taste one another’s blood or flesh, keep one another warm - that 
attraction was now all one with the fear, and the hunter could not be told from the hunted, nor 
the eater from the food. (195-96) 
!
The implication is that God’s asking Adam to name the ‘others’ was the paradigmatic alienating 
experience, expressed by Enright in a parodic reworking of the Cartesian formula: ‘I think of words, 
therefore I am’.   This correlates with the mage Gelluk’s renaming of the metal, mercury, as Turres 41
(semen) - an act that epitomises phallogocentric attitudes that have seeped into the minds of wizards 
since the establishment of Roke School. Masculine power ejaculates itself as the ‘word’ only men 
should speak, the true speech only men are supposed to know. That is why Lily, Alder’s wife, 
refuses the bond of her true name in the land of the dead. She refuses to be bound in the unlife of 
soul-existence, where lovers, mothers, children and friends do not recognise each other. While the 
old Mages used True Speech as a device to ‘save’ the soul forever, the dead souls want to relinquish 
the burden of individual identity and rejoin the earth, water, sky, their constituent elements. 
          For Le Guin, isolation generated by androcentric paradigms results in the radical alienation 
which we can witness in the form of environmental degradation and species extinction. In her 1988 
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Introduction to her story collection Buffalo Gals, Le Guin asks her readers to remember that the 
‘continuity of existence, neither benevolent nor cruel itself, is fundamental to whatever morality 
may be built upon it’ (11) - a notion that gains urgency in the Earthsea series. Ged tells Arren in The 
Farthest Shore, ‘The woods and seas, the powers of water and earth and light, all that these do, and 
all that the beasts and green things do, is well done and rightly done. All these act within the 
Equilibrium. From the hurricane and the great whale’s sounding to the fall of a dry leaf and the 
gnat’s flight, all they do is done within the balance of the whole’ (361). Ged’s words are echoed by 
Otter in ‘The Finder’, when he talks to Anieb’s mother and aunt in despair, almost, of the human 
condition. ‘I think there’s an evil in us, in humankind.’ He tells them. ‘Trust denies it. Leaps across 
it. Leaps the chasm. But it’s there [...] I look at the world, at the forests and the mountains here, the 
sky, and it’s all right, as it should be [...] No animal does wrong. How could they? But we can and 
we do’ (TF, 45). Human beings however, have to learn to act within this harmony, because they 
have power over all these things and over each other. 
Le Guin’s notion of the ‘continuity of existence’ is emphasised several times in the Earthsea 
series. For example, in A Wizard, Ged tells Yarrow that all power stems from one source, and all 
names and all things ‘are syllables of the great word that is very slowly spoken by the shining of the 
stars. There is no other power’(151). Similarly, in the short story ‘Bones of the Earth’, the wizard 
Heleth is described thus: ‘He stood still and felt the dust and rock of the cliff-top path under his 
feet, and the cliffs under that, and the roots of the islands in the dark under that. in the dark under 
the waters all islands touched and were one’ (TfE, 146). This concept is very similar to Barfield’s 
notion of an antecedent unity that precedes all existence, and which has disintegrated and become 
fragmented in the process of the evolution of consciousness from participatory to alienated. Both Le 
Guin and Barfield believe that imaginative participation is absolutely necessary to regain the lost 
wholeness, for, as Barfield insists, imaginations demands unity because ‘it is itself a unity’.  The 42
fragmentation is exemplified in the Archipelago in which Ged and Otter live. The Archipelago is a 
collection of heterogeneous loci that are nevertheless interconnected, home to peoples vastly 
disparate in their religious, cultural and social attitudes, yet conjoined in their existential link to the 
lands and waters that are at root one, even as they (land and water) fragment into places and spaces 
that provide and encourage different forms of socio-cultural constructs.  As the Earthsea series 
unfolds, this Archipelago becomes an increasingly complex paradigmatic symbol of Le Guin’s 
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vision of a humanity that is able to subsist in a biodiverse, sustainable sphere – and of the dangers 
that threaten such mutual cohabitation. The symbol retains the essential space ‘between’ that Buber 
says is vital for a dialogic, ‘I-Thou’ relationship, in which the ‘otherness of the other’  is retained 43
as each person responds to the other with his or her whole being. Le Guin comes to a conclusion 
similar to Buber’s: ‘it is only when the otherness, the difference, the space between us (in which 
both cruelty and love occur) is perceived as holy ground, as the sacred place’  that true communion 44
occurs.  The ‘sea’ component in the portmanteau Earthsea stands for this ‘space between’, and it’s 
on the sea that Ged has his self-defining encounter with his own other, the Shadow, in the first of 
the Earthsea novels. 
          The Other Wind is a self-reflexive narrative that draws attention to stories as transformative. 
Telling and retelling stories enables innovation and transformation, not least in the way human 
beings make meaning of their life and its surroundings, including other living beings and natural 
environment.  The fundamental efficacy of retelling stories as a way of re imagining history has 
been demonstrated in the Tales as the history of Earthsea is re-told from marginal perspectives; and 
is demonstrated in Le Guin’s own revisions as she overturns some of her basic percepts without 
damaging the structural or thematic framework of her stories. Story-telling is possible only in 
ordinary language - ‘fallen’ language. In other words, when human beings decided to give up True 
Speech, in which the name and the thing are one, they opened up for themselves avenues of 
linguistic exploration for what could be, instead of what is. In this sense, fallen language is creative, 
allowing humanity to imagine alternative ways of being. As the Roke wizards agree, the ability of 
making and shaping is their mastery, greed, weakness, fear, art, magic - but most of all, joy. Within 
this framework, Le Guin re-visions the creation of Éa by dismantling several of the notions that 
seemed to be an integral part of the earthsea metaphysics, as we shall see below.  
!
7.6. Breaking and Mending  
 In certain ways, Le Guin seems to accept the soul/body dichotomy; for instance, she gives 
Otter/Medra an out-of-body experience, where the astral human looks at the physical body from 
outside, in ‘The Finder’. But she rejects the dichotomy as a signal or foretoken of eternal life. On 
the contrary, she represents the survival of the soul without the physical body as bleak, colourless, 
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and disaffected, an unlife on a ‘darkling plain’  without joy, love or light. Gradually, as the 45
Earthsea sequence progresses, it becomes intolerable that the characters we have come to know in it 
– such as Ogion or the Archmage Nemerle – should be subjected to such an inhumane destiny.  ‘The 
Finder’ is the first of the stories to suggest that there might be an alternative, as Anieb succeeded in 
communicating with Otter from beyond the grave.  And The Other Wind enacts the destruction of 
the Land of the Dead, dismantled by the combined powers of the council on Roke. 
 The scene where the ghosts of the dead segue into elemental forms bears a striking 
similarity to the scene in Philip Pullman’s celebrated novel The Amber Spyglass in which the 
protagonists, Lyra and Will, release the spirits of the dead to rejoin the world. As Alder, Tehanu, 
Irian, the king and the mages break the wall, ‘a white wind [...] erased the meaningless stars’ of the 
dead world; and the ‘great multitudes of men and women’  step across the broken barrier, 46
becoming ‘a wisp of dust, a breath that shone an instant’ and disappeared. 
 By this means the ghosts in both books escape from a mental prison erected through 
centuries of discourse steeped in transcendental imagery: eschatological narratives from Plato’s 
Timaeus to Virgil’s Aeneid; from the Jewish Sheol to the Christian Heaven, which conceive a 
separate existence for the soul after the death of the body. Western minds remain locked into this 
discourse; but Le Guin rejects the privileging of the soul, and spurns those visions of an afterlife in 
which punishments and rewards are meted out by an immortal judge. In her eschatological myth, by 
contrast, the dead are freed from the land where they exist in a dreadful limbo, an act that also 
symbolically frees her readers from the mental incarceration that privileges an imagined 
transcendental realm of eternal existence over the physical world they inhabit. 
 As Kalessin says, after the wall is dismantled and the dead rejoin the earth, ‘Aissadan verw 
nadannan’ - which the Patterner translates as ‘What was built is broken. What was broken is made 
whole’ (240). Tehanu, too, becomes whole as she transforms into a blazing golden dragon, burning 
like her name, a ‘great bright star’ flying into the sky from which the unmoving stars have been 
wiped away. The image of the dragons, Irian and Tehanu, wheeling in ‘vast gyres’ up and up, 
symbolises the freedom Tehanu has achieved - or chosen, for as Kalessin made clear, the choice 
was hers. The dragon’s flight in ascending gyres images higher, more profound planes of 
consciousness, learnt through pain, love and loyalty. Tehanu, it must be remembered, chose to stay 
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with her foster parents, Ged and Tenar, as a child; and in doing so she showed even more 
courageous than the young Ged, embracing her shadow - her mutilated, abused self – in order to 
affirm the loving community she had found on Gont. Later, Alder was chosen by the dead to seek 
her out as the prophesied Woman on Gont who will save Earthsea - an act foreshadowed by her 
saving of Ged and Tenar, who rejoined the Ring of Peace for Éa. In this narrative Le Guin imbibes 
the radically subversive potential of fairy-tale metamorphoses to posit a space for the abused child, 
unrepresentable in language, since no vocabulary is vast enough to sustain a meaningful space for 
her, except the language of symbolism; a space at the limits of the imaginary that not only 
represents the child but provides utopian hope for her.  And this also offers hope for all humanity, 
for no concept of humanity is comprehensible where the dehumanised, abused child cannot find an 
identity, a way to survive. As the earth is mended by the breaking of the wall, and Tehanu achieves 
wholeness by becoming a dragon, we see several other forms of achieved wholeness in Earthsea. 
!
7.7. Joinings: Lebannen and Seserakh 
Just as The Other Wind enacts the conjoining of the realms of the living and the dead, so the 
marriage of Lebannen and Seserakh represents a joining of two earthly realms, the east and the 
west. Quite early in her career, in 1978, Le Guin stated that the central, constant theme of her work 
had been ‘marriage’.  This statement has been interpreted by James Bittner as a metaphor for her 47
commitment to the yin-yang complementarity.  In The Other Wind, the marriage is both literal and 48
metaphorical - an integration of opposites prefigured by the making whole of the broken Ring, 
which signalled peace amongst the disparate peoples of Earthsea, and was a sign of the metaphoric 
integration of east and west through Ged and Tenar’s collaborative effort.  
          Le Guin has repeatedly created scenarios where encounters between different cultures are 
presented, though most of these are in her science fiction. Many such encounters are represented 
from the point of view of an anthropologist, since Le Guin has learned from her anthropologist 
parents the acute difficulty of representing an alien culture. In the Second Earthsea Trilogy, Le Guin 
has tackled the still more difficult task of recording the experience of an abused child. To do so the 
narrator approaches Tehanu from Tenar’s viewpoint, who confesses like an honest anthropologist 
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that she does not wholly understand her charge because she does not know what a one-eyed child 
sees. The space of ambiguity with respect to Tehanu’s feelings was necessary if Le Guin’s narrative 
was to achieve any measure of authenticity. 
          Another character difficult to represent is Seserakh, who symbolises a wholly other culture. 
Just as Tenar builds a spider’s web bridge of love for Tehanu that allows the little girl to learn to 
interact with other human beings, it is Tenar who helps to close the seemingly unbridgeable gap 
between the two cultures represented by Lebannen and Seserakh. The princess’s appearance, veiled 
from head to toe, and the fact that she cannot speak or understand Hardic, intensifies the reader’s 
sense of her alienation. As Maslen has pointed out, Le Guin often conveys ‘isolation primarily in 
linguistic terms’;  and Seserakh’s isolation in these terms is almost complete, ignorant as she is of 49
the language of the place to which she has been sent as the future bride of King Lebannen. She is 
terrified that she will be sacrificed to dragons by the ‘sorcerers’, or that Lebannen will steal her soul 
once he has married her. Nevertheless, she shows great dignity and courage in the face of these 
terrors. As Lebannen states, she has been used as a bargaining tool, but she ‘faces’ up to her 
predicament - symbolised by her removal of the veil – and proceeds to reveal some crucial 
information in the form of the ancient myths of her land. 
          It would seem that the west can only perceive the veil in two ways: as an irresistible allure 
(exemplified in the sailors’ curious glances on the way to Roke), hiding mysterious sexuality/
beauty; or as an impassable barrier, shutting out all forms of communication. In both cases the veil 
needs to be removed, for it provokes fear, curiosity and resentment. It is interesting to note that 
Seserakh is the one who has to make the necessary linguistic and socio-cultural ‘translations’ and 
adjustments in order to be accepted as the new queen. Seserakh is the one who has to make the king 
like her. She is the one who has to learn Hardic. The king makes no attempt to learn her language or 
her ways. The fact that she is beautiful and manages to attract the king reinscribes the woman’s 
body as the site of her role-construction by society.  At the same time, Seserakh ensures, by her 
willingness to enter into conversation with Lebannen and his people, that she gains a voice, and her 
voice forms an integral part of the narrative that enables the wall that encloses the Land of the Dead 
to be broken down. 
          Entering into conversation is harder for Tehanu, since she has no community who share her 
experiences and can therefore understand her language.  Earlier in the book, when Heather (Moss’s 
 R. W. Maslen, ‘Towards an Iconography of the Future’, p. 64.49
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companion) suggests that Tehanu might be the next queen, Ged’s face hardens into immobility, as 
he realises the impossibility of such an outcome. Tall, beautiful princesses – even foreign ones – can 
marry the king, but ‘poor’, abused and disfigured girls can only rely on their imagination - if indeed 
the dragon’s flight can be interpreted as such - for freedom from social constraints and 
constructedness as Other, and for the ability to speak. For Tehanu does find a voice in her parting 
speech to Tenar; and when she does she speaks sheer poetry, which lifts her out of the sphere of 
human limitations into a spiritual potential expressed in the mother-tongue of community, of 
conversation, of turning together: 
!
when I die, [she says,] I can breathe back the breath that made me live. I can give back to the 
world all that I didn’t do. All that I might have been and couldn’t be. All the choices I didn’t 
make. All the things I lost and spent and wasted. I can give them back to the world. To the 
lives that haven’t been lived yet. That will be my gift back to the world that gave me the life I 
did live, the love I loved, the breath I breathed. (231) 
!
This speech sums up Le Guin’s vision of the world as a cosmic web of connections, and of human 
life as a part of the dance of an ongoing renewal. It identifies all the people of Earthsea as one, 
erasing the barriers, veils and perceived disfigurements that come between them.  Tehanu’s words 
of hope represent Le Guin’s most apocalyptic moment, speaking as they do for the ghosts who have 
been released from the Dry Land; and it seems appropriate that these words should have been 
uttered by a girl whose voice has been irreparably damaged by the atrocity inflicted on her, but who 
still holds precious the life, love and breath she has been given. 
!
7.8. Creation 
The theme of connectedness reverberates in the patterns of relationships that develop throughout the 
novel, as well as in the structural principles that inform it. In the process of envisioning an 
apocalypse, Le Guin rewrites the creation myth of Éa. Creation and eschatology are inextricably 
linked, and death is renewal rather than an end, Le Guin demonstrates, basing her premise on 
mythical modes of thought. For example, in Navaho myths the world is conceived so that ‘the real 
and the spiritual, or the secular and the sacred, are the samething [sic]; a seamless, centred sphere, a 
wholeness. . . . When you dance the World Renewal Dance, that is actually and exactly what you 
are doing: you are renewing the world, you are dancing the dance that the world dances. You’re 
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here; it’s here’.  This is not a ‘simple’ world-view, and it is especially difficult to understand for the 50
western consciousness steeped in ‘a culture with a very powerful system of beliefs and views based 
on the idea that the world was made by somebody else, from outside’.  The apocalypse of Tehanu 51
is such a dance, the dance of renewal of this world, and rejection of another.  
          The idea of creation by a transcendent deity is implicit in Le Guin’s own earlier Earthsea 
narratives, but in Tehanu she re-visions the creator as the dragon Kalessin. In changing her 
conception of the dragon so radically, the narrator of Earthsea functions effectively as the artist-as-
trickster, repeatedly disorienting her reader’s expectations and assumptions. In The Other Wind, 
Kalessin too is presented as a border-crossing figure; its children, Irian and Tehanu, are messengers, 
also traditionally boundary-straddling, shape-shifting figures like Hermes, who is the messenger of 
gods to humans. Kalessin is genderless, but not sexless, as it has sons and daughters; perhaps it is 
androgynous, like the Gethenians in The Left Hand of Darkness, another boundary-straddling 
characteristic. In his illuminating study of the trickster figure, Lewis Hyde demonstrates that 
trickster figures such as Coyote, Hermes and Mercury are the ‘lords of in-between’, the ‘spirit of 
the doorway’.  This ties in with Le Guin’s concept of Segoy as a threshold figure, presented in the 52
second verse of the Creation song of Ea discussed above, the last line of which refers to ‘the eldest, 
the Doorkeeper, Segoy’.  
 The threshold with which Segoy is here associated is the site of ambiguity, a space of 
‘heightened uncertainty’ (Hyde, 6), and this concept of uncertainty – of wavering or looking two 
ways – is vital for Le Guin, who promotes what she calls, following Victor Turner, communitas in 
opposition to structure.  The former is flexible, while the latter is rigid: as Turner puts it, 53
‘communitas breaks in through the interstices of structure, in liminality [literally, threshold-ness]; at 
the edge of structure, in marginality; and from beneath structure, in inferiority’.  In The Other 54
Wind, communitas breaks in through ‘inferior’ or hybrid figures such as Alder and Tehanu, who 
become the means of saving Earthsea from what is in effect an invasion by the dead.  
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            It might be argued that Kalessin’s speech to the dragons - recounted by Irian at the council - 
talks of an end to hybridity and boundary-crossing, saying that after Tehanu there will be ‘no 
choosing [...] no way west’ (152). But as Hyde reminds us, in some cases trickster ‘creates a 
boundary, or brings to the surface a distinction previously hidden from sight’. In this way, continues 
Hyde, the boundary is where the trickster is always found, ‘sometimes drawing the line, sometimes 
crossing it, sometimes erasing or moving it’.  So while it is true that Kalessin seems to be creating 55
a boundary, the dragon’s attitude as it descends on the broken wall, through which the ghosts of the 
dead are rejoining the vaster cosmos, is ambiguous. When Azver asks Kalessin if Irian would ever 
follow the way back through the forest - an ambiguously worded question, leaving the readers in 
doubt as to whether he means that Irian’s chosen dragon-hood will make her the Master Patterner, 
or whether he is asking if she will ever come back to him in human form - the dragon’s ‘long, 
fathomless eye’, which has been described as full of ancient laughter, looks at the wizard, 
effectively leaving everyone in doubt about how rigidly its restrictions on two-way traffic between 
humankind and dragons will apply (241). Certainly, as Tenar later tells Ged at Gont, Azver believed 
that Irian would come back to him from the ‘other’ wind. So Le Guin retains the trademark trickster 
features of humour and uncertainty in Kalessin, and in her novel.  
          This raises the question of the seeming contradiction in Le Guin’s narrative, alluded to earlier, 
concerning the function of True Speech for dragons. Ged says that there are no lies in True Speech, 
as mentioned above. But in the Wizard, the narrator informs us that ‘Although the use of Old 
Speech binds a man to truth, this is not so with dragons. It is their own language, and they can lie in 
it, twisting the true words to false ends [...] in a maze of mirror-words each of which reflects truth 
and none of which leads anywhere’ (87-88). In confirming Kalessin’s ability to generate ambiguity 
even when using True Speech, Le Guin destabilises the true/false dichotomy, which forms an 
essential aspect of value-systems produced in religious frameworks that posit a single, 
unambiguous, authorised version of Truth. Le Guin’s project of demystifying such absolute 
categories involves a reappraisal of True Speech. In the wizards’ conception, words in True Speech 
seem to be, to appropriate Barfield’s terms, ‘solid chunks with definite boundaries and limits’ that 
disallow mutability; in contrast, ordinary words are constantly shifting their meanings: ‘flashing, 
iridescent shapes like flames’.  In contemporary linguistic terms, this can point to the difference 56
 Hyde, Trickster Makes This World, pp. 7-8.55
 Barfield, Poetic Diction, p. 67.56
!  234!
between nouns as fixed entities, constituting the monolithic subject which can stand alone, 
seemingly independent in its closed circle of self-sufficient, autarkic meaning; and grammar, which 
engenders meanings through relationships, and interactions between different parts of speech.  
          The Tao proposes that everything is in a state of constant flux, and Le Guin endorses this, 
stressing that anything which does not change dies. This problematises the concept of a True Name, 
for if nothing remains constant, what particular stage of development or change in a thing or a 
person does a name encompass? In Le Guin’s vision of a dynamically interconnected world, names 
should be the recognition of a temporary function, soon to transform, for example a seed that grows 
into roots and trunks and branches. She does not deny the importance of names in the Second 
Trilogy, accepting her earlier recognition that words have power, and that names do signify the 
‘essence’ of the named.  But language can also work, she tells us, as a device for producing 57
distance, which can operate as alienation as well as a space for negotiation. Names can go wrong, as 
she explains in a 1994 interview, when they are used as tools of division, to screen off the world, 
rather than as a means of communing with the otherness of the other.  This is precisely how the 58
wizards of Earthsea are deploying True Names - as instruments of distantiation, secret knowledge 
rarely imparted for fear of the other. 
          This aspect of Names can make them devices for socio-cultural imprisonment. If the word as 
name is valorised over other words that indicate forms of commonality between people or things, 
the name delimits the identity of the thing named. For example, as Ogion says, Ged is not just an 
Archmage - he is a human being, with elements of the sparrowhawk in him. The name Ged 
circumscribes him as the greatest wizard in Earthsea - it excludes the man, the bird, the boy, the 
potential lover. In fact, the implicit suggestion is that there might be areas within the human and 
non-human world that resist being named, pinned down or labelled. Perhaps that is why the trees of 
the Grove are called just trees, for names of places and things can be just as delimiting as names of 
people. Another example that illuminates the True name as lacking the referential totality generally 
imputed to it in Earthsea can be found in the short story ‘Dragonfly’, which relates the naming of 
the girl whose use-name is Dragonfly. When the village witch reveals her True Name to be Irian, 
the girl is furious, for Irian is the name of her emotionally (and perhaps sexually) abusive father, 
whom she hates. However, she is not just Irian, as she declares in her moment of transformation 
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from girl to dragon on Roke Knoll - she becomes Orm Irian, the daughter of Kalessin. Another way 
in which names can constrain personal or collective narrative is by assigning authority to one 
version of the story, the version presented by the author. As Farah Mendlesohn has shown, authors 
can deny the possibility of polysemic discourse by presenting an authoritative version of events 
using various rhetorical techniques.  One of the ways of presenting a hermetic world is by using 59
maps, which name and identify all the places that the reader will be visiting or hearing about, 
leaving no room for any readerly altercation with the universe she is exploring. An interesting 
variant of this mapping is found in Le Guin’s Tales from Earthsea, which has two maps at the 
beginning. The first map of Earthsea is named, and the maker’s name is written in a corner. The 
second map is an ‘eighth century’ one, with the same shapes and notable landmarks on the island, 
but unnamed. The writer cedes historical authority by refusing to posit her narrative as the 
beginning of a world she has named, unlike Lewis and Tolkien, whose framing narrative of creation 
and (for Lewis) apocalypse foreclose any disputation with their world and its meaning. By 
disclaiming any absolute or objective truth to the history she is narrating, Le Guin opens up her text 
for argumentative interaction with the reader. 
 A name that exists in isolation becomes like a stone, a tolk thrown at Tenar because she (a 
woman) has dared to refer to its authoritative verbal identity. This is exemplified in the Old Mages’ 
effort to give a person’s eternal life by having them retain their True Name after death. The 
disembodied souls of the dead are pure subject, without predicates to give them meaning through 
relational categories. As Ged tells Cob, these are nothing but ‘a shadow and a name’ (462). In 
contrast Tenar has multiple names, as she transforms her roles and her self. While Ged, in the 
Tombs, tells her she can be either Arha or Tenar, Le Guin shows in Tehanu that she can in fact be 
both, and more. Multiple names as functions of changing identity are a device used to compelling 
effect by Tolkien, in The Silmarillion and The Lord of the Rings, where many characters have 
several names which operate at many levels. To give just one example, Gandalf is Olórin in Valinor, 
Mithrandir (Grey Pilgrim) for the Elves, Tharkûn (Staff-man) for the Dwarves, the White Rider 
after his resurrection from the abyss, Stormcrow and Láthspell (Ill-news) when Theóden and 
Wormtongue accuse him of bringing trouble,  and many more. These names are identifications of 60
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his changing roles, so that the act of naming generates and identifies metamorphic possibilities, 
both human and linguistic.   
          As we have seen, Le Guin conflates lying and story-telling, not to the denigration or elevation 
of one or the other, but to draw attention to the human ability to participate in what the Wizards call 
‘the joy of making, shaping’. By ‘making’ they mean both the crafts of the hand, such as weaving, 
building and so on, and art, such as inventing stories, singing songs, dancing, and so on, which 
together form an integral part of Earthsea culture. Stories can wrench the solitary noun from its 
fixed single-meaning universe and place it in context, there to wrestle with other words in an effort 
to transform, contradict or modify each other, like Jacob wrestling with the angel, being left 
wounded, and finding himself transformed from Jacob to Israel. Stories and myths have famously 
been called ‘lies breathed through silver’;  and it is clear that Le Guin valorises those forms of 61
truth that can only be conveyed in imagined stories, in concrete and experiential rather than abstract 
and conceptual terms. There is purposeful ambiguity in the dragon’s use of language, embodied in 
an anecdote told by the Roke wizard, Onyx. When Alder asks Onyx if dragons can lie, the Roke 
wizard replies that the legendary wizard Ath once asked the great dragon Orm the same question; to 
which the dragon replied ‘No’, before reducing the wizard to ashes. This is a story told, presumably, 
by Orm (the only witness of the event), and like all stories, remains poised on the brink between 
fiction and truth. To sum up, dragons retain ambivalence and uncertainty in True Speech, but 
humans bind themselves into single meanings if they deploy this language; the wall that fixes them 
forever behind a single Word, then, needs to be dismantled. To dismantle one needs to return to the 
beginnings of things, which is one of the central functions of fantasy. By returning, we may escape 
from a world constructed by hierarchical binaries: and this is not a reactionary nor a conservative 
retroactive move, Le Guin insists, but an act of subversion (Dancing, 85). The inward or backward 
journey of fantasy is driven by desire for change, and necessitates a tectonic shift of semantic zones, 
changing the roots of words that have settled into comfortably conformist meanings. That is why Le 
Guin goes further back in Earthsea’s history the further forward she goes with the Earthsea 
sequence. Lewis’s retroactive movements in the Narnia sequence look distinctly limited and timid 
by comparison.  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CONCLUSION 
          Literary fantasy is fugitive literature: it flees from the laws of the ‘real’ world to create a 
world with its own laws. The word ‘fugitive’ is Tolkien’s,  and it suggests dissatisfaction with the 1
way things are, a desire for change. Fantasy decides to flee because the process of creation becomes 
atrophied in the real world as laws, which cannot be changed. By presenting a world that is 
manifestly constructed, and by its insistence on reader participation in sustaining the conventions of 
this constructed world, fantasy points to the constructedness of all worlds; to the intrinsic 
connectedness of creativity with human consciousness and language; and to the possibility that the 
laws of the real world are liable to constant mutation.  
          Fantasists attempt to renew language itself. The process of estrangement on which fantasy is 
predicated is most satisfyingly applied to the instrument of creation, language. That creation is a 
process is the reason for the fugitive impulse of fantasy, which does not want to play with what 
Coleridge calls ‘dead counters’ - which is how words often operate when used in scientific or 
analytical discourse. The way to quicken these dead counters is to wrench them from their context 
in the real world, and place them in new fields that allow room for humorous, ironic, absurd or 
marvellous play. By blatantly proclaiming its impossibility, fantasy permits estrangement to operate 
at the linguistic level: words are defamiliarised, through creating new metaphors and symbols in a 
new world. The linguist Wilhelm von Humboldt describes language as an ‘infinite use of a finite 
means’. This infinite use is made possible by metaphor, which is a ‘semantic innovation, an 
emergence of meaning’.  The discursive strategy of metaphorical language can operate in a fantastic 2
world by concretising the emergent meaning.  
          The impulse to rewrite validates the possibility that lies at the heart of language. Tolkien has 
said that ‘fairy-tales never end’ - an insight germane to the issue of the understanding of the creative 
aspect of language and its centrality to building worlds, primary as well as secondary, our own as 
well as imagined ones. Fantasy plays a pivotal role in the evolution of consciousness and language. 
The intertextual interactions of fairy-stories with myth and scripture testify to the importance of a 
historical imagination. The radically different worlds created by fantasy are a testimony to the 
infinite uses of a finite means. !
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